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THE LIFE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

THE LIFE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON,
K.G., G.C.B., Etc.

With Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence.

BY THE
RIGHT HON. SIR HENRY LYTTON BULWER, G.C.B., M.P.

VOLUME II.

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LIFE OF HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,

THIRD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.

BOOK VII.

New era in European politics—Belgian revolution—My being sent to Belgium—Meeting Lord Palmerston on my return—Agreement with his views as to Belgian affairs—Explanation of the facts which had rendered the union between the two countries impossible—Belgian negotiations—Difficulties.

I MAY here repeat the remark with which I closed the preceding volume, viz., that my main endeavor throughout it had been—since Lord Palmerston's great career as a minister was then scarcely begun—to render him more particularly known as a man. His personal history, however, now becomes more or less the history of the foreign policy of his country, and I shall make public events a more prominent part of my work. This, indeed, is the more necessary, since Lord Palmerston received the seals of the Foreign Office at a moment when the policy of Europe was assuming a new aspect. The revolution which overturned the Bourbon throne in France affected naturally the course which its occupants had pursued. The Spanish war and the Holy Alliance were the results of a system which was to preserve sovereigns from the control of their people; the triumph of the citizens and the press against the soldiery of Charles X. was the signal of a reaction among

the people against arbitrary and unpopular sovereigns. On all sides crowns were falling into the gutter. The insurrection by which we were most affected was the Belgian one. We had sufficiently learnt the danger and the cost of having to watch and defend ourselves against an enemy possessing the long line of coast by which we had been hostilely confronted during the reign of Napoleon. We had desired, at his fall, to take all possible precautions against being again exposed to similar dangers; and our main object at the Congress of Vienna was to guard the Netherlands from future invasion. We had imagined that we had done so by uniting Holland with Belgium, hoping thus to have created a powerful kingdom, of which we had protected the frontier by fortresses raised under our inspection and in some degree at our expense. A variety of causes, however—of which I shall speak presently more in detail—had long made the Belgians discontented with a ruler who was one of those clever men that constantly do foolish things, and one of those obstinate men that support one bad measure by another worse. It was not surprising, therefore, that the events of July at Paris had been echoed in August by a movement at Brussels.

Our government was very anxious as to the turn which this movement might take. The independence of Belgium was hardly at that moment thought of. The two alternatives that seemed probable were either that it would fall again under the authority of Holland, or that it would be annexed to France. At one moment the Duke of Wellington meditated sending British troops to guard those strong places which we had a right to consider partly ours; and it was most desirable at all events to know the real state of the country and the degree of support which the rebellion at the capital was likely to obtain in the provinces. It so happened that being at that time attached to our embassy

at the Hague I was sent by Lord Aberdeen into Belgium to give some account of what I saw there. The insurrection broke out at Ghent when I was in the "Grande Place," and the *commissaire* of the hôtel was shot by my side. I proceeded to Brussels, where the Dutch troops under Prince Frederick were on the heights, with their commander, evidently undetermined;—barricades were erected throughout the town, and the most respectable of the middle classes were in arms. I turned into the country: the roads were covered with peasants marching under the guidance of the priests to support the insurrection—fast becoming a revolution. The insurgents took possession of Ath as I was passing through that fortress. The troops nowhere could be depended upon; for one of the clever devices of the King of the Netherlands had been to mix Belgians and Dutch in every regiment, so that the colonel never knew in a crisis whether his orders would be obeyed or controverted. My opinion therefore as to the immediate result of the conflict then going on was pretty well made up, when, after many adventures (which, if I were writing my own memoirs, it would be interesting to relate), I acquired by an accident a full and complete knowledge not only of all that was actually doing by the Belgian party throughout Belgium at that moment, but of all that was to be done during the next few days. I was informed of the officers who were gained, the regiments that would revolt, the fortresses on which the Belgian flag would be hoisted on a certain day. And as my information came to me in no way that imposed secrecy, I returned home and communicated it. But my reports were not—and this was very natural—in conformity with Sir Charles Bagot's, who was in Holland; and they were received coldly and with no small degree of disbelief.

I had hardly, however, been in the country a week when I was summoned up to town by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The events that had taken place since my return were so precisely in conformity with my predictions, that the merit of my reports, which, as I have said, owed a great portion of their exactitude to accident, were exaggerated. Lord Aberdeen complimented me, and desired me to go back at once to Brussels, to reside there and regularly communicate events, and my opinion on them. At one moment an arrangement was possible with the Prince of Orange (who had never approved of his father's policy) as viceroy; but this opportunity being lost, a separation between the two countries became inevitable, and M. Van de Weyer, one of the provisional government then sitting in Brussels, started for London, in order to explain the feelings of the Belgian people to the English government.

I said just now that I would speak "more in detail" of the causes which had made the Belgians discontented with their sovereign; and it is well that I should do so here, because it would be impossible to understand the policy which Lord Palmerston pursued in overturning one of the main provisions of the Treaty of Vienna without a thorough knowledge of the circumstances in which that policy originated.*

It is, moreover, to be repeated that with the creation of Belgium commenced a new era in Europe. The first stone in the structure built up by the allies of 1815 was then displaced. From that time it has been year by year falling to pieces. Thus, the event which commenced the work of demolition, whatever its merits, was so serious in

* I profit by a short sketch which I drew up at the time when facts were fresh in my memory, and which appeared with slight alterations in one of our reviews—"The Westminster."

its consequences, that it is worth while to inquire whether wisdom or necessity justified it.

I shall as briefly as possible state facts.

In the conference between the ministers of the Allied Powers in 1814, it was agreed as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, but without any previous reference to the citizens of either country, that Holland and Belgium should be united. A protocol was accordingly drawn up stating the terms of that union—these terms contained eight articles, forming a basis of the strictest impartiality; in conformity with which Article I. declared that the constitution of Holland should be so modified by common accord as to suit the wants and wishes of the United Provinces. Much may be said of the manner in which this declaration was carried out. None of the articles of the new constitution were allowed to be discussed or changed. It was to be accepted or rejected as a whole; and although these circumstances rendered the thorough understanding of its general spirit so essential, it was published only one week previous to the meeting of the Belgian Notables. These Notables were not chosen, as might be supposed, after a general law, by the nation. They were named by the government. Of 1603 thus called together 1323 met—voted for the constitution 527, against it 796, absent 280. The king notwithstanding pronounced it to be accepted. Such an equivocal sanction was irregular. Nevertheless, the constitution thus adopted was not a bad one, and seemed designed to maintain that equality between the government of the northern and southern divisions of the Netherlands kingdom which was the fundamental principle of their union. Some guarantee, however, was necessary for its observance. The best that could be granted was the liberty of the press; and this was accordingly given by an article (227) which allowed all persons

to express their opinions, under the responsibility of answering for such writings as might attack the rights of society, or of an individual. Still the author might ask what security he had that in exposing any act of ministerial injustice the meaning of this article should be strictly observed, or not in fact misapplied against him; he was given such a security in the immovability of the judges, as well as in the popular system of their appointment; since every judge was to be chosen from a list of three names presented to the king, either by the Lower Chamber, or by the Provincial States: thus the impartiality that was to administer the laws had two securities,—one, the liberty of the press, the other, the independence of the judges.

But it so happened that shortly prior to the publication of this constitution Napoleon returned from Elba, and the King of the Netherlands, under the provisional state of things which then existed, published an ordonnance threatening with the severest punishments* any who should attempt to pervert the loyal disposition of his subjects. The terms of the ordonnance were purposely vague, inasmuch as it was meant to be comprehensive: its effects therefore were doubly severe. Still the crisis in the king's affairs was urgent, and if when the circumstances which called for this law had ceased, the law itself had been abolished, its enactment would simply have been one of those arbitrary acts of expediency which extraordinary circumstances may dictate. The vanquished hero, however, fled from Waterloo. He was an exile in the midst of the seas at St. Helena—he died—this law nevertheless remained in existence. It existed and was maintained in practice from 1825 to 1829;† and, though enacted for an especial

* Branding, the galleys, death, etc.

† Five months after its suppression it was replaced by another little less severe, although during this interval not one single case

case, and expressly leveled against acts of rebellion and sedition, and such writings, as, according to the text,* pointed out their author as the agent of a foreign power, it was applied, in the most ordinary times, to every production of the press; so that it became impossible to attack the acts of a minister, or, in short, to express any political opinion whatsoever, without coming within the scope of its oppression.

But where were the judges presented to the king by the Lower Chamber or the Provincial States, and holding their offices during life?

For above thirteen years a provisional judicature was the only one which existed, nor had any other up to 1830 sat in Belgium,—a provisional judicature, in which the judges were selected as well as named by the king, and entirely dependent upon his good will and pleasure.

Thus the article which conferred the liberty of the press was rendered null—the article which regulated the appointment and the existence of the judges evaded. I pass to another subject.

The taxes of a country should necessarily be upon its means—in proportion to its wealth, not in proportion to its population. Holland was more wealthy than Belgium. If this required any proof, it was found in the fact that the inhabitants of towns, taken as a general estimate, are richer than those of the country, and that this class of population was more numerous in the northern than the

of a violation of Article 227 (regulating the liberty of the press, and providing for the rights of society) had been brought before the courts.

* These are the words: “*Que l'écrit signale l'auteur comme partisan, ou instrument d'une puissance étrangère ou qu'il ait occasionné un soulèvement*”

southern provinces of the Netherlands.* Besides, when it was asked why Holland should send the same number of deputies to the States-General as Belgium, it was said: "True, the people of Belgium are the greater number, but the people of Holland are the most wealthy, and property is to be represented as well as population." If, then, a country ought to be taxed according to its riches, Holland ought to have been more heavily taxed than Belgium; and this, in fact, was at first the case. In 1821, however, the budget (passed for ten years) changed the system of imposition: for taxes upon colonial luxuries (paid by the wealthy and commercial people) were substituted others which pressed upon the poorer and agricultural class. This change is the more remarkable for having introduced into Belgium the odious *Mouture* (or tax on flour), which was the immediate pretext for revolt. It is just, however, to say that the Belgians had already resisted it by every legal means.

The following are the divisions in the two Chambers:

	For.	Belgians.	Dutch.	Against.	Belgians.	Dutch.
Upper	21	2	19	17	17	0
Lower	55	2	53	51	51	0

Thus out of 72 Belgians 4 voted for this tax, 68 against it; while the Dutch were unanimous in its favor. By these and similar practices in 1827, when, since 1821, a general augmentation of four millions of taxes had taken place, Holland was augmented by one million, Belgium by three millions; and in the aggregate of impositions Belgium paid the greater proportion.† In this manner, the poorer

* Dutch population, 2,281,789; in towns, 770,691; in the country, 1,511,098. Belgian population, 3,777,735; in towns, 651,341; in the country, 3,126,394.

† In 1821 the sum total was about 72,000,000 florins, of which Belgium paid 35,000,000 florins, Holland 37,000,000 florins. In

country was taxed more heavily than the richer;* and this injustice was the more striking, because from all the offices and establishments which Belgium was contributing the most largely to support it was almost an exclusion to be a Belgian. Nor was this partiality confined to persons; it extended to localities: Ostend, Ghent, Antwerp—Antwerp, so favored under the French Empire, and by the natural advantages of its position—received no mark of attention from the Dutch government. There were two societies of commerce—both in the north: of various public establishments, the vast majority were in the same part of the kingdom. *La haute cour militaire* was in the north. *Les écoles militaires* were in the north. *Le conseil suprême de la Noblesse* was in the north. *La chancellerie de l'ordre militaire de Guillaume* was in the north; and—who would think it possible?—*La chancellerie de l'ordre du Lion Belgique* was in the north too. The administration of the mines also was in Holland, although there is not a single mine in that country. The only public establishment in Belgium, which was placed there after ten years of expectation, was the bank at Brussels. But here the director was a Dutchman, the secretary was a Dutchman, the chiefs of the different bureaux were Dutchmen, and so on. A table of the different persons in public employment in the year 1829 gives the following results:

1827 the sum total was 76,859,424 florins, of which Belgium paid 38,808,319 florins, Holland 38,051,102 florins. Belgium, majority, 757,217 florins.

* Nor was this all: the interest of the debt during these six years had been also augmented above 3,000,000 florins, the capital of which had been chiefly expended in the war in the Dutch colonies, and on the improvement in the dikes and canals of Holland.

	Dutch.	Belgians.
Ministers and Secretaries of State, not including Prince Frederick.....	12	3
Council of Ministers.....	6	0
Councilors of State.....	12	11
Extra ditto (two foreigners).....	27	18
Referendaries of the first class.....	8	5
Referendaries of the second class.....	12	10
Administrators and Directors (two foreigners)...	13	1
Secretaries-General and Greffiers.....	19	1
Referendaries of the Ministerial Departments...	24	3
Principal Clerks (two foreigners).....	106	11
Council of Nobility.....	5	1
Total.....	244	65

DIPLOMACY.

Ambassadors, three.....	2	1
Envoys, twelve.....	9	3
Chargés-d'affaires, five.....	5	0
Resident Ministers, two.....	2	0
Minister Plenipotentiary, one.....	1	0
Consuls, eighteen (two foreigners).....	11	5
Total.....	30	9

ARMY.

Generals-in-Chief.....	4	0
Lieutenant-Generals.....	16	4
Colonels of Infantry.....	13	4
Colonels of Artillery.....	6	0
Directors of Engineers.....	4	0
Total.....	43	8

To continue:—One of the articles of the constitution declared, "*Que l'instruction publique serait un objet constant des soins du gouvernement.*" So it ought to be of all governments. But who would ever think that this article, so simple in itself, and so natural in its meaning,

should ever be construed into the gift of an arbitrary power over the whole education of the kingdom? Such was actually the case, however. It was commanded that all existing seminaries for education should cease within a certain time unless they received the approbation of the king, without which none in future should be established. At least it might have been expected that certain qualifications would be stated for obtaining this approbation. No; it was entirely arbitrary in the king to grant or withhold it. A distrust was everywhere shown for the Roman Catholic, and a preference for the Protestant religion. In North Brabant, almost entirely Roman Catholic, eight out of eleven inspectors of schools were Protestants; and this was the more remarkable, because under the old system, when these inspectors were chosen by the provincial administration, five out of six inspectors were Roman Catholics. In the other provinces of the north, among all the inspectors there was only one Roman Catholic. So that in the northern provinces, including North Brabant, there were altogether, out of seventy-nine inspectors, five Catholics; and yet these provinces, according to a census in 1815, form about a third of the whole population. Protestant professors, moreover, German as well as Dutch, were appointed in the universities in the south, and were even found in the *Collège Philosophique*, the ostensible object of which was the education of Catholics for the Romish Church. But stronger objections may be made to the assumption of this power than even to the use that was made of it. It was not a casual act of violence proceeding from a temporary cause, and likely to have a mere temporary effect; it was a well-aimed, a long-sweeping blow—the effect of which was to be felt by a future generation.

If other acts of injustice and oppression were not in vio-

lation of any express article of the constitution, it was because the persons who framed that constitution could hardly have foreseen their possibility. They could have hardly thought it conceivable that the king would commit the most partial act of which he could be guilty—the actual imposition of the language of one part of his subjects on the other—when the system of government he had sworn to observe was that of the most perfect impartiality. He did, however, positively declare, not only that Dutch should be used in all public documents, but that all persons speaking in the public courts should employ it. The language of society—the language of the bar—the language of a greater portion of the people of all ranks—was French; but this did not signify. It was in vain that a lawyer had consumed the best years of his life in the study of his profession. He was to teach himself a new tongue, or the capital of his labors—of his education—was to be wrested from him. Some quitted the bar; others, induced by long habit, still continued at it, but prepared themselves to see the honors, the applause, and the practice they had been accustomed to receive transferred to others so fortunate as to have been born on the north side of the Mordyke. The loss to these persons was not merely that of an honorable livelihood; it is necessary to penetrate our minds with a sense of those higher feelings of pride and ambition which animate men who have reached the head of their profession, in order to appreciate the extent of that injustice which this foolish and tyrannical ordonnance inflicted. Still the measure was not full. The minister who urged his master thus headlong to his ruin did not, in the midst of his designs, feel easy respecting his accomplices. He desired to see those whom he employed completely in his power. But how was this to be effected? Nothing so easy, said Mr. Van Maanen;

and out came an ordonnance, which declared that every person who was dismissed from or who voluntarily quitted office must have a satisfactory testimonial from the king, without which he was deprived of all his public rights as a citizen. He could neither vote for nor be eligible to the local magistrature or the Chambers. It was these accumulated griefs, long fomenting in the public mind, which, when the revolution in France gave a stimulus to discontent, produced rebellion. The king, it is true, whose unhappy policy had proceeded from the best intentions, promised that the complaints that had become too loud not to be heard should be redressed in an extraordinary assembly of the Legislature. But this assembly was to be a joint assembly of the two countries, an assembly that was to meet in Holland, while the greatest part of the Belgian complaints were against the influence of Holland.

It was only necessary for the Dutch to vote together, and three or four Belgians to vote with them, in order to legitimize the refusal of all the Belgian requests. It may be said that a majority of this kind was not likely to occur, and would not have sufficed. By the table subjoined it appears that similar majorities had occurred—majorities which had sufficed in all instances to overpower Belgian interests.

VOTES OF THE CHAMBERS OF THE STATES-GENERAL.

	Ayes		Noes	
Laws for the introduction of the mouture and abatage taxes }	55	{ 53 Hollanders, 2 Belgians.	51	{ 0 Hollanders, 51 Belgians.
Budget of 1829.....	53	{ 49 Hollanders, 4 Belgians.	51	{ 4 Hollanders, 47 Belgians.
The ten years' budget* from 1830 to 1840 }	61	{ 48 Hollanders, 13 Belgians.	46	{ 5 Hollanders, 41 Belgians.
Law for declaring the chase a royal privilege (droit regalien) }	25	{ 25 Hollanders, 0 Belgians.	50	{ 0 Hollanders, 50 Belgians.
Law against the press	52	{ 46 Hollanders, 6 Belgians.	52	{ 4 Hollanders, 48 Belgians.
Law for the tax on beer	39	{ 39 Hollanders, 0 Belgians.	58	{ 3 Hollanders, 55 Belgians.
Project of law respecting the coffee trade }	60	{ 13 Hollanders, 47 Belgians.	36	{ 0 Hollanders, 36 Belgians.

Such were the facts which severed the two countries, and made it clear that any attempt to reunite them on their old basis would be unsuccessful.

It was after having noted them that I returned to England to take my seat in the Parliament to which I had just been elected.

I then for the first time made Lord Palmerston's acquaintance at a party at Lady Cowper's, and still remember his appearance as that of a man in the full vigor of middle age, very well dressed, very good-looking, with the large thick whiskers worn at that time. His air was more that of a man of the drawing-room than of the

* This system enabled the ministry to get prospective grants for ten years in advance; notwithstanding which there was always a large additional annual budget. The government would therefore calculate on the "*minimum*" of its means, and the people could never estimate the "*maximum*" of their responsibilities.

senate; but he had a clear, short, decisive way of speaking on business which struck me at once. All the questions he put to me went straight to the point; and one could see that he was gathering information for the purpose of fortifying opinions.

The opinions he had formed were similar to those I had acquired, viz., that if we wished to prevent Belgium becoming a French province, we had to contrive a plan for giving it a separate existence.

He had just at this time entered office; Lord Aberdeen quitting it on November 16. Negotiations, however, had already commenced, and a conference between the great Powers been established in London, at the request of the King of Holland, who not unnaturally applied to those who had formed his kingdom to maintain it. The cessation of hostilities had also taken place, and was shortly afterward (December 5) succeeded by an armistice—the conditions being that the forces of each country should withdraw within the limits they possessed previous to their union. On December 20 the future independence of Belgium was pronounced by the great Powers.

The question of the future destiny of Belgium, thus taken up by Europe, was not an easy one, and peculiarly difficult to our own Minister of Foreign Affairs, in assuming as necessary a dissolution of the kingdom which it had been considered one of the triumphs of England in 1814–15 to create.

Holland had many partisans among English statesmen, who, imperfectly acquainted with the facts I have brought forward, thought that the recent insurrection in Brussels had been an uncalled-for imitation of that which had taken place in Paris. They said and believed that in abandoning the Dutch we were subordinating ourselves, if I may use this expression, to the French.

When they could no longer pretend that the two countries should be subject to the same government, they still contended that we were partial and unjust in the bases we laid down for their separation; and there was a certain feeling in favor of the Protestant country against the Catholic one which was not altogether to be despised.

It was not, moreover, likely that even if Lord Palmerston's conduct had been free from all objections, it would have been viewed with unanimous approbation. He was one of those who by joining the Whigs when but recently divorced from the Tories, had made office possible for the first and impossible for the last. Opposed during a long period of his life to Parliamentary Reform, he was now connected with a Cabinet which brought forward a measure of reform that twenty-nine out of thirty of the party he had recently belonged to deemed revolution.

Among the most able, the most violent, the most eloquent, and least scrupulous of that party was the gentleman who, it may be remembered, was the last messenger sent by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Palmerston, when, previous to the meeting of Parliament in 1830, the duke was negotiating for allies; and in a debate, July 12, 1831, Mr. Croker made a violent onslaught on his former friend, accusing him of keeping back papers not only from the House but from the Conference.

"The right honorable gentleman" (Mr. Croker), says Lord Palmerston in his reply, "had done what in him lay, by provocation, accusation, and, what is worse, exculpation—for I can forgive him anything sooner than his entering into a defense of my conduct—to draw me into a discussion of the whole question. Now instead of entering into those details and those arguments and explanations which must necessarily recall the whole of these transactions—which I have already told the House that, as a minister

of the Crown, I think it my duty not to do— I will repeat that it is not my intention to depart from the decision I have already come to ; and, in my opinion, the right honorable gentleman might have acted with greater advantage to the interests of the country if he had abstained from introducing the subject. But it seems that, in the absence of the principal performers, he has been to-night allowed a whole benefit to himself. He has given us a display, part tragedy, part comedy, and part tragi-comedy ; and I wish I could encourage him by stating that he sustained each portion with equal success. Everybody knows that he is an exceedingly happy joker—happy sometimes in his self-satisfaction ; and while he confines himself to the light and comic strain he makes himself agreeable to everybody ; but he must not attempt too much versatility. He may be a good statesman-of-all-work, but I assure him that he is not a good actor-of-all-work ; and in his attempts at the heroic he is apt to confound pathos with bathos, and to overleap the narrow bounds between the sublime and the ridiculous. I recommend him, therefore, in future, if he wishes to preserve his reputation, to observe the rules laid down in some of his earlier and fugitive productions in the dramatic art—to cease to vex the grander passions of the soul—

‘To leave high tragedy, and stick to farce!’

He will thus yet afford much amusement ; if it be not very natural, it will at least be very entertaining.”

It would appear that the latter allusions of this passage had specific reference to a certain copartnership of a literary and satirical character which in previous years had existed between Mr. Croker and Lord Palmerston. For though the latter did not make it so appear in his jocular

allusions to certain squibs* which had been attributed to the pen of the Tory subordinate officer and political scribe, Croker, in his reply, took care to rectify the omission.

"His noble friend had said that he (Lord Palmerston) did not write in newspapers. Such an observation from his noble friend was to him (Mr. Croker) a little surprising, if it meant to imply that, in a moment of relaxation from official business, he would not condescend to employ himself in such an occupation; and, indeed, the noble lord's friends around him cheered the statement with a vociferation which appeared to imply that the occupation itself was in some degree a degrading one. Now, what he was about to say, he would assure his noble friend he would say in perfect good humor. He would say that if that cheer meant to insinuate that those who wrote for newspapers pursued a degrading occupation (Lord Palmerston nodded dissent)—his noble friend signified that he did not share that opinion; and he should not therefore say what he was about to utter. He might be allowed, however, to observe, in reference to this topic, that if any person should hereafter collect those fugitive pieces which had been attributed to him (Mr. Croker)—with what justice the House would be presently able to judge—he repeated, that if such a collection should be made, and that the merit of those

* The authors of the "New Whig Guide" were Lord Palmerston, Sir Robert Peel, and Mr. Croker.

"We three," writes Mr. Croker, "were the only culprits. I was editor. 'The Trial' was Peel's. We each gave touches to the others' contributions, but so slight as not to impair the authorship of any individual article. I do not think Peel wrote any of the verses; Palmerston wrote very little of the prose. Peel's natural turn was humor, but he was extremely shy of indulging it."—*MS. Mem. of Mr. Croker*. See also *Lockhart's Mem. of Theodore Hook* (in *Quarterly Review*).

pieces should continue to be attributed to him, he should feel it his duty to do justice to his noble friend by declaring that some of the best and most remarkable were his (Lord Palmerston's) own. He remembered well the days which he spent with his noble friend, not certainly in business of the grave importance which now occupied his noble friend's time;—he recalled with pleasure those earlier days, in which they pursued and enjoyed, not indeed the 'search of deep philosophy,' that the poet delighted to remember, but—

‘ Wit, eloquence, and poesy—
Arts which I loved, for they, my friend, were thine.’ ”

The encounter was a graceful and historical one. It is, however, better to withdraw our attention at this time from Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and turn to him in Downing Street. His letters from Paris in the year 1829, when he was out of office, show the feeling prevalent among many (General Sebastiani—who had just become Foreign Minister in France—in particular) to whom the late revolution had given influence with respect to extending the limits of France. Nothing, perhaps, could have been more tempting to these persons or to the monarch of the barricades himself than the present state of Europe and the present position of the Low Countries. On the other hand, there were the northern courts, which, if united with Holland and England, would have felt in no wise indisposed to declare themselves against revolution and against Louis Philippe, and who thought that they had the first general in Europe, a statesman of no small consideration in the British Parliament, on their side. Luckily for Lord Palmerston, he had in London two men able and inclined to help him,—M. de Talleyrand, who represented France, and who, though he showed no

disinclination to favor French schemes of aggrandizement whenever he thought a good opportunity for doing so presented itself, was nevertheless persuaded that the one great object which France had at that moment to secure was the English alliance—and a young diplomatist, M. Van de Weyer, who represented Belgium, and combined in a remarkable manner ability with modesty, and could display ardor without rashness. Thanks to these auxiliaries, to the moderating sagacity of the monarch (named for a time “the modern Ulysses”), and to the great name and experienced wisdom of Lord Grey,* a crisis was passed over peaceably which might otherwise have affected a past and the present generation.

The difficulty of producing order out of chaos was at that time, indeed, so great that as I look calmly now at the difficulties that a statesman had then to contend with, I am more and more surprised at their having been overcome. There was to decide upon the boundaries of the future states, some of the places naturally belonging to Belgium being still in the hands of the Dutch, and a portion of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg—a country which the King of Holland held as representing a branch of the House of Nassau under the German Confederation—having taken part in the recent revolution. The boundaries once settled, there was still to settle the navigation of the Scheldt; the division of the debt—the guardianship or demolition of fortresses which Belgium by itself could not adequately defend—the establishment of a republic or the selection of a king—and this with the German sovereigns

* After the election of King Leopold, another person who exercised a considerable though unostentatious influence over the history of his time was Baron Stockmar, who contributed not a little to smooth away the difficulties along which the independence of Belgium was jolted on to its achievement.

on one side fearful of the extension of France and the expansion of French principles, and the French people on the other, excited, jealous, ambitious, and under a new government which had as yet neither an ancient authority nor a newly-acquired prestige.

Nor was this all: here was the Dutch nation, proud of its historical renown, smarting under its recent humiliation, governed by a sovereign obstinate by character, and rendered more so by the conviction that right was on his side;—there the Belgians, inflated by their late triumph, believing that they had it in their power to create a European war if they thought proper, and disposed to use or abuse this power. Under such circumstances the course of negotiation could hardly run smooth. It had various epochs. The first was the most critical. Revolution had united, as it were, France with Belgium, and the government with which Louis Philippe's reign commenced was anxious to maintain its popularity in Belgium, without having made up its mind exactly how it should use that popularity.

At this time (January 20) were proposed by the conference what were styled *les bases de séparation*, in twenty-four articles,* accepted by the French representative in London, as by the representatives of all the other Powers, and accepted also by the King of Holland, but rejected by

* Principal provisions of this arrangement were, first—Holland to be what it was in 1790; second, Belgium to be the rest of the Netherlands excepting Luxembourg, which was to remain part of the Germanic Confederation; third, convenient exchanges of territory between the two countries to be arranged by the Powers; fourth, rivers traversing both states to follow *Acte Général* of the Congress of Vienna, and to be free; and fifth, Belgium to form a neutral territory, the five Powers guaranteeing its integrity and inviolability.

the Belgian provisional government, and not agreed to, with respect to some of its provisions, by the French Cabinet.

This state of things was brought to a crisis by a majority of the Belgian congress then assembled at Brussels offering the Belgian crown to the son of the King of the French. That monarch, kept in check by his own judgment, and the unmistakable warnings of Lord Palmerston, declined the perilous honor he was invited to accept; and the Belgians were sobered by seeing that they could not count upon France going to the extremity of braving Europe in support of their exaggerated pretensions. Meanwhile, political changes took place in Paris. M. Périér, anxious for peace and order, succeeded M. Lafitte, who had appeared to be constantly wavering between a policy of internal and external tranquillity, and a policy of agitation at home and aggression abroad. Henceforth began a gradual approximation of ideas, which brought the united conference and the Belgian government and congress at last to the choice of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who was to marry a French princess, as the fitting occupant of the Belgian throne; and to a new plan of arrangement, called "the eighteen* articles" between Belgium and Holland. But just as Holland had accepted, and Belgium refused, the twenty-four articles, Belgium accepted, and Holland refused, the eighteen, on the faith of which, notwithstanding, King Leopold assumed the Belgian crown. It is to be observed that Lord Palmerston for a long time—guided, no doubt, by old traditions and the fact that the Prince of Orange, who had never joined in his father's policy, possessed many partisans in Belgium—had shown

* The principal differences related to Luxembourg—no longer assigned altogether to the King of Holland—and to the debt—a larger share of which was assigned to Holland.

an inclination favorable to his selection, though he had taken no active part in support of it; nor did he now accept Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg* as a candidate put forward by England, justifying France to claim some compensating advantage; but he readily approved of him as a prince known to the northern courts, and not disagreeable to them, closely connected with the Royal Family of England, and about to be so with the Royal House of France, independent as to means, brave, and prudent. This is the first period in that long diplomatic struggle with which Lord Palmerston commenced his career as Foreign Minister, and his letters are so characteristic that I quote a large number, notwithstanding the space they will occupy in a work of which I desire as much as possible to confine the limits.

N.B.—These are taken from the copies preserved by him.

* It is worth while remarking that the first prince thought of by the Belgians was Prince Leopold.

BOOK VIII.

Some of Lord Palmerston's letters to Lord Granville,* to the period of Prince Leopold's election as King of Belgium.

To Right Hon. Viscount Granville, G.C.B., British Ambassador, Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Jan. 7, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“In a conversation which I had a few days ago with Talleyrand, about the affairs of Belgium, I mentioned to him an idea which had occurred to me, as an arrangement which might probably smooth some of our difficulties. The King of the Netherlands would wish his son to wear the crown of Belgium; the Belgians want much to have Luxembourg. Could not the king give up Luxembourg to his son, on condition of his being elected by the Belgians? and might not the Belgians choose the Prince of Orange, on condition that he should bring Luxembourg with him? Talleyrand looked very grave, and said he thought his government would not like to see Luxembourg united to Belgium. I asked why, inasmuch as it had been so united hitherto, and would not be more inconvenient to France when united to Belgium alone, than when united to Belgium joined with Holland. He said, the fact was that their frontier in that direction is very weak and exposed, and Luxembourg runs into an undefended part of France. He then said, would there be no means of making an arrangement *by which Luxembourg might be given to France?* I confess I felt con-

* I should observe that none of these letters have before been published, and that I am indebted for them to the kindness of Mr. Cowper-Temple, who, with the late Lady Palmerston's permission, has allowed me the use of them.

siderable surprise at a proposition so much at variance with all the language and professions which he and his government have been holding. I said that such an arrangement appeared to me to be impossible, and that nobody could consent to it. I added that England had no selfish objects in view in the arrangements of Belgium, but that we wished Belgium to be really and substantially independent. That we were desirous of living upon good terms with France, but that any territorial acquisitions of France such as this which he contemplated would alter the relations of the two countries, and make it impossible for us to continue on good terms. I found since this conversation that he had been making similar propositions to Prussia about her Rhenish provinces, in the event of the possibility of moving the King of Saxony to Belgium and giving Saxony to Prussia. To-day, he proposed to me that France should get Philippeville and Marienburg, in consideration of France using her influence to procure the election of Leopold for Belgium. I do not like all this; it looks as if France was unchanged in her system of encroachment, and it diminishes the confidence in her sincerity and good faith which her conduct up to this time had inspired. *It may not be amiss for you to hint, upon any fitting occasion, that though we are anxious to cultivate the best understanding with France, and to be on the terms of the most intimate friendship with her, yet that it is only on the supposition that she contents herself with the finest territory in Europe, and does not mean to open a new chapter of encroachment and conquest.*

“My dear Granville,

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Jan. 21, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"The protocol* which I send you has been the result of two hard days' work. We were at it yesterday from four till half-past nine, and to-day for several hours. Talleyrand wanted the neutrality to extend to Luxembourg, but the objection was, that that duchy belongs to a sovereign who is independent, and to a confederation of which he is member, and that the conference has no power to deal with the right of peace and war, which belongs to the sovereign of Luxembourg and to the confederation. I pointed out to him that there are but two military roads out of the duchy, the one southward to Thionville and Metz—awkward places for any army that could be held in Luxembourg to run against—the other northward, by Givet or Dinant—a direction which would not be chosen for invading France—that consequently France could have nothing to fear from Luxembourg. That, on the other

* *Protocol No. 11, dated January 20.*—Stated what were then called "*les bases de séparation*," observing that, since the Belgians had agreed to retire from before Maestricht, and to avoid all causes of hostility, the conference, in order to strengthen the general peace, proceeded to fix the limits which were henceforth to separate Dutch from Belgian territory, giving to Holland all that was the Dutch Republic in 1790, and to Belgium all the rest of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, except the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which was assigned to the King of Holland, and attached to the German Confederation. It then declared that Belgium should form a perpetually neutral state, the five Powers guaranteeing its neutrality, as well as its integrity and inviolability, and giving "a solemn avowal" that in these arrangements they will under no circumstances seek any augmentation of territory, any exclusive influence, any isolated advantages.

hand, Luxembourg seems to belong to the system of defense for the Prussian frontier of which Coblenz is the center, and that it must be important for Prussia, as flanking the line of advance from Thionville to Coblenz. He fought like a dragon, pretended he would not agree to the neutrality of Belgium if Luxembourg was included, then said he would accept instead of it the cession to France of Philippeville and Marienburg. To this we of course positively objected. First, we had no power to give what belongs to Belgium and not to us, and we could not, under the pretense of settling the quarrel between Holland and Belgium, proceed to plunder one of the parties, and that too for the benefit of one of the mediators. Besides, if France began, the rest might have a right to follow the example. At last we brought him to terms by the same means by which juries become unanimous—by starving. Between nine and ten at night he agreed to what we proposed, being, I have no doubt, secretly delighted to have got the neutrality of Belgium established. If Talleyrand complains that our confidence in him seems abated, you may say that this was the natural consequence of our finding that he was aiming at obtaining for France territorial acquisitions, at the same time that France was crying out for non-intervention and peace. We are bound to say, however, that after Talleyrand has bound his government by the self-denying declaration contained in this protocol, we can say not another word on that subject.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

" FOREIGN OFFICE, Jan. 27, 1831.

" MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

" I send you a copy of another protocol* upon Belgium which has been agreed to and signed to-day, but which we shall not communicate officially to the Belgian and Dutch governments till to-morrow, and I believe Talleyrand will not send a copy to his government till to-morrow. Talleyrand read me to-day part of a letter he had received from Sebastiani, which was very satisfactory as to the course of the French government upon the affairs of Belgium. It sanctioned the signature of the eleventh protocol,† declaring Belgian neutrality and renouncing territorial aggrandizement; it renewed the former declarations that the French government would neither consent to a union of Belgium with France, *nor accept the crown if offered to Nemours*; it stated that Leuchtenberg had

* *Protocol No. 12, dated January 27, 1831.*—It embodies the preceding protocol in an annex of twenty-four articles, called "Bases destined to establish the separation of Belgium from Holland." It declares how the public debt of the kingdom of the Netherlands should be divided; $\frac{1}{3}$ chargeable upon Holland, and $\frac{2}{3}$ on Belgium; and that in consideration of this division, the inhabitants of Belgium should enjoy the navigation and trade with the colonies belonging to Holland on the same footing, and with the same rights and advantages, as the inhabitants of Holland. Further, that the port of Antwerp should, in conformity with Article 15 of the Treaty of Paris, of May 30, 1814, continue to be solely a port of commerce; and that Belgian and Dutch commissioners of demarkation should meet with as little delay as possible, to establish and trace the limits of the two countries.

The condition which subsequently created the greatest difficulties was the division of the debt; Belgium positively refusing the portion allotted to her.

† Of January 20, just alluded to.

declined; that the objections to Charles of Bavaria were insurmountable, being founded upon his personal hostility to the king and his political hostility to France, upon his ultra-principles in public matters and his over-liberal practices in private, and his marriage or connection with an actress. It then again pressed the young Neapolitan as the only remaining choice free from objections, and expressed a hope that we would, as an act of friendship and kindness towards the king and government, consent to this arrangement.* Talleyrand also told me that he would answer for it that no marriage would take place between the prince and an Orleans princess. What the private and personal character of Charles of Bavaria may be I know not, but even if there was a real objection to him on that score, a country just rising into order from the chaos of revolution requires a man of full age for its king, and a lad of nineteen (alluding to the Neapolitan prince) is really not fit to be at its head. However, our objections to this choice are not so strong as to make us positively refuse to assent to it if all the other parties concerned thought it the best way out of the difficulties of the case. Talleyrand also said that his government wished him to ask me about the armaments going on in England. I asked him, 'What armaments?' he said, 'Our naval ones.' I said the best reply I could make to that question was by asking another, namely, What was the nature and object of the naval armament in the French ports? He said that at Toulon there were a few ships of war in a half state of equipment; and at Brest two line-of-battle ships and two frigates had been ordered to be fitted when it was thought we might have to force the Scheldt by a combined operation. I said that we

* The nephew of Louis Philippe, who seems always to have had an eye to family interests.

understood that they had six sail of the line and a certain number of frigates lying in the outer harbor at Toulon fit for sea ; that Lord Stuart* having some time ago spoken about them to one of the French ministers, he was told that they were destined to bring back part of the troops from Algiers ; but that since that time we have received information, which we believe to be correct, that the line-of-battle ships in question have their lower-deck guns on board, which ships intended for taking in troops never have, inasmuch as the space occupied by these guns is required for the men. Talleyrand replied that he really did not know how that might be, and had no particular information about these Toulon ships, but did not believe them to be ready for sea. I said that perhaps it might be enough to say that if they were getting a few ships ready we were only following their example ; but that, however, I did not want to make a matter of importance of what in fact was a very simple affair ; that I believed the papers had given some exaggerated statement of what was doing in our dock-yards ; that the fact is that we had last summer four line-of-battle ships in the Mediterranean, of which two had come home for repair or other reasons, and that we are going to send out two others to supply their places ; but I added, laughing, that I did not believe either of us were making naval preparations which the other might look upon with any jealousy. You may as well mention this conversation to Sebastiani, and take that opportunity of asking again about the Toulon ships. *It is no harm, however, that the French should think that we are a little upon the alert with respect to our navy, because I believe*

* Lord Stuart de Rothesay, the late ambassador at Paris, who was still staying there, "as he wished," writes Lord Granville, "not to commit himself to vote with either party."

it is the fear of a naval war which has greatly tended to induce the French government to make the efforts necessary for the preservation of peace.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 1, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Talleyrand sounded me as to my agreeing to naming Duc de Nemours King of the Belgians. I told him we should look upon it as union with France, and nothing else, and it was for France to consider *all* the consequences which such a departure from all her engagements must necessarily expose her to; that I do not believe the bulk of the French nation wish for Belgium at the price of a general war, and that I do not believe the bulk of the Belgians wish union with France or a French prince. The other three Powers* are quite unanimous on the subject,

* *Protocol No. 14, dated 1st February.*—States that his Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary observed that the obligation entered into by the five Powers, by Protocol 11, of 20th January, “not to seek any increase of territory, any exclusive influence, any separate advantage in the arrangements respecting Belgium, would seem also to impose on them the obligation to reject any offers that might be made by the Congress at Brussels, in favor of any prince of the reigning houses of those states whose representatives are now assembled at London,” and he proposed to the conference to declare in a protocol that in case the sovereignty of Belgium should be offered to a prince of one of the reigning families of the five Powers, such offer should be unhesitatingly rejected. The plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia unanimously agreed in this opinion, and declared themselves ready to enter, in the name of their courts, into the engagement proposed. The plenipotentiary of France took the question *ad referendum*, in order to

and I must say that if the choice falls on Nemours, and the King of the French accepts, it will be a proof that the policy of France is like an infection clinging to the walls of the dwelling, and breaking out in every successive occupant who comes within their influence. I told Talleyrand that I thought that he had but one course which as a public man he could honorably pursue; that the king his master had but one course which without a violation of public faith was left open to him. What that was it was needless to point out, but that I could not bring myself to believe that it would be departed from.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 2, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“The Cabinet have considered the question of the Duc de Nemours, and have determined as I tell you in my official dispatch that we must require from France the fulfillment of the engagement, by a refusal to accept for him the crown of office.

“We are reluctant even to think of war, but if ever we are to make another effort this is a legitimate occasion, and we find that we could not submit to the placing of the Duc de Nemours on the throne of Belgium, without danger to the safety and a sacrifice of the honor of the country.

“We are ready to agree to any reasonable proposition which can be made for giving a sovereign to Belgium un-

receive the orders of his court, which would immediately arrive. This was the more noticed, since the previous letter of Sebastiani, read by Talleyrand to Lord Palmerston, stated plainly that the crown, if offered to the Duc de Nemours, would not be accepted.

objectionable to any party; and as I told you before, we should not have insurmountable objections to the Neapolitan prince if his election could be accomplished and would remove all other difficulties. But we require that Belgium should be really and not nominally independent.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 8, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I am obliged to go to the House, and we have had a conference,* and I have not time to write more than two lines.

* *Protocol 16, dated 8th February.*—Relative to the impediments to which the communications of the fortress of Maestricht were still exposed. The plenipotentiaries state to the Commissioners that the five Powers would consider all interruptions of such communications on the part of the Belgians as acts of hostility to themselves, and warned the provisional government of Belgium that the five Powers would blockade all the ports of Belgium, and take other measures, if necessary, in order to cause their decisions to be respected and executed.

“(Private.)

“PARIS, February 4th, 1831. Half-past six, P.M.

“MY DEAR PALMERSTON,—

“Never was a change of tone, of temper, and of language so rapid as that which took place to-day in the case of Sebastiani. At one o'clock he was warm, warlike, and mounted on his highest horse; at half-past five he comes into my room to announce the telegraph communication of the election of the Duc de Nemours, and in a much subdued, but most friendly tone, to inform me of the king's positive refusal, and begs me to obliterate all mention of what passed between us this morning on the subject of the protocol. He expressed a wish to act cordially with the other Powers of the conference; but what he expressed with most earnestness was his

“The change of tone you mention in Sebastiani, between one o'clock and five on the 4th instant, probably arose from his receiving in the interval an account from Flahault,* perhaps by telegraph from Calais, that the Cabinet had met on Wednesday to consider the election of Nemours, and had determined to require France to refuse acceptance at the risk of war. Flahault went back yesterday without having accomplished much during his mission. He again reverted to the proposal of an alliance offensive and defensive between England and France in a conversation which I had with him yesterday; he suggested that it might be kept an entire secret from all the world, but that it might afford France a ground for disarming by the security it would give her. I said that these offensive and defensive alliances were not very popular in England; that he could not doubt our desire that France should remain as she was, neither conquering nor conquered; and *that if she was unjustly attacked, England would beyond a doubt be found on her side*; that our position at present ought, I conceive, to be that of impartial mediators between France on one hand, and the three other Powers on the other; that as long as both parties remain quiet we shall be friends with both; *but that whichever side breaks the peace, that side will find us against them*; that there does not at present seem any immediate danger threatening France, to guard against which such a

desire that the confidence between us should be unbounded. ‘Tell Lord Palmerston,’ he said, ‘that we will not have a thought concealed from him, and that I look to his acting toward us with the same frankness.’

“Yours ever sincerely,

“GRANVILLE.”

* Count Flahault had been sent to England on a special and confidential mission.

treaty could be necessary; on the contrary, if danger exists, it is more likely to come *from* than *against* France:— I said, however, that we could bear the idea in mind, and that at all events they might rely upon this, that while France remains quiet, and does not revive the Bonaparte system of aggression and aggrandizement, it will be the wish and interest of England to cultivate the closest friendship and alliance with her.

“Pray communicate with Ofalia* in a confidential way when he has anything to say. Zea Bermudez† begged me to ask you to do so, and that good and worthy bore and I are upon the most excellent possible terms.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 15, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I have received your letter‡ and dispatches of the

* Don Narciso Heredia, Conde de Ofalia, Spanish ambassador in Paris. Lord Granville writes on the 11th that he “will attend to Lord Palmerston’s wishes about him, but that it is really difficult to turn one’s mind to any other question than this all-absorbing one of Belgium.”

† Spanish minister in London, afterwards prime minister in Spain.

‡ Stating that the French government had disavowed the acts of their plenipotentiary in London, and that an assertion to this effect had been made in Brussels.

(Extract.)

“PARIS, Feb. 11, 1831.

“Flahault* returned here yesterday; he has come from England

* The Count de Flahault, the most amiable man of his time, born in 1785, filled with great distinction many important military and diplomatic

11th and 12th. I have been prevented from writing to you officially to-day, but will do so by a special mission to-morrow, after a Cabinet which I have summoned to take into consideration a formal communication to the French government upon the subject of their menacing armaments. I confess that I like the aspect of their proceedings less and less every day. Their assurances of friendship and peace are indeed incessant and uniform, but they continue actively preparing for war when nobody threatens them, and while every day discloses more and more their designs upon Belgium, and the underhand proceedings which they are carrying on with reference to that country. They every day betray an unceasing disposition to pick a quarrel, and to treat us in a manner to which we can never submit. *Pray take care, in all your conversa-*

with good and useful impressions. He asserts that we have been straightforward, and that we wish for peace if France will abstain from aggression. He evidently thinks, though he does not exactly say it, that his friends here, in their disavowal of Talleyrand, in their intrigues to defeat Leuchtenberg and procure the election of Nemours, have acted unfairly by their own ambassador, not very honorably toward us, and most unwisely for themselves. We seem to be as far removed as ever from the settlement of this Belgic question. The Palais Royal are so intent upon putting this Prince of Naples on the throne that there is nothing they will not promise to induce the Belgians to elect him. They will engage that an Orleans princess shall be his wife; they will, notwithstanding the protocol of January 20, promise to support the Belgians in their demand of Luxembourg, Limburg, and the left bank of the Scheldt and Maestricht."

posts during his long and busy life. Aide-de-camp to Murat, general of division at Waterloo, French ambassador at Berlin, Vienna, and London. He died in Paris, August 31, 1870, Grand Chancellor of the Order of the Legion of Honor.

tion with Sebastiani, to make him understand that our desire for peace will never lead us to submit to affront either in language or in act.

“If they are straightforward in their intentions, why cannot they be so in their proceedings? Why such endless intrigues and plots, and such change of plans, all tending to the same object—the establishing in Belgium that influence which they have renounced in the 20th January protocol?*

“If the Neapolitan prince is elected freely by Belgium of its own accord, well and good; but if he is to be placed there by a French intrigue, and, being nephew to Louis Philippe, is also to be his son-in-law, there would be but little difference between such an arrangement and that of the Duc de Nemours.

“Talleyrand told me to-day they meant to offer to the Belgians, as an inducement to take this prince, their aid for a better arrangement of the debt, and improved limits. I remarked that as to limits we never would permit the territory of Holland to be made over to the Belgians, nor would the Confederation of Germany give up to them Luxembourg, and that as to debt, that which we decided was, that the two original debts previous to the union, which were put together by the treaty of 1814, must now be separated and taken back by each party, and that the debt incurred since the union should be divided between the two in a just proportion. Everything else being not decision but proposition.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

* No. 11, already alluded to.

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 17, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Sebastiani really should be made to understand that he must have the goodness to learn to keep his temper, or, when it fails him, let him go to vent his ill humor upon some other quarter, and not bestow it upon England. We are not used to being accused of making people dupes.* Pray explain to him that Talleyrand misunderstood what I said to him about the Prince of Naples, and seems to have overstated it to his court. He asked me to direct Ponsonby to desist from giving support to the Prince of Orange. I said I should advise Ponsonby to do what I had always told him to do, namely, to take no part whatever in favor of anybody. But I did not say to Talleyrand—at least, I never meant to say—that Ponsonby would assist in putting forward Prince Charles.†

“I doubt very much whether the dispatch which Sebastiani showed you as having been addressed to Talleyrand,

* Alluding to an observation of Sebastiani, that the French government was accused of being duped by the English one.

† Precisely this case was repeated about the Spanish marriages with respect to another nephew. Lord Aberdeen said he would not oppose Count Trapani. M. Guizot construed this into a declaration that we would support him. Prince Charles, however, shared the fate of Count Trapani. He was thrown over, and a family arrangement made in another way. Lord Granville writes on February 24—“I wish to apprise you without delay, that the Prince of Naples having been thrown overboard, the king and Sebastiani have recurred to the project of having Prince Leopold elected King of Belgium, and married to an Orleans princess. . . . The king represented to me that the Belgians urged most earnestly that he would give his daughter in marriage to their sovereign, whatever prince might be elected.” Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg had been one of the first candidates thought of.

disavowing the protocol of 27th January, ever left Sebastiani's drawer. Up to this very day, when we have had another conference, not one word has been said to us by Talleyrand of his government disavowing any of his proceedings.

"I have a great personal regard for Sebastiani, and I believe him to be really friendly to England; but what confidence can be placed in a government which runs such a course of miserable intrigue as that which the present French Cabinet is pursuing about Belgium; saying one thing here, and unsaying it there; promising acceptance* through Bresson, and refusal through Talleyrand; changing its opinions, declarations, and principles with every shifting prospect of temporary advantage?†

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 23, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I send you a protocol (No. 19)‡ which has been signed

* Acceptance of the Duc de Nemours.

† Lord Granville in his reply, dated February 21, says, "I hope that the severe but salutary lesson given to him (Sebastiani) in your private letter to me of the 17th, and which you *sent through the French Foreign Office*, will have the effect of making him keep his temper under control." The mode of conveying indirectly to a government opinions that it might be uncivil to state directly, through the medium of letters certain to be opened and read, is not unfrequently resorted to.

‡ This protocol refers everything to the Treaty of Vienna, the principles of which it declares to be still in force. Those principles were to provide for the good government of the Netherlands, and prevent a European war concerning them. See Appendix.

at the wish of Talleyrand, by whom and by Matuszewicz* it has been drawn up. Talleyrand means it as a measure of peace, and to strengthen the hands of his government against the violent party.

"We hear that Casimir Périer† is to be minister of the interior, instead of Odillon Barrot, as at first supposed. If this is true, it is well.

"The king is returned, looking very well, and declaring himself greatly satisfied with his ministers. Ponsonby says the fortresses on the Belgian frontier are fully provisioned, and without garrisons,—who are the guests for whom this feast is prepared? is it for the French?

"Yours very sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B

"(Private.)

"PARIS, Feb. 25, 1831.

"MY DEAR PALMERSTON,—

"I have had a headache all day; it has increased, and I feel quite unequal to writing. I cannot, however, omit expressing my apprehension that your protocol No. 19, which is a most able, statesmanlike paper, and which you say is intended by Talleyrand to strengthen the hands of the government here against the violent party, will not be much liked by either the king or his minister. They are both very much out of humor with Talleyrand for his total disregard of his instructions. Sebastiani told me

* One of the Russian plenipotentiaries.

† The preceding ministry had been intending and preparing for war, which justified Lord Palmerston's apprehensions. The change was a change for peace, and represented Louis Philippe's feelings, though not those of M. Lafitte, whose plans Lord Palmerston, by his firm and resolute bearing, had defeated.

that nothing but his extreme anxiety to avoid all appearance of quarrel with England would have prevented his recalling him after his disobedience of the order given him to declare the non-adherence of the French government to the protocol of January 27.* You are wrong in your suspicion that the letter never left Sebastiani's drawer. Nothing now is so unpopular here as the treaties of 1814 and 1815, and though neither the king nor his ministers will venture to deny that France is bound by those treaties, yet you may be assured they will loathe the solemn recognition of the obligations which they impose; do not therefore be surprised if this protocol should produce the recall of Talleyrand.†

"Yours, etc.,

"GRANVILLE."

* Appended to protocol of January 20, and related to the partition of the debt, on a basis that the Belgian government had refused to accept, and which the Dutch government had accepted. The revolutionary French government, which was then acting as the partisan of the revolutionary Belgian government, dissented with it from the provisions of that protocol; but in order to do so formally, they had to disavow their ambassador, and as that ambassador was M. de Talleyrand, they hesitated about his disavowal, though they finally stated their grounds for not giving a complete assent to the document he had signed. In the mean time it is possible that he was satisfied secretly that the king approved of his prudence, though the king's government might condemn his temerity.

† This experienced diplomatist confiding in his personal authority, kept the objects of his mission more in view than the instructions of the ministers who sent him. Gain what he could for France, but keep well with England, was his policy throughout the whole of these transactions.

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, March 1, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Cowley's* statement that Austria does not mean to meddle with the Pope's territory is satisfactory and relieving. We are all too busy with Reform to make it possible to give you instructions about Italy, and I have not yet taken the opinion of the Cabinet, but I should myself say to France that it would not be worth her while to risk involving all Europe in war for the sake of protecting the revolutionists in Romagna. If we could by negotiation obtain for them a little share of constitutional liberty, so much the better; but we are all interested in maintaining peace, and no one more than Louis Philippe.

"So long as the French really and bonâ fide keep within their limits, they need not wish to have truer or warmer friends than they now have in Downing Street.

"Yours, etc.,

"PALMERSTON."

"P.S.—I cannot refrain from saying how much we all appreciate the admirable manner in which you execute all our instructions."†

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, March 9, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I have been too busy to write to you for some days. Reform is thriving, inconceivably popular in the country,

* Lord Cowley, still British ambassador at Vienna.

† Lord Granville, in reply (4th March), says, "I am much gratified by your little postscript, approving my manner of executing your instructions."

and likely to be carried in the House, and, whatever the Tories may say, will not be revolution, but the reverse. Talleyrand read in conference to-day Sebastiani's dispatch about the protocols, which amounts to little after all, except as letting themselves down as easy as they can. We shall meet on Friday to prepare an answer to it.*

"I wish the French government would make up their minds to act with good faith about Belgium, and we should settle the matter in three weeks; but the men in power cannot make up their minds to be honest with stoutness, or to play the rogue with boldness. Might they not be reminded that when the Russians have reconquered Poland, which (were it not for the ill-concealed spirit of aggrandizement of France) I should say I am *afraid* they will, the tone of Russia about Belgium will be different from what it has been, and that Prussia and Austria will probably be swayed by her influence?

"If, therefore, the French ministers mean what they say about Leopold,† and are not amusing us, they had better not delay the matter till the Poles are at the foot of Nicholas.

"Their protest about Bouillon, I discovered from Talleyrand, is founded upon a secret intention of getting it themselves. It really disgusts one to see the government of a great country in a great crisis of affairs, when such great interests are at stake, scrambling and intriguing for such pitiful objects as the ruined castle of Bouillon and its little circumjacent territory. But it will not do; their argument will not hold water, and the Treaty of Vienna is dead

* The real difference was not great; but it was the object of the French government at that moment not to agree with, but to hold a separate position apart from, the other Powers.

† In allusion to what Lord Granville had said in his letter of February 24 about Prince Leopold.

against them. The part which was ceded to France, or rather left to France in 1814, is given to Luxembourg by Article 68 of the Treaty of Vienna, because it is within the limits therein mentioned, and the part which was not so ceded to France is attached to Luxembourg by the 69th Article.

"We have thought it necessary to get an explanation as to the meaning of Chokier's title of Regent;* we must first know what his title means, and whether it implies Nemours as king.

'Yours sincerely,
"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, March 11, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I am sorry for the determination of Austria about Italy; it is wrong and foolish.† It will be impossible for

* Baron Erasmus Surlet de Chokier had, on February 24, been elected Regent by the Belgian Congress, pending the negotiations for a sovereign.

† Insurrections broke out in the beginning of February in the Papal States and the Duchies of Modena and Parma, and the insurgents, who had acquired power without the loss of a single life, were for a time completely successful. They failed, however, to stir up revolt in Naples, Tuscany, Piedmont, and Austrian Lombardy, though they addressed stirring appeals to the inhabitants of those provinces. The new Pope, Gregory XVI., who had been elected just as the insurrection broke out, and the dispossessed sovereigns of Parma and Modena, applied for aid to their powerful neighbor Austria, who had massed 100,000 troops in Lombardy. France, however, who was at this moment under the influence of the war-party, fanned the hopes of the insurgents by declaring that she would not allow Austrian troops to interfere in any quarrel between an Italian prince and his subjects; as her coun-

England to take part with Austria in a war entered into for the purpose of putting down freedom and maintaining despotism ; neither can we side with France in a contest the result of which may be to extend her territories. We shall therefore keep out of the contest as long as we can.

“ The Reform plan gains ground every day, both by the reflection of members themselves, and also by the influence exerted upon them by their constituents. The country is decidedly for it, and enthusiastically.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“ (Private.)

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, March 15, 1831.

“ MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“ We are delighted at Casimir Périer’s appointment,* and hope it may be the means of procuring peace in France and out of it. Pray cultivate him, and make him understand that the English government place great confidence in him, and consider his appointment as the strongest pledge and security for peace.

“ Perhaps it is as well to have Sebastiani as any one else, and possibly with Périer he may sail straighter than he has hitherto done.

sels modified, she quenched those hopes by letting it be understood that she would not take any steps to prevent Austrian troops from marching into the revolted districts, provided they did not prolong their occupation. They did consequently enter into the countries which had thrown off the established authorities, put down without difficulty the rebellion, and at the demand of France were withdrawn.

* As President of the Council (Prime Minister of France), in place of M. Lafitte ; a post which he retained till his death on 16th May, 1832.

"Talleyrand was anxious for him, as he and Molé are not friends. I trust France and Austria may still not quarrel about Italy. Esterhazy thinks his court will agree to the French proposal, and wishes *very much* that we should be parties to the negotiation, thinking that they might fare better for having an uninterested party as a third in the matter.

"Our Cabinet are willing, and I shall write to this effect to Seymour.

"We have not yet given Talleyrand our answer* to Sebastiani's note about the nineteenth protocol, but shall do so the day after to-morrow—it will be a note signed by the four Powers.

"Talleyrand said to me to-day, 'When you write to Lord Granville, pray tell him not to treat the Belgian affair *comme une grande chose; en maintenant ce n'est qu'une petite chose* it can be soon and easily settled.' This may be very well for France to say, but we never can look upon the Belgian affair as a trifling matter, but on the contrary as one of the greatest importance to England.†

"Pérrier ought to understand that France cannot have Belgium without a war with the four Powers. Whether

* The answer given, and to which I have already alluded, was at once firm and conciliatory, pointing out the real meaning of the 19th protocol, and adhering to it. The French government declared itself satisfied, and the conference thereupon agreed to examine the condition in which Bouillon was placed by existing treaties.

† Lord Palmerston I think did not quite understand M. de Talleyrand's meaning. He was then a young negotiator. But an experienced one, whilst he bears constantly in mind the important points of his case, avoids being too emphatic about them. One should glide to one's point, and not rush—stamping one's foot—up to it.

she could have it by a war with the four Powers is another matter.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, March 18, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“It is absolutely necessary to come to an understanding with Casimir Périer about Belgium. If he is willing to take the straight line, and act fairly with the four Powers, we shall settle the matter amicably and honorably to all parties. But if he lends himself* to the petty intrigues of the Palais Royal upon this matter, I foresee that it must end in war. Talleyrand says he has written to his court things on this subject which would make us stare to hear them; and he has begged us all to write in the strongest terms to our ministers at Paris, begging them to bring the French government to a point upon it.†

“The way to put it, as it strikes me, is this—Europe never will consent, unless forced to it by a disastrous war, that Belgium shall be united, directly or indirectly, to France.

“France cannot attempt to bring about such a union without violating many solemn engagements, and forfeit-

* Lord Palmerston hardly does justice here to the King of the French, whose conduct was in the main straightforward, but who had naturally to accommodate himself to circumstances, and the management of the various parties by whom he was surrounded.

† Here is another proof of how steadily Talleyrand—at times suspected by Lord Palmerston, and anxious, no doubt, to get the best terms he could for his government—stuck, with or without instructions, to his main object—that of keeping France and England united.

ing her character for honor and good faith. There are two courses open to her. Either she may break loose from her treaties and her engagements, brave the united resistance of all Europe, and seize upon Belgium by force of arms, and try to keep it at all risks. Or, she may fulfill her engagements honorably and strictly, and, casting aside all selfish interests and sordid views, concur with the other allies in bringing about such a settlement of Belgium as may be best for the general security and permanent tranquillity of Europe. Either of these courses may have something to recommend it to a great country; the one its boldness, and noble contempt for the laws of nations; the other its integrity and honor. The middle course must at all events be unworthy, having neither the honesty of the one nor the daringness of the other.

“We can feel no doubt which is the choice which Casimir Périer will adopt; but we do feel very anxious that he shall distinctly and promptly make known the decision which he takes. The greater part of our difficulties with the Belgians have arisen from the double diplomacy, double-dealing, infirmity of purpose, and want of principle in the French government. Whether the sin lies with Sebastiani, or Soult, or Lafitte, or the king, or his secret advisers, male and female, I cannot tell, nor is it material to explain. The result has been most embarrassing.* The encouragement given to the deputies who came to offer the crown to the Duc de Nemours, to expect that France would support their pretensions with respect

* It is questionable, as I have said, whether Lord Palmerston made sufficient allowances for the difficulties under which Louis Philippe and his government were placed, when he passes such severe censure upon them; but it is clear that he was right in not allowing those difficulties to direct his own policy out of the straightforward path in which he kept it.

to limits, have been the reasons which have induced the Belgians to throw out protocols in our face, and to issue their absurd proclamations.

“Upon two points we must come to an immediate understanding: the limits between Belgium and Holland, and the interference of Belgium in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

“If the French government will make the Belgians clearly understand that France thinks the limits drawn by the conference equitable and just, and that she will give the Belgians no support, moral or physical, in their attempts upon the Dutch territory, I have no doubt we shall soon bring M. Chokier to reason upon this matter.

“With respect to Bouillon, the conference would have no objection to apply to the King of the Netherlands that it might not be occupied by his troops and those of the confederation, till the question started about it by the French government is settled, although it is scarcely possible to look at the Treaty of Vienna and entertain a doubt upon the subject. As to the ultimate settlement of Belgium, the more that country is drawn back to Holland,* the better for itself and for Europe. As a source of attack against France, Belgium is made powerless by the neutrality which has been agreed to; and as a further security for France, there could be no objection to dismantle some of the fortresses nearest and most menacing to her frontier.

“As to Sebastiani's pretended alarm at the armament of

* For a long time Lord Palmerston adhered to the idea that, though the separation between Holland and Belgium was a necessity, Belgium might still be governed by a prince of the Nassau family, and the Prince of Orange would, as I have said, have been his choice; but he always made the selection of a sovereign subordinate to the settlement of the country, and the general interests of Europe.

the German Confederation, the armament of France, and the accumulation of troops in her frontier provinces, must compel all the States of Germany to prepare the most effective means of resistance.

“To us here, who know not only the real sentiments of Prussia and Austria, and I may say also of Russia, but also the great difficulty which they would have in bringing into the field any force at all adequate* to make an attack upon France, the alarm expressed by the French government with respect to these Powers, and their apprehension that some attack upon France is intended, wear the appearance of thin pretenses to excuse the military preparations of the French government and to hide for the moment their own ambitious designs. This may be all a mistake of ours, and the French may be honestly and sincerely afraid. But if that be so, you may assure them in the most positive and unequivocal manner, that although all the other Powers would probably unite to resist aggression on the part of France, no one of them has the slightest or most distant intention of becoming an aggressor itself; *and the English government could almost take upon itself to be answerable to France for the sincerity and good faith of the pacific declarations of the other Powers.*

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, March 25, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I have had two long conversations with M. D’Ar-

* A remark that shows how much the condition of Germany has been changed by the genius of a Bismarck in these latter years.

schot;* the substance of what I told him was as follows: While the Belgians continue to treat the conference in so unbecoming a manner, and to set up pretensions which place them in a state of moral war, if not actually of physical war, with the four Powers, and with all Germany, the letters which he has brought from the regent to the king must remain in his pocket.† We can hold no relation with the Belgian government; and though I shall be happy to receive M. D'Arschot at my house as an individual, I cannot ask him to the office, nor hold any communication whatever with him in his official capacity, for I acknowledge none in him. We are willing to recognize Belgium as independent, and assist her in remaining so, provided she will be so in reality; but union with France we cannot permit, because it would give to France an increase of power dangerous to our security. We know we

* Sent to England by the regent as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary.

† The Belgian government, supported, as I have said, up to this time, directly and indirectly by France, accepted the armistice established by the great Powers, and adopted whatever concessions they made in favor of its own pretensions, but declared in every other case that the conference had merely the power to make proposals, and not to establish conditions; refusing to receive any representations as to the choice of a king, or any decision as to the limitation of territory, assuming that the territory which the Belgian Congress had declared to be Belgian was to be Belgian as a matter of course. The tone of Regent Chokier's government had become so haughty, indeed, as to be ridiculous. But Lord Palmerston's anger was not against the Belgians, who he thought naturally enough tried to swagger and get all they could, but with the French government for encouraging their exaggerated demands; and in fact, at the same time that the English government refused to accept Count d'Arschot as the Belgian government's representative, the French government received M. Le Hon in that character.

should have to fight France after such a union, and we had better therefore do so before it. We believe the other three Powers to have similar feelings, and to be equally determined to prevent such a union. That the limits which the conference has fixed for the separation of Holland and Belgium are perfectly equitable and just, and have been acknowledged to be so by France; that Holland must retain her ancient territory, such as she possessed it in 1790, when she was an independent state, and Belgium a dependent province. That as to Maestricht, it is an indispensable protection to Holland in the valley of the Meuse, and never can be surrendered to Belgium. That as to Luxembourg, the conference have decided nothing, because they had no power to do so; the treaties of 1814 and 1815 have decided that question; and those treaties cannot be broken by the Belgians without the consent of the confederation, who are probably stronger than the Belgians.

“That we have only acknowledged a fact, and have not created it. We have said that the Diet have a right to re-establish their authority and that of the Grand Duke in Luxembourg—and to this declaration France has subscribed.

“When D’Arschot wanted to talk with me on the choice of a king, I told him it was pure waste of time to discuss that matter as things now stood. Their constitution, as they will call it, declares part of Holland, and all Luxembourg, to be parts of their territory, and requires their king as his first act to swear to maintain the integrity of their territory; these claims must be given up before anything can be acknowledged by the five Powers, and therefore they would make the king swear one day an oath which he must necessarily break the next.

“The above is the substance of what I said to D’Arschot in my two conversations.

"You were quite right in what you said to Périer and Rothschild about Landau and Bouillon; we can have no security for Europe but by standing upon a strict observance of treaties, and an abnegation of all interested views of aggrandizement. The moment we give France a cabbage-garden or a vineyard, we lose all our vantage-ground of principle; and it becomes then a mere question of degree or the relative value of the different things which, one after the other, she will demand.

"If once we admit that the *pacific* ministry is to be supported by gratifying the war-party without the risks of war, to obtain our object we must do it effectually, and we all know—not, indeed, what *will* satisfy the war-party, but what will *not*, and most undoubtedly Bouillon and Landau will never do so.

"Be inexorable on that point: I am sorry that Périer mooted it.

"As to disarming, I see no reason why the conference should not lead to some general arrangement for this; and if France is sincere, it might easily be effected.

"I have no time to write on any other subject to-day.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, March 29, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"We are waiting anxiously to see what line Périer takes.

"The Poles fight gallantly, and the Russians have suffered more than people supposed; but the emperor must ultimately succeed. I have had conversations with Wielopolski and Walewski, and have told them both that we must stand upon our treaties; and while, on the one hand,

we should remonstrate if Russia tried to depart from the Treaty of Vienna, on the other hand, we could not do so ourselves by helping to make Poland entirely independent.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Granville.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, April 1, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Talleyrand read me, two days ago, a dispatch from Sebastiani, saying that France would support Leopold; and that he had no doubt that England, for the sake of an arrangement so advantageous to her, would agree to all the French wishes about Bouillon and Luxembourg and Maestricht, etc. Talleyrand, before I could say anything, said that the answer he meant to give was, that the election of Leopold was an object of comparative indifference to us, and that we were not disposed to make any sacrifices to obtain it.

“I said he was quite right, and begged him also to say that, even if we looked upon Leopold's election as a matter of English interest, still we were bound by engagements to other Powers, and that we should preserve our good faith in preference to consulting our selfish interests; that consequently the election of Leopold would make no change whatever in our opinions and determinations, and that we should not be a whit more inclined to support the unreasonable pretensions of the Belgians with Leopold than without him. But I said the reason we wished for Leopold, next after a member of the family of Orange, was that we think he would become a good *Belgian king*; that he would be no more English than French, but would look to his own interests, and to those of the state which he governed.

"To-day Talleyrand read me a dispatch from Sebastiani, dated the 30th, written before he could have received Talleyrand's answer to the one before mentioned, and desiring him to consider that communication as *non avenue*. What the reason of this fresh change may be I know not, nor is it material to inquire; but the thing to press upon them is, that the choice of a sovereign must be preceded by a settlement of limits, otherwise we shall get into inextricable difficulties.

"Talleyrand says that they ought to publish in the '*Moniteur*' their acquiescence about the limits, and that is true enough.

"He introduced to me to-day Casimir Périer's son, a good-looking youth, to whom we shall be happy to be civil. I am going, on Sunday evening, to Brighton for a week; but I shall be ready to come to town at a moment's notice if necessary. Russia goes to Brighton also, France and Austria to Richmond, and Prussia mounts guard in London.

"Yours, etc.,

"PALMERSTON.

"Malcolm has by this time four sail of the line; a fifth is going out immediately; and Hotham, who succeeds him in the command, will sail in a week or ten days with a three-decker; and Malcolm will leave his own ship there and come home in a frigate.

"We shall thus be strong enough in the Mediterranean to do what we like with any fleet the French can have in that sea."

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, April 12, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Talleyrand has read to us, in conference, his last communication from Sebastiani about Belgium, which he received last week. It is highly satisfactory; and pray let Périer know how sensible we all are of the change of tone and disposition which he has infused into the French government.

“We are going to prepare an answer to this dispatch; and we mean to make an acknowledgment of the many important points of agreement between France and the other four Powers, and to touch very lightly upon those matters in which there are still shades of difference remaining, such as Bouillon, etc.*

“Talleyrand has spoken to me about the fortresses, and I told him that Sebastiani had mentioned the subject to you. I said that we had spent a great deal of money on these fortresses, and that they were by no means intended as points of attack upon France, but as means of defense against France; that, however, I apprehended that this was a matter upon which we all might come to an understanding, especially if the dismantling of some of them would be useful to the present government. The fact is, that these places are too numerous by far for the military means of Belgium, and that some of them must be dismantled, to prevent them falling into the hands of France upon the first rupture which they might tempt her into. The most plausible notion upon this subject is, I think, to dismantle those fortresses which are in the front and center, and to leave those which are upon the seacoast and the Meuse: the former must fall a prey to France; the

* Up to this time, as has been said, France had been pursuing a policy of her own, and Belgium had been leaning on her.

latter could be succored by England and by Prussia. Thus, speaking vaguely and without full consideration, Ypres, Menin, Courtray, Tournay, Mons, Ath, Oudenarde, Marienburg, Philippeville, might probably be dismantled, while Nieuport, Ostend, Ghent, Charleroy, Namur, Dinant, Liège, Huy, would be retained.

"These details, however, you had better not enter into with the French government, but only say, generally, that we are not indisposed to discuss the matter. Talleyrand asked me again yesterday about our naval preparations. I told him—what is true—that they do not exceed our peace establishment for our foreign stations and our guard-ships at home. But that our guard-ships are getting their crews on board. It is Graham's intention to cruise by-and-by for the benefit of exercise to the men.

"Don Miguel's proceedings toward the English at Lisbon are, however, so outrageous, that we may possibly be obliged to send some of our sea-captains to pay him a visit.

"The Italian affairs are settling down for peace. Charles John* flew a kite at us for the Garter, the other day, but without success. Do not mention this.

"Yours, etc.,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, April 13, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I am sorry to receive your private letter and dispatch of the 11th,† which reached me this morning; and should

* King of Sweden.

† The substance of this dispatch and letter was to advise our yielding to the wishes of France about Bouillon, whether they were exactly just or not, for that the French nation, being mortified about the turn of Italian matters, the French government

be still more so, if I thought Sebastiani likely to remain in office (which, however, I trust will not be the case), because they indicate that the political intermittent fever which has so long hung about the French government still afflicts them, and that the hot and cold fits come on them by turns. Talleyrand, however, has received a letter from Casimir Périer saying that his opinion will be entirely followed with respect to Belgian affairs; so that Sebastiani's renewed chicanery becomes of less consequence than it would otherwise be.

"Before I advert to any of the topics of your letter, I may as well say that I discovered, by a conversation two days ago with Maberly,* of the House of Commons, that the great anxiety which the Belgian government have lately expressed that D'Arschot should be received here, arose from the circumstance that they were told that if he was received by this government they might be able to negotiate a loan; but that without such a reception a loan would be impossible. But Maberly also told me—that which you will do well to communicate in confidence to Périer, but *not* to Sebastiani—that there was over here, a little time ago, an agent of Soult, sent ostensibly to buy horses and equipments; but the agent, having got introduced to Maberly, in the way of business, became too open

wanted to be able to tell the Chambers they had at least gained something from the allies. And that if we did not oblige the French government in this they might go to war, and that it was not worth while to go to war for so small an object. Lord Palmerston's answer is remarkable and of universal application. You don't stave off war, or stop demands by yielding to urgent demands, however small, from fear of war. The maxim of "giving way to have an easy life," will, if you follow it, lead to your having life without a moment's ease.

* Member for Abingdon.

to him upon politics—said that Soult was determined to get possession of Belgium; that France, however, was not prepared to engage in a naval war with England, and was consequently most anxious to detach us from the other four Powers, and to persuade us to consent to the views of France. That for this purpose they would offer us Antwerp and Ostend, and would make any arrangement almost that would be agreeable to us, but consistent with their views; that Soult, and those who acted with him, who, however, were not named, had no confidence in Talleyrand, and could not employ him in the negotiation; but if Maberly could sound the government, and found that we were disposed to listen to such propositions, Soult would send over a confidential agent here, by whose means the affair might be settled without the conference knowing anything about it. Maberly said he told this person that these were matters he had nothing to do with; and he did not suppose that the government would be at all inclined to enter into such a negotiation; but that, nevertheless, he should mention the matter to me whenever he had an opportunity; and in the mean while the agent is gone back to France.

“My answer to Maberly of course was, that if the man came to him again, he should tell him that he was sure that any such proposition would be peremptorily rejected. But it is right, I think, that Périer should be aware what sort of colleagues he has, and the manner in which they create distrust in the sincerity of the French government.

“Now with respect to your private letter, for I have not your dispatch at this moment before me, and cannot answer it till to-morrow. And, first, I should say that I think I see in Sebastiani’s tone the rainbow of Skrzynecky’s

victories.* But however the French may raise their pretensions in consequence of the reverses of the Russians, still we ought to be steady to our point, since we have never required more than is strictly just; and events in Poland cannot make that less so than it was. If the French are bent upon encroachment and war, no concession will keep the peace, and the surrender of rights will only be, like the buying off of the Danish ravages, a temptation to a speedy repetition of such profitable attempts.

“Now as to Bouillon, it seems quite clear, from the treaties of 1814 and 1815, that the larger and south part of the duchy, including the town, was added to Luxembourg in 1815, and that the communes of Gidinné and Vaurians were at a later period added to Belgium; and if you will look at any map of the kingdom of the Netherlands published since 1818, you will see these territories thus distributed. I have before me at this moment Wegyard’s map of 1816, republished in 1819, which you will no doubt find at Piquet’s, where the divisions are clearly colored and marked. How, then, are the conference to assign to Belgium that which existing treaties determined to be a part of Luxembourg? And really I must say the language and arguments of Sebastiani, and his propositions on this as well as on other subjects, are truly deserving of admiration! At one time he prides himself upon declaring that the conference is a pure mediation, and cannot even pronounce upon the question of limits; at another, he considers it a supreme dispenser of territories, able to take from one and give to another, at its will and caprice,

* General Skrzynecky had, since the 25th February, been in chief command of the Polish army, and had defeated the Russians with great loss at Wawer on the 30th and 31st of March.

and without regard to any principle but the wishes of France. He says that Bouillon *ought* to belong to Belgium, and that the left bank of the Scheldt is also *necessary* for that country; and that we must support the present government of France by helping to make these arrangements. In the first place, I should like to know how France is concerned in these things, if Belgium is not to belong to her; and how Périér's government is to gain such glory by adding to Belgium, which is to be an independent state?

"The French continually come upon us with the argument, Do only consider our difficulties, and how we are pressed; and so consent to do some little thing unreasonable, unjust, dishonest, against treaties and principles, in order to enable us to say that we have carried some one point at least. In reply, I would say, choose some point to be carried which is consistent with treaties, and engagements, and justice, and probably you will be able to carry it; we will give you every support which can honestly be afforded you, but that which you ask is impossible. Why should we wish to help you to maintain yourselves? Why, in order that you may maintain your engagements and abide by your treaties; but if the way to maintain you is to allow you to break these engagements, we are sacrificing the end to obtain the means.

"Yours, etc.,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, April 18, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I was unable to write anything to you yesterday in addition to my public dispatches.

"Pray impress upon Périér the importance of keeping

our reserved protocol* secret,† and of not communicating it to any of the ministers but Sebastiani, who I conclude must, on account of his office, be informed of it. It was solely in confidence of Talleyrand's assurances that this should be done that we signed the protocol. He laid

* It was not officially made known to Prince Talleyrand till the 14th July.

† "*Protocol of a Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 17th April, 1831.*—The Plenipotentiaries of Austria, of Great Britain, of Russia, and of Prussia, having met, have directed their attention to the fortresses constructed since the year 1815 in the kingdom of the Netherlands, at the expense of the four courts; and to the determination which it would become necessary to take with respect to these fortresses, when the separation of Belgium from Holland shall have been definitely effected.

"Having carefully examined the question, the Plenipotentiaries of the four courts were unanimously of opinion that the new situation in which Belgium would be placed, with her neutrality acknowledged and guaranteed by France, ought to change the system of military defense which had been adopted for the kingdom of the Netherlands; that the fortresses in question would be too numerous not to make it difficult for the Belgians to provide for their maintenance and defense; that, moreover, the unanimously admitted inviolability of the Belgian territory offered a security which did not previously exist; finally, that a part of these fortresses constructed under different circumstances might at present be razed.

"In consequence, the Plenipotentiaries have finally decided, that as soon as a government shall exist in Belgium, recognized by the Powers taking part in the Conferences of London, a negotiation shall be set on foot between the four Powers and that government for the purpose of selecting such of the said fortresses as should be demolished.

(Signed)

"ESTERHAZY, WESSENBERG.

"PALMERSTON,

"BULOW,

"LIEVEN, MATUSZEWICZ."

great stress upon it being signed, saying it would give Périer much strength with the king. As to any pretension which France may set up to be a party to the discussion, which of the fortresses are to be dismantled and which kept up, it never can for one moment be listened to by the four Powers, whatever Périer may think or say upon the subject.

“These fortresses were built by the money of the allies, money which, though part of it consisted of contributions paid by France, they, the allies, might have laid out in any other way if they had chosen. France was not consulted as to their construction, and for the best of all possible reasons, namely, that they were intended as a check and barrier against aggression by France; and it would have been a strange and anomalous proceeding to have invited the expected invader to deliberate in council upon the best means of providing a defense against his possible attack.

“For the same reason as these fortresses were erected, not as Talleyrand says *en haine de la France*, but *en crainte de la France*, it would be ludicrous to discuss with her which of them should be dismantled; the very considerations upon which the selection should be made would be matter which could not possibly be treated of in presence of a French minister without either giving offense to him or risking the defeat of the objects in view. How, for instance, could France be expected to concur sincerely with the other Powers in dismantling those fortresses which could least effectually stop her army, and which would first fall into her hands in case of war, and in leaving those which could be most useful in checking her advance, and which would be the last to be reduced by her arms? There is the most palpable incongruity in the very notion itself.

"Talleyrand wanted necessarily that France should be a party to that protocol, but we made him feel that it was utterly impossible she should.

"If therefore Périer should contend that all the fortresses ought to be demolished, you may make him comprehend, in civil and friendly terms, the view which I have explained above, and that the principle upon which these fortresses will be considered will not and cannot be that Belgium is to be deprived of all defense, and that through her Holland and Prussia are to be thrown open to France; but that it is intended to reduce the number of these places more nearly within the limits of the probable means of defense of Belgium, succored, if necessity should require it, by the other Powers of Europe.

"I see no harm in conveying this idea clearly and distinctly to Périer's mind, because, as that is a principle from which we cannot depart, the sooner and more distinctly it is understood by the French the better.* After all, however, the four Powers cannot dictate to the Belgians on this subject, and whatever is done must be done with their consent and concurrence, and probably at their expense.

"My dispatch to Hoppner will have been an answer by anticipation to the communication about Portugal. I shall

* One of the great merits of Palmerston's mode of dealing with questions was, that he never shirked a difficulty. When people know how much they differ, they try to see how far they can agree. The longer they remain doubtful as to how far they differ, the more their differences increase.

Lord Palmerston insists the more on this question of the fortresses, from the fact that Lord Granville, who often acted as a mediator between the two governments, did not quite agree with him—on this matter; and thought that the French should have a voice in it as well as the allies.

be glad if our necessary vindication of our honor and our rights were to bring about the dethronement of Miguel, but this is scarcely to be expected.

"The fight made by the Poles is deserving of the greatest admiration, and it is impossible not to wish them heartily success; but the odds against them are still very great, unless the rising in Lithuania should prove extensive and embarrassing to Russia.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, April 22, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"You say in your letter of the 18th that the French government urge that the nation will not be satisfied with any government which appears to have no influence in the councils of the great nations of Europe, and that therefore we ought to receive liberally and with favor any interpretation of treaties attempted to be established by them which may not materially affect the security and interests of other nations. Now to this doctrine I must demur; and we cannot feel any confidence in a government which urges it. What do they mean by influence in the councils of other nations? If they mean the power of inducing those nations to connive at or submit to French encroachment or aggrandizement, it is the old cloven foot in a new disguise, and the same hateful spirit of aggression reviving under a different pretense. What France may want to get, or to have done, is either just or not; it is either right or wrong. If it is just and right, it ought *therefore* to be done; and if it is unjust and wrong, it ought *therefore* not to be done; and I never can admit that it can be wise to give way to the unjust pretensions of France for the purpose of gaining for the French government, be it Périet or

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Sebastiani, the support of the violent party, or even of the moderate encroachers. Depend upon it, no good is gained by such concessions; you only whet the appetite instead of satisfying it. We should betray our own weakness and encourage fresh demands. What is the use of having a moderate and pacific administration in France, if, for the purpose of keeping them in the good graces of the violent and warlike, we submit to the demands of the latter instead of having the benefit of the good faith of the former? It is a contradiction in terms; and when such arguments are used, distrust the sincerity of those who employ them.

"If the French government want to have influence over the other Cabinets of Europe, let them convince those Cabinets that France is disinterested and honest; that she has no views of aggrandizement and encroachment upon her neighbors; that she sincerely wishes to remain at peace herself, and to maintain peace between and in other countries. Then her opinions may be received without suspicion, and, being founded upon no secret designs, will probably be entitled to consideration.

"Périer is honest; but it is not in human nature that he should not every now and then be swayed by the dishonesty of Sebastiani,* and, I fear I must add, the want of fixed principle of the king. But make him understand

* This term is only used as implying that Sebastiani's views of aggrandizement, derived from his old master Napoleon I., were dishonest. It is fair to add that Lord Palmerston's ideas respecting this statesman were subsequently modified—that is to say, he always thought that the views Marshal Sebastiani entertained as to making France greater than she was by encroaching on some of her neighbors were dishonest, but he ceased to believe that the marshal would pursue these views by indirect or dishonest means—and finally, indeed (the marshal having become ambassador in London), lived on the most friendly terms with him, begging on one occasion that he should not be moved.

how unreasonable it is for any government to ask that other governments should sacrifice principles and permanent and general interests to please, not even the French ministers themselves, but the violent party of whom that government are afraid.

"Leopold was to see the Belgians to day, and meant to tell them that he could make no decision on their proposition until they have come to an agreement about limits with the five Powers.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"I have suggested to Bulow that if Prussia marches into Poland to help the Russians, and if France attacks the Rhenish Provinces, it would be impossible for England to make war to help Prussia; and I have also said to Esterhazy that an application by Russia to Austria for military aid would afford Austria a fair opportunity to offer mediation instead. There would be no harm in hinting this to Appony; though I am glad to find that Austria has declined the aid which Russia has applied for."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, May 13, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I do not yet see our way out of Belgian difficulties. Prince Leopold will not accept till the Belgians have acceded to the Act of Separation, and they, on the other hand, say that they cannot accede to that act in the present state of the country, nor until they have a sovereign, Chambers, and a regular government.

"Here we are, then, at a dead lock. Leopold is, however, I think, quite right not to accept until he knows what it is which is offered to him. Were he to go now he would

be like Miguel, recognized by nobody ; and, in fact, they offer him not a throne so much as a quarrel with all Europe, and complete uncertainty of ever getting out of it.

“The conference cannot go back from what they have declared as to the limits of Holland, though the Luxembourg question might be made a subject of ulterior negotiation.*

“The Deputies† talk of going back to Brussels the day after to-morrow. They profess to lament the anarchy and disorder which await their country, but to be hopeless of being able to save it. It seems to me—and I tell them so—that if the evils on one hand are so great, and the sacrifice required on the other so small, it is strange they cannot make the one to avoid the other. The way I put the matter to Devaux‡ to-day was this. You say you cannot accede to our *Bases de Séparation* because by so doing you would cede Maestricht, which you have declared to be part of your territory. I say you have as yet no territory at all by any right but that of conquest and military occupation, which is an imperfect right till completed by the formal cession of the sovereign to whom the country so conquered and occupied previously belonged. You have

* Luxembourg had not been treated as part of Holland, but as belonging to the King of Holland. The Belgians claimed parts of it, as having shared in their revolt, and indeed put forward rights to the whole, as having once belonged to Brabant, but were not unwilling to pay for the concessions they might acquire. If the conference had wished to give what they asked for to them it could not have done so without the assent of the German Confederation, to which Luxembourg belonged. This matter, therefore, admitted of a separation from the general question between Holland and Belgium, and to be treated of at a later period.

† Sent to offer the crown.

‡ One of the ministers of state in Belgium, and sent to England on a special mission.

conquered your own country, Belgium, and have driven the Dutch king's troops out of it, and it is theirs *de facto*, and will be theirs *de jure*, whenever he makes a treaty ceding his right of sovereignty. But Maestricht is in his hands still, and that place, therefore, is yours neither *de facto* nor *de jure*, and it is as absurd to say that it has become your property merely because the congress has so decreed it, as it would be to declare Belgium possessors and owners of Aix-la-Chapelle or Lille upon similar grounds. We therefore require you to cede nothing to which you have any shadow of a right as far as Maestricht is concerned; in other respects the limits of 1790 would be advantageous to you, because while you would restore Venloo to the Dutch, you would receive the citadel of Antwerp, which would be a gaining exchange.

"One cannot help wishing the Poles heartily success; and one should be glad to help them in any way consistent with our good faith toward Russia.

"Frederick Lamb's appointment to Vienna will be gazetted to-night. Lord Cowley sent me in his resignation some months ago, but circumstances made me delay to act upon it. The time of his coming home is left to himself to fix.

"My dear Granville,

"Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, May 29, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I take advantage of a courier of Prince Talleyrand to send you a few lines.

"I have had a letter from Lord Ponsonby dated 26th, and another of the 27th, from which it appears very

doubtful whether the Belgians will agree to the Articles of Separation between them and Holland.*

"I have written to him to-night to say that, if the Belgians do not do so by the 1st of June, he is to carry into execution without further orders the instructions already given him, and to quit Brussels. We conclude that General Belliard† has received similar instructions, and will do so too; but I wish you to ascertain that fact, and, if such instructions have not been given him, request the French government to give them, by telegraph if necessary, in order that they may reach him in time: it would be very unfortunate if Belliard were to remain after Ponsonby had left, as it would look like a difference of purpose and policy between France and the other four Powers on the Belgian question, where none exists, and would consequently do mischief.

"If the Belgians resume hostilities it may become necessary for the five Powers to blockade the Scheldt, according to their former decisions; not that the King of Holland has not a naval force at the mouth of the river amply sufficient for that purpose, but because perhaps the moral effect of such a measure by the five Powers might prevent the necessity of land operations.

"We shall be strictly within our principles of non-inter-

* These were not the original bases of separation in twenty-four articles, but the modification of them in eighteen articles. The King of Holland had accepted the first and refused the second. The Belgians, as I have elsewhere said, finally accepted the second, and the King of Holland refused to do so

† General Belliard, a very distinguished French officer, subsequently accredited to King Leopold, and who died shortly afterward at Brussels (Jan. 26, 1832), had been named French commissioner from the conference in lieu of M. Bresson, sent as French minister to Berlin.

ference in the internal affairs of Belgium. We shall not march a man into Belgium for the purpose of meddling in the interior; as long as they remain quiet within their limits nobody will molest them; but the moment they stir a step to attack Holland, they will get a most exemplary licking, in all probability by the Dutch unaided; but if necessary by the Dutch assisted by the five Powers.

"People all say the Belgians are madmen, and there is no use in reasoning with them. I have observed a good deal of method and calculation in their madness, and at all events they are not destitute of that cunning which belongs to insanity. I cannot help thinking therefore that when they find that we are really in earnest, and that they have driven us to the extreme point to which we will go, they will gradually recover their senses, and find out a way to arrange matters somehow or other.

"At all events, however, it is impossible to go one step further in concessions to them. Their pretension, now newly revived, to the left bank of the Scheldt is preposterous.

"Maestricht never was theirs, and will not be theirs.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, May 31, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Bagot tells me that the King of the Netherlands sent off a courier to Fagel,* at Paris, the other day, at twelve at night, apparently upon some sudden determination; and as these midnight movements cannot be common in Holland, many conjectures have been formed as to the

* The Dutch minister in Paris.

cause.* The most general seems to be that the king, angry with the conference, and thinking we do not sufficiently take his part, has proposed to France to join with him in partitioning Belgium. Let me know if you can find out anything about this matter.

“Tell Casimir Périer that you have repeated to me his communication to you at dinner the other day, and the desire which he expressed to be well with England. Assure him that this government, and I, individually, as its official organ, entirely participate in his sentiments on this subject. We feel strongly how much a cordial good understanding and close friendship between England and France must contribute to secure the peace of the world, and to confirm the liberties and promote the happiness of nations. *We are deeply convinced that it is greatly for the interest of England and of France that this friendship should be intimate and unbroken. But true friendship cannot exist without perfect confidence on both sides. Each party must be convinced that the other has no secret views and selfish objects to be pursued to the detriment of the other. Suspicion and distrust are fatal to confidence and friendship.*

“Now, when I first came into office in the autumn, I, as well as the rest of my colleagues, felt the greatest desire to be well with France, and a confident belief that nothing could prevent us being so. We knew that we, on the part of England, had no selfish objects to pursue, no interests to be promoted which could be at variance

* The courier alluded to, “whose midnight departure,” writes Lord Granville, on the 10th June, “set agog the whole diplomatic corps at the Hague, was sent not to Fagel, but to Frankfort; the object of his journey was to obtain money for the King of Holland.”

with the just rights of others, or which could give to any other nation well-founded cause of jealousy. We fancied that France had been in the same temper. We heard her repeated declarations of a wish to cultivate the closest alliance with us; and believing that she had been cured of the disease of conquest, and that the enjoyment of free institutions of her own had taught her to respect the independence of her neighbors, we imagined that the alliance to which she invited us was to be a bond of peace and a covenant of justice. But we had not long been engaged in the management of affairs when we found symptoms of different dispositions in the French government; and the spirit of aggression and the ardent thirst for aggrandizement, which were betrayed, instead of being concealed by the underhand intrigues and double diplomacy which was intended to veil them, proved to us that those who thus had been courting our alliance only meant to make us the instrument of their own ambition—that their object was, in imitation of the master of their school (Bonaparte), to draw us away from those whom they intended to attack, and, having worked with us as tools, to deal with us afterward as occasion might require. Hence it was that when Flahault brought us civil and complimentary propositions of alliance between France and England, we, knowing full well what was meant thereby, met them by civil and complimentary refusals. This feeling of suspicion and distrust went on increasing to the end of Lafitte's administration, and everything we saw of the policy of that administration tended to drive us away from French connection, and to teach us that the interests of England and Europe required us to draw closer and closer the other three great Powers of the East. Since the accession of Casimir Périer we have observed a complete change in the spirit and temper of French policy. Every-

thing which has sprung from *him* has been calculated to inspire confidence; and if now and then the old spirit has broken out in those who are acting under him, we have always felt that these were unauthorized demonstrations, and that they would be checked when known by him.

"Say, in short, that we have the greatest confidence in and respect for him, and that we are convinced that so long as he is at the head of affairs in France the two countries will become daily more and more united by close and intimate friendship. It will not be without its use that you should take advantage of any opportunity you may find to say to the king how much the good understanding between the two countries depends upon the respect and confidence which are inspired by the personal character of Périer, and how greatly his appointment to be Prime Minister in France has contributed to the peace of Europe.

"I will send you an official answer about Metternich's proposal for a congress; but in the mean while you are quite right in supposing that we should be as adverse to it as the French. We ought to prevent any more congresses till we have another French war in Europe, which, I trust, will not be in our time; and, by-the-by, do not encourage Sebastiani in his endeavors to draw to Paris the settlement of matters which might be treated of in our conference.

"I am going to-morrow to Windsor for two days. Grey will spend the whole Ascot week there.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"WINDSOR CASTLE, June 3, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"We shall certainly not interfere between France and Portugal unless the French government wish us to do so;

that is, always supposing that the French have no intention of invading Portugal, and mean to confine their operations to the capture of ships. It may be worth while, however, for the French government to be quite sure that they ask nothing but what is entirely reasonable and just before they proceed to extremities, because even when one has to deal with such a fellow as Miguel, it is a great thing to be perfectly in the right.

"The accounts from Greece make us doubt very much the wisdom of choosing Prince Otto of Bavaria for sovereign. He is but sixteen, and cannot, for four or five years to come, be really and substantially king.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, June 10, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"The king has given you leave of absence to take your seat.* I do not like the contents of two of your last dispatches about Luxembourg and Lisbon.

"If Sebastiani treats the existing treaties of Europe as *vieilleries*, he may bring an old house about his ears. With respect to his intention of bombarding Lisbon, it may be as well to request Périer to pause before he takes such a determination. England is upon very ticklish grounds in this dispute between France and Portugal. In an ordinary case we should be bound to interpose our good offices, according to the stipulations of the treaty, of which I inclose an extract; and it is only because we think Don

* He left Paris on the evening of the 16th, arrived in London on the morning of the 19th, started on his return *via* Dieppe on the 2d, and arrived in Paris on July 6.

Miguel is very much in the wrong that we do not do so.* I am not quite sure, however, upon a full consideration of the subject, the Cabinet may not be of opinion that our engagement requires us to do something, and of course that something would be to advise Don Miguel to do all that we may think France justly entitled to exact.

"But if the French were to attempt to land in Portugal, or to threaten to bombard Lisbon, we might find ourselves compelled, very unwillingly, to interfere and to assist the Portuguese; and it is unnecessary to say how much we should regret any event which could place us in collision with France. A bombardment of Lisbon seems not an appropriate measure of retaliation for the offense—it would be punishing the innocent inhabitants for the sins of the guilty government; and, besides, if we stood by and allowed such a thing, we should have an immense outcry in this country, on behalf of the English in Lisbon, whose property the French shells would not distinguish from that of Don Miguel himself. I shall write you a dispatch on this subject; but you may as well speak of it to Périer,

* The French had sent a squadron under Rear-Admiral Roussin to Lisbon to support their vice-consul there in demanding redress for outrages committed on two French subjects, MM. Bonhomme and Sauvinet. Satisfaction not being granted, the French commenced reprisals, whereon Don Miguel claimed the aid of the British government, on the ground that, as he was not at war with Great Britain, Great Britain was bound by treaty to defend him against all aggressors. Lord Palmerston refused the application, stating that, while perfectly aware of the obligations toward Portugal imposed by treaties, "His Majesty's government do not admit that the true meaning of those treaties can compel them blindly to take up any quarrel into which a Portuguese administration may, in its infatuation, plunge its country, or to defend that administration, right or wrong, against all whom it may choose to injure or affront."

and show him the extract from the treaty of 1703, which is still in force, having been renewed by the treaty of 1810.

"The Belgians are arrived. I have seen Devaux and Nothomb.* They appear to me preparing to yield; and we have no alternative but requiring them to do so. They must agree to the bases de séparation,† in substance or in form, and then they may negotiate as they like about exchanges afterward.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, June 14, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Leopold has not yet given his final answer to the Belgians. He delays it that we may bring them nearer to our point, which I think we have some chance of doing. They are giving way gradually.

"I have talked much to Falck and Zuylen to persuade the king to be quiet.

"Ponsonby will be here this evening.‡ He will be appointed immediately to Naples, instead of Hill.§

"Assure Périer that we are all anxious to prevent war, and by a little patience and management I trust we shall succeed.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"I shall write, by to-morrow's Lisbon mail, to Hoppner,||

* Named commissioners to the conference.

† These were the twenty-four articles.

‡ He had been recalled from Brussels along with General Belliard by the conference, on the 6th June.

§ The Right Hon. Wm. Noel Hill, afterward Lord Berwick.

|| British consul at Lisbon.

to desire him strongly to urge the Portuguese government to give to France the satisfaction demanded."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"The accounts we have from Brussels show that the French and Belgian republicans will make a great effort to prevent the acceptance of our propositions;* but the best-informed seem to think that they will not succeed.

"It is said that the army, the Civic Guard, and the majority of the people are all for Leopold and for peace. No efforts, however, ought to be spared to bring about a favorable result. There is a suspicion in Belgium that Soult and Pellet are counter-plotting; and I have seen a letter to-day from Brussels, in which there is the following statement:

"General Pellet writes to a friend at Lille: That if the Belgian friends of France will advance one step toward her, she will advance with fixed bayonets three toward them—or words to that effect.

"It also adds that Pellet, being asked to change the garrison of Lille, replied that it was not possible, '*cela pourra gêner les affaires des nos frères Belges qui bientôt demanderont nos secours.*' I think you would do well to communicate this confidentially to Casimir Périer, who will be best able to judge what degree of probability the statement carries with it.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

* These were the new proposals contained in eighteen articles.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 15, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“The King of the Netherlands means to refuse the eighteen propositions,* but Wessenberg and Bagot had on the 12th persuaded him to postpone for a couple of days the announcement of his refusal.† Perhaps the letter which the conference wrote to Wessenberg on Tuesday last, and which would reach the Hague on Thursday night, might have some influence on the king. Leopold goes off to-morrow morning, and will be at Brussels on Tuesday. We shall recognize him immediately, and I conclude France will do so too; the other three will pause, if the King of the Netherlands refuses, but they will ultimately and soon come in. It may be quite as well for Leopold, with respect to his new subjects, to be recognized at first only by England and France. Lebeau and Devaux will not take office at first, but will of course be necessary to Leopold, and must come in soon.

“Le Hon will be his minister at Paris: he has not settled who he is to send hither.

“Reform is going on well, but slowly. Peel had a meeting at his house yesterday, at which it was discussed whether they should try to improve the bill, and send it up to the Lords as good as they could make it, or whether

* Annexed to protocol, page 26, dated June 26. The Belgian Congress, in its decree of July 9, agreed to and adopted the eighteen articles.

† Baron Wessenberg, one of the Austrian plenipotentiaries, being commissioned by the conference, had, on June 27, repaired in person to the Hague, as the bearer of the eighteen articles proposed by the conference to Belgium and Holland, as the preliminaries of a treaty of peace, to give the King of the Netherlands all the information required regarding them.

they should do their best to spoil the bill, and send it up to the Lords in such a state as to make it sure to be thrown out. The meeting, much to their credit, adopted the first resolution.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.”

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 22, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“As to Leopold’s accession to the throne of Belgium, what you said to Sebastiani is perfectly true.* The French government for months found fault with us for putting forward the Prince of Orange, and it was they who set up Leopold this last time, if the idea did not originate with the Belgians themselves.

“It may be quite true, indeed, that the French put him forward because they thought him their best chance of preventing the Orange family from returning, but still they cannot with truth allege that he is the nominee of England.

“I don’t quite like the state of affairs in Portugal. We shall get into hot water with France if she attempts anything like occupation of any part of Portugal, even were it only the Fort of Cascaes. The French government may be driven by public opinion at Paris, but we could not in that case resist public opinion in London. I trust, however, no such plan is in contemplation, and that they mean to act up to the assurances given to you.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.”

* That Prince Leopold was not to be considered especially an English candidate.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I have received to-day your letters and dispatches, inclosing copy of the French king's speech. The speech is boastful and arrogant, and must give offense all over Europe. I told Talleyrand that I thought the part of it that relates to foreign affairs *too full of pretense*, and that there were many things in it which *we* should never have thought of saying. He seemed to feel conscious that it was open to criticism — which, indeed, all the other members of the conference had taken care to let him know; but he excused it by saying, it was necessary for the government to take this sort of tone, in order to keep its ascendancy at home, and that *the best thing they could do was to make a speech which should please the French much, and not very much displease other people.*

“The Etonian part of the Cabinet are at Windsor to-day, and therefore I cannot consult Lord Grey or summon a Cabinet; but I apprehend our government will think it necessary to ask the French government whether their fleet will not come away from Lisbon, as ours did when we had obtained the satisfaction we required; at all events, there can be no harm in your hinting, as from yourself, that the English government and Parliament will begin to be jealous of the French occupation of the Tagus, if the French fleet should remain there.

“England never would stand the occupation of the Tagus by the French; and no government here could be allowed to connive at it.

“I hope Périer will not be so foolish as to resign in the event of his being beat about the election of president; he ought to be told that he has duties to his country and to Europe which require him to fight to the last. Pray

take every opportunity of flattering and encouraging him to stand stout.

“My dear Granville, yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“I send this by a special messenger, because I think it of importance to lose no time in ascertaining, if possible, what the French government propose to do about Portugal.

“As to Don Pedro, we have rather chosen to know nothing of his plans; but he makes no secret of his determination to use every effort to reinstate Donna Maria on the throne of Portugal.”

BOOK IX.

Correspondence with the British ambassador in Paris, from July 15
to the taking of Antwerp.

THE letter of July 15, which states that King Leopold was starting for Brussels—the King of Holland having rejected the arrangement which the Belgians had accepted—closed the period in these transactions which I have described as the most critical and the most dangerous, because during this period it was uncertain whether France would range herself peaceably by the side of the established governments of Europe, or whether, as representing a new order of things, arising out of her recent revolution, she would provoke a general war of conquest and opinion. This question was decided, as I have said, when King Leopold was raised to the Belgian throne. That event, however, had taken place without the assent of the King of Holland to the conditions on which it had been based. Hence the chances of new complications, among which the government of France, influenced by principle, passion, vanity, or interest, might excite the Northern courts to resist her and justify them in doing so.

On the one hand, it was pretty certain that any act in which we joined the French would be tolerated, if not approved of, by those Northern courts: on the other hand, it was pretty sure that any act which left the French isolated would place them on the verge of war. Their policy, therefore, if they meant peace, was not to separate from us; our policy, if we meant to be their ally without being

their dupe, was to deter them from pursuing any course that was aggressive or unjust. The King of Holland was not long without creating one of those new complications which, as I have just said, were to be apprehended. For, pretending that the armistice to which he had assented was broken by King Leopold's assumption of an independent authority, to which he had not given his sanction, he sent an army at once into Belgium, defeated the Belgian forces, and only retired before French troops, that marched to repel the invaders, without concert with the allies, but not without manifold assurances and explanations. It is at this moment that the following correspondence commences; and, as it will be seen, there were not a few dangers and difficulties still to encounter:

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, August 5, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“So here is a pretty fly out of the King of the Netherlands! Who has bit him I cannot guess; we have some suspicion of France.* Bagot has always thought there was some secret understanding between France and the Dutch government. Talleyrand, if you remember, proposed to me some time ago that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice, cry out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians, cover Belgium with troops, and then settle everything as we chose! Is this the realization of the first step of this plot?

“France has been angry about the fortresses. Has she fancied that by urging the Dutch to war she should have a fair pretense to enter Belgium as an ally, and thus to get

* The King had on August 1 given orders for the recommencement of hostilities against Belgium.

into these fortresses, and keep or demolish them as she chose? Talleyrand was silent yesterday in conference when the matter was discussed; but to-day he backed me well, and acted as fairly as possible. This might, however, have been occasioned by his finding that the Cabinet have taken the matter up seriously.

"The great thing to be done now is to prevail on the French government to prevent the French soldiers from running into Belgium, and to induce them to stick to the alliance and concur in the decision of the conference.

"Sir Robert Adair sets off* to-morrow. Codrington's squadron will be in the Downs on Monday; and a three-decker just arrived from the Mediterranean at Spithead, instead of being paid off, will be fitted out again for sea.

"Yours faithfully,

"PALMERSTON."

The step deprecated by Lord Palmerston took place. The French soldiers did run into Belgium. This measure caused great excitement, as will be seen by the following letters.

"(Private.)

"HOUSE OF COMMONS, August 11, 1831.

"My DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"As I am sending off to you a messenger to-night with my dispatch about Portugal—which has been accidentally delayed longer than it ought to have been—I write you a few lines from the Speaker's room to tell you how much the feelings of this House are excited by the march of the French troops into Belgium.

"I have been assailed with questions and notices of

* Named Ambassador Extraordinary at Brussels.

motions on the subject ; all of which have for their object to express the strong expectation felt that now that the Dutch troops are retiring from Belgium, the French troops will also return to their own territory. This was *the assurance given verbally by the French ministers to the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers ; and it was on the faith of this assurance that the conference adopted the march of the French as a measure of the alliance*, and forbore to make those objections which they would have been entitled to make, to a decision taken by France singly upon a point of such vast importance to the other Powers. I should entertain no doubt that the French government will make good their promise, if it were not for the additional condition about the restoration of peace which has been slipped into Sebastiani's note.* But that addition, making as it does a most important and essential difference in the nature of the assurance, is calculated to excite very unpleasant doubts.

"Pray take an early opportunity of speaking to Périér on this subject. Tell him that you have as yet no instructions to make any communication to him on the subject ; but that, anxiously desirous of doing everything that may depend upon you to preserve unimpaired the good understanding which subsists between the two countries, you think it right to apprise him that the entrance of the French troops into Belgium, even with the consent

* The phrase in Sebastiani's letter was—" Nous n'avons d'autre but que de maintenir l'indépendance et la neutralité du nouveau royaume, dont les grandes Puissances ont reconnu l'existence, de rétablir l'armistice qu'elles ont garanti, et de *hâter ainsi l'instant où des arrangemens, concertés entre les Puissances, et acceptés par le Roi de Hollande et le Roi des Belges, assureront aux deux pays une paix durable qui peut seule conserver la tranquillité de l'Europe.* Ce but atteint, l'armée Française rentrera immédiatement en France."

of the other Powers, is looked upon with the greatest jealousy in England, both in and out of Parliament; that I was led by the assurances given to you, and more especially by the communication afterward made to me by Talleyrand, which I was told the English government might make use of in Parliament—that I was led by these to hold out to the public here the expectation that the Dutch troops once driven back (*refoulées*) within their own limits, the French would retire to the Department of the North; that if this expectation should not be fulfilled, the French government will be accused of bad faith in the whole transaction; and that, in short, with the strongest desire to be friends with France and to preserve the peace of Europe, it is impossible for us to say what decisions we may be driven to take. The French government are perpetually telling us that certain things must, or must not, be done, in order to consult public opinion in France; *but they must remember that there is a public feeling in England as well as in France*; and that although that feeling is not as excitable upon small matters as the public mind in France, yet there are points (and Belgium is one) upon which it is keenly sensitive, and upon which, if once aroused, it would not easily be appeased.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“(Private and confidential.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1831, 10 P.M.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“We have no official communication to make to you till we know what the French government mean to do about our last protocol;* and upon their decision on that point may turn the question of peace or war. But I think it

* No. 31.

right to lose no time in communicating to you a conversation which took place to-day between Talleyrand and Bulow, and which was related to me immediately, in confidence, by the latter, because it is highly important in the present state of things that you should be aware of it. We had a conference here to-day, to place on record* the last communication from Verstolk.† Talleyrand came first, and after him Bulow, both being in the Red Waiting-room till the rest should arrive. Talleyrand immediately began about Belgium, and said to Bulow that that country could not go on as it was; that Leopold is a poor creature,‡ and unfit to be a king; the Belgians a set of cowardly vagabonds, unworthy to be independent; that we have got into a difficulty that threatens to upset either the French or the English ministry; that if the French troops retire, there is an end of Périer; and if they do not, the English government must fall; *that there is but*

* Protocol No. 32.

† Baron Verstolk van Soelen, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Hague, had written, on August 8, to the conference on the subject of the renewed hostilities.

‡ M. de Talleyrand did not show his usual discrimination of character when he made his first assertion as to King Leopold, and was hardly just or friendly to the nation his government affected to protect when he made the second. His proposal for partition was made in the teeth of the engagements of January 20, 1830, and of June 26, 1831; and necessarily justified the suspicions with which Lord Palmerston regarded the whole conduct of France at this epoch:—

January 20, 1831.—“La Belgique formera un état perpétuellement neutre. Les cinq Puissances lui garantissent cette neutralité perpétuelle ainsi que *l'intégrité* et *l'inviolabilité* de son territoire.”

June 26.—“La Belgique formera un état perpétuellement neutre. Les cinq Puissances lui garantissent cette neutralité perpétuelle ainsi que *l'intégrité* et *l'inviolabilité* de son territoire.”

one solution of these difficulties, and that is partition ; that if France, Prussia, and Holland united, the thing would be simple, and England must be contented with the making of Antwerp a free port. He dwelt at some length upon this, *his old and favorite project*, till their conversation was interrupted by the arrival of the other plenipotentiaries.

"I have also heard to-day that orders have been received from Paris by stock-jobbers to sell out on the expectation of a fall, in consequence of the supposed determination of the French government not to evacuate Belgium.

"All these are serious things and of vast importance. I can give you no specific instructions upon them without a Cabinet decision ; and we can take none till we know what the French determine to do. But you will know how to throw out, as occasion may offer, hints and warnings to P rier, so as to let him at least understand all the *possible* bearings of the decision he is about to take, without expressing any doubts of his good faith, but, on the contrary, dwelling upon our confident reliance on it.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"P.S.—We have been again attacked to-night in the House for standing by passive spectators of hostilities committed by France upon our two ancient allies, Portugal and Holland.*

* It is to be observed that Lord Palmerston, instead of dreading discussions in Parliament, as it is now the fashion to do, always takes advantage of them in support of a national policy.

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, August 13, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“We were delighted to receive your dispatches and letter,* which I received late last night, after I had sent

*“(Private.)

“PARIS, August 10, 1831.

“MY DEAR PALMERSTON,—

“I approve very much of your protocol,* and give you great credit for having concocted one which in so short a time shall have been concurred in by all the representatives in the conference, and sanctioned by your colleagues. I told Périer this morning that you thought he had put your confidence in him to a severe trial, when, without any previous understanding, the French government had ordered the march of their army into Belgium; he assured me that your confidence was not misplaced—he thought trick and deceit as dishonorable in public affairs as in private life, and in the end never answered. When he spoke to me doubtfully of his majority in the Chamber, I said that perhaps the unpopularity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs might lose him some votes. That is true, he answered; but since I have been Prime Minister, Sebastiani has acted cordially with me, and in entire accordance with my opinions and views; and I should think I acted dishonorably by him if I gave him up in consequence of a clamor which the press has raised against him. I begged him not to understand me as complaining of Sebastiani; but he would allow me to express the wish that, if any change were to take place with respect to the Foreign Department, he would himself take the *portefeuille*; his manner of answering me gave me reason to think that he was not indisposed to adopt my suggestion. He is very anxious, as indeed you must be, to settle definitively the Dutch and Belgian question—men’s minds will not be tranquillized until it is settled; and after having driven back the Dutch, and saved the Belgians from the Dutch, the conference will have a right to speak more authoritatively to both than they have hitherto done.

“I have been at the Palais Royal this evening. I never found

* Protocol 31.

off my letter. So far, so good; the ratification of our protocol,* and the renewed assurances by P rier of the good faith and honor of the French government, are as satisfactory as anything can be; but when you wrote, the decision of the King of the Netherlands to retire was not known in Paris; and the important and eventful question

the king so cordial and so overflowing with professions of doing nothing but in concert with England.

“Yours sincerely,

“GRANVILLE.”

* Extract—Protocol No. 31, dated 6 August, 1831.—“When they had heard these declarations (of the French government, communicated by the plenipotentiary of France), the conference were of opinion that, on the one hand, France, in coming to the determination which she had adopted, had not had time to comply with the obligation which she wished to fulfill, of concerting measures with her allies; but that, on the other hand, she manifested her determination only to have recourse to these measures for the execution of the engagements entered into by the five Powers with respect to the maintenance of the armistice between Holland and Belgium. Consequently, the plenipotentiaries of the five courts regarded the entrance of the French troops into Belgium as having taken place, not with any object personal to France, but with that object to which the deliberations of the conference are directed, and it remained understood that the extent to be given to the operations of these troops, and the duration of their stay in Belgium, should be fixed by common agreement between the five courts at the conference of London.

“Moreover, it was agreed upon that the French troops should not cross the ancient frontiers of Holland; that their operations should be confined to the left bank of the Meuse; that under no contingency should they invest the town of Maestricht, or that of Venloo; . . . in fine, that, in conformity with the declarations made by the French government to the representatives of the four courts at Paris, the French troops should retire within the limits of France as soon as the armistice shall have been re-established as it existed before the renewal of hostilities.”

then remains, Will the French government withdraw their troops into France as soon as the Dutch have evacuated Belgium? Pray make them comprehend *all* that hangs upon that decision.

"Grey writes to you. He is peremptory on this point; and even if the Cabinet had the slightest wish to give way upon it—which they have not—public opinion in England would prevent them. It is, then, a question of war or peace. On *Thursday* next Vyvyan* renews his motion on Belgium. On that day *at latest* I shall be compelled to give the House of Commons a categorical answer, *yes or no, to the question, Do the French troops evacuate Belgium or not? Pray enable me to give an answer by that day, and let not the French government mistake the import of the answer which they may enable me to give.* The yes or no which I shall have to utter will imply events of most extensive consequence to the two countries and to all Europe.†

"Talleyrand has read me his dispatch of yesterday to Sebastiani, which is perfect.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 17, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I have been talking to Talleyrand, who gave me to read a private letter to him from Sebastiani, dated the 14th. In that letter Sebastiani announced the retirement of 20,000 French into France, and the falling back of the remainder upon Nivelles; but there was an ugly passage alluding to the fortresses, and hinting that an arrangement

* M.P. for Okehampton.

† The great merit of Lord Palmerston's diplomacy is that it is not ambiguous.

must be made about them before the French army would entirely evacuate Belgium.

“Talleyrand asked me what I thought of the letter. I said that his government would deceive themselves if they thought that we could ever consent to mix up the fortress question with the evacuation of Belgium; that the French government have bound themselves to evacuate Belgium,* and we must expect them to fulfill their engagement; that as to the fortresses, if they expected that we were to sign a treaty with them for the destruction of those fortresses, I would tell him that I would never put my hand to such a treaty, even if the government agreed to it; but that I was very sure that the government would be of opinion that our honor requires that France shall not be a party to such a treaty, and that moreover we cannot even deliberate upon the question of demolition till the French troops are out of Belgium. I asked him what his government wanted—to have the thing done or to make a theatrical display? If the former, they ought to be satisfied with the decisions† we have taken and communicated to them. We wish some of these fortresses to be dismantled as much as they do, and it *will* be done. If they want only dramatic effect, that may suit them, but it does not suit us; and the other Powers of Europe will not submit to humiliation to gain a few votes for the Périér administration. We wish to maintain that administration because we believe it to be pacific, and that France, under its sway, will behave like a good neighbor. But if it is necessary for us all to endure humiliations in order to keep

* By accepting Protocol No. 31.

† By the secret fortress protocol of April 17, made known officially on July 14, which declared that a portion of these fortresses should be destroyed.

that ministry in, then we will say, let us have Mauguin and Lamarque at once; at least we shall then know what we are about and who we have to deal with. *We fully mean to dismantle many of these Belgian fortresses; but we will never endure that France should dictate to us in this matter at the point of the bayonet.* What I said seemed to make some impression upon Talleyrand, and he begged me to write to you accordingly.

"I hear that young Périer has brought instructions to him to renew his application for Philippeville and Marienburg; but we must be firm, and resist these encroaching claims, or we shall not know where to stop.

"The only value to us of Périer and his Cabinet is, that we believe them to be lovers of peace and observers of treaties; but if they are to be merely puppets, put up to play the part cast for them by the violent party, what is it to us whether they stand or fall?"

"If they were to fall, and their successors were to engage in a war of aggression, all Europe would again unite against France, and the treaties of 1815 might, perhaps, in some future day be looked upon at Paris as an arrangement they would be glad to get back to.

"These considerations could not even be adverted to if we were pressing the French government to yield to unreasonable pretensions of ours, because they would only put up their spirit to resist the more; but when the question is whether the government shall act honorably by its allies, at the risk of being criticised by a few bad speakers in the Chamber, such considerations are not out of place or season.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, August 17, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I like not your letter nor your dispatches,* nor those which Talleyrand read to me to-day by desire of Sebastiani.

“The dispatches which Talleyrand himself writes to Sebastiani are perfect, and evidently written that he may read them to me. What else he writes I cannot tell, but I am not so sure that what he reads to me is all he sends, and that the rest is in the same tone.

“*One thing is certain—the French must go out of Belgium, or we have a general war, and war in a given number of days. But, say the French, we mean to go out, but we must choose our own time and our own terms. The time, however, they have agreed shall be settled by the conference, and it must be as early as is consistent with the objects for which they professed to go in.*

“They came in at the invitation of an allied sovereign, whose neutrality and independence they have agreed to guarantee, and they marched for the accomplishment of the objects which the five Powers have all been aiming at. What terms, then, are they entitled to make as to their retreat? None! With regard to the fortresses, make them understand that their pretensions are utterly inadmissible. The very basis upon which we can agree to the demolition of any of these fortresses is the security derived from the guarantee of France and of the other Powers.

“That guarantee, then, must be given in the fullest and most formal manner before we can stir a step; and to dismantle these fortresses while the French have them in possession would be a disgrace to all the five Powers; and

* They stated that the French would not go out of Belgium without some previous arrangement as to the fortresses.

as to making France a party to the treaty for their demolition, that is impossible. Nothing shall ever induce me to put my name to such a treaty, and I am quite sure the Cabinet never would sanction it.

"We have had no Cabinet to-day upon your letter and your dispatches, because we want to learn the result of my letter and Grey's of Saturday last. Sebastiani and Soult apparently want to pick a quarrel with all their neighbors, or to compel everybody to submit to their insolence and aggressions.

"They miscalculate their chances, however, I think; and they will find that a war with all the rest of the world, brought upon them by a violation of their word, will not turn to their advantage, nor redound to their honor. They will not be the better able to carry on the war on the Continent for losing all their commerce, and for being deprived of the revenue arising therefrom. The ruin of their sea-ports will create general distress throughout the country; the Chambers will soon be sick of barren glory if they succeed, or of defeats brought needlessly upon them if they fail; the ministry will be turned out, and the king may go with them. The Carlist party will make an effort, and with the republicans may give much embarrassment. Austria and Prussia are well prepared for war.

"The Belgians will not join the French.*

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

* This decided language, which a less resolute minister would have avoided as likely to provoke war, really prevented it, as will be seen by the following extract from a letter of Lord Granville, dated Paris, August 15, 1831:

"My representations and Talleyrand's dispatches of the state of public feeling in England have alarmed them (Périer and Sebastiani) a little, and produced the half-measure, which Talleyrand is

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1831.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I send you a dispatch and a protocol.* We had a conference after the Cabinet this morning, and the protocol is a faithful record of our proceedings. We felt that the four Powers have a right to require the French troops to evacuate Belgium as soon as the Dutch have done so; but not having yet any official report of the latter fact, we postponed expressing any opinion as to the time of French evacuation.

“Talleyrand told me during the conference that he had received to-day a messenger who brought him letters, by which it appears that the French troops *will* evacuate, that the French government do not mean to set up any claim about Philippeville and Marienburg, but that they must have something settled about the fortresses; and he suggested, as from himself, that I should write to you to say that if the French will only go out of Belgium, the fortress question shall be settled to their satisfaction.

“I told him we never would agree to mix up the two questions; that the French entered Belgium as a measure of the alliance to succor Leopold, promising solemnly that they would go out when that object had been accomplished. That in their verbal communications to the ministers of the four Powers, in their subsequent note in Tal-

instructed to announce, of the immediate return to France of 20,000 men, and of the retreat of the remainder into that part of Belgium between Nivelles and the French frontier.”

* No. 33; noting the fact that 20,000 men of the French army had been ordered to return to France, and reserving to a future opportunity the settlement of the period at which the occupation of Belgium by the French troops should entirely cease.

leyrand's communications to me, and in the 31st protocol,* the return of the French troops is declared to be dependent upon the accomplishment of the objects for which they went in. But that in no one of those communications is it pretended that these troops marched in to demolish the fortresses; such an act would indeed have been to make war against the four Powers, and not to co operate with them.

"I asked him whether his government wished that people hereafter should believe the French government on its word, and should be able to put any trust in their promises. That if they did wish this, they must fulfill their promises and keep their word, and not now, when all the conditions of retreat are about to be made good, start upon us a new condition entirely foreign to the circumstances which led to the march, and to the object for which it was directed.

"Let France keep her word honestly and fairly, let her evacuate Belgium as soon as the Dutch have retired to their territory, and then we will lose no time in settling the details of an arrangement which we all wish to carry into execution just as much as France herself. By pursuing such a course, she will preserve her honor pure. She will retain her friends, maintain peace, and at the same time attain her object. By a contrary proceeding, she will put all these things to risk.

"If the French want *éclat* with the Chambers and the public, what better mode of acquiring it than being able to say that they flew to the aid of the Belgians, and saved them from their Dutch invaders; that they marched to defend the principle of national independence, and in support of the engagements of France; that having with unex-

* Dated August 6, already noticed.

amplified rapidity succeeded in *all* their objects, they have not sullied their laurels by any sordid or interested attempts; that they have maintained their honor spotless, and have instantly withdrawn, thereby showing their respect for that independence which the energy of their arms had rescued and established?

"I have seldom seen a stronger feeling than that of the Cabinet about this question of the fortresses.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 23, 1831, 11 P.M.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"There never was certainly a more difficult task than that which we have now to perform in getting the French out of Belgium. The French wish to stay in; the Prussians do not know their own mind on the subject, because they have always a secret thought that if the French stay, and war ensues, partition must follow, and they will come in for their share; and hence it is that Werther is not very keen on the subject, though Ancillon* protests to Chad† that his only wish is to get the French out. Austria is the nearest to us in her feelings on this point, and has no particular interest to pursue in it. Russia, who, I suspect, knew more of the Dutch king's inroad than she would choose to own, is always ready to use hard words and high language to everybody, but would not be sorry to see us all quarreling together. The Dutch (here, at least) affect to wish the French to stay, pretending that the desire to get rid of them will make the Belgians easier to deal with; and the Belgians say they want their protection while the

* Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

† British minister at Berlin.

Belgian army is remodeling, and until Holland has agreed to a truce. But it is of great importance to get the French out. Only think what our difficulties would be if a change of government were to happen at Paris, and other men to come in, not tied by Périer's verbal assurances, and indisposed to execute his written engagements. Pray urge him strenuously to stay in: it is really a duty which he owes to Europe, in order that France may be able to keep her faith with other nations.

"I had a long conversation yesterday with Talleyrand. He began by saying he came to ask a little help and a small act of friendship, which would cost us nothing and would be very useful to them. It was about the fortresses. He only wished that what we meant to do should be done immediately, and the French would then immediately withdraw. I said we felt great friendship for and should be glad to help them, but there were things we could not do. That if I understood him, they wanted to attach a new condition to their retreat, and *that* one nearly touching our pride and interests, namely, the demolition of the barrier fortresses. That we could not submit to such a condition, because it would be humiliating, and that we must claim the performance of the engagements entered into by France.

"Besides, I said, how is this to help you? Are you to keep our determination secret, or are you to make it public? If you keep it secret, how can it help you in France? And if you are to make another *coup de théâtre* of it, and boast that the French army did not retire from Belgium till the Powers of Europe had named the fortresses to be demolished, that may be very useful to Périer's government, and highly gratifying to the good people of Paris, but it will be so at the expense of the administration of Lord Grey, and of the just pride of the English nation, to say

nothing about the other three ; and I added that, however much we wished well to Périer, there is no reason why we should undergo humiliation to give him strength.

" We discussed this matter to-day in Cabinet, and it was agreed that all we could do would be to begin the discussion between the four Powers and Léopold for the purpose of selecting the fortresses to be dismantled ; but that France could not possibly be a party to this discussion, and that the retreat of her troops cannot be coupled with this question, but must stand upon the grounds upon which it was originally placed. I shall write to Adair to urge Leopold to give authority to somebody here to treat about these fortresses.

" Yours sincerely,

" PALMERSTON."

" (Private.)

" FOREIGN OFFICE, August 25, 1831.

" MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

" I have received with great satisfaction your dispatches and letters,* which arrived yesterday and to-day, announcing that orders have been given for the evacuation of Belgium by the French. I have to-day also heard from Adair, who sends me copy of the official demand by Leopold, that a division of infantry, with some cavalry and artillery, should for a short time remain. This request of his seems

* *Extract of Letter from Lord Granville.*

" PARIS, August 31, 1831.

" Périer promised that he would endeavor to do what he could to meet our wishes ; and when, in answer to what he had mentioned of the request of Leopold to retain some part of the French troops for his protection, I said that *this request ought rather to have been addressed to the conference than to the French government*, he fully acquiesced in the justice of that observation." Lord Palmerston has noted on this the words "*Quite true.*"

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reasonable; and if the force thus left is but a few thousand men, there can be no objection to their continuance till the King of the Netherlands has formally bound himself by the suspension of arms not to renew hostilities.

"I have sent you copies of what I have written to Bagot* about the Dutch vexations at Antwerp and its

* *Viscount Palmerston to Sir Charles Bagot.*

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 23, 1831.

"SIR,—

"I inclose copy of a dispatch from Baron Hocheplé Larpent, H. M. Consul at Antwerp, by which it appears that as late as the 19th inst., seven days after the cessation of hostilities had been agreed upon between the Prince of Orange on the one hand, and Sir R. Adair and General Belliard on the other, the Dutch were actively employed in cutting the dikes and inundating the country in the neighborhood of Antwerp. Such an act of extensive devastation cannot for an instant be justified by the pretense upon which it is understood to be rested. It is said that General Chassé, thinking it convenient to have a water communication between the citadel of Antwerp and the flotilla below the town, without passing along the river, determined for this purpose to lay under water the whole of the peninsula behind the *Tête de Flandre*, a tract of nearly three miles across; and it appears from the dispatch of Baron Hocheplé that this extensive inundation was carried into effect by cutting the great sea-dikes at a time when hostilities had ceased for several days, and when, therefore, no molestation could be apprehended by Dutch vessels from the batteries on the banks of the Scheldt.

"His Majesty's government trust that so unjustifiable a proceeding was not sanctioned by any orders from the Hague, and must as soon as it was known have met with the immediate disapprobation of the Netherland government, as being, in spirit, an infraction of the agreement to suspend the operations of war; and your Excellency is instructed to request the Netherland government to give, without loss of time, the necessary orders for repairing the breaches which have been made in these dikes, and for remedying, as far as circumstances will admit, the extensive

neighborhood, by which you will see we have not been inattentive to the interests of the Belgians.

“With respect to the fortresses, we will do all we possibly can to meet the wishes of the French government; but they must allow us to do it in our own way. The proposition that we should empower Adair to treat with Maubourg* on this matter is quite inadmissible. The question is a military question, which must be decided upon full consideration, and not by spinning a teetotum. It is only here in London that all the reasons which bear upon it can be fully brought into discussion; and Austria and Prussia, but especially the latter, have as strong an interest as we have in the decision. We never can admit that these fortresses were intended for aggression against France; and the nature of things speaks for itself. If these fortresses were on the extreme frontier of a great and powerful kingdom like France, having a large army as its peace establishment, then indeed they might menace the safety of neighbors, because such a power might, within its own territory, assemble round such fortresses a force sufficient to make a sudden inroad, as France has recently made into Belgium, and the fortresses would be a support and base of operation. But the Belgian army is not very likely to invade France; and if the Prussians intended to do so, and through Belgium, it is quite clear which of the two parties, the French or the Prussian, would first get to Mons, Tournay, Menin, and other places on the French frontier.

and wanton injury thus inflicted upon the inhabitants of the district where this outrage has been committed.

“I am, etc.,

“PALMERSTON.”

* Latour Maubourg, French ambassador.

“The Duke of Wellington’s opinion, as a military man, is decidedly against the dismantling of any of them; as he contends they are all necessary for the defense of Belgium, and that Belgium might easily garrison them against a *coup de main*; and of course the ‘Times’* will take that line when the question comes to be discussed in Parliament. Only see, then, how inconceivably difficult our position would be if the Opposition could assert, not only that we had agreed to sacrifice fortresses which have cost us millions sterling, and which, in the opinion of the highest military authority, are indispensable for the defense of Belgium against France, but that we had permitted the selection of places for dismantling to be made by that very France whose aggression they were destined to prevent. There really would be something in the proceeding so utterly repugnant to common sense, and so incompatible with the condition of an independent nation, that it is quite and entirely impossible. The other Powers, moreover, will not hear of it, and especially Prussia. Bulow has received instructions to press for the immediate evacuation of Belgium, and to state that the prolonged continuance of the French troops would compel the King of Prussia to put his troops in the Rhenish Provinces into movement.

“For the present, matters seem to stand as well as under circumstances is possible. The bulk of the French army is retiring from Belgium; a small portion remains at the request of Leopold, upon grounds which will cease to exist as soon as Holland has agreed to the armistice. We have now got full powers for Van de Weyer to negotiate

* It is curious to see how even at that period the “Times” constituted a fourth estate of the realm.

for peace, and we must try to settle matters definitively as soon as we can.

"I write you a dispatch about the French ships of war in the Tagus, because a motion is to be made on Tuesday upon the subject of the English and French expeditions to Portugal, and I should be glad to be able to say by that time when the French ships are likely to go away entirely.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 26, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"You have done capitally, and the successful result of your efforts is most satisfactory.* Our opponents are now obliged to tender us their *doleful congratulations* upon our fortunate escape from what they looked forward to as a certain piece of luck. In the mean time Reform is getting slowly through the Commons, and I have little doubt of its safe passage through the Lords.

"I cannot wonder at Leopold's wishing to retain for a time some portion of the French troops. But when we have the Dutch acceptance of our armistice, and the Belgian army is a little reorganized, he may be able to let them go, and the sooner this is done the better.† Adair says that Belliard tells him that there would be danger of Orange risings if the French were all to go. This may be true, and certainly is an additional reason for keeping a *small force*. But I do not think the presence of a foreign garrison good for any sovereign; and if Leopold means to

* The French government had by this time promised to withdraw their troops, though they had not done it.

† The Dutch first consented to a six weeks' armistice, lasting till October 10.

stay at Brussels, he should have his own people about him, and none others.

"I hope we may soon be able to come to an agreement in the conference as to the proper terms of peace between the parties, and then we must tell them *that* is what they are to have; for as to their coming to any common understanding together, they would not do it in six years, instead of six weeks, if it depended upon their convincing each other. By giving the upper nook of Limburg, the whole of the right bank of the Meuse, and Maestricht to Holland, the Dutch interests as to territory would be amply provided for; and Prussia, being secured on her own frontier, would probably be pretty easy as to other arrangements; though I see that Bulow has a mighty longing for the fortress of Luxembourg, with a small district round it; not that he has ever dropped the slightest hint of such a notion, but, knowing him pretty accurately, I see it pretty clearly at the bottom of the well. This may account for Werther's readiness to give France Philippeville and Marienburg: the consent of Prussia to that cession would be purchased by the acquiescence of France in the cession of Luxembourg fortress to Prussia. *But let us stave off all these nibblings: if once these great Powers begin to taste blood, they will never be satisfied with one bite, but will speedily devour their victim.*

"In the mean while Bulow is wishing sincerely for peace, but wants to turn the balance upon every occasion too much in favor of the Orange family. These are his instructions; and I have written to Chad to beg him to point out to Ancillon that if this is pushed too far, it must tend to unite France and England in favor of Belgium, and to make a split in the conference.

"I am sorry to hear bad reports of the present state of the Roman legations, where increasing discontent prevails;

while the Papal government do not understand how to take the proper measures for allaying it.

"I have written to Chad and Heytesbury to urge the Prussian and Russian governments to acknowledge Leopold forthwith; but I have no expectation of their doing so.

"*Talleyrand has for some time past been preaching to all who would listen to him the necessity of partitioning Belgium*, and sending Leopold to Claremont, unless he were made Grand Duke of Luxembourg; and he put up Alexander Baring, the other day, to broach this doctrine in the House of Commons. There would be no harm, I think, if you were to hint to Périer that this sort of language held by the French ambassador here, in the face of the known engagements of France, is calculated to excite in the public mind those suspicions of French policy and intentions which have broken out lately in Parliament and in the papers, and therefore must be prejudicial to the French government, besides tending to impair the cordial good understanding which we wish to see maintained, not only between the two governments, but between the two nations.

"You will have seen very violent language in the 'Times' against France. We cannot help it. The 'Times' breaks loose every now and then, and goes its own way. However, its tone of late cannot have done much harm, since it must have tended to convince the French that the government would be supported in the tone we have been taking about Belgium, and might even have gone further without exceeding the sentiments of others.

"Yours, etc.,

"PALMERSTON."

“(Private.)

“FOREIGN OFFICE, September 2, 1831, 11 P.M.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I have just received your dispatches and letters of the 31st, the contents of which are very satisfactory as far as they go.

“To-morrow the conference meets again to consider the plan of a definitive treaty. Talleyrand made great difficulties yesterday about signing the protocol* I sent you, harmless and innocent as it was; alleging that he was afraid of signing anything more without referring to his court for authority. But Warsaw had already begun to tell with Prussia. Bulow said to him that he knew why he would not sign; the armistice which we had established tended to settle things, and the wish of France was to keep them unsettled, in order to prolong her occupation. This was her wish, though she dared not avow it; but if he (Talleyrand) did not sign that protocol that very day, he (Bulow) should immediately propose to the conference to make a formal demand for the immediate retreat of every French soldier from Belgium. This passed in a corner between the two; and I then afterward took the thing up in a similar way, and observed that if we could not make a record of the armistice because it referred to Protocol 34, which had not yet been accepted, there seemed nothing for us to do except to go back one number, to Protocol 33, which had been accepted.† All this brought Talleyrand

* No. 38, inviting the King of the Netherlands to cause the dikes round Antwerp to be repaired, in order to put a stop to the inundations; and informing the Belgian government that it ought to raze the batteries erected against the citadel of Antwerp, and stop all other hostile operations.

† Of August 18, mentioning that 20,000 French troops had received orders to return to France.

to his pen and ink, and the paper was signed. But he begged me to write to you to explain his embarrassment.

"The English Reform Bill will probably be through the Committee to-morrow or Monday, and out of the House in the course of a week or ten days.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"P.S.—I am very much pleased with what Sebastiani says to you about Latour Maubourg. If Leopold adheres to our protocol, and sends a man to London, the fortress question might be settled in a week with satisfaction to all parties concerned."*

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, September 3, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"We shall never get on with the Belgians till the French are out of Belgium. There is no end to the intrigues, which their presence gives rise to. I do not believe a word about the danger to which Leopold is exposed from what they call anarchy; it is all a pretense got up between

* "Sebastiani instanced, as a proof of his disposition to accede to the wishes of the British government, Latour Maubourg's having only pressed for Leopold's adherence to the April protocol" (respecting the demolition of the fortresses), "and the instruction to Belliard to urge the Belgic government to accept the armistice proposed in the 34th Protocol. He also took to himself some credit for his peremptory rejection of the secret article proposed by the Belgic government relative to the eighteen articles of separation."*

* *Note by Lord Palmerston to this.*—"Namely, that if France would obtain for Belgium the eighteen articles, Belgium would knock down as many fortresses as France pleased.—P."

Brussels and Paris. Stockmar admits that foreign troops are not necessary for internal quiet, provided peace from without is secured. No doubt the late invasion greatly unhinged the government, and unsettled men's minds and revived the hopes of the Orangeists; but since the Dutch are gone and cannot come back again, surely Leopold's army and civic guards must be able to maintain order; and if they *will* not do so and uphold their king, I do not see what right we have to interfere in the matter. But this is a pretense: the French want to push their own interests, and specially the fortress question, as is proved by Gérard's asking for the citadel of Tournay.

"My dear Granville,

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"(Private.)

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Sept. 16, 1831.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"So there is an end of the poor Poles! I am heartily sorry for them; but their case had become for some time hopeless. If they could not defend Warsaw, what can they do at Modlin or Plock? The only thing now to be done is for the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna to take care that that treaty is not violated by Russia.* I have only this instant received the news from

* I find these notes for dispatches written to Lord Heytesbury on the Polish question:

"March 22, 1832, to Heytesbury.—The revolt of Poles and their casting off authority of emperor and king could afford Russian government no grounds for departing from stipulations of Treaty of Vienna. That revolt cannot release Russia from engagements to other Powers, which had for object not merely welfare of Poles, but security of neighboring states.

"The article relative to national representation and institutions has not been fulfilled by Russia.

Chad, and therefore have had no opportunity of talking to the Cabinet on the subject, or of knowing what we may resolve to do.

“November 23, 1831.—Recommend amnesty full and complete. The Treaty of Vienna declared that Poland should be attached to Russia by its constitution. A constitution the Emperor of Russia accordingly gave; and it is no forced construction of the meaning of that treaty to consider the constitution so given as existing thenceforth under the sanction of the treaty.

“But argued, same Power which gave may modify or take away; but constitution once given became link which under the treaty binds Poland to Russia, and that link cannot be unimpaired if constitution should not be maintained.

“Constitution carefully guards against any change by mere act of executive authority.

“Art. 31 declares that Polish nation shall forever possess national representation: a Diet of king and two Chambers.

“Art 163.—Organic statutes and codes of laws cannot be modified or changed except by king and two Chambers.

“Art. 45.—Every King of Poland shall swear before God and on Scriptures to maintain constitution and cause it to be executed; and Emperor Alexander on November 27, 1815, formally gave this constitution, and declared he adopted it for himself and successors.

“Treaty makes a marked distinction between the kingdom of Poland and the incorporated provinces.

“Provincial states suitable to incorporated provinces; constitution suitable to separate and distinct position of kingdom in relation to Russian Empire.

“To take away constitution is to reduce kingdom to condition of the provinces.

“Europe looks to re-establishment of law and justice from submission of Poles, and not to acts of retaliation and vengeance; such acts could not be palliated if resorted to by a Power which has subdued all opposition, and can plead for its measures the necessity of no pressing emergency.

“Has been stated in proclamations of Russia that only a part of Poles had joined revolt and majority remained faithful.—Innocent

"We are quite satisfied with the French communication about the evacuation of Belgium, and have drawn up a civil protocol on the subject, which I send you to-day.*

"The Belgians are playing the foolish game of delay, and will now perhaps repent it, since the success of the Russians gives advantage to the King of the Netherlands. We cannot get an answer from them to our three questions about limits, debt, and Luxembourg; and instead of answering us they start childish discussions about words, merely to kill time.

should not be punished for guilty; but if whole nation has shared in revolt, proof of deeply-seated discontent not likely to be removed by sweeping abrogation of constitution.

"March 12, 1832.—It does not follow that because war between two states dissolves treaties, therefore civil war annuls constitutions.

"This dispatch to be communicated to Count Nesselrode."

* *Protocol No. 41.*

"Sept. 15, 1831.

"The plenipotentiary of France opened the conference by declaring that the French government had, of its own free will, resolved upon withdrawing from Belgium the last remaining division of French troops, which had been left there until the present time solely at the express desire of the actual sovereign of the country; that the retreat of this corps will commence on the 25th of this month, and that on the 30th Belgium will be entirely evacuated.

"In reply to this declaration, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia expressed to the plenipotentiary of France the satisfaction with which they received it. This new demonstration of the generous principles by which the policy of France is guided, and of her love of peace, had been expected by her allies with entire confidence, and the plenipotentiaries requested the Prince de Talleyrand to be persuaded that their courts would know how to appreciate at its just value the resolution taken by the French government."

"We have to-day had a conference with Goblet about the fortresses; he is an intelligent and well-conditioned man, and understands the business. We have all agreed that Menin, Mons, Philippeville, and Marienburg must be dismantled, that Ath or Tournay should be added to them, and that Charleroi should be maintained. There is a doubt whether either Ath or the citadel of Tournay ought not to be kept—probably the latter. I confess that for my part I cannot bring myself to see the advantage of laying Brussels entirely open, by leveling everything between the Meuse and Scheldt. Do not, however, say anything on this subject to the French government at present.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

I have thought it desirable to insert thus largely Lord Palmerston's letters on the most important questions concerning Belgium, because they strongly bring out the leading qualities of his character, both as an individual and a diplomatist—those qualities being boldness of language and directness of purpose.

I might be tempted as a critic to say that he was rather prone to suspect intentions and to conceive prejudices; but whilst allowing he was open to these charges, it is but just to observe that by his firmness of conduct and clearness of argument he finally succeeded in carrying his two points; viz., the departure of the French troops from Belgium, and the destruction by Belgium and the allies of those fortresses* which they deemed the most desirable to

* The definitive convention respecting the destruction of these fortresses was signed December 14, 1831, to which was appended a declaration, signed January 23, 1832, to the following effect:

"Que les stipulations de la convention du 14 Décembre motivées par le changement de la situation politique de la Belgique ne peu-

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destroy, without taking into consultation the Power against whose disposition for conquest they had been erected. The fortresses destroyed were Menin, Ath, Mons, Philippeville, and Marienburg, the two last of which the French had first wished to acquire, and then desired to have left, with a wish (not improbably) of subsequently obtaining them. There can be no doubt that the whole of this correspondence shows that disposition for conquest, aggrandizement, and glory which distinguishes the French nation and which made M. de Châteaubriand say, "*La France n'est qu'un soldat.*" But I should be sorry if it was thought that I thus wished either to damage the interests or attack the character of an illustrious people. It is the same vivacity, the same energy, the same chivalrous impulses which have made them constantly anxious to extend their frontiers and to be careless of their lives, which have made them the life, the animation, the glory of Continental Europe—the cultivators of art, the diffusers of civilization, the generous sympathizers with every humiliated nationality in its distress. We must take them for such as they are—uniting ourselves frankly with them where our interests and principles are the same, defending ourselves frankly and boldly against them where our principles or interests differ—not showing humility in their prosperity, nor indifference in their adversity—and remembering that when they could unite, the union of France and England has been hitherto the peace and prosperity of the world. Another difficulty had now, however, to be met.

I have stated that the Dutch government had acceded

vent et ne doivent être entendues que sous la réserve de la souveraineté pleine et entière de S. M. le Roi des Belges sur les forteresses indiquées dans la dite convention, ainsi que sur celle de la neutralité et de l'indépendance garanties aux mêmes titres et aux mêmes droits par les cinq Puissances."

to the first plan of separation proposed by the conference ; to this the Belgians had refused their assent. It has been seen that in order to facilitate the election of King Leopold the allies had altered their original stipulations as contained in twenty-four articles, and had adopted new ones contained in eighteen. To these the Belgians, not without much difficulty, agreed, whilst the Dutch would not agree. But after the inroad of the Dutch and the defeat of the Belgians, Holland stood in a position very different from that which she had previously occupied. She was no longer the Power which had been driven from Belgium by a successful revolution, but the Power which, after that revolution had been fully organized, showed a capacity to vanquish it, and would have done so but for the intervention of a foreign state. It was impossible to deny that this added greatly to her moral force ; and it was now thought that all circumstances, past and present, should be taken into fair consideration, and some final resolve imposed on the two parties.

This was done in an arrangement consisting, like the first, of twenty-four articles.* Belgians and Dutch alike

* There were, as I have stated during the course of these transactions, three projects for the settlement of the differences between Holland and Belgium.

That of January 20-29, 1831, which Holland accepted and Belgium refused ; that of June 26, which Belgium accepted and Holland refused ; and that of November 15, which Belgium accepted with hesitation and Holland refused, and which, as far as territory was concerned, was imposed, and meant to be imposed, on both parties. .

The first gave Holland all her ancient territory and Luxembourg to the King of Holland, and to Belgium all that had not belonged to Holland in 1790.

The second left the question of Luxembourg undecided, seeming to suggest it might be assigned to Belgium, maintaining its established relations with the Germanic Diet, the King and Kingdom

objected ; but the Belgians finally dropped their opposition, owing, no doubt, to the influence and moderation of their king, who nevertheless bitterly complained.

"Here am I," he said in a letter to Lord Palmerston, "who was only induced to accept the throne of Belgium on certain conditions, which the allies solemnly guaranteed to me.

"The King of Holland defies the allies, and attacks me;* and in consequence of this I am required to agree to things which if they had been imposed on me originally I should have refused." I could quote much of the correspondence of this monarch to show the ability with which he defended the cause he represented; but I have already, perhaps, trespassed beyond the limits of quotation with respect to Belgium, and I shall therefore give but two short extracts, which will sufficiently attest King Leopold's appreciation of Lord Palmerson's conduct.

January 2, 1832: "It gives me the sincerest pleasure to be able to thank you most warmly for the honest and

of Holland receiving adequate compensation; and pointed out what had at first been overlooked,—viz., that Belgium was entitled by the first proposition (January 20), which the King of Holland had accepted, to various portions of territory which were considered Dutch, but which had not belonged to Holland in 1790.

In the last the conference took into its own hands the disposal of those possessions which had neither belonged to Holland nor Brabant in former times, but had become annexed to the monarchy of the Netherlands, distributing such possessions in the manner it thought most equitable and convenient between them.

The other differences related to the division of the debt, and the rights over rivers, canals, and roads, which it was necessary to establish for the common benefit.

* An armistice, as has been stated, existed, proposed by the authority of the allies, and accepted at the commencement of these affairs by the two belligerents.

vigorous line of policy which you have adopted in the present complicated state of European affairs. The fortress business is satisfactorily settled. It has been a great annoyance to me, because the French thought I had proposed the treaty in its present shape, and been guilty of the worst faith possible by keeping it a profound secret. The only accusation I cannot stand is that of bad faith, because nothing is more abhorrent to my nature.”*

Again, April 17, 1832: “I must do you the justice to repeat what I have often already expressed—it is impossible to adopt a more honorable, straightforward line of policy than you do.”

King Leopold, in reality, was much too sensible a man not to see that Belgium had still to be legally created; that it had never yet existed as a kingdom, and might at any moment pass away under some new combination, if it did not receive a legitimate existence. He was, therefore, inclined to accept any conditions at all reasonable, and which he could get his people to sanction, providing those final conditions were to be really final and made imperative, if necessary, on the resisting party.

All the Powers agreed to the twenty-four articles, though Austria and Prussia, and Russia especially, made some reserves.†

* The Belgian government had previously informed the French government that it would endeavor to save Philippeville and Marienburg, and destroy instead Charleroi and Tournay. But the conference would not consent to this; and the King of the Belgians finally subscribed to the destruction of Charleroi and Marienburg, his plenipotentiary having endeavored to save them.

† Austria's reserve relates simply to the rights of the Germanic Confederation concerning any exchanges made relative to the Duchy of Luxembourg. The Prussian reserve, made by a separate declaration, is of the same kind. The Russian ratification is *sauf*

M. Van de Weyer, then minister in London, had the courage to accept at Lord Palmerston's advice the arrangement thus made, notwithstanding such reserves; an act which saved his country from interminable embarrassment, though some of the more sanguine patriots in the Belgian Chamber at the time condemned it.

Lord Palmerston thus justifies M. Van de Weyer's conduct :

“(Private.)

“STANHOPE STREET, May 14, 1832.

“SIR,—

“I regret extremely to learn from M. Van de Weyer and Baron de Stockmar that your Majesty and your ministers are dissatisfied about the Russian ratification, and are of opinion that M. Van de Weyer did not exercise a sound discretion in consenting to accept that instrument. If M. Van de Weyer was wrong in so doing, I can assure your Majesty that he did not err alone, and that he acted not merely upon his own opinion, but in conformity with that of others, who have your Majesty's interest at heart. But whether we were right or wrong on this particular occasion, I feel it but just to say that a sovereign has not often been served with more devotion, with more ability, and with more judgment than your Majesty has been by M. Van de Weyer, through the whole of the very difficult matters with which he has been charged since he became your Majesty's plenipotentiary ;

les modifications et amendemens à apporter dans un arrangement définitif entre la Hollande et la Belgique dans les articles ix, xii, xiii, which relate to the navigation of rivers, the construction of roads, and the partition of the debt—questions which, as they related exclusively to Holland and Belgium, Russia left to an agreement between the parties themselves.

and I cannot but persuade myself that when this last transaction comes to be impartially considered, it will be found that it forms no exception to the meritorious character of his former services."

The important thing, in fact, was to get all the Powers to agree to the territorial limits that were to be assigned to the two countries, and to place that country—henceforth to be considered neutral, inviolable, and independent—under their common safeguard. The matters reserved were altogether secondary; and it would have been most unwise to have rejected the concurrence of Russia in the settlement of all the greater affairs because she did not wish to bind herself so imperatively as to the smaller ones.

A decision, moreover, was taken by the conference which of itself established two orders of questions. The territorial delimitation it had fixed was pronounced to be incapable of change, and to be effected, if necessary, by compulsion. The other questions it still left within the domain of negotiation.

A difference, however, here again took place. The three Northern courts, whilst agreeing that measures of compulsion had been necessary as to territory, would have made those measures of a pecuniary nature. The two Western Powers thought this mode of action more dilatory, more uncertain, and in reality more oppressive to the Dutch nation.

Besides, as the convention of the 15th of November was considered not so much a joint treaty as a separate one, which each of the Powers had made with Belgium by separate ratifications made at separate times, each held itself free to carry out its provisions in the manner it deemed best. Consequently, after a certain delay, which

was granted in order to give Count Orloff, a special envoy of the Emperor Nicholas, the opportunity of dissuading the King of Holland from a useless resistance, on his declaration that King William's obstinacy was unconquerable, an embargo was placed on Dutch vessels, the harbor of Antwerp was blockaded by an English fleet, and the fortress attacked by a French army. Meanwhile, the decided conduct of our government in all preceding matters had strengthened instead of diminishing the confidence of France and England in each other. The French knew what we would tolerate and what we would not; we knew that the French would not do anything manifestly unjust that we resisted. There was no jealousy this time, therefore, as to the employment of a French force, no new disputes or demands as to its withdrawal.

In this way, Antwerp and its fortress became finally and unequivocally the property of the Belgians. As the King of Holland would not give up the two small forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek, he was punished by the Belgians retaining, pending an ultimate agreement, those parts of Limburg and Luxembourg which were eventually to belong to the Dutch. This ultimate agreement was not concluded till April, 1839; but in 1833 an indefinite armistice was established; and from this period all that was important concerning Belgium might be considered settled.

I shall take no further notice of this subject, therefore, except when it is incidentally alluded to in a renewed correspondence with Mr. Temple, who had been staying in England with his brother till 1833, when he was named minister to Naples. It will be seen that, in the correspondence between the two brothers that on their separation recommenced, Lord Palmerston does not speak with much amiability of the conduct of King William of Hol-

land ; but when Count Orloff had given him up there was little to say in his favor ; and in fact that which might have been a dignified firmness, if his prolonged resistance could have had any patriotic result, was querulous obstinacy when he was uselessly causing expense and discomfort to his own subjects, and keeping open a question which unforeseen events might again render troublesome and dangerous to Europe.

To be just, one must acknowledge there were many phases in these transactions, and it is difficult to take any one, and say that this party was entirely right in it, and that one entirely wrong ; but I may say that throughout them all Lord Palmerston kept his eye fixed steadily on the general result, taking for his guide the desire to place the two countries in such a position as would tend, when the generations which had raised their hands against each other had passed away, to draw their descendants together by connecting interests, instead of tearing them apart by conflicting passions. The wisdom of his policy can be tested now, when we ask ourselves—at nearly forty years' distance—whether, if either Holland and Belgium were threatened to-morrow by an invading army, they would not be more likely to coalesce as separate states for their common defense than when their names were united and their hearts divided under “the Kingdom of the Netherlands.”

BOOK X.

Events in Europe—Part taken by England in Portugal and Spain
—Correspondence with Mr. Temple from 1833 to May 12, 1834,
including mention of the Quadruple Alliance.

DURING the negotiations relating to Belgium which I have just been describing, important events were taking place in other parts of Europe. The Polish revolution was put down by Russia, and the nationality of Poland trampled under foot. Mehemet Ali, the Governor of Egypt, having overrun Syria, threatened Constantinople. In Germany the princes had combined in 1832 to suppress the liberties that had been granted to their subjects. In Italy, Austria had interfered to maintain the government of the Pope. Greece, disgraced by the assassination (October 9, 1831) of the illustrious statesman* who had dedicated his life to her regeneration, had obtained a sovereign predestined to be unfortunate, and a better frontier, which was purchased from the Porte (May, 1832). Such were the events in which we played a subordinate part, for they took place in countries more or less beyond the sphere of our control; but there were countries placed within our reach, where our beneficent influence might be felt, and the prestige of England, connected with the principles of freedom, made to prevail. To these countries our foreign policy had been principally directed. I allude to Portugal and Spain.

* Capo d'Istrias.

In the former, Don Miguel, by a series of acts betraying stupidity, cruelty, and injustice, had discredited himself equally with Europe and with the people over whom he had established a temporary tyranny. Forced to give a degrading satisfaction to England and France for unjustifiable violence committed on their subjects, he had day by day rendered himself more odious and contemptible to his own countrymen. Don Pedro, moreover, had arrived in Europe, and by a successful expedition seized Oporto, July 9, 1832. Encouraged, no doubt, by the well-known sentiments of our government, and the belief in success that those sentiments inspired, he had found means to raise money and equip a fleet, which, when it passed from the hands of Admiral Sartorius to those of Admiral Napier, destroyed the usurper's. Not long afterward Don Pedro was in possession of Lisbon.

In the mean time a new state of things had arisen in Spain. By the old laws of that kingdom, females were included in the royal succession; May 10, 1713, Philip V. introduced the Salic law; Charles IV. had, in 1789, re-established the ancient constitution; the Cortes, in 1812, had reverted to the Salic law; King Ferdinand had, by decree in March, 1830, revived the decree of Charles IV., but in a dangerous illness which shortly afterward occurred, the priestly party surrounding the sick monarch's privacy had prevailed on him to annul this decree, thus leaving his brother, Don Carlos—the avowed partisan of the extreme absolute party—inheritor of the throne. Ferdinand, however, had recently married a Neapolitan princess, young, beautiful, clever, and ambitious. By her he had two daughters, whose claims she naturally protected; and at her representations, having unexpectedly recovered from his indisposition, he again re-established the old law, 31st December, 1832, and placed the crown,

after his death, on his daughter's head. The assent of the Cortes had, moreover, on 20th June, 1833, sanctioned this resolution, so that the infant Princess Isabella was proclaimed queen, and her mother Christina, regent, when Ferdinand, who did not long survive his last dispositions as to the succession, died, September 29, 1833. Some of the old nobility, a large party in the clergy and army, and the large majority of the peasantry, no doubt, if they had been consulted, were in favor of Don Carlos, considering that he had lost his rightful position through the weakness of an old man and the intrigues of a pretty woman. On the other hand, all those who wished to escape from absolute government and monkish thralldom fixed their hopes on a new order of things. The minister of the day, M. de Zea, would willingly have maintained the young queen's rights, and preserved, though in an enlightened spirit, the old institutions; but the queen regent had the tact to see that she must have more than her dead husband's testament to give value to her living daughter's pretensions, opposed as these were by a prince of mature age, whose partisans had already taken arms, and whose cause was supported by the clergy—the most influential body in the kingdom. She allowed herself, therefore, to become the head of a constitutional party. And thus there were Don Miguel in Portugal, Don Carlos in Spain, pretenders to the crown, against the law, and in favor of arbitrary government;—and the two Infantas—Donna Maria and Queen Isabella—supported, the one by her father, the other by her mother—in favor of more liberal opinions, and with more plausible reasons for claiming the royal authority.

I resume the correspondence with Mr. Temple.

To the Hon. Wm. Temple.

"BROADLANDS, Sunday, Jan. 20, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"Here are two lines to Granville to ask him to tell you what you are to do as to Louis Philippe, and to put you in a way of making acquaintance with Broglie, if he is not too busy. It is always a good thing to have a personal knowledge, however slight, of those who govern countries.

"I shall not return to town till Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning. Adieu! a good passage and a pleasant journey to you.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, British Minister, Naples.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, March 21, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"I have received your letters from Florence and Rome, the last of which came first, and the first only to-day. I am glad you have had a prosperous journey and had got so near to its end.* Roussin has settled capitally the Turkish dispute with the Egyptian, and has done well in sending back the Russian admiral with a flea in his ear.†

* Mr. Temple had only been gazetted British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the court of Ferdinand II. the previous 9th November, having been named a few months previously to a similar post at the court of Saxony.

† The battle of Koniah, December 21, 1832, having opened to Ibrahim Pasha the road to Constantinople, the Sultan, alarmed, demanded troops and a fleet from Russia. The request was granted; but before the fleet arrived from Sebastopol, on February 20, Admiral Roussin, the French ambassador, drew up, with the consent of the Porte, the basis of an arrangement with

The Russians will no doubt be very angry, but that will not signify. Pozzo complained to Broglie, not of the thing, but of a letter in the '*Débats*' giving an account of it. Broglie said he was not responsible for the newspapers. The terms to be imposed on the Pasha are good, inasmuch as he does not get Damascus or Aleppo, and so has not the avenues of Mesopotamia; and moreover, he is to hold his pashaliks from year to year, as he is supposed to hold that of Egypt; and he is not to be like the Barbary Deys, which was what he wanted. His real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom, including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but, as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be. We must try to help the Sultan in organizing his army, navy, and finances; and if he can get those three departments into good order he may still hold his ground. Namick* had settled to go round by Paris two days before this news arrived; of course he did not alter his intention.

Mehemet Ali; and the Turkish government, hoping this arrangement would be accepted, was induced by the French admiral to request that the Russian fleet on its arrival should be withdrawn. Lord Palmerston alludes to this stage of the affair: but Mehemet Ali refused Admiral Roussin's propositions. Ibrahim Pasha moved forward. The demand for Russian assistance was renewed; and 15,000 Russian troops were landed toward the end of April on the shores of the Bosphorus. Finally, the Turks yielded to most of the exigencies of Mehemet Ali, and, on July 8, concluded a treaty with Russia, by which they in fact placed themselves under Russian protection by closing the Dardanelles to the ships of war of other nations. England and France protested, but their remonstrances remained unheeded.

* Turkish ambassador.

. Pedro's affairs are looking up again. Graham had a letter yesterday from Captain Glasscock in the *Douro*, saying that on the 4th inst. Solignac* made a sortie, and obtained a considerable advantage, killing and wounding six hundred of the Miguelites, with a small comparative loss on his own side. Pedro has twenty or thirty ships off the coast laden with supplies, and was gradually landing them at the Foy. This is a lift to Canning's negotiation,† from which, however, we cannot expect much, unless Zea (the Spanish Prime Minister) goes out, or is fairly beat down by his opponents in the Cabinet. This is more desirable than probable, as he is strong in the king's favor and the support of the arbitrary courts. We have authorized Canning (but this is for yourself) to pledge us to the acknowledgment of the claim of the Infanta, provided the Spanish government will co-operate with us in establishing Donna Maria. This may and will have considerable effect upon the queen; whether the necessary effect, we cannot tell. But I still think that Maria's cause will triumph.

"The only matter settled is the Greek affair, and that is well settled, just as I wished it, and we have got the best possible frontier for Greece; the line laid down is beautiful.‡

* A French general, who from January to June commanded Don Pedro's land forces at Oporto. Pedro created him a marshal.

† Sir Stratford Canning, who had been sent to Madrid on a special mission in December, 1832, the purport of which Lord Palmerston here alludes to.

‡ An extension to the north from the Gulf of Arta to that of Volo. This increase of territory had been purchased from the Porte, and paid for out of a loan of two millions and a half sterling guaranteed by the three Powers on the accession of King Otho, "whom the Muses themselves" (so said the poetical representatives of Greece) "descended from Helicon to proclaim."

"Zuylen* tried to linger here to see what we did with Dedel, and to mar if he could; but we all resolved to do nothing till he was gone; he was told this, and he went off on Tuesday morning the 19th. Dedel is to meet me and Talleyrand on Saturday 23d at two; but we shall do nothing with him, as he is instructed to require conditions to which we cannot agree for a preliminary convention:† but I am not without hope of drawing him into a discussion upon the disputed points of the final settlement; and if we can come to an understanding about them, we can be easy as to the terms of the preliminary convention. All the plenipotentiaries, and Dedel himself, wish for this course, which is in truth the only rational one to be pursued. He was an Etonian and a Johnian, before our time, he being fifty-six. I like him much, and he speaks English like a native.

"Domestic affairs go well. You see by what spanking majorities this reformed House of Commons is passing the most violent bill ever carried into a law; which combines in one act the Insurrection Act, the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus, and Martial Law.‡ It is a real *tour*

* Baron H. van Zuylen van Nyevelt was one of the Dutch plenipotentiaries sent over by the King of the Netherlands to attend the conferences of the representatives of the five great Powers.

† See note to letter of April 23.

‡ Lord Palmerston here refers to the measure known as the Coercion Bill (Act IV. of 3 & 4 William IV.), brought in by the government for the suppression of disturbances in Ireland. The first reading, March 5, was carried, after a debate of five nights, by 466 to 89. On the 11th, the second reading was carried by 363 to 84; and in the various divisions in committee the numbers in favor of the provisions of the bill showed the strength of the government: 246 to 85, 352 to 70, 123 to 44, 205 to 40, etc. On March 29 the bill was read a third time and passed by a majority of 345 to 86.

de force, but then it is to be followed by remedial measures, and there is the difference between us and Metternich or the Pope; we coerce as they do, but then we redress grievances as they do not. It is also to be remarked that few absolute governments could by their own authority establish such a system of coercion as that which the freely chosen representatives of the people are placing at the command of the government of this country.

“Durham’s retirement is really on account of his health, for had he been well, nothing, I believe, would have persuaded him to go out. How his office will be filled up is not settled; no arrangement is yet determined upon, and probably the appointment will be kept open till Easter. We naturally want to get Stanley into an office more suited than his present one to his capacity of Cabinet minister.* The Tories behaved beautifully about the Irish Bill at first, but they took huff the other day, and pretend that we are rendering the bill ineffectual by some modifications we have agreed to—in which they are quite wrong; so they have lately left us to ourselves, and hardly any voted with us on the court-martial clauses, but we had nevertheless a triumphant majority of one hundred and forty upon it, and that division has carried the bill. We shall finish the bill by Easter, and that is all. The session must necessarily be a long one, but, be it ever so long, we shall hardly dispose of all the great questions pending: India Charter, Bank Charter, Slavery, Poor

* Lord Durham was Lord Privy Seal, and was succeeded in that post by Viscount Goderich, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was created Earl of Ripon; and Mr. Stanley (the late Lord Derby), who was Chief Secretary for Ireland, was transferred to the Colonies. The Irish Office was taken for a short time by Sir John Cam Hobhouse, the late Lord Broughton.

Laws, Irish Church Reform, English Commutation of Tithes, etc. Some, however, must be got through. The king and queen are highly cordial with us; and the court, finding they cannot shake us off, think they may as well make us friends.

"Your horses went off some time ago, and I hope will arrive safe. Biondetta has presented me with a seventh colt by the Colonel*—there never was such a mare for colts; and if they all turn out as well shaped as Moses, I shall have no cause to complain.

"We must endeavor to establish some mode of occasional communication other than by the Neapolitan post.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"STANHOPE STREET, April 19, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"I am concerned to inform you that the whole of the Temple family, with all its connections, have been suffering more or less under the prevailing epidemic; but I, by right of primogeniture, have had a larger portion than the rest. Fanny, Elizabeth, and myself are all, for the present, confined to our respective houses. My attack began a fortnight ago, and consisted of inflammation on the chest and a violent attack of bile. The first, which was indicated by fever and pain across the chest, yielded immediately to a blister, but left an irritation in the trachea, with cough, which I have only just got quit of. The effect of this sort of attack is great prostration of strength, which requires every three or four hours sago or gruel; and

* Won the Leger in 1828, after running a dead heat for the Derby with Cadland.

when Doctor Granville, who attended me, found the fever was quite gone, and that there were no symptoms of inflammation left, he gave me quinine, and ordered me to eat lamb and drink sherry. I mention these details in case the epidemic should travel to Naples, either from Constantinople or London, at both of which capitals it seems to be very rife, that you may know the successful mode of treating it—as soon as any pain is felt on the chest, a blister is the specific. What I suffered most from was the obstinate bile, for which I was obliged to take more calomel than I have swallowed for years. However, I am now so nearly well that I am only waiting for a little finer weather to go out again.

“I have shut my door upon the *corps diplomatique*, because during the holidays there really was no business of importance; and if I had let in one I should have had them all, some out of kindness, some to fill their dispatches; and I should have been tied to the stake, to be baited, as long as they chose to bestow their tediousness upon me. I have seen some, however, who had real business. It is astonishing how general this disorder has been, with more or less severity, according to accident. With Fanny and Elizabeth, and Sullivan and his girls, and with George Bowles, it has only been a violent cold, but without inflammation. I wrote to the king last Wednesday to excuse myself from the levee; and Taylor,* in answer, said he was commanded by the king to desire I would take care of myself, and not play any tricks; by which, he said, he did not mean diplomatic tricks, of which the monopoly belonged to the Dutch king and Ancillon.

“We have made no way with the former. Dedel has given us a note, which is just like all the former perform-

* Sir Herbert Taylor, Private Secretary to the king.

ances from the Hague, shuffling, evasive, and unreasonable. In short, the king is determined to do anything rather than make any arrangement whatever, partly from his unconquerable desire of recovering Belgium, partly from his fearing that when peace is made, and the Dutch have to pay their bill, they will vote a king too expensive a luxury and reduce their establishment down to a stadtholdership. In the mean time the three Powers are saying one thing here, and another at the Hague, and trying, for various reasons, to spin the thing on as long as they can. They see that it cannot now lead to war, and they think it gives us and the French useful occupation, which prevents us from meddling with other things.

"You see that Zea* has gained a victory at Madrid, has ousted his dissentient and liberal colleagues, banished the nobles who would not follow his orders, and imprisoned the queen in her palace. This seems to me too violent a system to succeed long, and Zea is not a man of sufficient capacity and scope of mind to play the tyrant with effect. The wine-merchant and the consul† predominate over the minister and the statesman, and he is utterly devoid of dignity of character and commanding qualities of mind. To be sure, he is in the *pays des aveugles*, and therefore may be king. In the mean time, he is creating a union of

* Zea Bermudez, Spanish Prime Minister during the last days of Ferdinand and the commencement of Queen Christina's regency, opposed himself equally to Don Carlos and his partisans, and to the Liberals, who wished to establish a constitutional government. For a time he succeeded against both, but ended, as a matter of course, by being overthrown. He had been in England as Spanish minister, and was known to Lord Palmerston, who calls him, in a letter to Lord Granville, already quoted, "that good and worthy bore."

† M. Zea had been both.

all parties, but a union against himself, and an explosion seems not improbable. While Zea continues Mayor of the Palace, there is no chance of our persuading the Spanish government to come to any arrangement upon Portuguese affairs. Zea is bound to Miguel as Faust to Mephistopheles—whether merely by obstinate vanity and prejudice, or, as some people say, by promises of titles and estates in the event of Miguel's success, it is difficult to say; but I verily believe he would rather give up Ferdinand, or even Madame Zea herself, than his beloved Miguel—it is the passion of a mother for her deformed child.

“As to the contest between Pedro and Miguel, it is anybody's race yet. The story of Sartorius* having run away with the fleet is not true, and, I trust, for the honor of an Englishman, not likely to be so. Pedro receives reinforcements and supplies, and I rather expect that Solignac is meditating some vigorous blow, when he has received reinforcements which are coming to him from France. A vigorous and daring effort might carry Lisbon, and dethrone Miguel in a very few days. It is not unlikely that the changes in Spain may lead to some such attempt, by proving that nothing is to be expected from diplomacy, and that the bayonet and not the pen must decide the issue.

“You will learn the result of Turkish affairs much sooner than we shall; but I cannot believe that Mehemet Ali will think of standing out against Austria, France, Great Britain, and Russia, any one of whom could crush him with their little fingers. If he yields (with a bad grace, no matter),

* There had been a quarrel between Don Pedro and Admiral Sartorius, who at first commanded Don Pedro's fleet, about arrears of pay. The sailors mutinied, and the admiral had threatened to confiscate the fleet in payment of his men; but the affair was settled by Sartorius being paid and resigning his command, in which he was succeeded by the more enterprising Napier.

Turkey may go on as she is for some time longer ; and if the Sultan really has any stuff in him, he might in a few years make himself independent, by well organizing his army and navy, his finances, and his administration of justice. But it is very difficult for one man to reform and set to rights a large empire ; especially when that one man does not know what to aim at, or how to go at it, and when all those about him who ought to help him thwart and oppose him. I wonder whether Metternich would allow that some alterations might be useful in Turkey, or whether he would extend even to that country his abhorrence of change ?

“ The affairs of Italy seem to be in a miserable state, and the governors appear to be doing all they can to make themselves hated by the governed.* I speak more particularly of the Papal States and Modena ; as to the latter, the Grand Duke is mad, and that accounts for, though it cannot justify, his vagaries. The cardinals are supposed to be in their sound senses ; and it is lamentable to see what the sound sense of a cardinal amounts to.

“ Here, we are going on well, and the present government is as likely to stand as any that ever existed. In fact, no other government can be formed ; Peel and the Tories would find no support in the House of Commons or the country, and a government of O’Connell, Hume, and Cobbett might do when we become a republic, but would be impossible under a monarchy. Poor Durham is very ill, and I know that he is very desponding about the state of his own health.

* The Papal Government, among other unpopular acts, had restored various taxes which had been reduced or abolished in consequence of the popular demands during the Revolution of 1831. (Annual Register, vol. 75.)

"Mr. Briton, the other day, began to make a show of building upon his field between the canal and my ground; a palpable bully, for the spot is as ugly as can be conceived for a house, and in some of his fields on the Southampton Road, nearly opposite Nightingale Wood, he might find a spot with a very good view. I have had some parley with him thereupon, but it has come to nothing; only I have ascertained that James Withers has him tied up by lease for two years to come.

"Althorp will be able to repeal taxes to the amount of a million per annum this year; not a bad financial exploit. Adieu, my dear William.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON.

"Dr. Granville makes the most delightful barley-water for a cold, with an infusion of lemon-juice, and an ounce of gum arabic to a pint, and some sugar. It is better than any lozenges.

"Lady Minto is out of danger, but has been most alarmingly ill."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"STANHOPE STREET, April 23, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"I can give you better accounts of us all, as we are all nearly well again. I send you the correspondence with Dedel, which you will like to see.* Your official dispatches

* The first letter of M. Dedel, dated March 23, announces his arrival, with full powers to negotiate a preliminary convention; and he incloses a draft convention of seven articles, among which was one proposing an armistice up to August 1, and the obligation that the Belgian troops should evacuate all places on both banks of the Scheldt which they did not occupy on November 1, 1832. On April 2, Lord Palmerston and Prince Talleyrand answer, ob-

are very well written, and in a remarkably good style; I wish I could say the same of your private letters, but *non sunt inventæ*. I conclude they are coming by a private hand.

“The Sardinian *chargé d'affaires* has communicated to me, by order of his court, the treaty offensive and defensive with Naples against the Barbary Powers. It seems a natural alliance, and one is glad to see the Italian states looking to each other for support. We hear that a declaration is likely to be made at the Hague by the three Powers,

jecting to these two articles, which, according to them, showed that the Dutch government did not intend to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but to be free to attack her again on August 1; and likewise, because the Belgians would be required to give up places which actually lay within the limits of Belgium, as fixed by the treaty of November, 1831, while Dutch troops would be allowed to occupy other places also within Belgian limits. They pointed out to M. Dedel that the principal points of difference remaining between the two countries consisted chiefly of—1, the amount of tonnage duties leviable on the Scheldt, and the place for payment of them; 2, arrangements for preserving the passes of the Scheldt and the buoys, and the amount of pilot dues; 3, conditions on which the Belgians should relinquish the right of making a road or canal through Limburg; and, 4, the settlements of the accounts pending between the two governments. M. Dedel, on April 16, replied, proposing an armistice for an indefinite period, as suggested by Lord Palmerston and Prince Talleyrand, instead of his Article 3, objected to by them, and explaining that he did not mean a territorial evacuation by the Belgians—which he declares could not take place either in Limburg or Luxembourg—but solely the evacuation of some places near Lillo and Liefkenshoek, in order to prevent the possibility of any collision between Belgian and Dutch troops. Lord Palmerston and Prince Talleyrand, on the 22d, object to the latter, and decline the arrangement. Finally, however, an arrangement was made for an armistice between the two states, by a convention, signed in London on May 21, by Lord Palmerston, Prince Talleyrand, and M. Dedel.

telling the King of the Netherlands that he is no longer of any use to them, and that he bores them to death. That they have now started fresh game in the East, and beg he would have the kindness to finish his affairs. Adieu!

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, May 7, 1883.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

“I have received to-day your dispatch with the letter from Frederick Ponsonby about Egyptian affairs.

“The last accounts we have from Constantinople* are of the 16th of April, and by them we are led to infer that matters will be settled between the Sultan and the Pasha, as the only undecided question was which of the two should have Adana.

“The settlement of this matter will be a great advantage, for if it had gone on the French and Russians might have come to blows, and that would have been a war in Europe. We are going to send Sir Pulteney Malcolm back to the Mediterranean, and he will take another three-decker with him, so that he will have two three-deckers, two large 74's, and two 50-gun frigates, equal to 74's, and besides a large armed steam-vessel, which he says is more useful to him than another 74, as it carries four heavy 32-pounders,† one of which, as Paddy might say, is, I believe, a 64-pounder.

“We have not settled who succeeds Malcolm in the North Sea, but it will probably be Dundonald, for the benefit of the Dutchman, in case he should drive us to war.

* On May 5 the Sultan gave Adana up to Mehemet Ali.

† Lord Palmerston's postscript to a diplomatic act is an allusion to the force that is to support it.

"The government have fully recovered their shake* of the other day, and it has indeed rather made us stronger instead of weaker, by proving that there are no respectable set of men ready to take our places. We must stay in by the necessity of things.

"Though I asked Thompson to put off his motion on Friday last, because my whistle was not then quite in tune for a long debate, yet I am now quite well again in every respect, and Fanny and the Sulivans are almost well also, though some of them still cough a little. It is marvellous how many people have had this influenza.

"The Duke of Orleans is arrived, and I dined at Talleyrand's with him yesterday. He is wonderfully improved since I saw him in Paris in October, 1830. He was very well then, but he has since become a man, is grown very good-looking, and has got the manners and deportment which belong to his station. He is really a very creditable-looking heir apparent to a crown, and seems, from the short conversation I had with him, to have become as

* Lord Palmerston here alludes to a defeat government sustained on April 26, when Sir W. Ingilby, M.P. for one of the divisions of Lincolnshire, moved that the malt tax should be reduced from 20s. 8d. to 10s. per quarter. On a division this was carried by ten votes, the numbers being 162 to 152. However, on April 30, on Sir John Key's motion to repeal the house and window taxes, Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, moved as an amendment, "That a great deficiency of revenue would be occasioned by the reduction of the malt tax to 10s. per quarter, and by the repeal of the taxes on houses and windows, which could only be supplied by the substitution of a general tax upon property; and that, as the effect of that course would be to change the whole financial system of the country, it would at present be inexpedient to adopt it." This was carried by 285 to 131; and when Sir W. Ingilby moved for leave to bring in a bill founded on his first motion, leave was refused by 238 to 162 votes.

much developed in mind as in person. He stays a fortnight in London, will dine with the king on Friday, and go down to Windsor next week.

"Hobhouse has made a complete bother about the window-tax, and his vote, and his seat, and his office. He has behaved like an honorable and disinterested man—which he is—but has reaped the fruits of his folly in pledging himself to his constituents on questions.*

"There is no truth whatever in the Tory reports of a quarrel between me and Grey. No two men, I believe, ever went on better together in office, and very few half as well. I never met with anybody with whom I found myself so constantly agreeing.†

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON.

"Walpole‡ goes to Chili as Consul-General, Stephen§ is my private secretary, and John Ponsonby,|| Duncannon's

* Sir J. Hobhouse, late Lord Broughton, pledged himself as M.P. for Westminster to vote against the window-tax, but, being Secretary for Ireland, could not vote against the government. He therefore resigned his place as secretary and his seat as Member, and stood again for Westminster, but lost his election. Col. Evans (the late General Sir De Lacy Evans) was returned in his place.

† This is borne out by the private correspondence between Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston, copies of which I have seen.

‡ Lieut.-Col. the Hon. John Walpole.

§ Sullivan.

|| The present Earl of Bessborough. He had been elected M.P. for Bletchingley at the general election in May, 1831, at which Lord Palmerston failed to obtain re-election for the University of Cambridge, and when a seat was required for Lord Palmerston, Mr. Ponsonby retired from Bletchingley in his favor. The Hon. Francis George Molyneux was then a clerk in the Foreign Office, and afterward, for several years, Secretary of Legation at Frankfurt.

eldest son, précis-writer. Sefton looks torvovous when I meet him, that I have not appointed Molyneux; but he cannot complain, because Ponsonby is as good a Whig as Molyneux. I do not think it right to give these appointments to clerks in the office, and Molyneux's handwriting provokes me beyond expression. I prefer yours twenty to one."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, June 25, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"Many thanks for your frequent and entertaining as well as interesting letters, and for your regularity in the way of dispatches. I am exceedingly well pleased with our minister at Naples.

"I am glad to be able to tell you that the storm which hung over the government is pretty well blown over, and the ministry may now be considered safe. The duke made a grand mistake in beating us in the Lords about Portugal. The question being one in itself unimportant, our defeat upon it did not compel us to resign, and yet it was a question so intimately blended with general principles of government that the House of Commons was sure to take it up as it did, in the opposite sense, and to bear us triumphantly through. Nothing, therefore, was to be gained by the victory of the day, while the display of strength put us on our guard with reference to future occasions, on which a defeat would have been more inconvenient and embarrassing. We have profited by the warning. The king has written a very strong letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury for the benefit of the right reverend bench. The Peers in general have been assailed with warnings from all quarters. We have modified our Irish Church Bill, and though the Tories may still fight us upon it when it gets into the Lords, and possibly may beat us

upon some minor details, yet I think we are quite safe against any important defeat. The fact is—though the duke and some of his friends will not and cannot believe it—a Tory government is an utter impossibility in the present state of the public feeling. The country would not stand it, even if the House of Commons would; but the House of Commons would *not*, and such a government would be wholly unable to conduct the affairs of the country even for the shortest possible time. I condole with the Holy Alliance, but they must bear with us still, for they cannot get rid of us. The king was in despair at the idea of a change so brought about at this moment, for he foresaw all the evils of which it must be productive. Peel also was, I believe, by no means well pleased at the move made by the duke, and I understand that he was not at all consulted upon the occasion; in fact, there is very little communication between Peel and the duke.

“We have nearly settled our East India question, and our Slavery Abolition measure. The India Company are pretty well satisfied with our proposed arrangement for the renewal of their charter; and both West Indians and saints are moderately *dissatisfied* with our plan for the abolition of slavery. To be sure, we give the West Indians a tolerably good compensation. I really believe that the twenty millions which are to be voted for them are about the whole value of all the estates at the present market price; so that they will receive nearly the value of their estates, and keep those estates into the bargain. I must say it is a splendid instance of generosity and justice, unexampled in the history of the world, to see a nation (for it is the national will, and not merely the resolve of the government or the Parliament) emancipate seven hundred and fifty thousand slaves, and pay *twenty millions sterling* to their owners as compensation for the loss they

will sustain. People sometimes are greatly generous at the expense of others, but it is not often that men are found to pay so high a price for the luxury of doing a noble action.

“Some persons on the Continent want to have it supposed that the English are so bent upon economy and retrenchment that no provocation or injury would rouse them to incur the expense of another war. This vote of so large a sum for the satisfaction of a principle ought to show those persons that it would not be safe to rely too much upon their calculation.

“Our session can hardly end till the beginning of August. I have individually had an easy time of it; for the House has been too much engrossed with domestic matters of the utmost importance to pay any attention to foreign affairs; but I shall be glad when the session is over, as perhaps I may then manage to get down to Broadlands for a week, and I long for a little run. I have, however, quite recovered from my attack of influenza, and feel no remaining effects from it, and I have relapsed into my usual and habitual state of uninterrupted good health.

“I was very glad that Sullivan was able to manage a trip to the Rhine—it will do both him and Elizabeth all the good in the world. They seem to have been greatly delighted with the beginning of their tour, and I dare say will be so with the rest of it. Bowles and Fanny left town this morning upon one of his tours of inspection. Stephen* remains with me, and does his duty extremely well, and shows much industry and intelligence. Walpole lingers, but I am driving him to get off as fast as he can.

“We have a flight of German princes come over to us;

* His nephew, Stephen Henry Sullivan, was then his private secretary.

but Princess Victoria is hardly old enough as yet to make it worth their while to come. The Duke of Brunswick, the Prince of Solms, two Dukes of Würtemberg, Prince Reuss-Lebenstein-Gera, have all been seized with a sudden desire to see England. We shall see what will come of it all.

"We expect Dedel back again next week. It looks as if the Dutch king really meant to negotiate for a definitive treaty; and, indeed, the convention of 21st May,* by placing Belgium in a position in which she can exist without a definitive treaty, takes away one great inducement which the king had for refusing† to sign such a treaty.

"We were all greatly pleased with the Duke of Orleans, and he was equally so with his reception here.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Sept. 3, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"Thank you for all your letters. I have been very busy, and a bad correspondent. The Sulivans are come back, and very prosperous. The Bowles' are in Scotland, but I have not heard from them very lately. The end of the session is a great relief. I hope you liked the Speech; it is long, but, I think, good. The king spoke the passage about Turkey with emphasis, and looked round at Lieven to see how he took it.† Metternich is delighted with the

* This convention—alluded to in note to letter of April 23, page 143—provided for an armistice until the conclusion of a definitive treaty.

† The passage alluded to was the following: "The hostilities which had disturbed the peace of Turkey have been terminated, and you may be assured that my attention will be carefully directed

Russian treaty with the Sultan : he is easily pleased ! The Duchess of Braganza and Donna Maria are coming over here from Havre, to wait till their steam-vessels are ready for Lisbon. They will be here on Friday or Saturday, landing at Portsmouth, and will probably be asked for a day to Windsor. Maria's affairs go on prosperously in Portugal ; she has won the race, though she has not got to the winning-post. Miguel and Bourmont deserve to be hanged for burning all the wine at Oporto ; there never was so atrocious an outrage. What the three sovereigns are going to meet for in Bohemia, time will show. Nesselrode writes to Lieven (to be shown to me) that it is only for an *épanchement de cœur*, and that politics have nothing to do with it. How can people take the trouble of writing such stuff ? It is as if they wished to prevent one from believing *anything* they say. We have adjourned the conference for the present, waiting till the Dutch king applies to the Diet about Luxembourg and agrees to certain conditions about navigation. Luckily, the convention of May puts the Belgians in a condition in which they can bear to wait, and let the Dutch force their own king on. I have no immediate prospect, however, of getting out of town for more than a day or two ; but later in the year I hope to get to Broadlands for a fortnight or three weeks.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ Stephen makes a capital secretary.”

to any events that may affect the present state and future independence of that empire.”

To the Hon. William Temple, Naples.

"STANHOPE STREET, Oct. 8, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"I send you by a messenger lots of things to amuse you and put you *au courant*. I sent you the other day, by the Mediterranean packet, *via* Malta, copies of dispatches which I did not like to trust to the continental posts; let me know whether they reached you safely, and whether that mode of communication will answer for things which are not very pressing, but which ought not to be read by others.

"You are doing exceedingly well, and I am much pleased with your activity and manner of writing your dispatches; and I hear you give great satisfaction to the English of all descriptions. I am very glad of this, though I never doubted it would be so, because I know what good stuff you are made of: go on, and prosper.

"I am glad to hear the King of Naples perseveres in his conciliatory system: pray encourage it as far as you can *without appearing to meddle too much in matters which do not concern us*.^{*} But if the despotic courts frown upon him, he may be more likely to value the smiles of England.

"The news we have had from Spain and Portugal is highly important and interesting. From the first we have just received, by the Bayonne telegraph, the news of the death of Ferdinand;† but my dispatches come no later than the 26th, on which day Addington had his audience of the king, to deliver his letters of recall. From Portu-

^{*} The sentence in italics is in strong contradiction with the charge which Lord Palmerston's opponents used to make of his restless desire to interfere in everything.

† He died on September 29.

gal our Lisbon news is of the 24th September, announcing the sudden departure of Bourmont* and his officers for Spain—evidently in consequence of accounts they had received of Ferdinand's approaching danger. Portugal was to them only an interlude; their real scene of action is Spain. It is impossible to speculate here as to the turn of events in Spain; but Vial, the Spanish minister, declared to me that civil war would immediately break out, and that he expected Carlos to go to Toledo and there to declare himself king. The Duke of Wellington, I hear, says, 'Leave them alone; they will not do each other much harm.' However, I think the Christinos will carry the day; but if Carlos makes an attempt, there will be a reaction, *and it will end in constitutionalizing Spain*. We shall now see whether Zea has been a traitor, or only a fool, in placing so much power in the hands of the Carlists. His scheme I take to be a marriage between the young queen and Carlos' son, and then the appointment of Carlos as a principal member of the regency. We shall soon know whether he has carried his point. If he has, it is practically the ascendancy of Carlos and the extinction of the moderate party.

"France has at once intimated her intention to acknowledge the young queen. We shall wait till we see the turn which things may take. Indeed, the Cabinet being dispersed, no resolution on a doubtful case could be taken; but if the queen is proclaimed, and keeps her ground, we shall acknowledge of course.

"Maria's cause has won the day in Portugal, though the race is not quite over; but the departure of Bourmont and any difficulties in Spain must be fatal to Miguel. He

* Marshal Bourmont, known as the Conqueror of Algiers, commanded Don Miguel's forces in Portugal for some time.

has been supported for some time past by Bourmont and Spain, and without those props he must fall. I expect soon to hear of his retreat from before Lisbon; and as soon as his army begins to fall back it will fall to pieces also. Reinforcements to Don Pedro of about five hundred men have gone out from hence, and as many from Belgium, and two or three thousand more will follow. These have gone to Oporto, to be on the rear of Miguel's retreat. The triumph of Maria, and the accession of Isabella, will be important events in Europe, and will give great strength to the Liberal party. England, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, looked upon merely as a mass of opinion, form a powerful body in Europe; and Greece, further on, is rising into a state upon similar principles.

“What have been the subjects of discussion at Schwedt and Münchengrätz seems to be gradually getting out; and the *epanchemens d'amitié*, which Nesselrode desired Lieven to tell me were the only reasons for these meetings, seem to have consisted of a very general political benevolence. An eventual partition of Turkey between Austria and Russia is thought to be one of the topics; and this seems to me very probable. It is needless to say that England and France would oppose this to the utmost of their means. I told Esterhazy of this report, and said it was very inconsistent with what Neumann* had been ordered to tell me six months ago by Metternich—that if Russia attempted to appropriate to herself one inch of Turkish territory, it would be war with Austria. Esterhazy said that Metternich had never gone quite so far with him, but had told him that Russia had frequently asked him to consider what should be substituted for the Sultan and his empire if they should fall, and that Metternich had always evaded the

* Austrian Secretary of Embassy, then Chargé d'Affaires.

discussion, saying that his object was to maintain what exists, and that it was therefore needless for him to inquire what should be set up in its place. Ancillon and Nesselrode do not like our protest* at Constantinople. We shall repeat it at Petersburg; and we have ordered the *Caledonia*, a three-decker, and one of the seventy-fours from the Tagus, together with an armed steamer, fully equal to a seventy-four, to join Malcolm off the Dardanelles. This will give him six sail of the line, a steamer, and two or three fifty-gun frigates, besides smaller vessels—a very respectable squadron, three of them three-deckers. We shall send an eighty-gun ship to the Tagus, to keep up our complement of three sail of the line there; and if things were to end well in that quarter, we should send another line-of-battle ship from thence to Malcolm.

“I have not, however, yet authorized Malcolm to go up the Dardanelles. The Cabinet meet the 3d November, and then we must consider this Eastern question, and give instructions about it. If all remains quiet, of course there is nothing to be done. But an insurrection is probable. If it produces civil war, the Sultan, at the head of one party, may call in the Russians to put down the other; and then comes the question, Shall we let them return, or can we prevent them from doing so? We hear from Odessa that their Black Sea fleet is not to be laid up in ordinary this year; but the Black Sea is difficult of navigation in the winter. The Turkish government, threatened by Russia, may invite the English and French squadrons to come up to Constantinople to defend the Bosphorus. My own opinion is, that in such case they ought to go up; and I think that when we have seven liners and the French six, the eleven or twelve Russians will never venture to face

* Against the Russian Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, July 8, 1833.

us, with a host of transports besides in their train; indeed, the English fleet alone would be enough to stop them.

"They have laid down two sail of line at Archangel, to be sent round to the Black Sea next summer; but we must have some explanation with the Turks about the passage of ships of war through the straits, which, by the treaty of 1809 with us, is declared not allowable.

"Another and more likely subject of discussion between the three sovereigns are the affairs of Germany; and this extra congress of prime ministers, which is to take place next December or January, will probably lead to some violent and foolish resolves about Germany, its press, the universities, and the legislative chambers. These sort of measures are likely to recoil upon their authors, and do them more harm than good.

"If Portuguese and Spanish affairs were more within their reach, they would have done something about them, but geography forbids. As to Belgium, the three courts* are seized with a sudden desire to finish that matter, having probably at last discovered that this question has been the means of bringing England and France into closer contact.

"Poor Italy seems in a dreadful state, at least the Papal territories. The Emperor of Austria will hardly venture to take the title of Protector of Italy. I believe the 'Times' invented the report in order to hang on it a flaming article against Austria.

"At home we are going on well. Ireland is perfectly quiet—more than it ever was before. In England our harvest has been good. The unions are dwindling; the manufacturers are all employed, and everything prosperous. A part of this prosperity has been owing, how-

* Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

ever, to an over-issue of bank-notes by the Bank of England; and when they contract their issues again, as they will do a few months hence, we shall have distress and complaint again. This is the evil of paper; and even the abolition of one-pound notes does not wholly protect us.

"The Sulivans you will probably hear from; they are all well. Stephen makes a capital private secretary, and improves daily. The Bowles' are at Alnwick, and will be in town the end of this month.

"I have no immediate prospect of Broadlands; but I hope to get there in November or December, and that will suit me just as well as now, or rather better, if I should be able to get a gallop or two over the forest. How does Moses turn out? His younger brother is now in work, and promises well.

"I shall endeavor to move Goodwin from Palermo to some other consulship. Craven I shall send back to you, as you like him, and his father no longer wishes him to be removed. Minto is going southward for the winter, on account of Lady Minto's health; but I hope he will not give up his post: we cannot spare him. The king said to me the other day, that if Minto retired he thought you would be a very fit person to succeed him, and that your appointment would be taken as a compliment by the King of Prussia. I, of course, said all that was proper on your part and my own. Now and then, when you have an opportunity, send me a few lines about yourself, and how you like the place, and what sort of life you lead. The Cowpers* are going to Nice or Genoa for two or three months in the winter, on account of the youngest girl's health. To-day Fordwich was married to Ann Robinson,

* The father of the present Earl Cowper.

greatly to the joy of the whole of both families, and especially of Ann herself; no marriage ever went off so well in every respect.

"I continue very well, though still confined much to London; but last month I was a few days at Panshanger, and once or twice at Windsor for a day, and got some long rides, which did me great good.

"I send you back a dispatch, of which I have kept copies, to show you that when you go out junketing, and leave a blank signature, you ought to be careful whom you leave it with.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Dec. 3, 1833.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"Though the Malta mail is not the most expeditious of all communications to Naples, yet, as I believe it is a sure one, I send you a batch of dispatches which you will find interesting. Tell me if they reach you in decent time and by a safe channel from Malta.

"All is going on well here in England, and the country prospering greatly; manufacturing in full employment, and agriculture not worse off than usual. The unions are dwindling down to nothing, and O'Connell's Irish Parliament has come down to an American State Legislature, a large Quarter Sessions with no political functions.

"In Europe things are going on not amiss on the whole. We have won in Portugal, though Miguel is not quite driven out; but it is impossible that he should not be so in the end, and if Pedro had proper sense he would have expelled Miguel already. In Spain liberal measures must be pursued, which is saying in other words that the in-

fluence of England and France must take place of that of the three Northern Powers. We have reconciled Sardinia and France, and they are both very much obliged to us. We have left the Swiss alone, and they have settled their internal disputes.

“Austria seems to have failed in her attempt to establish her Italian Confederation, of which she was to be the protectress; and we understand that the failure was very much owing to the independent spirit of the King of Naples. This is a feeling on his part that deserves encouragement; and, whenever you have an opportunity, throw in a word to point out how much more importance Naples must acquire as a state perfectly independent and unshackled, than as a subordinate member of a confederation under the protectorship of a great Power like Austria, who is always meddling in other people’s affairs, and wanting to govern other states in her own way, instead of leaving them to theirs. In fact, if Naples would only give herself fair play, develop her natural resources, open her ports to the commerce of the world, and give free scope to her own industry, she would become a considerable Power of her class.

“Russia, however, is the only Power with which we are likely to come to a real quarrel; and even with her I trust we shall be able to keep the peace. But she is pursuing a system of universal aggression on all sides, partly from the personal character of the emperor, partly from the permanent system of her government. They are establishing in the island of Aland, within thirty miles of Stockholm, a fortified camp to contain twenty thousand men—a measure clearly and solely offensive. They are erecting fortresses along the line of the Vistula—obviously to threaten Austria and Prussia; they are intriguing to get hold of some of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube;

and they are never quiet on the side of Persia. All these German conferences and measures are, I believe, as much Russian as Austrian. But Turkey is the most likely cause of collision; though I think they will hardly pursue their schemes of aggrandizement there at present. The famine in the southern provinces of Russia will make it very difficult for them to do much in the way of soldiering in those parts this year.

"I have not yet been able to get out of town for more than four days at a time. I had three days' shooting at Woburn last week, and pretty good sport. An official party: Grey, Brougham, Lansdowne (non-combatants), Althorp, Melbourne, Ripon, Graham, John Russell, Auckland, Ellice, myself, young Ellice, and Lord Charles Russell, were the sharpshooters. But we did not do more in the way of pheasants than we have sometimes done at Broadlands. No day did we kill a hundred. I hope to get down to Broadlands next week, and to stay there a fortnight or three weeks. The Cabinet will have to meet again the first week in January. You will be glad to hear that Harry Sullivan* has distinguished himself greatly in his Oxford examination, though he did not actually win the prize contended for.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, March 3, 1834.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"You have not been very communicative of late, but by your dispatches I see you are alive, and I conclude you

* Another nephew, who died.

are well ; but I wish you would now and then write to let me know how you are going on, what sort of life you are leading, who you have at Naples, and other unofficial details. I hear you have a nice house, live well, see pleasant society, and are doing all sorts of right things. Very well. - Let us also now and then have a dispatch upon the state of the Neapolitan kingdom, and giving us information as to its resources, prosperity, commerce, and political relations.

“ We are doing well here ; the government, as you will see by our late divisions, is very strong in the House of Commons upon all great questions, however we may be now and then beat upon small points. Reductions of numbers in army and navy are negatived by immense majorities, and we may be beat upon little questions of a few hundred pounds. This is just as usual ; and I must say that this reformed House of Commons is growing to be wonderfully like all its predecessors : impatient of fools, intolerant of blackguards, tired with debate, and disposed generally to place confidence in government upon all matters which the members do not understand, or in which their particular constituents have not a direct interest. Property and land are strong in this House, and it is highly conservative. The session will not be very long or very difficult, as far as we can at present anticipate.

“ The Peers lie quiet. They could beat us if they would ; but they know it would do them no good, and they abstain. The king is in remarkably good health, and cordially with us ; the country prosperous ; trade and manufactures thriving, and the farmers suffering only just enough distress to make them happy and comfortable.

“ The trades-unions are rather increasing, but are not at present dangerous.

“ Ireland has been perfectly quiet under the Protective

Bill, and we shall probably renew it before the session is over; but of this say nothing.

"The Sulivans and Bowles' are quite well, and so am I; I am, indeed, on the whole, better than I have been for some time, being less severely fagged, not compelled to work so much by night, able therefore to get up earlier, and occasionally riding to Wormwood Scrubs before breakfast. I hope to get out of town for a week or ten days at Easter, and to Broadlands again.

"Our winter has been the mildest known for years, the thermometer generally between 40 and 50, and hardly one single day's frost; for the last week the thermometer has been between 50 and 60. I send you a cartload of dispatches, which will tell you how all Europe goes on.

"I presume always that this channel is a safe one. With Russia we are on a footing of cold civility. She is not ready to go to war for Turkey, and perhaps thinks it better to take the place by sap than by storm. We shall therefore have no war this year; and a year gained is a great deal in such matters. Austria may open her eyes; and if she joins us *really* in resisting the schemes of Russia, we shall checkmate Nicholas. Austria will join us, if she sees we are in earnest and determined to show fight. Esterhazy will leave us in the spring. Talleyrand stays. Pray remember me very kindly to Mareuil,* for whom I have much regard, and with whom I co-operated most agreeably while he was here.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

* He had for a short time been French Minister in London.

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"STANHOPE STREET, April 21, 1834.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"I take advantage of the departure of Percy Doyle* for Constantinople, whither he is going as paid attaché in room of Waller,† who goes Secretary of Legation to Greece, to write you a few lines.

"I have been very busy ever since I returned from Broadlands on the 4th of this month, working out my quadruple alliance between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, for the expulsion of Carlos and Miguel from the Portuguese dominions. I shall send you a copy‡ of it by Doyle, and I hope it will be signed to-morrow. I carried it through the Cabinet by a *coup de main*, taking them by surprise, and not leaving them time to make objections. I was not equally successful with old Talley and the French government, for they have made objections in plenty. But they were all as to the form in which I had proposed to make them parties to the transaction, and not to the thing itself. I have, however, at last satisfied their vanity by giving them a proper place among us. My first plan was, a treaty between the other three, to which they should be acceding parties. I reckon this to be a great stroke. In the first place, it will settle Portugal, and go some way to settle Spain also. But, what is of more permanent and extensive importance, it establishes a quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the west, which

* Afterward, from December, 1842, to December, 1851, Secretary of Legation and Chargé d'Affaires; and from December, 1851, to February, 1858, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Mexican Republic.

† Now Sir Thomas W. Waller; he was Secretary of Legation at Brussels from April, 1837, to September, 1858.

‡ See Appendix.

will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the east. I have, ever since Ferdinand's death, felt that morally this alliance must exist; but it was not till a fortnight ago that I saw the opportunity of giving it a substantive and practical form. The communications of Miraflores, and his renewal of the Spanish wish that we should send troops to Portugal, suggested the idea to me, and I have found its execution easier than I should have imagined. Miraflores and Sarmiento* are delighted; the former says the only thing he regrets is that he cannot himself be the bearer of the treaty to Madrid, to see the joy it will occasion. Those who will like it least, after the two Infants, are Pedro and his ministers, who wish the civil war to go on, that they may continue to plunder and confiscate; but as soon as peace returns the Cortes must assemble, and these people will be removed. I mean the ministers; for there is nobody to make a regent of but Pedro. I should like to see Metternich's face when he reads our treaty. Our naval co-operation is merely put in to save appearances, and to prove our good will, for there is nothing for us to do in that way, unless Miguel and Carlos were to attempt to sail away to Madeira, and even in that case Napier would be too many for them. Pedro was far from pleased at Napier's success in the north; it tends to finish the war too quickly. You will of course keep the treaty to yourself till it is ratified, except that you may show it in confidence to Mareuil, if he is still at Naples.

"Peninsular affairs may thus be considered in a fair train for settlement. The Belgian matter is just where it has been for a long time. The Dutch king is still squab-

* The Spanish and Portuguese Ministers.

bling with his agnates and the Diet,* and I have no notion whether he, Russia, Prussia, Austria, the confederates, any one of them, really wish for a settlement. If they do, they go oddly to work to accomplish their ends. I shall, however, certainly not go again into conference till the Luxembourg question is settled one way or the other.

“ With Sweden we are uncommonly well, and so also with Denmark. Both these Powers have declared they would be neutral in any war between us and Russia; and Denmark, I believe, if forced to join one or other party, would side with us.

“ With Russia we are just as we were, snarling at each other, hating each other, but neither wishing for war. Their last communication on Eastern affairs is anything but satisfactory. However, there is nothing at present done by us, because there is no danger of anything being done by them. They cannot return to Turkey unless invited by the Sultan, and the Sultan will not invite them unless he is again attacked by Mehemet Ali; but Mehemet Ali will not stir as long as we beg him not to do so, because he knows that our fleet could effectually prevent him. He cannot carry on war in Asia Minor without communication by sea with Egypt, and that we could effectually cut off. His only port is Alexandria, and his line-of-battle ships cannot go in and out of that port with their guns in ! Campbell† is doing very well at Alexandria. Our policy as to the Levant is to remain quiet, but remain prepared; time may enable the Turks to reorganize their resources, and the chapter of accidents is fertile in events. Metternich may emancipate himself from Russian bondage, though that is not very likely. But the Em-

* About Luxembourg.

† Consul-General.

peror of Austria may die,* and that is far more probable ; and then there will certainly be *some* change in Austrian councils, and Duke Charles will in all likelihood have more influence than he has now, and Metternich less. I am glad the Kings of Naples and Sardinia decline the Austrian Confederation. They act wisely, for such a league would strip them of all independence. Pray inculcate that doctrine where it may be useful, as you may have opportunities ; for the scheme is far from abandoned, and will be pressed again and again, on every possible occasion. The King of Naples might lose much European consequence by such a league, but could gain by it no counterbalancing advantage.

“I spoke to Ludolf† the other day seriously about the oil and fish question. I told him I had heard that his government fancied that we were going at all events to lower the duty on oil for our own convenience, and that consequently there is no reason why they should lower theirs upon fish. I told him it is true that to lower the oil duty would be very advantageous to the English consumers of oil, just as to lower the fish duty would be a great benefit to the Neapolitan eaters of fish ; but that Neapolitan and Sicilian oil is not the only oil in the world ; that Greece and France produce oil as good as that of Naples ; and that we could very easily gratify our own want of oil and punish their want of liberality by lowering the duty upon Greek and French oil, and leaving the duty on theirs at its present amount. I begged him to write this to his government, and urge it upon their serious consideration. I wish you would do the same, and tell them that we shall infallibly do this if they do not agree to our proposals, and,

* Died March 2, 1835.

† The Neapolitan Minister in London.

what is more, we wish to have their answer soon, and shall consider no answer as equivalent to a refusal. If you can manage this matter for us, it will get you credit.

"We hear you live very hospitably—I hope not too much so for your means, and that you keep a sharp eye upon that tall gentleman and his bills. How go on your horses, and how does Moses' colt turn out? I rode over to Day's while at Broadlands, and saw old Mrs. Day, alive and active, superintending a large establishment at a new farm they have, a couple of miles farther than where they were. They have thirty-six horses in training of different people's, and some beautiful colts by Lugborough coming out this year. My Mameluke colt out of Biondetta, three years this May, is there, and promises well; he will perform at Hampshire Races, if he can make a run of it. I was a week at Broadlands, entirely by myself, working all day, and almost every day, at F. O. boxes, and Holmes' accounts for the last three years, which I had not before been able to look at; they were all right, however. I must part with Thresher, who spends his nights at the alehouse, in order that the poachers may spend theirs in my covers. Conceive five guns killing sixteen pheasants in Yew Tree, and beating the whole wood thoroughly!

"London, I believe, has been very dull hitherto; but I have been too busy to know anything about that. I have not been to a single party, except Lord Grey's diplomatic Sunday evenings, and have not yet put my nose into the Opera House. I keep very well, however, and am better than I have been for some time, because I am not quite so hard-worked as you have seen me. I *can* now answer a letter, and write a dispatch, and I can keep my business down so as never to have above one day's arrear at the utmost; but seldom so much as that. I have written to

Sorell to offer him the consul-generalship in Lombardy ; I think he will take it, and he will be an excellent man for it.

“ Yours affectionately,
“ PALMERSTON.”

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, May 12, 1834.”

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

“ I am sending off a messenger suddenly to Florence and Rome, to try to get the Pope not to appoint an agitating prelate Archbishop of Tuam ; and I write a few lines by him to you, as he may as well go on to Naples from Rome while the Pope is pondering upon his answer. We are all quite well here. The Sulivans start next Sunday for Ems, to spend six weeks there, Sullivan fancying the waters will be good for him, though he is to all appearance extremely well. I have sent you a copy of our Quadruple Alliance Treaty by the last Malta mail ; we have heard to-day that the Spanish ratification had reached Bayonne in its way hither ; and a letter has been received in town by the Portuguese Consul-General from his correspondent at Plymouth, saying that the African steamer was arrived there from Lisbon, which she left on the 6th, and that she brings an account that Miguel, having heard of our treaty, which arrived at Lisbon on the 4th, had agreed to decamp, and was to embark in the *Slag* frigate for England on the 9th. This may be true, or may be another version of the stock-jobbing story of the Bayonne telegraph. But I have no doubt that, if not true, it is only premature, and *will* be true very shortly. *This treaty was a capital hit, and all my own doing.*

“ We are getting on swimmingly in Parliament, with
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immense majorities, and our session cannot be very long; probably about the middle of July will see it out.

"I wish you could contrive to put something more in your dispatches than the movements of the royal family.* Tell us now and then what the Neapolitan government think or mean to do about the affairs of the world—Spain, Greece, Italy, Morocco; what is the internal state of the country, as to commerce, finance, army, etc. We hear of a war between Naples and Morocco: is it true, and what is it about?

"Our queen is going to see her mother this summer; this has made a great to-do at court. The princesses wish her not to go, fearing the king will make love to the Maids of Honor in her absence; and the Tories are sorry, thinking they shall have a friend out of the way if they should want her; but the king is determined she shall go, and has made all the arrangements for her journey. We hear that Otho is grown so religious he has thoughts of giving up his crown. This do not mention. Adieu!

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

The great fact that comes out in this correspondence, is the Quadruple Alliance, which, as Lord Palmerston says, was all his "own doing."

It is to be observed that, during the foreign administration of Mr. Canning, a French army had marched into Spain to put down a constitutional government, and a British force had been sent to Portugal to maintain one. The English nation had seen with regret and humiliation the action of France, and sympathized with that of its

* Good hints to a diplomatist, which might perhaps be oftener given.

own government. If, then, the feelings it had thus manifested were honorable and natural, it was difficult to conceive a treaty more completely natural and honorable than one which united France and England in support of the constitutional cause in Portugal and Spain. Such a treaty was concluded and signed in London, April 22, 1834.

This treaty was the full completion of Mr. Canning's policy. It brought together a powerful combination of nations in the west, in support of the institutions we enjoyed, as a counterpoise to a combination that still existed in the north against such institutions. Mr. Canning's tact and talent had been shown in selecting the points for resistance where England was strong, and in manifesting spirit and determination where spirit and determination were more likely to preserve peace than to provoke war. Lord Palmerston had displayed the same tact and talent.

The Russians, as I have said, had annihilated the nationality of Poland; the Austrians, as I have said, had marched their armies into the Roman states to suppress the aspirations of their populations; the sovereigns of Germany had coalesced against the liberties which, in other times, they had promised to their subjects.* But,

* In these events of Germany Lord Palmerston took a great interest. He was convinced that the unpopular policy of the Diet would break up the German Confederation, and that an unjust policy on the part of the German sovereigns would alienate their subjects from them. He believed that England's opinion had a certain moral force, which England in certain circumstances was called upon by duty to exercise; and he thought also that she added eventually to that moral force by attempting to exercise it on the side of mercy, liberty, and justice, even when her counsels did not at the moment prevail. In this case he deemed it more imperative than usual that the voice of England should be heard; for the King of England was also the King of Hanover, and as

whilst he thought the British government required on certain matters to express its opinion without doing more, he thought that with respect to Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, England united with France could act as well as speak. She had done so. Belgium, as a neutral, independent, and liberally-governed state, had been created by her; constitutional government, and with constitutional government a prospect of future improved civilization and prosperity, had in Spain and Portugal been established by her. To give a solemn sanction to these achievements, and to preserve them undisturbed against intrigue and force, a treaty was now entered into by her. In that treaty she recognized principles in a manner which gave to those principles in the eyes of the world a certain weight and power. Her declaration in their favor also—though bold—was safe. To select noble ends, to pursue them perseveringly and attain them peaceably, is statesmanship; and after the signature of the Quadruple Alliance, Lord Palmerston held the rank of a statesman on the Continent of Europe.

King of Hanover was inclined to a policy which as King of England his Ministers could not approve.

A letter written to King William IV., with great respect and great firmness, affords an apt illustration of the liberality of his views and the independence of his character, and will be found, with the omission of a few passages entering more into detail than would be necessary now, in the Appendix.

BOOK XI.

Secession of Mr. Stanley and Sir James Graham—Correspondence with Mr. Temple—Lord Grey ceases to be Prime Minister—Lord Melbourne succeeds him—Lord Melbourne turned out—Sir Robert Peel in his turn ejected—Lord Palmerston returns to Foreign Office—His policy in regard to Belgium, Portugal, and Spain—Commencement of difficulties with France in Spain—Correspondence with Mr. Villiers.

IT is dangerous for a government to be too strong : Lord Grey's had been so. I remember that when the Reform Bill was passed, Whigs who were sanguine thought there would never be a Tory government again. Lord Palmerston was rather of that belief; and undoubtedly it took some time for opinion to work itself round to the Conservative side.

But the violent measures adopted toward Ireland had tried the minds of many of the Liberal party. None liked so strong a dereliction from the general principles of constitutional liberty. Some bowed to what they believed a necessity; others, less disposed to adopt expediency as the overruling guide of conduct, rebelled and went into opposition.

Parties of that kind are strong against a government when they have the sympathy of a portion of the government; and that was the case now. Lord Althorp, who had to introduce the bill, was in heart so opposed to it that he broke down in opening his case, and gave the opportunity to Mr. Stanley (afterward Lord Derby) of jumping up from his seat, and seizing Lord Althorp's notes and

papers and drawing from them the substance of one of the most eloquent speeches ever delivered in the House of Commons. Lord John Russell had not the same scruples as Lord Althorp with respect to adopting temporary measures, however severe, for the maintenance of public and individual security; but he held that tranquillity could not be permanent until the great mass of the population were conciliated, and that that conciliation was to be sought through measures affecting the property of the Protestant Church Establishment in Ireland.

Many thought that both were wrong in the course they pursued—Lord Althorp in supporting a measure which his judgment did not sanction, and Lord John Russell in raising a theoretical question to which he could propose no other practical solution than the appropriation of a miserable sum which, after providing for all the requirements of the Protestant Church, might be spared for other purposes: a proposition limited to affirming that an imaginary surplus might be applied to an imaginary object.

As Mr. Stanley's Coercion Bill led to dissatisfy a portion of the more liberal supporters of Lord Grey, so Lord Russell's Irish Church views alienated another portion of the more moderate supporters of that minister.

The following letter best explains the causes which, according to Lord Palmerston's view, led to Mr. Stanley's and Sir James Graham's secession, and then speaks of other matters. The reader will remark the nice tact with which Lord Palmerston sees the precise position of the seceders—the impossibility of their uniting immediately with Sir R. Peel, and the probability of their doing so later.

I doubt if Lord Durham played the part assigned to him; for I was one of a small number of young men who

were warmly attached to him, and with whom he spoke freely, and I never heard him say a word that could induce me to think he was engaged in any trick to bring himself into office. He had undoubtedly high pretensions, and the idea that some time or other he should direct the counsels of England; and I have little doubt that if he had done so, his statesmanlike capacity, and, above all, his high and courageous spirit, would have made him one of the greatest ministers that England ever knew, for his policy would not have been violent, though clear and decided.

His views with respect to Ireland, as he once explained them to me, were peculiar, and I have often since thought of them. "We can never do anything," he said, "with that country but by a great effort, which must combine a determination to make our authority respected, and the evidence that we only want great authority to develop national prosperity. These bit-by-bit reforms, introduced among a population excited, undisciplined, and taught to believe that everything is gained by agitation, will never succeed. I would bring forward a system including all the measures I deemed desirable, and granting a dictatorial power to the man who was to carry that system out. If I could get this great power confided to able hands, and to be exercised for only good objects, and but for a limited time, then I should have a policy which I think I could make successful; but shall I, or any man, have this? that is the question."

I return from this digression to the letter the mention of which drew it forth :

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, June 27, 1834.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

“ I forget when it was I wrote to you last ; I believe not since our ministerial changes. We have filled up our ranks again, and pretty well ; and I think we are quite safe for some time to come. In the course of time Stanley and Graham may unite with Peel, and then there will be the materials out of which another government may be formed. At present such a union could not take place without loss of character to all the parties concerned in it. Our strength, however, is in the House of Commons ; and though Stanley’s loss will be felt in debate, yet, on the whole, the change has not diminished the number of our adherents, but, if anything, increased our strength for a division ; because the great majority of the House is with us on the question upon which the split took place.

“ To me personally it is a great loss. Stanley, Graham, and Ripon were three of my most intimate friends ; and though I am equally intimate with many who remain, and very well with all who have come in, yet I hate these sudden changes of private intercourse, more especially when the necessary course of official life makes one’s official colleagues so much one’s private companions. I regret to be thrown out of habits of intercourse with men I like and esteem so much.

“ What is most provoking in the whole thing is that the break-up was, I am convinced, brought on by an intrigue planned and directed by Durham, who fancied that if he could drive out those who have seceded he should as a matter of course come in himself ; and great, I understand, was his mortification, disappointment, and astonishment that no offer was made to him. We all protested against it, both on account of his extreme opinions and because

his coming in upon their going out would have given a decidedly new character to the government in public opinion. Grey proposed to me that Durham should go to Paris, and Granville come home to the Admiralty. I protested against it, saying that Durham I knew to be my enemy,* and was a man whom I could not trust, and that Paris is the pivot of my foreign policy, and that I must have there a friend and a man in whom I can place confidence. Grey assured me I was mistaken in thinking Durham my enemy, and protested that he would act most honorably by anybody who employed him. This passed between us one evening at Lord Grey's Sunday party. I left the matter for the moment, and called on Grey the next morning to state more fully my objections; but he anticipated me by saying that Durham would not listen to any such proposal. Whether Durham had so declined, or whether Grey felt that he could not press him after what I had said, I know not, and never inquired.

"The way they managed the thing was this: Stanley had unluckily stated some time ago (last year) in Parliament that he never could agree to any different appropriation of the surplus of Church property, and that whenever that question came practically to be considered he and his colleagues must separate. John Russell had said about six weeks ago that if ever a nation had a just grievance the Irish were that nation, and that grievance the Church, and that he would separate if this grievance was not speedily remedied. Durham and Co. immediately put their wedge into this crack. They got Ward† to bring

* Lord Palmerston and Lord Durham would have agreed perfectly if they had understood each other; but Lord Durham thought Lord Palmerston a disguised Tory, and Lord Palmerston thought Lord Durham an ambitious revolutionist.

† The late Sir Henry Ward, G.C.M.G., who died in 1861, when

the question on prematurely, to force us to a vote upon it; and when it was found that we should parry the blow, and have a majority on the previous question, an effort, which proved successful, was made to get Stanley and Graham to resign before the debate came on.

"Nothing ever did so well as the Quadruple Treaty; it has ended a war which might otherwise have lasted months. Miguel, when he surrendered, had with him from twelve to sixteen thousand men, with whom he could have marched into Spain, forty-five pieces of artillery, and twelve hundred cavalry. Had he dashed into Spain, and taken Carlos with him, there was only Rodil, with ten thousand men, between him and Madrid, and part of Rodil's army was suspected of Carlism. But the moral effect of the treaty cowed them all—generals, officers, and men; and that army surrendered without firing a shot.

"Carlos is come to London, and will remain here. I hear he has taken Gloucester Lodge.

"I hope the Neapolitan government* will now acknowledge Isabella. See if you can give her a help in this. The case of Carlos is now desperate. The public will has declared against him in Spain; the Quadruple Treaty is a moral barrier against him, for, though its immediate object has been accomplished, yet the union which it has created subsists, and would lead naturally to fresh concert in case of fresh difficulties. The acknowledgment of Isabella by Naples would be no bar to the rights of the Neapolitan family if ever the Spanish nation should bring back the sons of Carlos; and the refusal of Naples to acknowledge her can in no degree assist in persuading the

Governor of Madras. He had been successively Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and Governor of Ceylon.

* It had issued a protest against King Ferdinand's decree in her favor.

Spanish nation to recall the sons of Carlos, or Carlos himself; whilst it is quite clear that until the Spanish nation do so of their own accord no external force could compel them to do so, even if England and France were to permit—which they would not—such force to be used. Naples then might gain present advantages by an early acknowledgment, advantages of trade, etc., and would lose nothing if the only event should happen which could give her any interest in the matter. An acknowledgment of Spain would render the king very popular in Europe, and give him an appearance of independence, or rather, I should say, would be a proof of his independence in Italy.

“Metternich has, I hear, been foiled in his congress by the King of Bavaria. This king would not agree to any other law for the censorship of the German press but that which exists in Bavaria; and he insisted that the tribunal of arbitration which has been invented by Metternich to decide between sovereigns and subjects shall have no jurisdiction unless *both* the disputing parties shall appeal to its authority. These two things Metternich was obliged to concede, and great is said to be his mortification and disappointment thereat.

“In the mean time he is taking his revenge upon Frankfurt and Switzerland: on the former by military occupation, on the latter by a fresh shower of irritating notes, in the hope of goading her to something which may afford him a pretense for interference. France, however, declares positively that she will not stand any military interference in Switzerland, and as to any other it will be nearly of no effect.

“With Russia we are where we were, bickering and on the point of a quarrel. The Lievens go away in a fortnight; Medem is already arrived. I am very sorry on private grounds to lose old friends and agreeable members

of society, but on public grounds I do not know that their loss will be great. I suspect that Nicholas has discovered that he has made a great mistake in recalling them; but I hear that Orloff and others like him are delighted. The Lievens are to keep house at Petersburg for the sucking Czar, and the great Czar and his wife are to go to their evening parties whenever they like to drop in. It is a splendid existence, certainly, and with much more of liberty than generally belongs to a Russian courtier; but I believe the Lievens would both give their ears to stay here.

“The Belgian affair remains in *statu quo*; and I am far better pleased, if no settlement is to take place, that the squabbling should be at Biberach instead of in Downing Street. When everything else in Europe is settled, perhaps the Dutch king may think it time to end this affair.

“The Sulivans are at Ems—as you probably have heard from themselves; and, as Parliament must last till the end of July, they will have good long holidays. The Bowles’ are quite well. You have heard of poor old Mrs. Robinson at eighty-seven.

“Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“All Europe are speculating upon who is to succeed Mandeville at Constantinople; but I have nowhere else to send poor Mandeville at present except back to Constantinople.”

The following letter of 11th July details the circumstances that led to Lord Grey’s retirement and the momentary dissolution of the Whig government—a consequence, let it be observed, of the false position that Lord

Althorp had taken up on the Coercion Bill. That of the 15th speaks of the reconstruction of the Cabinet under Lord Melbourne, and insists strongly on the fact that "men might go out of the government and come into it, but that those who came in would necessarily be of the same political principles as those who went out."

The assertion would have been true for some time to come, if Lord Palmerston had said "*those who come in and stay in*;" but with respect to the mere coming in, a subsequent letter of November 16 contains a startling contradiction to the previous prophecy.

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, July 11, 1834.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"You will see by the papers that Grey and Althorp have resigned, and that consequently, though no other member of the government has actually done the same, the administration is virtually dissolved. The papers will explain the why and the wherefore of all this imbroglio; in two words it may be stated to be this: that Althorp, having given up his own opinion about the clauses in the Coercion Act against the meetings, was willing to have proposed and supported those clauses as long as the fact that his own opinion was against them was known only to his colleagues; but when, by O'Connell's betrayal of Littleton's indiscreet confidence, it became known to all the world that Althorp's own opinion was against the clauses, he felt it impossible to support them in the House; and as the bill had been brought in with them in the Lords, he resigned. On the other hand, Grey, who long had thought of retiring, did not choose to continue in office after the loss of Althorp; and thus, the two heads having been cut off, the members have become virtually defunct.

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“What the new arrangement will be I cannot pretend to foretell ; as yet I am not aware that the king has sent for anybody to form a new administration. What he would like would be to have a government composed of a mixture of parties, thinking that such a government would be the most secure ; but such a government cannot be formed. It is impossible that Wellington and Peel should unite in government with the members of the present administration, or they with him. A pure Tory government would be swept away by the House of Commons, and if it were to dissolve, it would not find a new House more manageable. Stanley and Graham could hardly coalesce *just now* with Peel and Wellington. We then are driven back, by the insurmountable difficulties of making any other arrangement, to the necessity of endeavoring to reorganize a ministry out of the materials which compose the present ; and I think that is most likely to be the result. There would be some minor difficulties in the way, but the strong pressure of the public necessity would compel the persons concerned to overstep them. All this, however, is nothing but my own speculation ; and it will probably be some days before I can write to you anything certain. As far as I am concerned, I am truly delighted that this break-up did not happen six months ago, or before the Quadruple Alliance had worked out its final result.

“You will be very sorry to hear that poor Martin* met the other day with a sad accident, which has led to the loss of his left hand. He had shot a rabbit in cover, loaded, cocked, and put his gun under his right arm, and while he was advancing to pick up the rabbit, with his left hand put forward to push away the bushes, a twig caught the trigger, discharged his piece, and shattered his

* Gamekeeper.

wrist so that amputation became necessary. He is recovering, and doing well.

“Yours affectionately,
“PALMERSTON.”

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 15, 1834.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

“Our crisis is over; the ministry is reconstructed, Melbourne at the head,* and Duncannon at the Home Office and called up to the House of Peers. It is possible also that Hobhouse may come in. This arrangement will do very well, and will give satisfaction to all whom it is desirable to satisfy. The Radicals will be very angry that Durham is not brought in, and the Tories will be furious that Wellington and Peel were not sent for. I *know* that these last were perfectly ready to take the government if it had been offered to them, and *fancied* they could manage this House of Commons without a dissolution. In this they would have been egregiously mistaken; and a dissolution under present circumstances, and made, as it would have been, a battle royal of conflicting extremes, would have produced disastrous effects in the country. The Tories would not have gained above fifty or sixty votes, which would still have left them with less than 200 out of 650: what chance, then, could they have had even with their new House of Commons? However, all this is luckily avoided by the good sense of the

* One of my brothers—Lord Lytton—was dining at a house where, during Lord Grey's administration, his probable successor was discussed. Various candidates were put forward; but Lord Durham, alluded to as one, said at once, “Melbourne is the only man to be Prime Minister, because he is the only one of whom none of us would be jealous.”

king. He wished to have a coalition formed, but both parties told him that was impossible. Melbourne, the duke, and Peel all agreed in this, that it was impossible they could agree as colleagues. The moment the king found that his attempts at coalition had failed, he gave Melbourne a commission to form a government of his own. It is a great pity that Grey has retired, for he is just as fit for duty now, and will be so for several years to come, as he has been for several years past; but he is fanciful sometimes about himself, and I suspect he has for a long while been worked upon by persons who wanted him to go out, thinking that if he resigned others more to their taste would get to the top. They have been disappointed, and will continue to be so. The country does not want extreme parties, and the king will not have them. The result which has now happened must surely undeceive those foreign governments who have been speculating upon the return of the Tories to power. It must prove to them that the Tories cannot come back to office, let what will happen to the government of the day. That men may go out and men may come in, but that those who come in will necessarily be of the same political principles as those who go out. That consequently, whether the particular administration of the day is stable or tottering, the political system of England is settled and unchangeable. They ought, therefore, to make their own calculations upon this foundation, and not to be perpetually thwarting us, and treating us like people whose friendship they slight and whose hostility they disregard because they think that our existence will be too short to enable them to profit by the one or to suffer from the other. This has been the mistake of Metternich in all his dealings with England since 1830. He had always lived under the delusion that in six months he should have his

dear Tories in again, and has thought that if he shaped his policy so as to conciliate our good will, we should be turned out before he could reap any advantage from doing so, and that he would thereby have made a needless sacrifice.

“ Our session will not now be long, and the Coercion Bill will pass without much difficulty: we *must* omit the clauses which prevent meeting, because, after all that has passed, we could not pass them through the Commons.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1834.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

“As generally happens, I find a mail just going, and I have hardly a moment to write by it. I have little to say, unless I could say a great deal; that is, I have nothing particular to tell you, and have not time to give a general view of affairs.

“All the empire is quiet; and even Ireland tranquil. Melbourne goes on very well, and the government is, I think, likely to stand. The Chancellor is in a state of great excitement about his quarrel with Durham. They have split, and too widely ever to come together again. This is well. Parliament will not meet before February; indeed, the repairs for its reception will not be finished sooner. Shee will set out for his post at Berlin in about a fortnight. Minto is come home. I am sorry to find that the Neapolitan government has such Austrian tendencies; but this was, on the whole, to be expected. I hope they will not go too fast in Spain, but there is some danger of this,—not too fast in putting down Carlism, for in that

they go slow enough, but in carrying on their reforms and changes. Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,
“PALMERSTON.”

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, November 16, 1834.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

“We are all out; turned out neck and crop: Wellington is Prime Minister, and we give up the seals, etc. to-morrow at St. James’ at two. I am told that Ellenborough succeeds me. The Speaker takes the Home Office *ad interim* and till Peel returns from Italy, and Murray goes back to the Colonies. Goulburn and Herries are to have office because they can get re-elected. Stanley, I think, will not join; it would be a bad speculation for him to quit all his natural and family connections to come third into the Tory party, to which he does not belong. This attempt to reinstall the Tories cannot possibly last; the country will not stand it; the House of Commons will not bear it. All I dread is the collateral effect of the storm by which they will be driven away. Either they will dissolve or they will not. If they do not, they will be outvoted in the Commons, and, every man there expecting a dissolution, every man who has liberal constituents will be making violent speeches and declarations in order to curry favor with his electors. If they dissolve, then matters will be worse, because, though they may gain sixty or seventy votes, yet that will not give them a majority; and the greater part of the rest of the House will have been tempted on the hustings to pledge themselves chin-deep to most extravagant measures. Triennial Parliaments, ballot, and universal household suffrage will be the cry on almost every hustings, and no man who does not bid as high as

that will have any chance in the great towns. The Tories will be turned out; and then it will be difficult to make a government which shall be acceptable to the Commons and shall not at the same time consist of men pledged to all sorts of extreme measures. The duke, after having saved England in the field, is destined to be her ruler in the Cabinet. The way this came to pass is this. Lord Spencer was taken ill ten days ago, and died this day week at Althorp, in Northamptonshire. His death was known in London on Monday last, the 10th. The first thing Melbourne had to do was to consider who should lead the House of Commons. The Hollands, Ellice, and some other Whigs strongly recommended John Russell; some thought of Abercrombie. Melbourne asked me what I felt about it. I said it would be inconvenient to me to take the lead with my official business, but that I would do it if the government wished; and that I would, in short, either take it or leave it alone, as might be most convenient for the arrangements of the government. On Tuesday or Wednesday Melbourne wrote to the king at Brighton, to say that, as when he first took his present office he had represented the influence of Althorp in the Commons as one great foundation of the strength of the government, now that Althorp was removed to the Lords by the death of his father, he deemed it his duty toward the king to ask his Majesty whether he wished him to propose arrangements for supplying Althorp's place, or whether he preferred asking advice from other quarters. Melbourne added, that he would never abandon the service of the king as long as it was thought that he could be of any use; and that, however much the government must feel the loss of Althorp in the Commons, nevertheless there was no reason whatever to doubt that we should still retain the confidence of that House of Parliament.

"The king appointed Melbourne to come down to Brighton on Thursday, as Melbourne in his letter had proposed to do. On Thursday he went down, and had a long conversation with the king that day before dinner, and on Friday morning before he left Brighton. The result was, that the king objected to all the arrangements proposed; stated that he could not agree to the kind of measures about the Irish Church which Melbourne said the government would have to propose, although those measures are not ripe for being laid before the king, but were explained to him to be in principle precisely conformable to what had been stated to him when Melbourne took office, and to which he had then agreed. At that time he admitted that the Irish and English Churches stood upon different grounds, and that it did not at all follow that what was right to be done for one should also be applied to the other; that the Irish Church required still further reformation, and that no danger could arise to the English establishment from correcting the abuses or defects of the Irish. Now he said that the two stand upon the same foundation, that one cannot be touched without endangering the other; that he is head of the Church, and bound to uphold it, and that he could not agree to the sort of measures which Melbourne said would probably be proposed to him. On Friday morning the king gave Melbourne a written memorandum, in which he stated shortly the sum of these considerations, and added that, for these reasons, he thought it better at once to relieve Melbourne from the precarious situation in which he stood, weakened in the Commons and without any counterbalancing strength in the Lords, than to charge him with the task of proposing fresh arrangements; and he added, verbally, that he should send for the Duke of Wellington.

"Melbourne came to town on Friday evening. The

duke went to Brighton on Saturday (yesterday); and this morning Melbourne heard from the king that the duke had accepted, and that we were to be at St. James's to-morrow at two, to deliver up our Seals. This is a rapid military manœuvre. The duke not only had his list ready cut and dry, but had his men on the ground, ready to take charge of the position.

"Hudson, the queen's secretary, was sent off last night in search of Peel, who is somewhere in Italy. The supposed arrangements are: Ellenborough to this office; Manners Sutton, Home Office, till Peel's return; Sir G. Murray, Colonial; Goulburn and Herries to their old places, because they are sure of being re-elected; and Hardinge again to Ireland. I don't think Stanley will join them, even if asked.

"Whether we shall have a dissolution or not will be known probably in a few days.

"I am glad this did not happen six months ago, as several questions have since then been placed in a much better condition. Portugal is settled; Spain is safe; Belgium cannot be ruined, though they may cripple it by putting high duties on the Scheldt. I wish we had gone on six or eight months longer; and then really I should not have been sorry to have had some good long holidays, after four years or more, as it then would have been, of more intense and uninterrupted labor than almost any man ever went through before.

"I shall now go down to Broadlands and get some hunting, and, if Parliament is not dissolved, may perhaps run over to Paris for three weeks in January, previous to the meeting of Parliament.

"I have appointed Stephen paid attaché at the Hague.

"All here are well.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Hon. Wm. Temple, Naples.

"STANHOPE STREET, Nov. 25, 1834.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,—

"Pray send the inclosed to Mr. Pulling of Lymington, who is said to be now at Naples. It is to ask his support at my election—an election I am sure of, either by dissolution if the new government are able to stand, or else by return to office if the new government fall. My own opinion is that they cannot stand.

"The Tories in the House of Commons count barely 150 votes. To become a majority of 655, they must gain at least 200; and even then they would be a weak government, and obliged to have their people always in town. But how and where are they to find 200 more votes? Certainly not by converts if they do not dissolve; and certainly not by fresh elections if they do dissolve. In Ireland they would not by a dissolution gain a man: parties there have each taken their ground. In Scotland they might gain from five to ten. They must then get 190 in England and Wales. But out of the 500 who sit for England and Wales, at least 100 are theirs already. They must, therefore, turn out nearly half of the remaining Whigs or Radicals. This is impossible: the state of the representative body and of public opinion will not permit it: it is absolutely impossible. They may perhaps gain from 60 to 100 by dissolving; and that will still leave them in a feeble minority, and they will thus be turned out by the very House which they will have called together. I think Peel must accept the commission which the king has given to him, and not to the duke, to form an administration. If he were not to do so, he must abandon forever all pretension to be leader of a party. But I doubt whether he will consent to dissolve. I think his own bias

will rather be to abide by the decision of this House of Commons, and to try to propitiate it by great professions of reform. The effect of a dissolution must be injurious to the principles which he professes. The Tories would gain, it is true, and would become a more powerful opposition ; but, on the other hand, the Radicals would gain more ; first by the return of actual Radicals for places for which Whigs at present sit ; and further by the swallowing of Radical pledges by many members who are in their opinions Whig. I think Peel will feel this strongly ; but he may be overborne by the violent people of his own party, whom he will not be able to control.

“ I am staying in town a few days longer, to learn events, and to wind up some private business long neglected, but in a few days I go down to Hampshire to take the field, and commence itinerant spouter at inn meetings of freeholders, and to ride about the country canvassing. Really and truly, for my own comfort and enjoyment, I should not at all dislike a year’s respite from the confinement of office. It would not be a bad thing for me either, in a political point of view, to take a turn at House of Commons work as a regular employment.

“ The duke professes at present that no change is to be made in our foreign policy. This is said during the interregnum, and while he has hopes of catching Stanley or Graham, for whom he is angling. In truth, however, it will not be easy for him to make any great change in our foreign policy. Portugal and Belgium are settled ; Spain is beyond our control ; Russia he hates more than I do, and Turkey he will be just as anxious to protect. With France he will *mean* to keep friends, though he may do it with a less good grace than we did ; the main difference will be that he will be cronies with Metternich, with whom we were always bickering. There will be a fine

number of missions to give away — Paris, Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin certainly, besides Brussels and the Hague. At Naples I should think they will make no change; and of course you will act as if none was to be made, but pursue your profession steadily and regularly, without reference to changes at home. Washington will also be vacant, for Vaughan must retire from ill health. I wonder whether they will leave Ponsonby at Constantinople: probably they may. All are well; and Fanny and Elizabeth in town and at Fulham. Sullivan is in remarkably good health, barring an accidental cold.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Every one is acquainted with the short-lived ministry of Sir Robert Peel in 1834. Lord Palmerston rather underrated the increase of strength which a dissolution would give it. But he was right in saying it could not stand, notwithstanding the great ability of its chief; he was right also in saying that Mr. Stanley and Sir James Graham could not join that chief then, though they might afterward.

In regard to himself, his Quadruple Treaty had gained him, as I have said, a considerable reputation abroad, but at home he had rather lost than gained since 1830 in public opinion. The country had been too much occupied with internal affairs to think much of foreign. It is difficult to have more than one excitement at a time; and the Reform Bill had filled the national mind. In Parliament, Lord Palmerston had not taken a lead: his official duties fully occupied his attention and his time. But this was not all. When the Tory party was in office, the Whigs in almost hopeless opposition, a small band of clever men who stood between the two, and were almost sufficient to decide the

fate of parties, had great attention paid to them: there was a disposition rather to overrate than underrate them. It was necessary to have heard Lord Palmerston make one of his great thoroughly-prepared speeches in order to form any idea of his capacity as a speaker. He had made two or three of these speeches in opposition. Since being in office he had made none; and a large portion of the new House of Commons had not heard the eloquence which had made his reputation. The Whigs, moreover, are, as every one knows, exclusive. His early friendships were in a camp hostile to theirs. There were no juvenile associations linking them together. As to the Radicals, they considered him one step further off from them than the Whigs; and upon his losing his seat at Cambridge by advocating reform, and his seat for Hampshire against a Tory, there was a moment when, after Sir Robert Peel's discomfiture and a new Cabinet was formed, it became a doubt whether he would again be Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lord Melbourne, however, an old acquaintance, no very decided Whig, and an impartial judge of ability, was Prime Minister; Lord Palmerston got a quiet seat at Tiverton, and things went on as before. But it could not be said that, with the exception of the Premier, he had any decided political friend in the Cabinet or out of it. He ruled notwithstanding in his own department, and followed up the policy which the Quadruple Treaty had initiated, by obtaining the consent of the king and his colleagues to the raising of 10,000 men in England to serve Queen Isabella in Spain, under the name of the Auxiliary Legion. This act was greatly criticised. To those who believe that war is not part of the general system of the universe, that it can and ought to be avoided at all times, or is only justifiable when a nation has to defend itself against an actual invader, the permission, which in

fact is the encouragement, given to your subjects to serve under a foreign standard, and in a war which you, as a government, do not take part in, must appear condemnable. But, on the other hand, if we once admit, what experience seems to prove, that wars, "like earthquakes, plagues, and storms, are part of Heaven's design," in an incomprehensible universal system, directed to great ends, invisible to our intelligence,—if we believe, taking history as our instructress, that a country which cannot rely on its defenses cannot rely on its peaceful security, then the necessity of having an army skilled in the science of war, and drawn from a people imbued with a military spirit, justifies a government in allowing its people to engage, if so inclined, in a contest for principles which it is disposed to support, though it may not deem that the national honor or the national interests are so deeply engaged as to command the nation to take part in the conflict.

All men, in fact, have a natural right to espouse a cause, whether in or out of their country, which they consider for the benefit of mankind; that right may be restrained by laws which the government under which they live may deem fit to enact; but surely the government which can restrain a natural right can justifiably release it; and I thought at the time, and think still, that the sanction given to the British Legion was perfectly justifiable, and that even it answered the end for which it was intended, viz., that of preventing Spain and Portugal from relapsing into the bigotry, despotism, and sloth from which they had been struggling to emerge.

It is easy, indeed, to show that these countries have not realized our sanguine hopes and expectations. The progress of nations cannot be at once solid and rapid. But it is no small matter to stop them in a bad direction and to incline them toward a good one. Indeed, I venture to

say, that if any one would temperately compare the condition of the Spanish Peninsula in 1829 with its condition in 1869 he would be astonished, not at the small, but at the immense change for the better, morally and materially, which has taken place in it.

“Granted,” would say an advocate of non-interference. “But what are the prosperity and liberty of Spain and Portugal to us?” One might reply that there is hardly a spot in the world which can improve without the influence of that improvement extending itself to regions apparently remote. Nor can there be a doubt that the fate of two important countries in Europe affects Europe generally, and especially England, which by its vast commercial relations has in fact an inherent interest in every portion of the universe. But this is not the only answer to the feeble and selfish policy—short-sighted in its selfishness—which it has become the cant of the day to advocate.

Is a nation which forms one of a community of nations to be guided by influences directly opposite to those which would guide an individual who forms one of a community of individuals? Is a nation to be unsympathetic, inert, when it perceives other states pursuing a system hostile to its ideas, to its institutions—a system which, if directed against itself, would destroy what it is most proud of possessing and most desirous to conserve? Is it, then, to be taught that it should have no regard for principles as principles, but simply as to the direct application of them against its own property and safety? Society would dissolve if each individual looked simply to his own throat and his own money-chest and did not combine against murder and theft. A community prospers most where each member of it looks to the common benefit more than to his peculiar advantage. Just as a man is among men,

so a state is among states. Nor is there any generous sentiment that the one should entertain which the others should discourage.

At all events, whatever might have been the effect of Lord Palmerston's policy in Portugal and Spain, I may say here that I had some opportunity of judging the effects which this policy had produced in Belgium. In 1830 I had been, as I have said, at Brussels, with barricades in the streets, confusion throughout the country, disorder in men's minds as well as in their affairs. No one knew what to expect, few knew what to desire. Independence was doubtless wished for, but at the same time it was despaired of.

I returned in 1835 as his Majesty's chargé d'affaires. A king was on the throne, ruling with as much regularity as if he had inherited that throne from a long line of ancestors. A constitution which would not perhaps have succeeded elsewhere, but which, granting every liberty that a people could ask for, and which few people could temperately exercise, was in full and quiet operation. There was nothing to fear from powerful neighbors nor from internal distractions. The sovereign selected did honor to the dignity he had received. In later years the position he had acquired and the calm which he had established round his authority deceived people as to his character. He appeared to do little and to have little to do. It was not so at the time of which I speak. He was then studying the country over whose destiny he had to preside, with a minuteness of attention of which he made no parade, but which was involuntarily visible in his conversation. There was hardly a bridge, a road, a church, a public building, an individual of any note, with which or with whom he was not acquainted. I remember a courtier of his saying to me, "Our prince unites the most quiet of all manners

with the most active of all minds;" and the praise was hardly exaggerated.

In 1840 his rule indeed had become almost too easy to him, and he said to me, in the autumn of that year, that he at times regretted he had not accepted the destiny that had once been offered in Greece.

His ambition, however, became satisfied in another way. Allied with the Royal Houses of England, France, Portugal, and, finally, with the Imperial House of Austria, maintaining his influence when that of his father-in-law had passed away, renowned for his tact, his judgment, the dignity and urbanity of his manners, and enjoying the widest extent of popularity without the least apparent effort to create it, he was perhaps the only monarch in Europe of whom it could be said that he gave importance to his kingdom instead of deriving importance from it. But I anticipate!

Unfortunately, the principal feature in foreign affairs for the two or three years succeeding the Quadruple Alliance was a gradual alienation from France. It is generally said—and, I believe, not without reason—that M. de Talleyrand, who had manifested throughout his long life a constant tendency toward an English alliance, had rather cooled in this respect during his embassy in London: personal feelings were supposed to have had some influence over his opinions.

Accustomed to great consideration and respect in his own country, even when in disgrace, he did not think that he was treated with that attention in England to which his high individual position, apart from that conferred by his official dignity as ambassador, entitled him. Few people except Lord Grey, Lord Holland, and Lord Lansdowne knew indeed anything very clear about him. To the newer generation he was "Old Talleyrand"—something

of the past. The organ of veneration, moreover, was not broadly pronounced in Lord Palmerston himself. When a juvenile Secretary of War, he had faced the Duke of York; when serving in the Cabinet of the Duke of Wellington, he had never shown any disposition to give way to his Grace as a superior mortal. He treated M. de Talleyrand with the same want of peculiar deference. The old man, who had directed the early course of that great revolution which had changed the face of the world, who had confronted Napoleon in the zenith of his power, who had seated Louis XVIII. on the French throne, and who had had no small share in placing the crown on Louis Philippe's head, was treated by our Foreign Secretary—so said the Frenchmen attached to the French Embassy—just as M. Thomas, if he had been named French ambassador, would have been; appointments made with him were not always kept with perfect exactness. He complained of being kept at times for one or two hours in the anterooms of the Foreign Office; and though, having the conviction that peace could only be preserved in Europe, and the new monarchy preserved in France, by a good understanding with Great Britain, he bore all these marks of indifference with apparent imperturbability, he is reported to have felt them deeply, and to have left England with an impression as to English arrogance and presumption which induced him to advise his royal master not to neglect other alliances. It is certain that after his retirement a change of tone in our general relations was perceptible; and those young men who frequented the great diplomatist's *salon* in Paris began to say that it would never do to keep France *à la remorque de la haute Angleterre*.

But what was most to be regretted was that, when the connections between England and France became less

close, the differences between the two countries broke out precisely on the spot where it was most for the public interests that they should not appear.

In 1835 M. de Toreño had become Prime Minister in Spain, succeeding M. Martinez de la Rosa, the first constitutional minister who ruled in Spain. M. Toreño had been one of the first deputation that had originally applied to Mr. Canning for assistance against Napoleon; a man of great ability, both as a statesman and as a debater, bold, not over-scrupulous, gallant, as fond of pleasure as of business, and accustomed to take the lead in one and the other. Mr. George Villiers, the late Lord Clarendon, was English minister. To great charm of manners and an acute intellect he joined that self-confidence which high birth and high fashion usually confer.

Two clever men brought together in public affairs either like one another very much or not at all; and M. de Toreño and Mr. George Villiers liked one another not at all. In the land of the serenade and the guitar it is always pretended that love and politics go hand in hand, and the old question of *qui est-elle?* was raised on this occasion—I am far from saying with reason, for there were public motives sufficiently evident for inducing Mr. Villiers to see things with different eyes than those of M. Toreño.

It was natural that when the Absolutist party was overthrown in Spain it should have for its successors the Liberals, already well known. It was natural also that a new set of Liberals should immediately arise ready to contend for power with the old ones. M. Toreño had passed many of his years in France. He knew French statesmen, particularly those whom the recent revolution had brought into power. He was noble by birth, and, besides having the prepossessions of an aristocrat in favor of his own class, he had a strong idea that, to keep combined the various

elements of the Spanish monarchy, it was necessary to unite representative institutions with a strong central administration. He represented then the Liberal party of gentlemen in Spain, which was for resisting democratic demands and absorbing municipal powers. This party affected to be moderate, and was called the Moderados. The party in power in France was a party professing the same principles. Some of its statesmen had emphatically declared, "*gouverner est résister.*"

On the other hand, the more advanced party in Spain, headed by lawyers, doctors, and soldiers risen from the middle classes, professing no fear of the democracy with which it was connected, contending that the life of Spain was in its local self-government, called itself progressive; and this party was very much the same as that governing in England, which also professed no fear of the democracy, which also was for creating popularly-elected corporations, and which also styled itself the party of progress.

Nothing, then, but the closest understanding between the French and English governments, and a perfect union between their two representatives at Madrid—an understanding and a union which ought to have existed, and which did not exist—could have prevented that fatal schism between France supporting one Spanish party, and England supporting another, which led to evils almost incalculable in their consequences; since they have already struck from the heads of two sovereigns crowns which are yet in the dust!

It is needless to add that at the time to which I am alluding things did not become better when the Moderados, having lost M. Toreño (who, having been expelled from office, died suddenly in Paris), and having M. Isturitz, a converted Progressist, at their head, were ejected by a revolution at La Granja, of which, with the usual Spanish

exaggeration, the party vanquished accused Mr. Villiers of being the promoter; many, indeed, asserting, with that audacity which is the remarkable characteristic of Spanish politicians, that Mr. Southern, Mr. Villiers' private secretary, was seen in the gardens with a hatful of guineas which he was scattering among the insurgent soldiers.

Having thus spoken of Mr. Villiers, it may be neither inappropriate nor unjust to quote a letter written during the short period that the Duke of Wellington was at the head of the Foreign Office, in 1834, which explains both the views of our Minister at Madrid and those of the chief under whom he had been serving.

To his Grace the Duke of Wellington, K.G.

“(Private.)

“MADRID, Dec. 7, 1834.

“MY DEAR LORD DUKE,—

“I have received from Lord Palmerston the official intimation that his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon you the seals of the Foreign Department, and that my official correspondence is henceforth to be addressed to your Grace.

“It is unwillingly that I obtrude myself upon you at a moment when the most important avocations must engage your whole attention; but I feel that I am justified in so doing upon public grounds, as the policy which your Grace may adopt toward Spain, under her present circumstances, is not only of vital interest to Spain herself, but will in some measure be looked upon as decisive of that which England will observe toward other countries.

“If during the last year of Ferdinand's life measures of common precaution had been taken for the crisis which all must have foreseen, the accession of his daughter to the Spanish throne would have met with little opposition. At the moment of the king's death, however, Don Carlos

was still in Portugal; high offices of state were filled by disaffected persons; upwards of two hundred thousand royalist volunteers were in arms; the army was nearly disbanded, and the treasury was exhausted.

"It is manifest, therefore, that if the general sense of the country had been favorable to Don Carlos (and countless hosts of churchmen and employes left nothing untried to excite the people in his favor), there existed in the heads of the government no efficient means of controlling the national will; but the conduct of the people sufficiently disproved the predictions of the representatives of the Northern Powers, that upon the death of the king the country, from one end to the other, would be found Carlist.

"Your Grace is too well acquainted with this country to make it necessary for me to expatiate upon the manner in which foreign influence is looked for and leaned upon, even by those who are the most loud in their assertions of national independence. The recognition of the queen by England and France at once turned the scale in her favor. The geographical position of France rendered her recognition, materially speaking, of vital importance; but it was upon the moral support of England that the dependence of the queen's party was placed; and the time and the manner in which his Majesty's government took that step, second only in importance to the recognition of Louis Philippe under the government of your Grace, saved Spain from a general civil war. The partial insurrection in the northern provinces was at first commenced under the apprehension that the privileges peculiar to those provinces, which had always been respected by the despotic kings of Spain, would, as on a former occasion, be abolished under a more liberal form of government. A word of promise upon this subject, or an army well commanded, would at any moment during the first six months have sufficed to

restore tranquillity ; but it is difficult to say whether the war has been more wretchedly mismanaged under a political or a military point of view. It became one of savage retaliation, and the original objects, whether of ancient privileges or succession to the crown, were lost sight of in the appetite acquired by each side for conquest.

“ The arrival of Don Carlos in Navarre was wholly without result, except perhaps that of embarrassing his adherents : his presence can scarcely be said to have added a recruit to the insurgent ranks ; and not a demonstration in his favor has taken place in any other part of Spain. The war has never extended itself out of the mountainous districts, or much beyond an area of twenty square leagues. Mina, who is now engaged in the only service for which he is adapted, has been pursuing a system of which the good effects are already visible in the improving spirit of the population since his arrival.

“ In the progress of the revolution I have had abundant opportunities of observing the effect produced by *the moral support of England*, and I feel certain that it is to the confidence which that support has inspired that the queen is indebted for the comparative security in which her cause is now placed. The enemies of her cause comprise that numerous class in Spain who, living by abuses, are interested in their maintenance, together with the great majority of the monastic orders, as well as a portion of the secular Church, who feel that only such a government as that which Don Carlos would establish could venture any longer to postpone the ecclesiastical reforms for which the country is desirous. On the side of the queen are ranged the whole of the *grandees* (with the single exception, I believe, of the Duke of Granada, who is a religious fanatic), and of the wealthy, the intelligent, and the commercial and manufacturing classes of Spain—all as hostile to revo-

lution as they are to Don Carlos, but who, if their enemies unexpectedly acquire force, would all be prepared literally to die sword in hand rather than submit to those in whose hands Don Carlos would be but a blind and devoted instrument.

“Such a state of things would perhaps be the most fearful which this unfortunate country has yet witnessed. These numerous classes are now too deeply compromised to hope for mercy from the prince they have opposed, and who during the last four months has done little else than fulminate edicts of death and confiscation against them; they would, if rendered desperate, excite a spirit of revolution, as the lesser evil of the moment; and a war of opinions would commence, which it must be in vain to hope would not extend itself beyond the Peninsula.

“If improvement be possible in Spain, it is through the instrumentality of the classes to whom I now refer that it must be effected. They are all themselves aware of this; they are daily becoming more united in opinion; and they feel that so fair an opportunity for the regeneration of their country has not yet presented itself. They think most justly that the circumstances of the present revolution altogether differ from those of any other; that the amelioration which is in progress has commenced from above, and not, as hitherto, from below; that it is given and not taken; and there appears to be a determination nearly general to profit by experience, and avoid the errors which in former political crises rendered the progress of rational liberty difficult and dangerous.

“I hope I have not been an inattentive observer of all that has been passing around me during the last fourteen months; and I have here given your Grace as succinct a summary as I can of the reports which I have made and

the opinions which I have at different times developed to his Majesty's government.

"Your Grace will now perhaps permit me to say a few words respecting my own position in this country; for, without presuming to erect myself or the post which I occupy into great political importance, there are circumstances connected with my appointment to this mission which make it imperative upon me to guard against the slightest misconstruction of my conduct.

"Lord Palmerston recalled my predecessor* because he felt no confidence in his desire to give effect to the policy of his Majesty's government; and he selected me, who had no claim upon him, and was not in the diplomatic service, because he knew my opinions were in unison with his own, and as an act of friendship for which I shall be lastingly grateful to him.

"Under these circumstances, then, when Lord Palmerston quitted office, my inclination and, I conceive, my duty to myself would have dictated to me to lose no time in resigning this mission into your Grace's hands. Your Grace may perhaps be surprised at any hesitation on my part having taken place. I have, however, refrained from doing so purely upon public grounds, and because during the last ten days I have had ample evidence of the triumph it would cause to that party whose success I in my conscience believe would be disastrous to this country. That party entertains the most exaggerated notions of the advantage which they shall derive from your Grace's accession to power; and my resignation upon the first receipt of the intelligence would, I know, both from the Spanish Minister and my own observations, have been hailed as a confirmation of their hopes.

* Mr. Addington.

"I shall therefore respectfully beg of your Grace to consider that I continue in the exercise of my functions so long only as you may deem that I can be useful in the furtherance of that policy of which I have been the organ since my arrival at Madrid.

"It only remains for me to apologize to your Grace for the length of this letter. I have thought it my duty not to conceal from you the opinions which I have had so favorable an opportunity for forming upon a country to the well-being of which your Grace's future policy is of vital importance; and in the expression of those opinions I hope your Grace will not consider that I have used an unbecoming frankness.

"I have the honor to be, with great truth and respect,
my dear Lord Duke,

"Your Grace's most faithful servant,

"GEORGE VILLIERS."

At this time Mr. Villiers, as it will be seen, was simply arguing for the cause of Queen Isabella against the cause of Don Carlos; and France and England then held the same language and followed the same policy. After the ministry of M. Toreño, this situation, as I have said, altered; and as the person who greatly contributed to the change was in many ways remarkable, I shall say a few words about him.

Spain has at all times produced men of adventurous character, who rise suddenly to a great height and fall as suddenly into a deep abyss. M. Mendizabal was one of these men. Of Jewish extraction, his magnificent head, his tall and stately person, his manners, which evinced that dignity mingled with suavity which often proceeds from an inward consciousness of power, and is almost natural to Spaniards and Easterns when in authority,

created for him a sort of prestige, which his undoubted talents increased. Those talents, which had hitherto been only exercised in finance, had procured him a considerable fortune, which he risked in assisting Don Pedro in Portugal; and that cause having triumphed, he had added much both to his wealth and to his reputation. "Mendizabal is the man for Spain," every one said; and, as what every one says is for a time believed, Toreño, who wanted some one who could aid him in finance without being his rival in power, thought that he could not do better than call Mendizabal into Spain, and make him Finance Minister. But he did not know Mendizabal, who had nothing of the subaltern in him.

He was no sooner, indeed, in Madrid than he set up his own standard. The notion that he could fill an empty treasury gave him immense power. This he thought to increase by adopting a more liberal line of policy, which would call up the inert masses of the nation, and, by flattering their feelings, obtain access to their pockets. His language, his attitude, his opinions, and more especially the belief that he would find in some way or other the money that the state urgently required, gave him ere long an ascendancy in the court and the country which led to Count Toreño's retirement, and to his being the count's successor. Now Mendizabal had resided in England; he had English prepossessions; he had been placed in office as the result of English opinion; he advocated that course of popular concession against which Louis Philippe was then contending; and thus, from the time he became supreme in Spain, the ardor of the government in France for the objects of the Quadruple Alliance greatly diminished.

The immense popularity of the new minister, however, could not be of long duration, for the very reason that it was immense. People expected he would do miracles;

and he could not do miracles. It was soon, in fact, discovered that he had not the goose that lay golden eggs in the secret cabinet where at first he was supposed to conceal it.

He was, moreover, notwithstanding his democratic tendencies, more fit to be the minister of a despotic prince than a leader in parliamentary discussion. He knew nothing of the management of an assembly, and especially of an assembly which contained distinguished orators who were accustomed to command its attention. Among his opponents were men who had long considered themselves the chiefs of the popular party, and who did not at all approve of the manner in which they had been supplanted. M. Isturitz was one of these, and joining the Moderado opposition, he turned out, with the favor of Queen Christina (who had begun to fear her democratic protégé), Mendizabal, as Mendizabal had turned out Toreño.

But a party had been created too powerful to be thus set aside. The insurrection at La Granja, to which I have just alluded, was the consequence; and the Queen Regent was forced by Sergeant Garcia to give her sanction to the impracticable constitution of 1812.

A few extracts I give from Mr. Villiers' dispatches to Lord Palmerston, and of Lord Palmerston's to our ambassador in Paris, will give an idea of the course of those affairs which I have been rapidly running over, and show the coolness that had already established itself between the two governments.

(Extract.)

" MADRID, Oct. 21, 1835.

* * * * *

" The Grandees are endeavoring to prove to the queen *

* Queen Christina.

that the road taken by Mendizabal leads only to perdition, but she is behaving beautifully, and he has her entire confidence. *There is in that Señora, as I have always thought, if she were but courageously and faithfully advised, the elements for making one of the greatest sovereigns of modern times. She is capable of taking large views. She is ambitious of glory, and has at heart the prosperity of Spain. She is, moreover, acute, docile, and absolutely without fear, but is of course ignorant of the art of governing, or how to turn her position to the account which she herself desires. She has always done whatever she has been advised to do; but her advisers have always been incompetent or false.** Mendizabal was exactly the man she wanted to rescue her from her fallen state, which she felt she did not deserve to be in, but from which she could not extricate herself, and she accordingly looks upon him as an angel from heaven.

“GEORGE VILLIERS.”

(Extract.)

“MADRID, Oct. 15, 1835.

“MY DEAR PALMERSTON,—

* * * * *

“The chief alarm under which Mendizabal at present labors is the semi-hostile disposition of France, which is not confined to acts of assistance to the Carlists upon the frontier, but to very decided indications of ultimately recognizing Don Carlos. I am sorry to say that of this there are not only proofs in Frias’† dispatches, if he reports at all correctly his conversations with De Broglie, but there

* I have put this passage in italics, because fallen sovereigns have few advocates, and so much has been said against Queen Christina that it is just to draw attention to what, at an important period of her life, was said in her favor.

† The Duc de Frias, then Spanish ambassador at Paris.

are other signs, which I do not venture to notice upon the present occasion, which leave me no doubt that Louis Philippe is contemplating such a measure, upon the ground that this country is plunged into irremediable anarchy, and that the course which the queen's government is pursuing will only make confusion worse confounded. He is mistaken in this view, as he has been upon the whole Spanish question. The country, it is true, is in confusion enough, but Mendizabal's present policy is the only way of getting out of the scrape and of making the government strong, or rather of making *any government at all*.

* * * * *

"GEORGE VILLIERS."

Extract from Letter to Arthur Aston,* Esq., etc., etc., etc., Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1836.

* * * * *

"I will endeavor to persuade Mendizabal to join in saving his country; but he may differ with me as to the means most likely to conduce to that end.† A minister who has been recently expelled by intrigue is not easily persuaded that the best thing he can do for the good of his country is to help to consolidate the administration of his successful rival. However, another change of government just now would be another misfortune; *and I must say that no man could have behaved better than Isturitz has done in all matters in which we have to deal with him; and therefore we should wish him to continue in office.* You may assure Thiers that we are quite as anxious for a

* Mr. Aston was then her Majesty's Minister *ad interim*.

† Mendizabal was then out, and M. Isturitz had become, as I have said, his successor.

juste milieu in Spain as the former editor of the 'National'* can be, and Villiers has invariably and most perseveringly labored with that view.

* * * * *

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

Extract from Letter to Arthur Aston, Esq., etc., etc., etc., Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 19, 1836.

"DEAR ASTON,—

"We are very anxious for your next accounts. This acceptance of the constitution of 1812 by the Queen Regent, and the change of ministry at Madrid, are the consequences of the mistaken policy of the French government about Spain. The French last year grew jealous of our influence in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. In Portugal they succeeded in ousting Carvalho, and got Loulé appointed instead; and a pretty mess Loulé and his colleagues made of it! *That* intrigue nearly brought Portugal to bankruptcy. They then succeeded some months later in Spain, and turned out Mendizabal, and gave the power to Isturitz and Cordova; but there they were tampering with matters in a more ticklish state, and the consequences have been more serious. They have produced great and extensive misery in Spain during the last four months, and now they have established, nominally, at least, a most absurd and stupid constitution. In Greece they were defeated without much loss. But what a little and narrow-minded policy and view of European affairs that must have been, which led the French government to

* M. Thiers, before the revolution of 1830, had been the editor of the "National," a paper that represented the extreme liberal party.

exhaust against their dear friend and ally all those resources of intrigue and diplomacy which, if well applied, might have produced some results honorable to them and beneficial to Europe! *However, so goes the world, and one must take men as one finds them, and make the best of what is, shut one's eyes to failings and faults, and dwell as much as one can upon good points.*

* * * * *

"Yours sincerely,
"PALMERSTON."

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville, Paris.

"STANHOPE STREET, Sept. 20, 1836.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I suppose this will find you returned to Paris, but that you will scarcely find a new government formed on your arrival there. We hear that Soult refuses, and that no other good officer likes to accept, that Molé is ill, and that the whole concern looks rickety. . . . I think the tone for you to take with Molé is, that we look upon France as backing out of the alliance as fast as she can, that we are sorry for it, but wash our hands of the consequences; and upon those who have advised or who may execute the plan must rest the responsibility of any inconveniences which may follow; that constitutional government *must* triumph in the Peninsula, and that France will find herself in the disagreeable predicament of having abandoned a cause overclouded for the moment, but destined to succeed, while we shall have the merit and honor of having consistently supported it; that France will lose her credit with the Liberal party in Europe, whom she is about to desert, and will never be trusted or favored by the Holy Alliance men, unless she could assimilate her government to their model, which is impossible; that she will therefore be hated by

the first and despised by the latter. Such will be her fate as to her external relations, nor will the effect of her policy upon her internal condition be much more fortunate. *Her government will become identified, in the opinion of the nation, with the arbitrary party in Europe, and with the enemies of free institutions.* Discontent will increase; the discontented will enter into communication with the ultra-Liberals of Spain and Portugal, and plots and conspiracies will spring up like mushrooms. . . . The French government no doubt think that when matters have gone to a certain length in Spain, France will be called upon to re-enact the drama of 1823. But grievously do they deceive themselves in that. Spain is not the same as then; France is not the same as then. Louis Philippe could not send an army to put down institutions in Spain merely because those institutions were too democratic. The order for such an army to march would be the knell of his dynasty. . . . *France is putting herself in a false position, and at no distant time she will find her mistake.* We have performed the duties of friendship in warning her; the fault will be hers if the warning is in vain.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

“STANHOPE STREET, Sept. 27, 1836.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I am just come back from Bocket, where I have been for two days to meet the Hollands.

“We ought to come to an explanation with the French government, and to understand what it is they wish either to bring to pass or to prevent in Spain. Do they want Don Carlos to succeed? Would that be consistent with the honor of a party to the Quadruple Treaty? would it

be conducive to the interests of the dynasty founded in July? Do they think the establishment of a republic in Spain would greatly tend to the internal tranquillity of France?

* * * * *

"It seems to me that, next to Isabella herself, Louis Philippe is the person in Europe most interested in a speedy suppression of the civil war; and he is undisputably the individual who has the greatest power of putting the war down.

* * * * *

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

"BROADLANDS, Jan. 2, 1837.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I do not like the French speech at all. As to the French government acting up to the *spirit* of the Quadruple Treaty, that won't do. They may ride off upon the letter, though even that is not carried into execution. But the *spirit* of the treaty was to expel Carlos from Spain; and I should like to know what they have done, which could be in the slightest degree calculated to produce that effect—absolutely nothing; for I cannot allow the occasional seizure of a few pounds of saltpetre and lead to be at all commensurate with what they could do in the way of stopping supplies if they chose to exert their means. Then, again, their mention of their settlement with America and Switzerland, or, at least, with America, without a single allusion to the good offices which they asked from us, and which were so effectual in making up matters for them, was not very gracious on their part. In short, the speech is a thorough Molé speech; and all I can

say is, I wish him a speedy and safe deliverance from the cares of office, for it is evident that the reports we heard of his anti-English feeling were by no means exaggerated, notwithstanding that the Flahaults* undertook to be answerable for the contrary. I shall remain here a week longer. The Stevensons are with me, and I expect the Maltitzs and some of the bachelor diplomats—the married pairs have been daunted by the snow.

“PALMERSTON.”

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Jan. 27, 1887.

* * * * *

“Our speech will be moderate and short. On foreign affairs we shall say little, and especially not one word about France or French alliance. We can say nothing in their praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we can bestow upon them.

* * * * *

“PALMERSTON.”

* I do not agree with Lord Palmerston as to Count Molé (whom I knew well) being, generally speaking, anti-English. It is true that he did not think it wise to encourage the idea of a *cordiale entente* that would not be acted up to. He started on the basis that the two countries had policies not hostile, but not identical, and that they should endeavor to make these policies run as harmoniously as was possible together without pretending they were the same; but it is true that on Spanish affairs he represented the king, who at this time did not wish to separate himself too distinctly from the Northern Powers by being a prominent member of the alliance formed against them.

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 3, 1837.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Nothing, you see, could have passed off more quietly than our two nights on the address. Nobody but our friend Bowring said a word about France. After all the vamping of the papers about foreign affairs, this is what Hume, in his classical language, calls a '*mere monte mus*.' I take it that if affairs had gone ill in Spain, and had afforded a good handle against us, the Tories would have laid hold of it; but that as matters seem turning out well, they would rather wish the thing settled, in order to have one stumbling-block the less in their way.

"If, as you say, the French will have been mortified at not being mentioned in the speech, they will probably not be pleased at being so wholly forgotten in the debate.

"I have not seen Bourqueney since the speech. I suppose he waits to know what he ought to say about it.

"PALMERSTON."

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Nov. 3, 1837.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I have not much to say. I have had a conversation with Sebastiani about Molé, but said nothing which could lead to explanations inconvenient to Sebastiani. He asked me how things went on between you and Molé. I said, well and ill. That nothing could be more cordial than Molé's manner of receiving you, and that he always spoke to you with the greatest openness and confidence about the weather, and the French elections, and what was going on in the Chambers, and so forth; but that whenever you bring the conversation to those European questions in

which England and France have a common interest, and upon which something or other is to be done, Molé immediately shuts himself up in his cold reserve, has no opinion, is not sufficiently informed as to the facts, will reflect upon the matter, and, in short, evades giving any answer.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Extract from Letter to Arthur Aston, Esq., etc., etc.

“STANHOPE STREET, Nov. 20, 1837.

“DEAR ASTON,—

“I have to-day received your letter of the 17th, giving me an account of a complaint made by M. Bois le Comte* against Lord Howard, in a dispatch which has been read to you by Count Molé. Pray tell Count Molé that I know nothing of the matter, and am not aware of any fresh quarrel between Lord Howard and M. Bois le Comte. That as to M. Bois le Comte’s surmises with respect to the contents of Lord Howard’s dispatches to me, and of my answer to Lord Howard, it seems to me that the professed advice of the French government to avoid the appearance of disunion between our missions at Lisbon would be better accomplished if M. Bois le Comte were to employ himself in executing the instructions which Count Molé assures me he has received from his own government, instead of amusing himself by speculating as to the contents of the correspondence which passes between the English government and Lord Howard, of which M. Bois le Comte can know nothing whatever, except what Lord Howard may be pleased to tell him.

“If, as M. Bois le Comte asserts, Lord Howard has shown any particular coldness toward him immediately

* French minister at Lisbon.

after the arrival of some packet from London—of which, however, I am entirely ignorant—the cause may have been, that information may have been received by Lord Howard which may have led him to think that M. Bois le Comte had been engaged in some intrigue, with or without M. Castro Pereira, to procure Lord Howard's recall. I am quite uninformed whether such a suspicion has entered into Lord Howard's mind, but it would by no means surprise me to find that he entertained such an opinion; and if he did, I confess that I am not aware of any facts or arguments which I could state to Lord Howard that could be at all calculated to eradicate such a suspicion from his mind.*

"I write this to you to-day, because I may not have an opportunity of seeing Count Sebastiani before to-morrow's post. Pray read this letter to Count Molé.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

Affairs had now arrived at a state in Spain which brought pretty well to a close the deep interest with which for some time past the Spanish peninsula had been regarded. It was evident that the cause of Don Carlos would be the losing one, but that the Christinos when triumphant would still be agitated and weakened by divisions, and that the country, though rescued from stagnation, tyranny, and superstition, would only arrive slowly and by degrees at anything like settled prosperity and stability.

I will not, therefore, prolong my quotations on this subject. What I have recently cited was intended to show, and is sufficient to show, that Lord Palmerston had, or thought he had, serious complaints to make against the

* M. Bois le Comte had in fact been engaged in this intrigue.

French government as to the unfair and unfriendly manner in which it performed its duties as an ally, and that the differences between the two governments first broke out in Spain.

The fact of these differences is important, because they no doubt prepared the way for subsequent differences in the East; inasmuch as Lord Palmerston had then ceased to attach as much consideration to intimate relations with France as he had done when he thought that Power might be relied on to maintain a steady intimacy for peaceful and liberal objects among the governments of the West. I now proceed to the East.*

* I add to the extracts I have made from the Spanish correspondence two short citations from private letters, which relate to affairs that occurred at this time and excited considerable interest; but which it would interrupt my narrative of the principal events of the time to make the subject of any lengthened digression.

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

"STANHOPE STREET, March 11, 1836.

* * * * *

"I have referred the Cracow case to the king's Advocate, and shall do nothing till I get his answer; but it seems to me that the least we can do is to write a dispatch to our ministers at the three courts, to be communicated, by copy given, to the three governments; a mere verbal communication, or the mere reading of a dispatch, leaves no record in their archives. There is something to be said for the three courts; but then they have spoiled their own case by not choosing to own that they were afraid of disturbances at home.* The grounds put forward in their notes to the Cracow Senate are utterly untenable.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

* It was considered that Russia and Austria had a right to interfere with Cracow, if the persons who resided there menaced the tranquillity of their dominions; and no doubt this was the case. But the two govern-

"Feb. 3, 1837.

"This *Vixen* affair is very provoking. It forces into discussion a very intricate but at the same time important question of international right.

"Pozzo came to me two days ago to talk to me about it, and to give explanations to the same effect as the long passage in the Petersburg Gazette.

"I said that I had referred the matter to the king's Advocate, and that until I had his report I could say nothing, and form no opinion on the subject; but that I would let him know when I was able to talk to him about it.

"The fact is, that Russia has never declared a blockade, but has established custom regulations confining commerce to one or two points where custom-houses are established, and pretends that ships trading to other points on the coast are seizable as smugglers.

"Now, to entitle her to make such regulations, she ought to possess the coast *de jure* and *de facto*. Her right *de jure* depends upon the Treaty of Adrianople, which conveys to her, not Circassia, but the seacoast from the Cuban to St. Nicolas. But then arises the question, did the Turks possess that which they thus ceded, or, on the contrary, was not their occupation confined, like that of the Russians at present, to Anapa, Poti, and one or two other detached points on the coast? Here, then, a doubt may arise whether Russia has a title *de jure*. But there can be no doubt that *de facto* her authority is not acknowledged on the greater part of the coast which she thus interdicts to the commerce of other nations, and that, in point of fact, even at Anapa and Poti her garrisons dare not stir far from the *glacis*.

"On the other hand, we have no wish to go to war with Russia; and if we are to do so we should like to have some real and well-defined ground of quarrel, and not to begin fighting at the good will and bidding of Mr. James Bell, the bankrupt of Bucharest. Still we must not hastily acknowledge a right on the part of Russia which is not clearly ascertained, and which might be construed by her as implying more than meets the eye.

ments menaced would not acknowledge that they *could be menaced*, and this Lord Palmerston thought spoiled their case. The fact, however, finally prevailed, and the subject was dropped.

"Do you think there would be any chance of getting France to join us in endeavoring to bring about a cessation of hostilities between the Russians and Circassians? The war is a savage and exterminating one on both sides, and has no legitimate object on the part of the Russians. The loss of life on both sides is great, but greatest on the Russian side. If the French government really takes an interest in upholding Turkey and in checking the encroachments of Russia, I believe there is no better mode of doing both than by helping to keep the Circassians independent. The proposal to make to the two parties would be a truce or an absolute cessation of hostilities—that the Circassians should abstain from making inroads into Russia, that the Russians should leave off making attacks on the Circassians.

"There would be some difficulty in settling arrangements; but if England, France, and Austria could be brought to unite in addressing Russia on this point, depend upon it we should produce an effect.

"PALMERSTON.

"Perhaps it might be dangerous to speak to Molé on this matter. And if there is any chance of Molé's going out, we might wait for the benefit of such a change."*

* This letter explains why, though we might have had a right in this case to do something, we did nothing.

BOOK XII.

I go to Constantinople as Secretary of Embassy—State of things there—Characters of Khosrew and Reschid Pashas—Position of Mehemet Ali in Egypt.

BEFORE proceeding further with my narrative of public events on the Continent, I must notice a most interesting one that had occurred to us in England—the accession of Queen Victoria. I extract two short notices from Lord Palmerston's correspondence alluding to this event.

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville, Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, June 20, 1837.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“The poor king was released from his sufferings at an early hour this morning. He retained his mental faculties to the last, and was able to give directions on business even so late as yesterday.

“The Privy Council met this morning at Kensington, and was most numerously attended. The proclamation will be to-morrow. The queen went through her task to-day with great dignity and self-possession. One saw she felt much inward emotion; but it was fully controlled. Her articulation was peculiarly good, and her voice remarkably pleasing. To-day and to-morrow the two Houses do nothing but take the oaths. On Thursday there will be a message, as usual in such cases, to the two Houses; and an address in reply. We shall then go on with such busi-

ness as may not admit of postponement, and in about a month, in all probability, we shall dissolve.*

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Extract from Letter to Earl Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, June 27, 1837.

“To-day the queen received the addresses of the House of Commons, and afterward the foreign ministers. They were introduced one by one. Nothing could be better than her manner of receiving them; it was easy and dignified, and gracious.

“Yours, etc.,

“PALMERSTON.”

I now continue my story, relative to which I said, in concluding the last book, “I would proceed to the East.” It so happened, indeed, that just as attention, wearied by the prolonged struggle in the Peninsula, turned toward affairs in Turkey, I was sent as Secretary of Embassy to Constantinople. The old Sultan Mahmoud still reigned, the terror of that city and its neighborhood; the plan he had deliberately and with no common determination of character formed—that of introducing among his subjects the civilization of Western Europe—was just beginning to execute itself. Prussian officers were drilling his troops, an English officer† was instructing his navy, and though the great bulk of the population wore their old magnificent costumes, the persons who held official employments were obliged to dismiss the turban for the fez (the red cap now

* Parliament was dissolved on July 17.

† Captain, now Admiral, Sir Baldwin Walker.

in use) and to disfigure themselves in the frock-coat they still wear.

The Grand Vizier, Khosrew, then very aged, though still vigorous, was a shrewd, bold, illiterate barbarian, rather proud of being shorter and stouter than any other man in office. He had, however, great influence over the Sultan, and great authority over the Mussulman population, who respected him from the knowledge that he was ready to have every man in the empire drowned, shot, poisoned, or decapitated if it was necessary to carry out the views of himself or his master.

Despite all his ignorance, moreover, he had some enlightened views; and seeing that if great reforms were to take place they must be made through a new generation, and that power would naturally fall into the hands of those who could best carry out such reforms, he sent to Europe a certain number of youths at his own expense, who would be future candidates for employment, and grateful partisans of their protector.

A man of a very different stamp, Reschid Pasha, was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Khosrew was an old soldier; Reschid was in every respect a civilian. He had grown up in the bureaus of the Porte, knew thoroughly the forms and ways of that immense congregation of clerks and officials, knew also most of those clerks and officials personally, and had that kind of moral authority with them which a leading man in any profession exercises over its inferior members.

His imagination was audacious. He could conceive great plans, and was fearful of no danger that he did not see immediately hanging over his head; but he was physically timid, and, at the time of which I am speaking, crouched before the jolly ferocious old gentleman who though every now and then in temporary disgrace,

kept his foot, as Grand Vizier, on the neck of every subordinate.

Reschid was, however, the sort of man that Khosrew wanted. The Turks had become involved in European politics, and Reschid, who had been ambassador in France, knew something of Europe, and could talk French, at that time no small accomplishment. Besides, Reschid entered fully into the idea of Western reforms. He embraced completely the idea that Turkey could not be a power in Europe unless she became European. He was the first Turk, indeed, who, going beyond this, conceived the idea of making the Turkish empire not merely the empire of the Turks, but the empire of all those born in Turkey, and destroying by degrees those religious distinctions which made a small part of its population a guard over the rest. His plan, still in embryo, was not in theory so liberal as that since adopted, but perhaps more practical and efficient.

The Turks were still to be for awhile a privileged class, but Christians were to be admitted into all employments, and any Christian who served the state for a certain time was to enjoy the privileges and prestige of the dominant people. His notion was, that the Christians who were employed in this way might be depended upon, and that the Mussulmans, becoming by degrees accustomed to see Christians in authority, would be less shocked when the time came for making general that favor which was in the first instance to be partial.

At all events, a serious attempt was being made to reform and, if possible, revive the old empire. Lord Palmerston, as it will have been seen by some of his preceding letters, judged this desirable for the peace of Europe; whether his view was or was not a right one may be canvassed hereafter. It suffices here to say that it existed. The great obstacle at the moment was internal division,

for Mehemet Ali's ambition, though appeased for the moment by the sacrifices recently made to him, still aspired not merely to sovereign independence in Egypt, but to dictate, as mayor of the palace, the policy of the Porte at Constantinople.

His prestige at that time was great both with European Christians and Eastern Mussulmans. The obedient servant of the consuls at Alexandria, he spread artfully the belief that they would be his masters wherever he was master. Checked in the progress of his victories by a Russian army, he presented himself to the Mohammedan populations as the representative of Islamism, whilst Mahmoud was but the vassal of the Czar. But his prestige with both was unsound, for it was based in a certain degree on deception. To rule over Egypt with a strong arm was not a difficult thing. The people were serfs, and had been serfs from all recorded time. Public opinion and political power were confined to a few Turks, a few Mamelukes, descendants of the old dominant race, then both in soul and body subdued, and a few renegade or purchased foreigners, all looking up to an able and determined man who could give them distinction and wealth. But the crafty and imperious Albanian* would have found very different elements to deal with had he ever succeeded in seating himself, whether as real or nominal sovereign, on the shores of the Bosphorus.

The crafty Greek would have betrayed his counsels, the haughty Osmanli resisted and plotted against his authority, his power unsupported by tradition would have fallen to pieces at the first blow which cracked its surface; and it is easy now to see that they who imagined that with some thousands of half-drilled Arabs, commanded by a few Eu-

* Mehemet was Albanian by birth.

ropean adventurers, he could have built up a new dynasty or revived an enfeebled empire, were the victims of a romantic delusion. But, on the other hand, his prestige within the region where he ruled was not at that moment to be upset by the unaided forces of the Turkish government. The very effort that the Porte was making to acquire a new force was a weakness, for its first effects were to disorganize and dissatisfy—effects which had been seen in the defeat of its armies and the decline of its boldness and independence. The armed interference of Europe would be provoking an unknown result.

Meanwhile a state of excitement existed among the populations, and especially among the Embassies at Constantinople, which only a resident at Pera can comprehend. Every one expected something—no one knew exactly what to expect. The Turks about the *Serai* were divided into two parties: the one, wishing for present peace at all hazards, urged the Sultan to place himself fairly under the protection of Russia; another, imbued with a bolder and more patriotic spirit, preached incessantly a combination to destroy Mehemet Ali. A new rumor every day was in circulation. The French and English ambassadorial residences were then fixed within a stone's throw of each other at Therapia, a small village fronting the entrance into the Black Sea; and the two ambassadors, Admiral Roussin and Lord Ponsonby, each went to his window on getting out of bed, the one at six in the morning, and the other at six in the afternoon, prepared to see without surprise the Russian fleet anchored under their eyes. It was perhaps the only point on which these representatives of the two countries agreed. Both men of energy and ability, the one a philosopher, the other a fine gentleman, self-willed, and assuming rather to direct their governments than to be directed by them, were united by a

common apprehension, in which each encouraged the other. This apprehension was no doubt an exaggerated one, but it could not be considered as altogether absurd.

Meanwhile our commercial relations for some time past with Turkey had been of the most unsatisfactory description, and the state of things which was ruining our own trade was equally ruinous to the Turkish dominions.

By our ancient treaties, called "*Capitulations*," it was agreed that our goods should be imported into Turkey on a payment of three per cent., and that we might export Turkish produce at the same rate of duty. But in reality our imports were taxed forty, fifty, sixty per cent., and Turkish exports sixty, seventy, a hundred. In fact, commerce had become almost impossible. The Board of Trade did not clearly understand the cause of these abuses; to all complaints the Turkish government answered that the provisions of our treaties were fulfilled. And this was literally the case. The goods on landing paid the stipulated charge; but then they could not be sold without an additional charge, and if removed from the place of landing another impost was exacted. So also Turkish produce was shipped when purchased at three per cent.; but this was also charged before it got to a port with various internal duties. And, moreover, it was the custom of the Porte to give or sell local or general monopolies, allowing certain persons the exclusive privilege of buying and selling certain articles. The producer was not master of his own produce; and the merchant who wished to be a purchaser was constrained to submit to any demands that a privileged extortioner might exact.

In Egypt the Pasha claimed to be the universal monopolist, and to buy from the native growers and sell to the foreign traders at the prices he thought proper.

I have said that Lord Ponsonby was a man of consid-

erable ability, and this he was, though with a somewhat neglected education. Extremely indolent, except under great excitement, he attended little to the ordinary affairs which form the current business of an embassy; but he could take up and pursue with the force of a strong will any object which presented itself to his imagination in striking colors. The remonstrances of consuls and merchants had no effect upon him; even those of the Foreign Office, when they suggested some temporary palliation of a passing mischief, or dealt with a mere local grievance, were put carelessly aside. But he had been for some time meditating whether it would not be possible to startle by a great triumph, which, in the shape of a commercial treaty, would satisfy the interests of English traders and gratify the dominant passion of Sultan Mahmoud. But he had, on the other hand, a horror of details, and above all of details in figures, and consequently did not see how he could bring out his project in any practical form. He took me then into his confidence, and proposed that I should study the question at issue, and endeavor to form a convention which should attain his two objects; placing sufficient confidence in me to say that he should be perfectly satisfied with whatever I proposed.

The next day, I remember well, Alexander Pisani, long attached to our Embassy, and whose services to it, I may say, *en passant*, have been invaluable, brought me a somewhat ponderous bag, containing all the papers that had long been collecting on commercial matters; and it was only after studying them attentively that I was able to explain, in the manner in which I have done, the real nature of the grievances, upon which remonstrances in various shapes, and under apparently varying circumstances, were being constantly made. When I had thus a general notion of the question I had to deal with, I called on my friend

M. Bilcocq, Secretary to the French embassy, who I understood had been for some time charged by Admiral Roussin with the task of endeavoring to see if any new commercial arrangements could be proposed between France and the Porte.

M. Bilcocq was a charming man. He sung beautifully, was very gallant, and excelled in *calembourgs*. He was an excellent classical scholar, and had an unhesitating good opinion of himself. He received my proposals characteristically. "Pardon, my friend," said he; "when you have studied these commercial questions a year here at Constantinople—when you have been endeavoring to draw up something like a treaty on that knowledge, you will be yet a year carrying on negotiations with this stupid government before you get into the position which our embassy occupies at present in this matter. So, if you please, we will act singly, and each take his own way; for I have no wish that you should gain credit by my experience."

I thus saw that I should not only obtain no aid from my agreeable colleague, but that probably I should encounter his opposition: a little more knowledge of the locality, indeed, taught me that every embassy considered itself, if not the enemy, the rival of the other.

I found, however, in Mr. Cartwright, our Consul-General, and who had been forty years in the East, a man eminently qualified to add to the information I had acquired; and I persuaded Lord Ponsonby, who was not on very friendly terms with him, to consent that he should be joined with me in the task I had undertaken. I also received a good deal of information from two intelligent merchants—one English, Mr. Hansom, and one French, M. Durand; and in this way I became pretty well acquainted with the results that would satisfy the English and French trade.

I was soon, therefore, in a position to commence operations on the plan which I proposed to myself, viz., that of making a treaty which would be as beneficial to every government as to that of England, and which every government should be at liberty to accept; but to make this treaty so quietly and silently, that no one should suspect the proximity of its accomplishment until it was signed. As I had dropped the subject with M. Bilcocq after our first conversation, and had rather seemed to be seeking information from curiosity than business in my conversations with M. Durand, no one suspected that I was seriously employed about the immediate settlement of an affair which, according to my friend the French Secretary, it required three years at least to accomplish.

My intentions were seconded by the fact that I had pitched a large Persian tent in one of those beautiful valleys of the Bosphorus which boast a fountain surrounded by centenarian trees; and to this retreat—there not being at that time a great deal of general business in the Chancellerie—I used frequently to resort.

Some verses I had written in two or three ladies' albums gained me the credit of being a poet. Pera talked of my romantic tendencies; and I was thought to be writing a new "Lalla Rookh" when I was occupied with a treaty of commerce.

Nourri Effendi, however, the Minister of Commerce, had his *yali* just opposite my happy valley; and, with the aid of our head dragoman, M. Pisani, I negotiated with him the draft of a proposed commercial treaty, which was submitted to the examination of a commission.

Matters, however, had now advanced so far that further secrecy was impossible; and I had a visit from the gay and intelligent M. Bilcocq, who asked me what we were doing. I told him frankly, and the terms I was trying to

obtain. He lifted up his eyebrows, slapped his thigh, and, ridiculing my project, said what people often say who don't try for a thing earnestly or who don't know how to obtain it—"This project of yours is an *impossible* one." I willingly admitted that success was always a very difficult thing, but affirmed that difficulties were not always impossibilities: he laughed good-humoredly, and we parted. Difficulties and intrigues there were. For though every one admitted that if I could succeed they would all be benefited, every one wished that he should succeed, and not that I should.

I knew, however, that in a changing scene of this kind, one has only to persist with an idea clear in one's own mind, and to let events come to aid its accomplishment.

Accordingly, whilst negotiations were going on, some favorite who had been opposing the treaty fell into disgrace; those who were against him had now the opportunity of exaggerating his mistakes.

The general substance of our proposals was laid before Mahmoud, and in the destruction of monopolies the astute and determined old Sultan saw—as Lord Ponsonby had expected he would—the means of bringing Europe and his rebellious vassal into differences. The order was given to settle and sign without an hour's delay; and I was suddenly summoned to the country-house of the Reis Effendi, or Minister of Foreign Affairs, near whom I was encamped. Our head dragoman, M. Alexander Pisani, came quietly to the same rendezvous. The opportunity was not to be lost. We passed the whole day copying and translating; at ten at night Lord Ponsonby dropped down in his caique, and we woke the next morning with the treaty concluded.

The next morning also this fact was known, to the utter horror and surprise of my friend and colleague.

"Est-il possible, mon cher, que vous nous avez joué ce

tour là?" "Quel tour? Seulement nous avons trouvé possible ce que vous avez cru impossible." "Mais que faire?"

"Nothing more easy, my dear fellow; here is a copy of our treaty; do you have another copy made, and sign it to-day, and then let the journal at Smyrna (a journal in the French pay) say that this happy result was entirely brought about by Admiral Roussin's influence and your great knowledge of commercial affairs."

M. Bilcocq, as usual, laughed heartily, shook me by the hand, and followed my advice.

I have gone with some detail into this affair, not only because it was an interesting epoch in my own life, and that narrative is improved by these personal episodes, but because it brings out Lord Palmerston's character. The whole of this affair had been commenced without instructions from him, and brought to a conclusion without his sanction. Another minister might have been sore at anything done in this way, or sought to give himself the credit of doing it. But Lord Palmerston was above all petty feelings of this kind. He got Lord Ponsonby raised in the peerage, named me to the post I then asked for—Secretary of Embassy at Petersburg—and mentioned in Parliament in a very flattering manner my services.

It is in this way that a chief attaches those who serve under him, and makes them zealous in serving him well.

As to the treaty itself, it reposed on two principles, which, after the explanations I have given, will appear simple enough. On the one hand, monopolies were prohibited, and one duty, which might be considered a new export duty, covered interior taxation; on the other, internal taxes on imported goods were abolished, and an additional import duty to the regular import duty imposed. All the governments, that of Russia alone excepted, at

once adopted the terms we had thus stipulated, and Russia herself not long afterward was obliged to do the same. One blemish disfigured our work, viz., the high export duty we had left; but the Turks, blind to their own interests, would not then consent to modify this mistake, and it was only some years afterward, when I negotiated as ambassador another commercial treaty, that it was removed.

I shall here quote a few extracts from letters which show the bent of Lord Palmerston's mind even in 1838.

I shall quote also one or two letters of my own, and Lord Palmerston's replies, in a correspondence which originated in my being charged to negotiate the treaty of which I have been speaking—a negotiation which led, not unnaturally, to a discussion on the great topic of the day, Mehemet Ali.

It will be seen that I foresaw that the Sultan's forces would be beaten, if he forced on an engagement, and that I also foresaw the probability of future arrangements respecting the connection between detached divisions of the Ottoman Empire and the center;—arrangements which circumstances have since brought about.*

It will be seen likewise that Lord Palmerston was never angry if you expressed contrary ideas to his own, and thus gave him an opportunity of re-examining his own; though when his mind was perfectly made up he expected you to carry out implicitly his convictions.

* The nice question here is to give these separate divisions such ample local power as provides for their self-government, and yet to retain in the hands of the Porte sufficient imperial power to keep the Turkish empire a corporate and coexisting body, which is as much the interest of the parts as of the whole; for no one of the parts is sufficiently powerful to be independent as a part, though all the parts when united together, each part preserving the other, the whole may maintain its independence.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, G.C.B., Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, June 5, 1838.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Your communication about Egypt is important, and tallies very much with other information which we have received from elsewhere.* I must bring the subject under the serious consideration of the Cabinet. My own opinion is, and has long been, made up; it is that we ought to support the Sultan heartily and vigorously; with France if France will act with us; without her if she should decline.

“But all this is only thinking on paper, and, till the Cabinet have decided, you can say nothing to Molé. I foresee difficulty in getting the Cabinet to take any vigorous resolve.

“There are very few public men in England who follow up foreign affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have not happened.

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, G.C.B., Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, June 8, 1838.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I have only time to write you a few lines about Egypt. The Cabinet yesterday agreed that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare himself independent, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish empire. They see that the consequence of such a declaration on his part must be,

* Extract from dispatch from Colonel Patrick Campbell, British Consul-General in Egypt, to Lord Palmerston, dated Alexandria, May 25, 1838:

“The intended realization by Mehemet Ali of his long-meditated plan to declare his independence, has at length been unequivocally communicated by him, both to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France, and myself.”

either immediately or at no distant time, conflict between him and the Sultan. That in such conflict the Turkish troops would probably be defeated; that then the Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan, and a Russian garrison would occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles; and once in possession of those points, the Russians would never quit them. We are, therefore, prepared to give naval aid to the Sultan against Mehemet, if necessary and demanded; and we intend to order our Mediterranean fleet immediately to Alexandria, in order to give Mehemet an outward and visible sign of our inward resolve. We should like the French squadron to go there too at the same time, if the French are willing so to send it. With respect to the mode of making our communications to Mehemet, much is to be said both ways. Separate declarations have the advantage which Molé mentions; a joint and collective declaration would give us some hold over Russia, if it was founded upon a previous and recorded agreement between the five Powers, giving to the five some determining authority over the conduct of each; but this would be a tedious matter to arrange, and would not be settled in time. What *I* should like, and what *I* should *think* I could get the Cabinet to agree to, would be a short convention between England and France on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, by which the two former should bind themselves for a limited time to afford to the latter naval assistance, in the event of his demanding it to protect his territory against attack; and the wording might be so framed as to include the case either of Russia or of Mehemet Ali.

“I am convinced that such a convention as I describe would save Turkey, and preserve the peace of Europe, by *its mere moral effect*, and without our being called to act upon it.

"Now, all this I write to you on the supposition that France is honest and can be trusted—not in the execution of the treaty, because, at all events, she could not help executing such an engagement—but I mean in the previous negotiation; and you will use your judgment as to the degree to which you will confidentially sound Molé on this matter. It must not be forgotten that one great danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia, which, though prevented at present by the personal feelings of the emperor, may not always be as impossible as it is now; and it would be well to fix the policy of France in the right track with respect to affairs of the Levant while we have the power to do so.

"PALMERSTON."

To Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., British Ambassador, Constantinople.

"STANHOPE STREET, June 23, 1838.

"MY DEAR PONSONBY,—

"I am not able to send you by this messenger any official instructions upon the subject of Mehemet Ali's declared intention of setting up for himself as an independent sovereign; but I shall do so by the next messenger. In the mean time, you may assure the Porte that England is entirely of the same opinion as France, Austria, and Russia on this matter, namely, that Mehemet Ali cannot be permitted to take such a step. We shall probably send our squadron to Alexandria and Syria, in company with some part of the French ships of war, to give Mehemet an outward and visible sign of our inward intentions on this subject.

"We could, indeed, stop all Egyptian ships, whether of war or merchantmen, if we have for so doing the authority of the sovereign of Egypt, the Sultan. But if Mehemet sent his supplies under neutral flags, then it could only be

Turkish ships of war that could rightfully stop and seize such supplies.

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, G.C.B., Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 6, 1838.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“According to your account of what Molé said to you upon Egyptian affairs, it seems to me that Sebastiani must have rather imperfectly brought the matter before his government; I wish, therefore, that you would explain the thing to Molé, and urge him to authorize Sebastiani to co-operate with me in endeavoring to effect a joint arrangement on the subject between the five Powers. The short state of the case appears to be this: if Mehemet Ali finds the least disunion between the great Powers of Europe, he will endeavor to make himself independent, and take his chance of the split which consequent events may produce among us. But if he does declare himself independent, and war ensues between him and the Sultan, and the Russians interfere, the chances are that some serious quarrel will ensue between France and England on the one hand, and Russia on the other; or else that England and France will be forced to remain passive spectators of things done by Russia which could not be acquiesced in without discredit to the governments of England and France. The question then is, which is the most likely way to prevent Mehemet Ali from taking the step he is meditating; and if he should nevertheless take it, which is the best way to prevent the evil consequences which that step might produce?

“Our opinion is, that for both these purposes a previous concert between the five would be most desirable. We think—first, that if we could announce to Mehemet that

such a concert is established, and that we are all prepared conjointly to help the Sultan against him, he would abandon his intentions, and remain quiet. But next, we think that if, in spite of this warning, he was to move, such a concert would afford the best security for bringing the matter to an end without any disturbance of the peace of Europe.

“We wish, and so does Sebastiani, that the representatives of the five Powers should be assembled here in London; that we should lay the case before them, and propose a combined system of action, suggesting that if the Porte should want aid by sea and by land, the three maritime Powers should give aid by sea, and Austria assistance by land; we should state without disguise that the solitary interference of Russia, however she may think herself either justified or bound to exert it, would excite great jealousy in this part of the world; and that as in the general interest and harmony it seems desirable to avoid such jealousy, with honor to all parties, and without any sacrifice of important interests, we propose the military action of Austria, which from the intimate union existing between Austria and Russia would be perfectly compatible with the honor of Russia, while, on the other hand, from the geographical position of Austria, it would not be the source of the same jealousy to England and France.

“In all probability the mere announcement of such an arrangement of this kind would keep Mehemet quiet; but if it did not, it would at least insure a result consistent with the maintenance of general peace.

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

“(Private.)

“July 30, 1838.

“DEAR PALMERSTON,—

“The French ambassador listened to a heap of absurdities about the object of my conferences with Reschid Pasha, and spoke to me in a tone and manner I thought necessary to check. I did so; but happily we ended better friends than ever; and I showed him the nonsense of what he had heard, and told him that, so far from my having urged the Sultan to make war on Mehemet Ali, I had pointed out to him the advantage he had evidently already obtained over the Pasha, by having to state to England and France that he had yielded to their advice and desires, and abstained from war, or acts calculated to create it; whilst the Pasha had declared his resolution to break through the limits the great Powers had assigned him; that I had no authority to offer a loan to the Sultan; that I had no authority to say one word officially to him, inasmuch as I had not received from you a line of instructions upon the subject of Mehemet Ali; that it was very true I had taken occasion at our conferences to endeavor to satisfy myself as to what were the real intentions and feelings of the Sultan respecting his own position, etc., and that I had satisfied myself that the Sultan would not at present attack the Pasha; and farther, to comfort the ambassador, I told him the real cause of my having suddenly sent off a messenger, viz., to forward to you a dispatch from the vice-consul at Erzeroum, in which it was stated that Mr MacNeill had quitted the Persian court, etc.

“PONSONBY.”

To the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

“CONSTANTINOPLE, July 30, 1838

“MY DEAR LORD,—

“I believe that Lord Ponsonby sent you home a statement of mine relative to the commercial question. Let me venture to urge that, if we wish to terminate this affair, we should not ask what is impossible, looking at the state of the Turkish revenue, for these people to grant; and that, on the other hand, we should demand in the *strongest and most positive* manner what it is just that they should perform.

“If the Turks consent to the abolition of prohibitions, monopolies, and ‘teskeres,’ in exchange for a fixed duty, to be levied at the ports whence the goods are exported, the three per cent. being then paid at the act of exportation, and that such fixed duty can be satisfactorily arranged by joint commissioners established for the purpose, I think we shall have settled satisfactorily the question of exports.

“On imports, it is impossible to expect that the Turks will allow the free circulation of our goods throughout the country without any duty either on buyer or seller further than the three per cent. It is giving up a large revenue, which we have no right to prevent their levying.

“The only way to come to any definite arrangement is to agree to pay, as in the other case, a fixed duty beyond the import duty, on goods being sold at the *échelles*, or seaports, or when they are sent into the interior—this duty freeing the goods from *any* subsequent one.

“There will be a difficulty, no doubt, here, in fixing what such duty should be. I say two and a half per cent.; the merchants admit three per cent.; I believe they would agree to more. The Porte will demand five per cent., but

may consent, if they are really in earnest about the thing at all, to come down to three per cent.

"After the settlement I have thus sketched out on imports and exports, I think it may be also practicable to lower the duty on goods in transit—a very important point.

"In regard to the Turks themselves, may I venture to observe that the genius of their manners and conversation is that of yielding everything at first? They begin by saying, 'Good—yes;' but when you come to the matter in question and to its details, you will find all those fine expressions mean nothing. Like all people in a feeble position, they respect you according to their opinion of your *force*. If, however, you wish that force to have a permanent influence, and to be unaccompanied by dislike, you must blend its exercise with justice; and if you wish it to arrive at a quick result through all that ambuscade of intrigues, and doubts, and fears, and prejudices which will be sure to be secretly formed against it, you must tell the Turk *what* he is to do, *why* he is to do it, *when* he is to do it, and show him that you only ask quietly and reasonably what you have a right to demand. In this way, and this way alone, you will do business with him; and if he sees you act thus, he will not only agree with you, but rely upon you. Forgive me if I say all this, but I am sure it is the truth, and that our influence is only to be maintained in this part of the world by a clear, decided course, which always shows a self-confidence. You were anxious, I believe, to ascertain the views of this government in respect to Mehemet Ali. May I venture to say that what I have been writing applies to this? Our ambassador could see no Turkish minister without its being a public matter, which sets all Pera and all Constantinople a talking. No Turkish minister would dare to tell him

anything else than that Mehemet should be put down, and that the Turkish government can easily put him down ; because the Sultan hates the Pasha with an intense hatred ; and any one who said that he should not be subdued and could not be subdued would probably lose not only his Sublime Highness's favor, but his own head. The Turks, however, will enter into any treaty with England for destroying Mehemet that does not compromise them with Russia ; but though they may use general expressions encouraging you to believe they would go further than this, I don't believe they *would*, unless you were in the most explicit manner to promise your protection, happen what may, and show also that your protection would be powerful for the purpose. For my own part, while I think that the opportunity which Mehemet's declaration has afforded us of settling the Egyptian question should not be lost—because to leave matters as they are is to leave two governments wearing out each other during an equivocal state of peace as much as they would do by open conflict—still, while I think this, I cannot help thinking also that any arrangement that can be made without war will be more permanent when completed, and easier and safer to complete, than one of another description. I think this—First, Because the army here is in that state that makes it almost *certain that if a battle were fought, it would be lost* ; while the population in Anatolia and Roumelia are also in that state that if a battle were lost, it is impossible to say what would, or rather what would not, be the consequence.

“Secondly, Because, if the most triumphant success were to be obtained instead of defeat, it would only, as far as I can see, get rid of one evil by the certainty of another.

“The great weaknesses of this empire proceed from ig-

norance and poverty; and you can carry on no plans of improvement which are necessary on account of the former, if you augment the incapacity which attends upon the latter. A war, however victorious, would cost money, and much money; neither would its expense end with its completion. Languid as this government is at its heart, it will be still more so at its extremities; and the farther those extremities are removed from the center, the more feeble will be the circulation of that power which has to animate and keep them alive.

“The great chance of regeneration for Turkey is the restoration of its finances, and the establishment of order in its administration. If Mehemet Ali could be confined to Egypt, in the possession of which alone he would not be formidable as an adversary, insured in the possession of that province for himself and family on conditions which would make him nominally dependent on the Porte; if Syria could form the subject of another combination, and all parties be forced to lay aside a menacing attitude, I think there would be some chance of reform and improvement in this part of the world; for, as the passions of individuals which might now oppose this arrangement passed away, general interests, which do not pass away, would remain and sanction it.

“That such an arrangement might be difficult I grant; but I don’t think it would be very difficult, and certainly neither so difficult nor so hazardous as any other.

“As long as Mehemet has nothing certain to lose or to bequeath, we cannot count upon his content and tranquillity; but give him the one and the other, and it is more than probable that in his old age he would prefer a smaller sum in his pocket to a larger one staked on the great gambling-table of war. Confined to the government of Egypt, also, and secure of its possession, his attention would be con-

centrated on peaceful pursuits, and most of the enormities he commits would cease from the cessation of their cause. Not sufficiently strong to defy the Porte as a rival, it would be the interest of himself or successor to maintain her as a feeble and indulgent mistress, under whom a nominal dependence as a vassal would be far preferable to any nominal independence that could be obtained from Russia as a neighbor.

"Hence I think it more than probable that the Viceroy would accept such a settlement of his affairs; at all events, it would be difficult for him to resist it. In Syria, were it known that England and France had any project for the establishment of some system less obnoxious than that under which this afflicted country has long groaned, *there would be no resisting the unanimous effort of the whole population.*

"As to all influence which your Cabinet or that of St. Petersburg may exercise here, I should tell you frankly that this will always be *less in proportion to any services you may render Turkey than in proportion to the dread which you or Russia are able to inspire her with.*

"Put down Mehemet; deliver over Egypt and Syria, etc. to the Porte. If after this she thinks you more powerful than Russia, you will have greater influence in her counsels. But supposing you did all this, and that still there appeared more to fear from Russia than from you—not only would Russia be as powerful as now, she would be more powerful than now, because all fears from Mehemet Ali and all hopes of vanquishing him by you would be at an end.

"The whole source of influence here, then, is strength, and the fear which follows it. At the same time, I repeat that that influence is more durable when it is exercised

soberly and justly. For the two things which the Turks best understand and most reverence are power and justice.

"These observations apply to every affair. With a French and English fleet ready at hand to act as it might be deemed expedient, and a just and moderate plan (such as the state of things rendered applicable) to propose to Mehemet and his master for their accommodation and acceptance by such a day and such an hour—giving both security and certainty for the insecurity and incertitude in which they both exist at this moment—I believe all differences might be briefly and permanently adjusted. But talking and talking through dragomans ends in nothing but the Turkish phrase of 'To-morrow.'

"A great object to effect is the partial disarmament of both parties; and this should form part of any project I advised. As long as this government maintains its present army, at all events, it never can begin to form an army that is worth maintaining; and if our policy is directed toward the future destinies of the Turkish empire, we cannot be too impressed with the idea that the only chance of giving it a future is to get, as I have already said, its finances in order, and on the order then established to form some decent scheme of civil and military defense.

"If, however, while we are discussing all these matters, Mehemet should act in them, which, unless some provocative step on the part of the Turks takes place, or some very tempting opportunity offers, I hardly believe—but if he were provoked and attacked—unless everything I have heard is erroneous—he would be successful. For the Turks have no general, unless the Prussian officers should furnish one, and their troops, as I said in my last, are so disposed (this is generally admitted) that they could oppose no concentrated or effectual resistance.

"However, as so much in respect to what we should do

must depend upon the strength of the two parties, while nothing one hears is to be relied upon, and your dragoman cannot, or does not, get you the required information, I think it would be most expedient to get some competent person to visit the spot, and to see in what state the Turkish army and the Egyptian army really is. As to the Turkish navy, it is perfectly unmanned, and altogether useless for purposes of warfare.

“Very respectfully and truly yours obliged,
“HY. L. BULWER.”

To Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Constantinople.

“WINDSOR, Sept. 13, 1838.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,—

“I had a long talk the other day with Achmed Fethi Pasha,* and gave him the best advice I could about his government and country. I strongly urged upon him how expedient it is for the Sultan to abstain from attacking Mehemet Ali, because Mehemet's army is now probably better than, or at least as good as, that of the Sultan. I said that the Sultan ought to employ himself in organizing his army and navy, and in improving his revenue, and should thus make himself strong enough to be able to beat Mehemet Ali by his own means. That the Sultan ought not to break with Russia, or give Russia any just ground for quarrel; but that there is no good reason why the Porte should allow Russia to interfere as she does in all the internal details of the administration of the Turkish empire, and especially to prevent and defeat every arrangement which has for its object the improvement of any part of the Turkish system.

“I said that this practice of constant interference on

* Turkish ambassador.

the part of Russia arises out of, and is endeavored to be justified upon, that article of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi by which the Emperor and Sultan engage to consult each other confidentially upon their respective affairs. But that it would be most important for the interests and independence of the Porte to get rid of that treaty; but the question is, how to get rid of it before it expires? That the only way seemed to me to be, to merge it in some more general compact of the same nature. That the present threats of Mehemet Ali appear to furnish a good opportunity for such an attempt, and that the Porte might found upon those threats an application to England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to enter jointly into engagements with the Porte with a view to maintain the independence of the Turkish empire. Such a treaty, I observed, if it could be obtained, would supersede that of Unkiar-Skelessi, and place the Porte in a state of comparative independence.

"Yours, etc.,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

"THERAPIA, August 28, 1838.

"MY DEAR LORD,—

"In regard to Egypt, we hear, as your lordship will be aware, that Mehemet, without abandoning his pretended or real project, defers it, and holds indeed a language which concurs with the views, whether erroneous or correct, which I have always entertained, viz., that his present object is to disquiet and alarm the great Powers as to the fear of war, without actually doing anything that can provoke their hostilities. (Some of the tribute due I understand to have been lately paid.) In this manner he trusts to persuade them that it is better to do something that will settle and keep him permanently quiet, than to leave him

in his present disposition. I cannot still help imagining (but then I don't know the man) that he would consent to many sacrifices to obtain some *fixed* position, much less important in appearance than that which he now for the moment occupies, and that the greater difficulty would be with the Sultan, who would only be brought to consent to this by obtaining all the outward marks of triumph. Moreover, I cannot help thinking that the death of Mehemet Ali would not clear up the present state of affairs, but rather still further embarrass them. With one man of ability all things are concentrated, and one knows where to grasp and grapple with them. Confusion is more difficult to deal with; nor can we be quite sure that France has not her designs in this part of the world as well as Russia.

"For England alone to subdue the Viceroy, if matters cannot be arranged with him (and more especially if we have in this commercial treaty a popular cause) would not be difficult; but it certainly might be accompanied with some reasons for alarm, if the entry of the Dardanelles were not ceded to us. If they were, I should have no apprehension.

"At the same time, Mehemet Ali subdued, I should still fear that if we sought for any stable or permanent basis of tranquillity we should not find it in again submitting Egypt to the old government of the Porte.

"Under no circumstances do I think that this government could now rule that distant province in such a manner as to add to its own strength or its own resources. To make it prosperous, or to keep it quiet, I am apt to imagine that the best plan would be to sanction in the governments of Egypt and Syria a certain degree of independence in their internal affairs. In short, a kind of confederacy,* with a sort of appointed head, though not a good govern-

* *Note by Lord Palmerston.*—This is the first step to dismemberment.

ment, is perhaps the best that can be formed for some time out of the disjointed limbs of the ancient empire of the Ottomans, which has not, I fear, in itself sufficient vitality so to preserve its different parts together as to regulate them with one constant and identical action.

“Excuse me, my dear lord, for writing all this—much more than I intended to do—and which is in closer correspondence with my own leisure than your employments.

“HENRY L. BULWER.”

To Henry L. Bulwer, Esq., Constantinople.

“WINDSOR, Sept. 13, 1838.

“MY DEAR BULWER,—

“A thousand thanks for your interesting letters, but above all for your treaty, which as far as I can judge is a *capo d'opera*, and will be ratified without reserve; but I have only just read it, and must consult the Board of Trade before I give a final decision on it. We certainly shall not reject it from any concurrence in the French apprehension that it will be bad for Mehemet Ali and drive him to declare himself independent in order to escape from its obligations. We are quite able and willing to keep his Pashaship in order upon a point like this. However, the truth is that what is good for the Sultan is good for Mehemet; and the abolition of monopolies will increase in the end the resources of Egypt, as well as of Turkey, though it may for the moment paralyze Mehemet Ali's scheme of finance.

“I am not surprised at all the little jealousy and impediments which you experienced. *But we must take people as they are, and make the best of their good qualities, without dwelling too much on their bad.** Besides,

* Lord Palmerston frequently repeats this phrase.

1838.

LORD PALMERSTON.

'*Les nations n'ont pas de cousins.*' I look forward, do, to a better state of things as between England and Turkey, and when people say that the Turkish empire is rapidly falling to decay, one always replies, 'It will not fall in our time if we try to prop it up, and not to pull it down; besides, an empire which has endured for centuries is likely to outlive the creation of yesterday, such as the authority of hemet Ali's authority.'

"PALMERSTON"

To Henry L. Bulwer, Esq., Constantinople.

"Sept. 22,

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"I have received your letter of the 28th August. I am glad to hear your opinions respecting the future prospects of the Sultan with reference to Egypt and because it is always interesting to know how one strikes an intelligent mind, observing events on the spot."

"I own that I have myself considerable doubts on the subject; but the present bent of my mind is to think that our policy should be founded upon the basis of an effort to maintain the Sultan and to uphold the integrity of the Turkish empire. To frame a system of future policy for the East upon the accidental position of a man who in seventy would be to build on sand; and no man can say what will come when Mehemet Ali goes. A little more of order, organization, and force to the scale of the Sultan, and a little less of sagacity, vigor of intellect, and administrative capacity on the part of the usurping government of Egypt, would place Syria again at the disposal of the Sultan. The distance of Syria or of Egypt from Constantinople would be no bar to the effectual annexation of those provinces by the Porte. Many provinces of other empires are just as far from the seat of

ment. There can be no doubt that it is for the interest of England that the Sultan should be strong; and it is evident that he would be stronger with Syria and Egypt than without them. I am, therefore, for continuing to aim at a maintenance of the integrity of the empire; we can think of a confederation when unity shall have been proved to be impossible.

"People go on talking of the inevitable and progressive decay of the Turkish empire, which they say is crumbling to pieces.

"In the first place, no empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbors forcibly tear it to pieces. In the next place, I much question that there is any process of decay going on in the Turkish empire; and I am inclined to suspect that those who say that the Turkish empire is rapidly going from bad to worse ought rather to say that the other countries of Europe are year by year becoming better acquainted with the manifest and manifold defects of the organization of Turkey. But I should be disposed to think that, for some years past, the foundations at least of improvement have been laid; and it is certain that the daily increasing intercourse between Turkey and the other countries of Europe must in a few years, if peace can be preserved, throw much light upon the defects and weaknesses of the Turkish system, and lead to various improvements therein.

"PALMERSTON."

What Lord Palmerston here says is the precise truth. When Turkey was a barbaric Power, with its flowing robes and its latticed windows, it existed as a romantic mystery, which no one thought of inquiring into; when it became more or less Europeanized, people put on their spectacles and began to criticise it with European eyes

and to judge it by European notions; and it may almost be said that what superficial observers pointed at as symptoms of deterioration were proofs of improvement.

The next letter closes the Turkish correspondence, which I quote, in 1838.

To Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Constantinople.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Oct. 13, 1838.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,—

“I send you the ratifications of the Commercial Treaty, and an excellent thing it is. We hear through France that Mehemet Ali does not mean to object. How could he?—he would have had neither the right nor the might to do so. He says he will evade it. That will not be so easy; and he will find that in the long run it is for his advantage as well as for that of the Sultan; that is to say, for the advantage of the people whom they govern.

“PALMERSTON.”

BOOK XIII.

I leave Constantinople, and in May, 1839, am named Secretary of Embassy at Paris—Lord Palmerston's mention of *Bedchamber* question—Position of things in Turkey in 1839.

I LEFT Constantinople as Secretary of Embassy at Petersburg, a post I had asked for ; but my health was much affected by a fever I had caught during the last month I had been at Constantinople, and it was not deemed necessary that I should start for Russia in the winter season. A change of ministry, which appeared probable in spring, on what was popularly called the *Bedchamber* question, had also affected my departure.

Lord Palmerston notices the termination of that question in the following letter :

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville.

“ FOREIGN OFFICE, May 10, 1839.

“ MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“ The Tories have failed to make a government, not from any difference between themselves, but from a difference with the queen. They insisted on the removal of the Ladies of the *Bedchamber*. The queen declared she would not submit to it ; that it would be too painful and affronting to her ; that those ladies have no seats in Parliament ; that the object in view in dismissing them was to separate her from everybody in whom she could trust, and to surround her with political spies, if not with personal enemies. They came three times to the charge.

First Peel made the demand singly, then he brought to his aid the Duke of Wellington, and again he came back with the unanimous opinion of his Cabinet that was to be. The queen, alone and unadvised, stood firm against all these assaults, showed a presence of mind, a firmness, a discrimination far beyond her years, and had much the best of it in her discussion with Peel and the duke. She sent Peel this morning her final refusal to comply with this condition, and Peel thereupon resigned his commission to form a government. We shall of course stand by the queen, and support her against this offensive condition which the Tories wanted to impose upon her, and which her youth and her isolated position ought to have protected her from. It remains to be seen whether this House of Commons will support us in supporting her, and, if it will not, whether this House does or does not faithfully represent the opinion of the country. However, nothing is as yet settled, but I believe Melbourne is or has been with the queen. You will learn further details by to-morrow's post.*

"Yours,

"PALMERSTON."

The Whig Cabinet, however, had not been long restored to office when I was named Secretary of Embassy to Paris, where the affairs of the East, which I had just been engaged in, had become the affairs of the day.

* However just the views that Lord Palmerston expresses on this particular case, the decision taken on it hardly forms the subject for a precedent. There might be female sovereigns who, if they had for their intimate friends the wives of political partisans hostile to the Cabinet that was to conduct the affairs of the state, would render the steady confident action of a government impossible.

I have mentioned the state of things that existed at Constantinople when I left it in 1838; they had not improved in 1839. In the position in which Mehemet Ali stood toward the Sultan, causes of irritation were constantly and necessarily arising, nor could these be appeased; for whilst one thought he had to seek his safety by increasing his power, the other saw no alternative but that of submitting to a master or destroying a rebel.

In fact, Mahmoud had long concentrated all the hopes of his remaining life on the overthrow of his audacious vassal, and had by degrees been collecting an army on the Syrian frontier, with which it was not unreasonable to anticipate success; for the Egyptian administration, whilst it maintained order, was as rapacious as that of the Turks, and more harsh and cruel, so that the imperial troops had little to fear from the inhabitants, whilst, with their artillery directed by European engineers, and an army drawn from a Turkish population, there did not seem much to apprehend from the slight superiority in discipline which French officers had been able to give to the less brave and hardy Arabs.

The European Powers were so far agreed in the first instance that they unanimously combined to preach to both parties abstinence from action. "We will not allow Mehemet Ali to cross the Syrian boundary if you don't attack him," they said to Sultan Mahmoud. "If you attempt to pass the line of your present boundary you will incur the displeasure of all Europe," they said to Mehemet Ali.

It is easy indeed to see why every great European Power wished to avoid a conflict in the East. If the Pasha of Egypt were successful, and his son Ibrahim marched on to Constantinople after victory, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi would be called into execution. England,

France, and Austria did not want to see Russia the established protectress of Turkey; it was inconvenient to prevent this by force, difficult to do so by arrangement; whilst Russia herself did not wish to be involved in the complications which an appeal to her assistance would produce.

France had an additional motive for desiring to preserve the *status quo*. She did not wish to see the Sultan disturbed on the Bosphorus; but she did not desire to see Mehemet Ali disturbed in his possession of Syria and Egypt.

There is a policy dating far back in the traditions of the French Foreign Office, which would assign to France the possession or patronage over Egypt. Napoleon's expedition gave to this policy a practical character. It was a policy natural and politic for France if France was the enemy of England; but it was a policy impossible for France if there was to be a sincere alliance and friendship between the two countries, because the mistress of India cannot permit France to be mistress, directly or indirectly, of the road to her Indian dominions. Now the French government did not want to quarrel with England; and yet in France they did not like to abandon the policy which it had become a custom to consider the national one.

The *status quo*, therefore, just suited them. But there was one party whom it did not suit, and that was the Sultan. The *status quo* was not only the severance of a large portion of the empire from his authority, it was the destruction of that prestige by which he held the rest; and there was daily forming a considerable party, even about his throne, in favor of placing, by some violent course or other, the scepter of Constantinople in the hands of his youthful son, Abdul-Medjid, under the guardianship of the old and fortunate despot at Cairo. Diplomatic

arguments were therefore of little avail, and Mahmoud went on perseveringly increasing his army, with a determination to risk all for all on the first favorable opportunity.

This was thought to have arrived in the spring of 1839, and on June 24 a great battle was fought at Nezib.

The Turkish general, Hafiz Pasha, was defeated—not so easily as it was represented, for the Turks fought well, and were on the point at one moment of gaining the victory; but once routed, the rout was complete. Misfortunes never come singly. On June 30 Sultan Mahmoud died, and almost immediately afterward the Turkish Grand Admiral, Achmet Pasha, went off with the fleet and delivered it up to Mehemet Ali at Alexandria.

Its army scattered, its navy gone, the Porte had no national means of defense. But Russia, as I have said, was bound to be its defender if called upon to be so; and the other states of Europe therefore had to determine whether they were to allow this office to be undertaken by Russia singly or by themselves and Russia conjointly. This was at once decided by the ambassadors of all the Powers at Constantinople agreeing to a note in which they pledged their governments to protect the young heir to the empire, and advised his ministers to listen to no offers from Egypt without their concurrence.

But to what extent and by what means was this joint protection to be afforded?

A new series of negotiations commenced, in which France gradually detached herself more and more from England, without confessing that she did so.

M. Molé, Marshal Soult's predecessor, had fairly stated at the first that England and France differed in their views as to Egypt, and invited an attempt toward an under-

standing; but Marshal Soult adopted a different course; he agreed in principle to everything that Lord Palmerston suggested, and Lord Palmerston was delighted.

Extract from Letter to the Right Hon. Earl Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 19, 1839.

“Soult is a jewel; nothing can be more satisfactory than his course with regard to us, and the union of England and France upon these Turkish affairs will embolden Metternich and save Europe.”

This did very well as long as we were talking about an agreement, but when we came to action on that agreement all accord ceased.

For instance, Lord Palmerston said that Mehemet Ali should be at once forced to restore the Sultan's fleet. The marshal said, “Certainly, but *not just now*; when we have settled every other point we will settle that.” Lord Palmerston said Mehemet Ali's limits should be defined, and he should be forced to withdraw within them, receiving in return the hereditary investiture of what he retained. “Quite right,” said Marshal Soult, “and we will settle all about Mehemet Ali presently; but the first thing to do is to settle about Constantinople: Ibrahim may march forward to it at any moment; then comes the question of the Russians doing the same thing; that is the first object to look to,”—thus endeavoring not only to turn attention from Egypt, but to involve us in difficulties with Russia, which would prevent any subsequent agreement between that Power and ourselves.

I have always found in negotiation that the worst course possible is to disguise real differences by plausible expressions. The disagreement which exists between two parties who wish to agree should be stated in the clearest and

broadest manner at the commencement. The sore should be probed to the bottom, or there is no chance of healing it; but, at all events, the discovery which our government had to make was as to what the French government would *really do*; as to what it *professed* its wish to do, that was of small importance.

It so happened that soon after this new phase in affairs Lord Granville's health required a visit to the seacoast, and I was left minister *ad interim* in Paris.

My opinion as to the course which the marshal had chalked out for himself was almost immediately formed, and is given in the dispatches subsequently published, and was that France was simply endeavoring to amuse us by an apparent acquiescence in our opinions, but that in reality she meant to adhere to her own, which were not ours. Such also, after a time, was Lord Palmerston's opinion.

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

"Sept. 1, 1839.

"DEAR BULWER,—

"Your letter of the 28th gives a very clear and distinct view of the confused and indistinct thinkings of the French government. It is evident that either from their own notions of French interests, or from fear of the newspapers, the French government will not willingly take the slightest step of coercion against Mehemet Ali, either for the purpose of getting back the Turkish fleet, or in order to enforce any arrangement which the five Powers may agree to propose to the two parties. My last communications to you will, however, bring the French to a point. They will see from those communications that, anxious as we are to continue to go on with them, we are not at all prepared to stand still with them. . . . They must therefore take their choice between three courses :—either

to go forward with us, and honestly redeem the pledges they have given to us and to Europe; or to stand aloof and shrink from a fulfillment of their own spontaneous declarations; or, lastly, to go right about and league themselves with Mehemet Ali, and employ force to prevent us and those other Powers who may join us from doing that which France herself is bound by every principle of honor, and every enlightened consideration of her real interests, to assist us in doing, instead of preventing from being done. I can hardly think Louis Philippe equal to the third course. The second is that which he would wish to pursue. But perhaps if he shall find that England, Austria, and Russia are agreed as to the first course he will follow us, even against his own inclination. The more I reflect on these matters, the more convinced am I that there is no possibility of a permanent settlement without making Mehemet withdraw into his original shell of Egypt; and Campbell's account of his manner when he received from Constantinople the account of the collective note sufficiently shows how conscious he is of his own inability to resist united Europe.

“As to the Turkish empire, if we can procure for it ten years of peace under the joint protection of the five Powers, and if those years are profitably employed in reorganizing the internal system of the empire, there is no reason whatever why it should not become again a respectable power. Half the wrong conclusions at which mankind arrive are reached by the abuse of metaphors, and by mistaking general resemblance or imaginary similarity for real identity. Thus, people compare an ancient monarchy with an old building, an old tree, or an old man, and because the building, tree, or man must, from the nature of things, crumble, or decay, or die, they imagine that the same thing holds good with a community, and that the same laws

which govern inanimate matter, or vegetable and animal life, govern also nations and states. Than which there cannot be a greater or more utterly unphilosophical mistake. For, besides all other points of difference, it is to be remembered that the component parts of the building, tree, or man remain the same, and are either decomposed by external causes or are altered in their internal structure by the process of life, so as ultimately to be unfit for their original functions; while, on the contrary, the component parts of a community are undergoing daily the process of physical renovation and of moral improvement. Therefore, all that we hear every day of the week about the decay of the Turkish empire, and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk, and so forth, is pure and unadulterated nonsense.

"Yours sincerely,
"PALMERSTON."

But, whilst France thus shrunk back from us, Russia came forward to take her place by our side, and M. de Brunnow had been sent to London to explain the feelings of his government on the subject under discussion. This next letter places clearly before us the position in which the various parties then stood—the one party bidding for our confidence as the other was losing it.

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

"WINDSOR, Sept. 24, 1839.

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"I have only time to write you a private letter, but will to-morrow send you a dispatch about Brunnow's mission. But as Sebastiani will write to-day an account of a conversation I had with him yesterday, and in which I told him frankly the substance of all Brunnow had said to me, I

wish you to be fully informed without delay. Brunnow says that the emperor will entirely agree to our views as to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and will join in whatever measures may be necessary to carry those views into effect; that he will unite with us, Austria, and Prussia, either with France or without her; and that though, politically speaking, he sees the advantage of having France of the party, personally he would be better pleased that she should be left out; that if we trust him as he hopes we do, and feels he deserves we should, he hopes we will trust him entirely, and not appear to show jealousy where we feel none; that consequently, if the measures of Mehemet should place Constantinople in danger, and render necessary any naval or military operation in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor, he hopes we will leave that to him, and that we will on our part undertake whatever is to be done on the Mediterranean and on the coasts of Syria and Egypt; that he is willing not only that anything which he may do with his fleet and army shall be held to be the result of concert, and not the resolve of Russia alone; but he is ready to begin by signing a convention which shall define our objects, determine our means of accomplishment, and assign to each his appropriate part; and that of course under such a convention the Russian force would withdraw as it came, whenever the object should have been attained; and Brunnow further said, in confidence, that if such a course were followed there would be no renewal of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. I have told Sebastiani all this, except the preference of the emperor to leave France out. I said that I had seen Esterhazy, who entirely agreed with me, individually, that it would for many weighty reasons be highly expedient to accept this offer, but that I could not say what the Cabinet may resolve upon a matter which it has not yet deliberated

upon, and that Esterhazy could not say what his government would determine upon an overture with which it had not yet been made acquainted.

“Sebastiani seemed little pleased with the prospect which this step of Russia seems to open of an arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian question in entire accordance with the views of the British government; but the only point on which he much dwelt was the objection which he urged against leaving to Russia the task of defending Constantinople, which he represented as confirming Russian influence and preponderance in Turkey. I said I did not see this, because if the parts assigned to each Power were to be determined by previous convention, each would act not for herself but for the whole, and exclusive influence no longer followed. Besides, I said, it seemed to me that there was no wise medium between confidence and distrust; and that if we tie up Russia by treaty we may trust her, and, trusting her, we had better mix no evidence of suspicion with our confidence. He at last only contended for our having a ship or two anchored within the Dardanelles if the Russians should be called to Constantinople; but that would be childish. Throughout the conversation I treated the matter as if France would of course be a party to the proposed convention, and he discussed it upon that assumption. As to the arrangement itself, nothing can be more miserable than the shifts and changes of the opinions and schemes of the French government; and it is evident that they have wishes and objects at bottom which they are ashamed of confessing. That, in short, their great and only aim is to do as much as they possibly can do for Mehemet Ali, without caring a pin for the Sultan, or having the least regard for their declarations and pledges. Sebastiani argued again for his plan of a frontier-line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout. I again started

all the objections to it, adding also that if Mehemet Ali had that bottom part of Syria he would necessarily command the west coast of the Red Sea and the holy cities, which Louis Philippe had long ago said to Granville it would be absolutely necessary to restore to the Sultan. I wish you to see Soult and to ascertain from him what Sebastiani has written, and what the French government mean to do, letting Soult understand that although the Cabinet has not yet come to a decision, they will meet about this matter in a day or two; and that the probability is that they will resolve to proceed in conjunction with the three Powers, whether France joins or not; but that on every possible account we should deeply regret that France should not be a party to the proceeding; and you might observe that France has distinctly approved of our object, though from internal difficulties she may hesitate as to taking a share in the means of execution. If Soult should hint that France would oppose the four Powers, you might suggest that she could not do so consistently with her own spontaneous declarations, and that it could not be worth while for France to make war with the four Powers for the sake of endeavoring to give to Mehemet a few square miles and some hundred thousand people in southern Syria; that no French interest could be promoted thereby; while, on the contrary, the character of France as a country which adheres to her word would thereby be greatly affected.

“ PALMERSTON.”

In October my functions as minister ceased—not disagreeably, since Lord Palmerston wrote to me on the 17th of that month, “I can assure you that we are all highly satisfied and pleased with the manner in which you have performed your duties, and they have been difficult.”

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I was also glad to find Lord Granville—who was a man of singularly calm and clear judgment—on his return to Paris entirely of my opinion as to what we might expect from Marshal Soult's government: the only question being whether, for the sake of maintaining a good understanding with it, we should abandon our policy and accept the marshal's. In ordinary circumstances this might be a matter of doubt; but in the present case, if we subordinated our views to those of the French Cabinet, we gave it the supreme authority in one half of the Ottoman empire, and became contemptible in the other. Nor was this the only danger; directly we sunk in prestige we lost—in our dealings with other states—power; and if Russia, who was now disposed to act with us, saw that we were afraid of France, there was nothing to prevent her offering her alliance to France instead of to ourselves, and thus realizing a policy which many Frenchmen and many Russians have at times advocated, and which would have established, by an *entente* between the emperor Nicholas and the king Louis Philippe, the ascendancy of one on the shores of the Bosphorus and of the other on the banks of the Nile.

These considerations determined Lord Palmerston to stand firmly by his own original views, though he became more and more convinced that they would not receive any real support from the military president of the French Council, who had by this time lost the first quality of a cunning man—that of *not being thought cunning*. Lord Palmerston at this time had drawn up a statement of grievances which Lord Granville thought too strongly expressed. Palmerston, at his suggestion, makes alterations, but says, in a letter dated November 5, "Though some of the facts and arguments that are used will, as you say, touch Louis Philippe in the raw, yet it seems to me

necessary to do so, and we cannot sacrifice ourselves out of delicacy to him."

Again, on November 22, he states what are the reasons which he believes cause King Louis Philippe to wish to assist Mehemet Ali against the Porte.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Nov. 22, 1839.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I understand that Louis Philippe said to some Foreign Minister the other day, that the reason why he protects Mehemet Ali is, that France will probably be at war with England before two years are over, and that then the French will want the co-operation of Mehemet Ali's fleet in the Mediterranean. A *very friendly speech*, if really made; but I had the information in a very secret way, and tell it you rather as a clue to sound by, than as a statement you could repeat.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

On December 6 another letter shows the Cabinet of St. Petersburg making propositions conciliatory to our policy, and the Cabinet of France arming a squadron apparently destined to oppose it.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Dec. 6, 1839.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I received yesterday a dispatch from Clanricarde, stating that the Russian government agrees to our proposal about the Dardanelles, and is willing that if a Russian force shall enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other co-operating Powers shall enter the Dardanelles.

Brunnow is coming back immediately to London, in order to carry on the negotiation which was suspended while this question was unsettled. I have told this to-day to Sebastiani, saying that I did so because I have no secrets with him, but begging him to say nothing about it to the other diplomatists here. This will give us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry our own views into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia will side with us and Russia, and France will be left to herself.

"I mentioned yesterday to Sebastiani, but in a friendly manner, that we had lately heard that the French government are equipping eight large ships of the line at Toulon, besides the nine which they now have in the Levant, and that one naturally asks one's self, Against whom is this formidable display of naval force directed? Not against Russia, because she has only twelve sail, and they are within the Black Sea; not against the Turks and Egyptians, because the former are prisoners, and the latter to the French friends: it must then be against us; and this is countenanced by a violent article against England in the 'Journal de Paris' the other day, said to be written by Duchâtel, and in which there is a boast that England shall be forced to subscribe to and guarantee the independence of Mehemet Ali, and that Gibraltar shall be given back to Spain. I gave him the names of the Toulon ships, which are as follows: *Neptune*, 83; *Alger*, 86; *Marengo*, 80; *Souverain*, 110; *Scipion*, 80; *Marseilles*, 80; coming from Brest, the *Ocean*, 120; *Suffrein*, 90.

"Sebastiani said he would write about this. I told him that we are going to commission three more line-of-battle ships to relieve three now in the Mediterranean whose time of service is out; but that of course if the French equip seventeen sail of the line we cannot pay off any, but may have to commission more, as this subject will of course

be commented on when Parliament meets. He says it is Leopold who has made Louis Philippe so much for Mehemet Ali. I saw Captain Cogan to-day—just come from Bombay through Egypt. He saw Mehemet at Cairo after his ducking in the Nile, and thought him looking much out of spirits and careworn.

“I am confident that if France would join us we should carry our points without firing a shot or striking a blow; but even without France we shall still carry these points.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

In the mean time Lord Palmerston could not be persuaded to be frightened by Mehemet Ali's threats.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Feb. 11, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Sebastiani was off, I believe, to-day. I hope and trust that Guizot will come over without delay. It is of great importance that he should do so. He is a sensible and enlightened man, and I cannot but think that we may be able to say things to him and to point out to him considerations which must have weight in his mind, and that through him we may act upon the French government; but then he must come soon.

“The accounts sent me by Hodges of his interview with Mehemet Ali lead me to think that Mehemet will end by yielding. Mehemet was very angry, extremely agitated, very violent, and most vehement in his assertions that he will never give way, supporting his assertions by solemn oaths; *all this indicates conscious weakness and internal fear*; already he has recalled four thousand men from the Hedjas to Egypt, and if he means to put Egypt into a state of defense he must spend a great deal of money,

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which he has not, and must recall more troops from Syria and Arabia. We are agreed with the three Powers; France has no real interest in any other arrangement than that which we propose. The Mehemet Ali cry in Paris and elsewhere is got up by Mehemet Ali himself, and we never can allow that he, acting through a fictitious public opinion in France, shall dictate to us; neither indeed can France herself, even if it be the real and deliberate opinion of France, give law to Europe.

“Let the French say what they like, they *cannot* go to war with the four Powers in support of Mehemet Ali. Would they hazard a naval war for such an object? where are they to find ships to equal or to contend with the British navy alone, leaving out the Russian navy, which in such a case would join us? what would become of Algiers if they were at war with a Power superior to France at sea? Would they risk a Continental war? and for what? could they help Mehemet Ali by marching to the Rhine? and would they not be driven back as fast as they went? Is the interior so tranquil and united that Louis Philippe would like to see the three military Powers of the Continent armed against him, and the two Pretenders to his throne, the Bourbon and the Bonaparte, supported by foreign or domestic aid? It is impossible. The French may talk big, but cannot make war for such a cause. It would be very unwise to underrate the force of France, and the evils of a war with her in a case in which she had a national interest and a just cause; but it would be equally inexpedient to be daunted by big words and empty vapor-ing in a case in which a calm view of things ought to convince one that *France alone would be the sufferer by a war hastily, capriciously, and unjustly undertaken by herself.*

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Thus matters went on, until the two fractions of the French opposition, that of M. Guizot and M. Thiers, made what was termed "*un mariage de raison*," and, combining together, turned out (March 1) the Soult administration. M. Thiers became President of the Council, and M. Guizot went as ambassador to London. This was a great change in the internal policy of France, but it did not change our notions or add much to our hopes with respect to its foreign policy. Lord Palmerston's feelings as to what he considered to have been and to be the uncertain character of French policy are expressed without much reticence in the following letters to Lord Granville, 16th and 23d April, 1840:

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville.

"CARLTON TERRACE, April 16, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"It has long been quite evident that the French government has been deceiving us about the affair of Buenos Ayres, as they have done about almost every other matter in which we have had any communications with them, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Tunis, Turkey and Egypt, Persia, etc., upon all of which their language and their conduct have been directly at variance. The truth is, however reluctantly one may avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe is a man in whom no trust whatever can be reposed. However, there he is, and we call him our ally: only we ought to be enlightened by experience, and not to attach to his assertions or professions any greater value than really belongs to them; more especially when, as in the case of Egypt, his words are not only at variance with his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. The Cabinet have determined that we must without delay bring the French to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet; unless they will reduce their ships in commission to

ten—the number which Soult stated to you in July last as the intended amount of the French active force—we must go down to Parliament and ask for an additional vote upon the specific ground of the unexplained armament of France. I shall make an official communication to you and to Guizot on this matter. Soult and the king used to say to you, and Sebastiani used to say to me, that they had talked of fifteen liners last year as their intended number; but upon looking back to your dispatches I see it was ten, and not fifteen.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

“BROADLANDS, April 23, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“What you say of the French in general is very true. There is no trusting them; and they are always acting a double part. I am afraid, however, that their double-dealing at present is not to be ascribed solely to weakness and timidity.* The truth is that Louis Philippe is the prime mover of the foreign relations of France, and one must admit in one's own mind that if he had been a very straight-

* Lord Granville pointed out to Lord Palmerston that there was a good deal of difference between insincerity proceeding from ill will, and insincerity proceeding from feebleness and timidity. “The king does not want to quarrel with us,” he said, “but neither does he want to quarrel with the French press and the French Chambers. He has fixed no greedy eyes on Egypt, but he does not want to quarrel with those who have;” and this was perfectly true. But Palmerston said, “I can't enter into motives; I must look to acts. And if a reputed friend will not act as a friend, I must consider he is not one.”

forward, scrupulous, and high-minded man, he would not now have been sitting on the French throne.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

It is not surprising that, with such feelings as are here expressed, a British minister deemed it desirable to continue in accord with those governments which not only expressed sentiments similar to his own, but seemed willing to act upon them.

With Austria disposed, like ourselves, to preserve the solidarity of the Ottoman empire, whether against the designs of Russia or France, there was a natural sympathy. Russia has never since the days of Catherine been in a hurry to extend her dominion eastward. She considers her ultimate influence over that portion of the world too certain to be precipitate in attaining it. Susceptible as to the manner in which France had endeavored to excite the suspicions of England against her, not indifferent to the advantage of breaking up a combination which for the last ten years had been opposed to her, and having no interest whatsoever in extending the power of Mehemet Ali and the influence of France over Egypt and Syria, unless she were directly and immediately to benefit by it, she was therefore, as I have said, as willing to act with us, if we had the courage to act with her, as France, thinking we should not have that courage, was unwilling.

It is here a duty to state that when M. Thiers has been represented as inimical at this moment to England, when he has been considered as the sole origin and author of those difficulties which finally separated the two governments decidedly and distinctly, injustice has been done him. No French statesman was at this time, nor indeed, I believe, has been at any period, more desirous to main-

tain friendly relations between the French and English governments than M. Thiers; though he was always a little puzzled by our declining the propositions he was ever ready to make for uniting, with a view to gain some advantage at the expense of our neighbors. It was the administration of Marshal Soult which had placed him in a position from which, in fact, there was no safe or creditable escape.

The Porte had been told she might rely on France as one of her trusted allies; the Pasha of Egypt had been taught to believe that France would stand his friend. We had been told that all that we desired was most just and reasonable; and yet there was nothing that we wished or proposed that France had shown a willingness to do.

M. Thiers' first act on coming into office, under these complicated circumstances, was to arrange a disagreeable difference between our government and that of Naples.

This entitled him perhaps to more consideration than he received; but Lord Palmerston's attention was concentrated at the time on Eastern affairs, and on their satisfactory solution was to depend the nature of his relations with M. Thiers, against whom he was not without prejudices. With respect to the East, however, M. Thiers was hardly, as I have shown, a free agent. Upon the whole, his better policy perhaps would have been to throw over all antecedent engagements, and either to have frankly joined the other Powers, or to have said boldly he would defend Mehemet Ali against them. But in the first course he would have had the French press for his opponent, in the second, the monarch. He took, therefore, a course which, if it had been successful, would have been praised as skillful, but which, if it failed, would be condemned as tricky.

Admiral Roussin had, as ambassador of France at Con-

Constantinople, been one of those representatives who had advised the Sultan not to yield to any demands of Mehemet Ali, but to trust to the protection of the great Powers. Admiral Roussin was a member of M. Thiers' Cabinet; still, M. Thiers saw no other escape from his difficulties than to bring about an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which would strip all other governments but that of France of the pretension to be the Sultan's protectors. For this purpose it was necessary to prolong the negotiations between the Powers, to obtain certain concessions from Mehemet Ali, and to urge their acceptance with the Porte, as a more safe and practicable issue out of its difficulties than any that could be expected from an agreement between several states that had different interests.

I need hardly observe to any one acquainted with Constantinople, that it was not easy to keep such a plan long secret. It was discovered; and the consequence of its discovery was a treaty (July 15) between those states which M. Thiers intended to circumvent; and this treaty was not, until signed, communicated to France. The mine, in short, by which M. Thiers meant to blow up Lord Palmerston was met by a countermine which blew up M. Thiers.

I had now once more been left, by Lord Granville's absence, minister at Paris, about the beginning of July, and M. Thiers, when I went to him one morning at Auteuil, communicated to me this treaty, the negotiations for which had been conducted, as I have said, with great secrecy, and not even communicated to our agents abroad. He was naturally much discomposed, spoke of the effect it would produce on public opinion in France, asked me to say nothing about it until he might take such steps as would prevent some violent explosion in consequence of it,

and spoke on the subject, I must in justice say, with more regret than irritation.

Lord Palmerston was "curious," as he says, to know how his treaty had been taken.

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., British Minister, Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, July 21, 1840.

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"I am curious to know how Thiers has taken our convention. No doubt it has made him very angry; it is a great blow to France; but she has brought it on herself by her own obstinacy in refusing to accede to any reasonable terms. I am inclined to think that Thiers has been misled by Ellice and Guizot, and has acted upon a belief that the English Cabinet would never venture to take such a step, and that if France would only hold out firmly the rest of Europe would yield to her will. France is now in a difficulty; but the best way out of it is the honestest; and the wisest thing Thiers could do would be to send off outright to Mehemet, and to tell him to accept at once the first proposition that will be made to him. If Thiers does not do this, he will consolidate an alliance from which France has excluded herself; and it cannot be agreeable to Louis Philippe to have France placed by him in this respect in the relative situation in which she stood in 1815.

"Thiers will probably at first swagger; but we are not men to be frightened by threats; and he will be far too wise to do any rash things that would bring him into collision with England alone, to say nothing of the other three Powers; especially in a matter in which France is wholly in the wrong. You say Thiers is a warm friend but a dangerous enemy;* it may be so; but we are too

* I had endeavored to prevent matters from coming to extremities, and urged an understanding with Thiers if *possible*.

strong to be swayed by such considerations. I doubt, however, that Thiers is much to be relied upon as a friend ; and, knowing myself in the right, I do not fear him as an enemy. The way to take anything he may say is, to consider the matter as a *fait accompli*, as an irrevocable decision, and a step taken that cannot be retraced.

“ To point out that when four great Powers bind themselves to a fifth, as we have done to Turkey, they must have resolved to carry the matter through at all hazards ; that France has more than once declared that she agreed with us in thinking the arrangement we mean to execute the best ; and that her only difference with us has consisted in her thinking that we have not the necessary means to accomplish our purpose, and in her having determined not to join us in attempting to enforce it. And the French government should, if necessary, be reminded that it has been told over and over again by us since last September that if she would not go on with us we should go on without her ; that we were ready and willing to go on with France, but not to stand still with France. Guizot said that the French government would now feel it necessary to be in force, in great force, in the Levant. Be it so. We shall not be daunted by any superiority of naval force which she may choose or be able to send thither. We shall go to work quietly in our own way, in presence of a superior force, if such there be, just as undisturbed as if it was laid up in ordinary at Toulon. France knows full well that if that superior force should dare to meddle with ours, it is *war* ; and she would be made to pay dearly for war so brought on.

“ But Louis Philippe is not a man to run a muck, especially without any adequate motive.

“ Guizot has looked as cross as the devil for the last few days ; and, indeed, on Sunday, when he dined here,

he could scarcely keep up the outward appearances of civility.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“I need not say that you should preserve silence upon the whole thing unless spoken to about it by the ambassadors and ministers of the three Powers, or by Thiers.

“We do not wish the matter to gain any unnecessary publicity yet awhile.”

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, July 22, 1840.

“MY DEAR BULWER,—

“I have received your letter of the 20th. It is very far indeed from my wish to irritate or goad Thiers into any hostility toward this country; and therefore I highly approve your conciliatory language, mixed as it has been with proper firmness; but it would never do to let Thiers bully us, as our friend Ellice, who has misled him, will no doubt advise him to try to do. I dare say all you say of Thiers is true; but, after all, Thiers at the utmost can only be France; and we none of us intend that France shall domineer over the other Powers of Europe, or even over England alone. Of all mistakes, in public affairs as well as in private, the greatest is to truckle to swagger and bully, or even to unjustifiable violence.

“I have no doubt that Thiers thought he had laid his plans so cleverly that he should compel all the Powers of Europe to place the whole matter in his hands; but I think the four Powers united with Turkey are as much as France alone, in a case of this kind, with other things on her hands, will like to deal with. If the French attempt to make much of their superior fleet in the Mediterranean, we must add

ten Russian sail of the line to ours; and they must remember that the Austrian flag will fly side by side with ours; and there is more meaning than two frigates and three corvettes in that piece of bunting.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

During this time I was desirous, as it will have been seen, rather to calm than increase the excitement on both sides of the Channel,—and in a letter, of which I have not the copy, must have excused in some degree the irritation of which I was the witness in France.

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

“WINDSOR, August 23, 1840.

“MY DEAR BULWER,—

“I have received your letter of the 21st, and, as I am going to-morrow to Tiverton, I answer it to-night.

“I am more than ever confirmed in my belief that for the present at least the French will remain quiet, and that there will be no war. However inconsiderate the French nation may be, the French interests growing up every day will make them pause before they begin an unprovoked and aggressive war against the four Powers.

“Thiers, therefore, sooner or later will give the order to ‘cease firing;’ the smoke will soon blow away from the eyes of the French people, and they will see more clearly the objects which have caused their false alarm; and both Thiers and Louis Philippe will take care to keep out of a quarrel which nobody means to force upon them.

“The language of Guizot to me is as pacific as possible; the result of what he says is, that France will remain quiet and wait for the course of events.

“The newspapers and war-party have had their day;

now will come the turn of those who have been injured by these manœuvres, and of those who would be ruined by actual war; and these people will probably now make their cries heard, though in a less noisy manner.

"The Bordeaux deputation which met Thiers on his return from Eu is a sample. France now is a very different thing from the France of the empire.

"Then war was the only way which anybody had of getting money; now war would put an end to most people's chance of getting money. A quarter of a century of peace does not pass over a nation in vain. But people say that Thiers is a dare-devil, capable of anything, and therefore highly dangerous, and consequently a man whom one ought to give way to. Now, I hold just the opposite doctrine. I do not fear a reckless fellow, at least as an open enemy, and am never for giving way to such a man unless he happens by a miracle to be right.

"However, do not let my contrary opinions dissuade you from writing me your own. For I may possibly be wrong, and at all events it is right I should know what are the impressions made upon an able man observing things upon the spot.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"The only thing that can now be done by the French government is to use their influence with Mehemet Ali to yield to the four Powers. We cannot modify the arrangement recorded in our treaty, and we are bound to carry that arrangement into effect, and to use whatever means may be necessary for that purpose. When that is done, France might unite with the other four Powers in a general treaty to support the Sultan."

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, Sept. 4, 1840.

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"You will have heard from Appony of the outrageous language held by Pontois to the Porte, and of the threats made by him that if the Sultan ratifies the treaty, France will assist Mehemet Ali and attack the four Powers. This communication was made by Pontois, through his dragoman, to Reschid Pasha on August 16; of course it was by orders from Thiers. I have received these accounts this evening only, and have no time to write to you about it officially; what I think of saying to you is, that we are to inform Thiers of what Pontois has done, expressing our conviction that he must have done it without orders, and will be disavowed, because it cannot be supposed that the French government could mean to hold one language in London and an opposite one at Constantinople, and promised peace to us while it was threatening war to the Sultan, and that both threats and promises should relate to the very same events and circumstances.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

During all this time my personal position was not agreeable. I knew M. Thiers at that time intimately; I had a great admiration for his abilities, and was under the influence of that charm which his easy manner, natural wit, and luminous intellect exercise upon all who live much in his society.

I believed that he was quite as disposed as any French minister would be to avoid a quarrel with us, and more dangerous than any if he was driven into one. I had endeavored, and was still disposed to endeavor, to prevent a

hostile separation between the two countries; and, not being aware of all the reasons which had induced our government to take the step it had taken so silently and so abruptly, I regretted it.

On the other hand, that step once taken, I did not see any honorable mode of receding from it. In short, before the treaty of July—which was of course a rupture with France—I would have done anything that was not unworthy of our government to prevent it; but when the treaty of July had been signed, when the French government—at that time unprepared for war—was evidently preparing for it, and in a certain degree threatening it; when I had reason to know that there were cabals about the English Ministry, and in the English Ministry against the chief under whom I was serving,* and when, moreover,

* I quote letter, written March 14, 1846, when the events of 1840 were discussed, and I wrote to Lord Palmerston, then out of office, offering him my testimony as to facts on which he was wrongfully accused, and with which I was acquainted.

“CARLTON TERRACE, March 14, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,—

“I am very much obliged to you for your letter of last month. No testimony can be more valuable than yours in regard to the transactions of 1840–41, because you had local knowledge not only of the most important of those transactions, but also of the events in the Levant which led to them, and which were their causes. We had indeed great difficulties to surmount in accomplishing our purpose; but although that purpose was to rescue Europe from a perpetually-recurring danger of war, and to protect British interests from injury by the scarcely disguised encroachments of two great foreign Powers, yet, nevertheless, the greatest difficulties which I had to encounter in the whole transaction arose from the unprincipled intrigues in our own camp.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

the information I received from the East induced me to believe that Mehemet Ali's supposed strength was a phantom which activity and resolution would easily put to flight, I urged in the strongest manner a steady persistence in the line we had adopted, and the most prompt and energetic measures for making it successful ; for I felt certain that success was possible, and that it was, upon the whole, less dangerous to meet the dissatisfaction which this would provoke, than to avoid that dissatisfaction by concessions which would induce the French nation to suppose that, even with all Europe at our back, we could not venture to brave its resentment.

I did not, however, choose to play a double part to M. Thiers ; and on one occasion I had a fair opportunity to let him know the bottom of my mind.

I had ridden down to see him at a beautiful château which he then occupied at Auteuil : I found him walking up and down in a long room or gallery, and I joined him in his perambulations. After a turn or two he stopped and said, "I have dispatches from Walewski" (the Count Walewski had been sent to Egypt on a special mission to Mehemet Ali). "He has terminated his negotiations with the Pasha ;" and he then stated to me the conditions, in some abatement of his original demands, which he (the Pasha), through Walewski's mediation, was willing to accept. "Well," he continued, "France thinks these conditions reasonable and just. If your government will act with us in persuading the Sultan and the other Powers to accept them, there is once more a *cordiale entente* between us. If not, after the concessions obtained through our influence from Mehemet Ali, we are bound to support him." With these words, he fixed his eyes on my countenance and added, gravely, "Vous comprenez, mon cher, la gravité de ce que je viens de dire !" "Perfectly," I

said, with an intentional air of equanimity. "You wish me to understand that if we accept the arrangement made through Walewski, you and we are the best friends in the world; if not, you mean to declare for the Pasha and go to war with us in his favor." We resumed our perambulations. "You know what I have been saying to you," M. Thiers resumed, "is said as M. Thiers, not as President of the Council. I have to consult my colleagues, the king also. But I wished you to understand clearly the tendency of my own personal opinions."

"I am much obliged to you," I replied, "for this distinction; but the fact is, you are President of the Council, and you think, no doubt, that whatever your opinions are, they will prevail. You will see, therefore, that my position is a very difficult one. If I say more or less than you mean, I may do incalculable mischief; so, if you please, I will ride back to Paris, and recount in a dispatch our conversation, and you shall read it and correct it just as you think proper."

Accordingly, I rode back to Paris, and wrote my dispatch and brought it back to M. Thiers.

It commenced by saying somewhat in this language:

"MY LORD,—

"You know that I have more than once said that M. Thiers, in the awkward position in which affairs have placed him, will endeavor to find some moment at which he may say to the king, 'You must follow me even to war if I think proper, or I will leave you exposed to public opinion as expressed by the newspapers.'

"The result of Count Walewski's mission has furnished him with this opportunity, and in the conversation which I shall have now the honor to report you will read the expression of M. Thiers' sentiments. But I think it right

to say to your lordship that you need not have the slightest apprehension as to the king's acceptance of M. Thiers' programme.

"If he places his resignation on the grounds which it seems to me not improbable he will adopt, the king will accept it without a moment's hesitation."

I then went on to relate as accurately as I could our interview of the morning. I put this dispatch, just as I had written it, into M. Thiers' hands; he read it, and then said to me, "*Mon cher Bulwer, comment pouvez-vous vous tromper ainsi? Vous gâtez une belle carrière; le roi est bien plus belliqueux que moi.* But do not let us compromise the future more than we can help. Don't send this dispatch. Let Lord Palmerston know privately what you think of our conversation. Events may always change; and it is better not to render affairs less liable to their influence than is necessary." I followed his advice, and only reported as much of our conversation as conveyed its substance, without giving its details.

Lord Palmerston, in answer to my report, wrote to me:

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, Sept. 22, 1840.

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"Notwithstanding the mysterious threatening with which Thiers has favored us, I still hold to my belief that the French government will be too wise and prudent to make war; and various things which come to me from different quarters confirm me in that belief. Besides, bullies seldom execute the threats they deal in; and men of trick and cunning are not always men of desperate resolves. But if Thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out, pray retort upon him to the full extent of what he

may say to you, and, with that skill of language which I know you to be the master of, convey to him, in the most friendly and unoffensive manner possible, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce before she sees the end of it; that her army of Algiers will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will just be chucked into the Nile. I wish you had hinted at these topics when Thiers spoke to you. I invariably do so when either Guizot or Bourqueney begin to swagger; and I observe that it always acts as a sedative. I remind them that countries seldom engage in unprovoked war unless they have something to gain by so doing; but that we should very soon have nearly three times the number of ships that France could put to sea, and must, therefore, have the command of all their interests beyond sea; and that, even if we had not such a decided superiority upon our own bottom, Russia would be with us, and has a fleet equal to the fleet of France. These considerations perhaps might weigh more with Louis Philippe than with Thiers, but I am inclined to think that they will weigh with somebody or other at Paris. However, I may be mistaken, and the French may either make war, in spite of their assurances, or commit some violent and outrageous act of aggression against the Sultan, which the four Powers will be obliged to resent; in that case France must take the consequences, and her government bear the responsibility. We are going on quietly but steadily with our naval armaments, and the months are now approaching when we shall get men easily. We raise all our seamen without a farthing of bounty, the only inducement held out to them being the certainty of good pay and treatment, and the advantages of pension after a certain period of service. The merchant-vessels

will soon be coming home for the winter. They will discharge their men, and we shall then get as many as we like. In the mean while, the *Britannia* and *Howe*, each of one hundred and twenty, and an eighty-four whose name I forget, will sail for the Mediterranean in a fortnight, and will make seventeen good ships on that station. Three more will immediately be got ready to take their places at home; as to the steamers, we have got seven hundred of various kinds belonging to the country, and I do not believe the French have got one hundred. You may, therefore, be fully justified, not in following the example of Thiers by turning braggart, but in declining civilly to accept (to use their own word) the threats which they may try to put upon us.

“ While Thiers is telling you that this last absurd proposal of Mehemet is the last word of Mehemet and of France, Guizot is getting conveyed to me through all sorts of out-of-the-way channels that if we would but make the most trifling concession, if we would give way the very least in the world, the French government would jump at our proposals. and the whole thing might be settled satisfactorily (to France, he means, of course). But as to the offer which has been modestly trumpeted forth as a concession, it happens to be just the reverse; for France has said for some time past that she would engage that Mehemet should be content with Egypt hereditary and Syria for his life; but now by a juggle he wants us to give Syria for the life of Ibrahim, which is nothing less than an anticipated inheritance of Syria for Ibrahim; and, therefore, something more instead of less than what was talked of by France before. Really Thiers must think us most wonderful simpletons to be thus bamboozled. As to concessions, the fact is, that when four Powers make a treaty, they intend to execute it; and, as we made our

whole extent of possible concession to France before the treaty, by offering to let Mehemet keep St. John of Acre, there is nothing more left that we can concede. If we go further at all, we must let Mehemet have Beyrout and Damascus, neither of which it is by any means possible to allow him to retain.

"I conclude by the great anxiety of Thiers to settle the matter soon, though at our expense, that he also looks forward to a speedy settlement of differences at the Bourse at the expense of other people; and that, having made a large sum by the fall, he wants to double his profits by the rise. Pray let me know when the next settling day happens at the French Bourse. I should like to know what day it will be, as I foresee that it will be a critical period. I hear that Flahault is coming over upon a special mission to the Court of Holland; but that will not be of any essential use to Thiers.

"Metternich is just as stout and firm as we are, and Thiers' intrigues will fail there also. I must say I never in my life was more disgusted with anything than I have been by the conduct of Thiers in all this affair.

"I hear from people who have been in Germany that the same feeling of indignation against the conduct of Thiers is felt by the Germans, and that France would find no friends beyond the Rhine. One notion of Thiers seems to be that he might attack Austria, and leave the other Powers alone. Pray undeceive him in this, and make him comprehend that England is not in the habit of deserting her allies; and that if France attacks Austria on account of this treaty, she will have to do with England as well as with Austria, and I have not the slightest doubt on earth that she would find Prussia and Russia upon her also. It is quite impossible that the severe pressure brought upon all interests in France by Thiers' folly should not soon

begin to be felt, and that loud complaints should not force him to take his line one way or the other. You think he will then cross the Rubicon. I still think that he will be unwilling or unable to do so.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Great efforts, as affairs became in appearance at this time desperate, were made to induce our government to give way—and these efforts came not merely from France, for there are always people who mistake cowardice for prudence, and who say, “After all, what does it signify?—better not have a row.” But I own that I myself, though more anxious for peace than any one, was more convinced than any one that concessions which at that time could only have been taken as the evidences of fear were not to be thought of, and I said so.

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

“CARLTON TERRACE, Oct. 3, 1840.

“MY DEAR BULWER,—

“Thank you very much for your letters. Your view of the effect of any concession to France as to the stipulations of the treaty coincide exactly with my own, and with the opinion of the government. The decision come to is precisely in conformity with the conclusions you arrive at. If the four Powers were to give way to the menaces of France, they would soon be compelled to go to war with her to resist her further encroachments, or they must be prepared to submit patiently to a succession of aggressions and insults. But, as far as we are concerned, we should be disgraced as a ministry, and our country would be dishonored by our means. In short, without further argument, the thing is impossible, unless, indeed (which I

cannot suppose), Mehemet Ali was to turn out to be such a wonder of the world as to be able to beat the four Powers and the Sultan united. I have been informed to-day that the French ministers are buying in the English funds, and the name of their agent was mentioned to me. If that be so, they must speculate upon a rise, which is only to be looked for from the continuance of peace.

"I hear also that Cabrera is at Paris on his way to the South of France. This looks as if Thiers meant, as you suppose, to try to give us some trouble in Spain.

"I am in great hopes that the vigor and energy shown by the Porte may bring the Syrian question to a speedy decision; and, though it certainly would be a good thing if Mehemet Ali could be got rid of altogether, yet I look upon that as a very improbable event, because he will give in long before matters come to this point. The only thing that could produce such a result would be a general defection of his troops, which, though possible, is not probable. We do not want to oust him from Egypt if he is content to spend the rest of his days there as a faithful servant.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"October 5, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Napier forever! I thought Carlos da Ponza would do all that man could do; and among other things, that he would drive the Egyptians out of Syria; and this he seems likely to accomplish. Pray try to persuade the king and Thiers that they have lost the game, and that it would be unwise now to make a brawl about it. They are beat, and there is an end of the matter, and they will only make their defeat the more remarkable by anything in the way

of display which they may now attempt. The intrigues and cabals which Thiers and his English and foreign auxiliaries have been playing off against me in every direction exceed belief.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

“CARLTON TERRACE, Oct. 7, 1840.

“MY DEAR BULWER,—

“I should like to hear something more precise about the supposed plan for burning our fleet; because the mere knowledge that such a plan is in agitation, without information as to when and how and by whom, does not help one much in preventive measures.

“The Devonport fire may have been accidental or the result of design; there are grounds for either belief; but it seems almost certain that the Sheerness fire was a hoax of the man who pretended to discover it. It is almost proved that the fire was lit by him, in order that it might immediately be put out by him; and that his plan was, not to burn the ship, but to claim merit and obtain promotion and reward for having, as he pretended, saved the yard from fire.

“We often get information of this vague kind of intended assassinations, fires, and other outrages, which have no foundation in truth; and the previous notice of which, if even well founded, would be quite useless for purposes of precaution, because unaccompanied by any detail.

“If a man says to me, ‘Take care of yourself, and be on your guard, for there is somebody who means to shoot you,’ such a warning may frighten, but cannot assist in protecting. If, on the other hand, a man says, ‘There is a plot to waylay you as you return home by such a road to-mor-

row evening, and the men who mean to attack you will meet in smock-frocks and fustian jackets, at the Rising Sun alehouse, at the corner of Cut-throat Lane, at five o'clock in the afternoon ;' then one may either take another way home, or send the parish constables to arrest the conspirators.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

This letter relates to rather a singular affair. Having been left, then young in my career, at so important a post at so important a time, I had taken the best steps I could, without being ostentatiously busy, to obtain all useful intelligence ; and I received one morning, from a person who was generally accurate, information that an attempt to burn our fleet was about being made.

The person in question could not or would not give any details. Lord Granville had just come back, and I told him what had occurred. We did not think that the information conveyed in this manner, even if correct, could be of much avail ; and Lord Granville discredited it altogether, but thought I ought to convey it to Lord Palmerston.

Strange to say, an attempt* was made to burn some of our ships the same day or day after, and Lord Palmerston's letter alludes to this attempt. I was told of the intention to do so. I could not at the time learn anything more than I had stated ; and Lord Palmerston and Lord Granville were both disposed to consider that the fires had been accidents, and my information a mere coincidence. But a

* The fire at Devonport, on Sept. 27, was serious, and caused the destruction of two men-of-war—the *Talavera*, of seventy-four guns, and the *Imogene*, of twenty-eight guns, besides other damage.

couple of months later, Lord Granville said to me one day, "You remember that report you received as to the intention to burn our ships? I discredited it at the time, but I have good reason to know that there was much more in the scheme which you heard of than I supposed." And he then told me the name of the party who he had heard from good authority had been engaged in it—a name not unknown in France, and therefore, as it belongs to an honorable family, I shall not mention it. I may as well add, however, that I thought this business was directly connected with stock-jobbing, and only indirectly with politics.

The following letter states the progress of affairs in Syria; and the last paragraph indicates that Lord Palmerston thought that if M. Thiers remained in office, and could carry out his policy, war was by no means improbable. I always felt convinced, however, that if we could bring affairs to a termination in the East before spring, the French could not go to war; and that the affairs in the East, if pursued vigorously, would be brought to an end before the spring, and that consequently there was no danger of war, and every probability of M. Thiers going out.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, Oct. 7, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I have received to-night your dispatch and letter of the 5th. I cannot help thinking that the detailed accounts which you will since that time have received in Paris by our newspapers of the events in Syria, must have had some effect upon public feeling in Paris; because those accounts show that the operation was mainly Turkish and Syrian, and that the people of Syria are heart and soul for the Sultan, and against Mehemet Ali. France, surely, never

could take up arms to compel a whole nation to submit to the yoke of a tyrant from whose oppression it hopes to get free. In short, I look upon the question about Syria to be pretty well decided. It is absolutely decided as regards everything north of Acre, because no man could now think of proposing to the Sultan to give any portion of that part of the country to Mehemet Ali, seeing that the Sultan's forces are in possession of Beyrout, the principal port therein. With respect to the southern part, between Acre and the desert of Gaza, I should not be surprised if we were soon to hear of something or other that would make it also out of the question that any part of that should be left to Mehemet's authority.

"It seems to me, therefore, that the field for negotiation is to be found in Egypt. The question is what the Sultan, by the advice of his allies, will give to Mehemet Ali, now in wrongful occupation of Egypt and Syria, in return for his immediate evacuation of such portion of Syria as his troops may still occupy. The value of Mehemet's compliance must depend, in some degree, upon the extent of territory which he will have to give up when the arrangement is made; and the sooner Mehemet makes it, the better terms of course he will get.

"With regard to your house, I should say that, in the event of your coming away, you should bring all your archives away with you, and that you might leave the consular agent in charge of the house.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

It will be seen, as I have said, from this last paragraph that war was held to be on the cards; but it was not thought that this would be by a declaration of war on the part of France, but by some act which would oblige or in

duce the other Powers to declare war against her. The letter now given is written under this impression.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

“CARLTON TERRACE, Oct. 8, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I am going out of town for a day, and have not time to write you a dispatch, therefore I send you a private letter instead.

“Pray go to the king immediately, and say you are instructed to deprecate in the most friendly, but at the same time the most earnest, manner, steps which we hear are under consideration, and which if taken would either make war inevitable, or at least render the continuance or resumption (if they have ceased) of friendly relations a matter of the utmost difficulty.

“We hear that two things are under consideration: first, what is now called an Anconade;* secondly, some declaration as to what France will and what she will not permit.

“Now as to the first, it would be (and you will know how to convey the idea in civil terms) nothing more or less than an act of piracy. The five Powers, France included, have declared their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. Four out of the five are laboring to carry their principles into practice. The fifth, for reasons of her own, declines being a party to the execution, and *therefore*, because the other four are acting up to her own principles, she is to seize possession of a portion of the territory of the very sov-

* Landing troops somewhere in Turkey, as the French had formerly landed them at Ancona.

ereign whom she has pledged herself to support.* Such a proceeding would be so inconsistent with every principle which governs or ought to govern the intercourse between man and man, or between nation and nation, that we are sure that the King of the French will never permit a thing which would cast an indelible stain upon the honor of his crown. It would besides bring twenty or thirty Russian line-of-battle ships into the Mediterranean; what to do when they got there it is not for us to say. But England could not remain a tame spectator of such a proceeding, and surely there is no need of creating fresh subjects of angry feeling between the two countries.

"Then as to a declaration. If France makes us a friendly communication tending to lead to an amicable discussion of the present state of affairs, we shall receive it and deal with it in the spirit in which it is made; but if France haughtily tells the four Powers that she will permit them to do certain things in aid of the Sultan, but will not permit them to do other things, it is manifest that such a communication can only tend to make all reconciliation impossible.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

It will be observed that Lord Palmerston draws a broad and accurate distinction between making a friendly communication—which he says will be received and dealt with

* This was the false position in which the Cabinet of Soult had placed Thiers. It had said, "We, the French government, are on the Sultan's side." The French government then could not consistently act against the Sultan. All the allies were doing the French government had said it wished done, but thought it could not be done.

in the spirit in which it is made—and making a haughty and menacing one. He never supposed that any government which was not in a position that forced it to be obedient to the will of another government could be presumed to be so servile as to be afraid of expressing its ideas, or so stupid or so insensible as not to have ideas. I quote an extract from a letter to Lord Granville of the 20th October, because it refers to a singular intention which betokened that restless desire to do something, when it cannot do the thing it wants, which has often characterized the French government. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Granville: “Can you find out by any means at your disposal what is the *coup d’éclat* for which the French squadron has been brought back to Toulon? I conclude it is to be ready to meet and drive back the Russian squadron from the Baltic; but that squadron will not come out at present, though we now hear that it will winter at Revel, where it will be free to come out almost the whole of the winter.” Lord Granville asked me to obtain the information which Lord Palmerston was seeking. I did so. The French fleet was not collecting at Toulon, as Lord Palmerston supposed, for the purpose of driving back the Russian fleet should it make its appearance in the Mediterranean; another purpose was assigned to it. Queen Christina, as it is known, had retired or been driven from Spain in October, and the government of General Espartero, then the Regent and supposed to be acting under English influence, was installed in the place of that of the Queen Mother. The notion of the French Cabinet was to seize the Balearic Islands, partly as a protest against English action or supposed action in the affairs of the Spanish Peninsula, and partly because, if a war in the Mediterranean should eventually take place, it would be of great importance to France to have those islands,

with reference to their connection with Algeria, in their power. The seizure of islands belonging to Spain, because Mehemet Ali was driven out of Syria, seemed a proceeding so little in relation with its cause, that, although I was positively assured that such were the instructions given to Admiral Lalande, I could not feel confident that I was not misled; but at all events my information, such as it was, communicated to Lord Granville, through him to her Majesty's government, reached Mr. Scott, then at Madrid (Mr. Aston being absent), who placed the Spanish government on its guard. M. Thiers, however, went out of office shortly after this. Nothing was done with respect to the Balearic Isles, and of course great doubt was entertained as to whether the plan revealed to me had really existed. All doubt, however, was soon dispelled; for M. Joubert, who had been in M. Thiers' Cabinet, being provoked by a question put in the course of discussion as to what the government he had belonged to—the menacing language and attitude of which was not denied—had ever seriously contemplated, rose up from his seat, and said that if the government to which allusion had been made had remained but a short time longer in office, the French flag would have floated on the Balearic Islands!

If "The Curiosities of Diplomacy" are ever published, this anecdote may take a place among them.

But to continue with the correspondence. In a letter of the 23d of October, Lord Palmerston speaks of the continued success of the Turks and allies in Syria, and notices the death of one of the most beloved and accomplished statesmen of his time—Lord Holland; a letter of the 29th returns to this subject. Lord Palmerston's eulogy is the more to be appreciated since the talented and amiable statesman whose loss he deplores had during recent affairs been his most considerable opponent.

It happened, indeed, that during the time when Lord Palmerston's policy was most in jeopardy from the attacks made on it at home, I accidentally learned that he would be severely attacked at the next Cabinet meeting. The information came to me from a Frenchman, who had evidently received it from London. It seemed to me so unfair that information of this kind should get to Paris that I wrote to Lord Palmerston, telling him what he had to anticipate. It is only by accident, and having been allowed to see some still unpublished memoirs, that I learned that it was Lord Holland who made the anticipated attack, and that then Lord Palmerston got up and read my letter, pointing out the great impropriety of people knowing at Paris, with the Court and government of which we were not on friendly terms, what would take place in the British Cabinet respecting foreign affairs, before he, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, knew it himself. This stopped all further discussion. But I should add that Lord Palmerston himself never told me of the service I had rendered him, nor until reading the unpublished diary to which I have alluded, and of which the substance is derived from a Cabinet minister of that period, did I ever know the cause of some enmities which I could not at the time account for.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

“CARLTON TERRACE, Oct. 23, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Our news from the Levant and from Paris is equally good: continued and rapid success in Syria, and the break up of the Thiers ministry in France. These two things will lead to the full execution of our treaty without any interruption of peace. It is quite astonishing to think what progress we have made in Syria in the fifteen days

between the 11th, when we landed, and the 26th, when our accounts came away. It is plain that we have as good as driven Mehemet out of the whole of Syria, and our accounts from Egypt show that his power even there is tottering to its base. In the mean while, Guizot is quite resigned to our turning the Egyptians out of the whole of Syria, and will thankfully be content with our leaving the Pasha in possession of Egypt. He may make a fight for more, but that is what he will be really satisfied with. Indeed, I have good reason to believe, by information I have received from Paris, that Mehemet has sent to Thiers to beg he would make the best terms he could for him ; adding that ' he, Mehemet, would gladly accept any terms whatever.' He is a beaten man, and his political and physical existence are both at their last gasp. Still, if he makes immediate submission, and saves us the trouble of going through the whole process of forcible ejectment, it will be well to leave him in possession of Egypt.

" We shall be anxious to hear from you what are the speculations as to a new administration ; I presume the meeting of the Chambers will be postponed, unless the king has another ministry ready cut and dry to make his opening speech for him. We heard yesterday that the deputies were coming up imbued with the spirit of peace, and that has probably had some share in bringing about the discomfiture of Thiers

" What a sad loss to us all this is of poor Lord Holland, both publicly and privately ! He kept the Whig party very much together, and his society was the most agreeable and delightful that any one ever knew. It is a dreadful blow to poor Lady Holland, and in her state of health I much fear its effects.

" I imagine the attack to have been gout in the stomach,

acting upon a system weakened by long infirmity and by a mode of life calculated to debilitate the whole system.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

“CARLTON TERRACE, Oct. 29, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“I have received yours of the 26th. It is impossible that we should not all be deeply afflicted by the loss of poor Lord Holland; but those who, like you, have been intimate with him from early life, must of course feel the loss even more strongly than others.

“There never certainly was a man more calculated by nature to win the love and to attach the affections of all who came near him. There was a natural overflow of heart, an absence of gall, and an unaffected kindness about him which one rarely finds combined with so much talent and such various attainments and such endless knowledge. He thought, or rather he felt, strongly on political affairs; but he never mixed any personal feeling with his public differences. Latterly he had quite lost his usual good sense and reason upon this Turkish affair; and indeed the weakness of mind he displayed about it seemed almost the result of bodily infirmity; but this never led for a single moment to the slightest diminution of that kindness and cordiality with which he had always treated me.

“Louis Philippe seems to have held to you the same language which Flahault and Guizot held while here, namely, that it is necessary, in order to assist the king to maintain peace and keep down the war-party, that we should make to the entreaties of the king those concessions which we have refused to the threats of Thiers. But this is quite impossible, and you cannot too soon or too strongly

explain it to all parties concerned. We have not acted as we have done out of spite against Thiers, nor from any personal feeling of good will or ill will toward any man, nor can such feelings be made the foundation of the political conduct of a government in matters of great European importance. We withstood the threats of Thiers, because what he asked could not be granted without great injury to the interests of Europe; and we cannot expose those interests to injury out of complaisance to Louis Philippe or Guizot, any more than out of fear for Thiers; and, moreover, if we were to give way, the French nation would believe that we gave way to their menaces, and not to the entreaties of Louis Philippe. Besides, there would be an end of all things if the Powers of Europe were to be making sacrifices of their important interests to appease the organizers of *émeutes* in Paris or to silence the republican newspapers; and then into the bargain we are carrying all before us in Syria, and shall very soon have placed the whole of that country in the hands of the Sultan; and it would indeed be childish to hold our hands when nothing but a little perseverance is required in order to carry all our points. I can assure you that you would be most usefully supporting the interests of peace by holding a firm and stout language to the French government and to Frenchmen.

“Nothing is more unsound than the notion that anything is to be gained by trying to conciliate those who are trying to intimidate us; by conciliate I mean to conciliate by concession. It is quite right to be courteous in words, but the only possible way of keeping such persons in check is to make them clearly understand that one is not going to yield an inch, and that one is quite strong enough to repel force by force. Some of our Whig friends and *grandees* have done great mischief by giving way to un-

founded alarms and holding what is called conciliatory language. The knowledge of the existence of such feelings and language in many quarters where more spirit and sagacity ought to have been shown has, I know, very much encouraged the French in their attempts to bully.

"My opinion is that we shall not have war now with France, but that we ought to make our minds up to have it at any time.

"All Frenchmen want to encroach and extend their territorial possessions at the expense of other nations, and they all feel what the 'National' has often said, that an alliance with England is a bar to such projects. I am not in the least surprised that the *doctrinaires* in Thiers' government should have been the most warlike. I should rather have expected it to be so. I do not blame the French for disliking us. Their vanity prompts them to be the first nation in the world; and yet at every turn they find that we are their equals. It is a misfortune to Europe that the national character of a great and powerful people, placed in the center of Europe, should be such as it is; but it is the business of other nations not to shut their eyes to the truth, and to shape their conduct by prudent precautions.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

It is not unimportant to read the next two or three letters which I here publish, because it is often urged as an argument against our doing this or saying that, a foreign minister or sovereign has declared an opinion in flat contradiction with our own. I had frequently to speak to the King of the French on the subject of curtailing the power of Mehemet Ali. "I agree with you, M. Bulwer," his Majesty used to say; "no doubt that Pasha should be

brought to his senses, but he is a second Alexander. I have not an army which could cope with that which he could bring into the field." As King Louis Philippe said this to everybody, half of those to whom he said it believed it; and the absurdity of Lord Palmerston attempting to put down such a mighty man as Mehemet Ali was ridiculed at half the clubs in London. Perhaps a timid minister in Lord Palmerston's place would have been a ridiculous one; but everything in affairs depends upon the manner in which it is done, and the spirit in which it is undertaken. That which the King of the French had declared to be impossible was proved to be not even difficult.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Nov. 3, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Nothing can be more striking than the entire fallacy of the representations made by the French of Mehemet Ali's power. The moment we began our measures of coercion, Ibrahim was to fly off like a shot to Constantinople, and Heaven knows what was to happen, besides a rising of the whole population of the empire in his favor. But, lo and behold! Ibrahim has plenty to do in Syria, and it seems that the subjects of the Sultan are not much disposed either to rise or to fall for Mehemet Ali.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, Nov. 15, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"Do not the French begin to find out that they have been grossly deceived in their estimate of Mehemet Ali's power, which has been shaken to the foundation by two

thousand marines and six or eight thousand Turkish recruits? or do they only feel like people who, not having been deceived themselves, have failed in an attempt to deceive others? Another thing, too, has now been made plain besides the weakness of Mehemet Ali, and that is the real design of France in all these matters. Rémusat has let the cat out of the bag by declaring that France, in protecting Mehemet Ali, meant to establish a new second-rate maritime Power in the Mediterranean, *whose fleet might unite with that of France for the purpose of serving as a counterpoise to that of England.* That is plain-spoken, at all events.

“If the French scheme for the Levant had succeeded, we should infallibly have had war before long, and growing out of those very affairs on which we should have made concessions in order to preserve peace. The moral and diplomatic contest we have had with France now will probably tend to keep the two nations without war for some years to come.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

“CARLTON TERRACE, NOV. 20, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“Neumann* tells me that he hears from Rothschild that Duchatel told the *Paris* Rothschild, in confidence, that a dispatch had been received from Walewski, saying that Mehemet had been sadly dispirited and cast down by our successes in Syria, and that Walewski had had the greatest difficulty in preventing him from yielding. If that is so,

* Austrian minister in London.

Guizot will have no difficulty in persuading Mehemet to submit to our last proposition.

“Was there ever so complete a delusion practiced upon human credulity as that which the French have so long played off upon mankind, about the power and resources of Mehemet Ali in Syria and Egypt?”

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Thus it will have been seen that the army of Ibrahim, when confronted with a small resolute European force inspiring a Turkish one, and aided by a friendly population, was an army of phantoms. With Mehemet Ali's prestige had sunk as a matter of course M. Thiers' prepotency; and when he went out his Majesty Louis Philippe said to me, “*M. Thiers est furieux contre moi, parce que je n'ai pas voulu faire la guerre. Il me dit que j'ai parlé de faire la guerre; mais parler de faire la guerre et faire la guerre, M. Bulwer, sont deux choses bien différentes.*” I thought when his Majesty said this of M. Thiers' assertion, “*Le roi est plus belliqueux que moi.*” One is not obliged in diplomacy to consider every menace of war as actual war.

M. Guizot succeeded M. Thiers on October 29, 1840, and I believe M. Thiers supposed that there was some intrigue of which I was cognizant for arriving at this result. I should have been perfectly justified in getting rid of M. Thiers, who meant to go to war with my country, and replacing him by M. Guizot, who did not mean to go to war. But I don't want to give myself a merit that I had no right to claim. I do not believe any such intrigue as M. Thiers supposed ever existed; at all events I never knew of any. A mutual dissatisfaction had grown up between M. Guizot and M. Thiers after the

signature of the secret treaty in London. M. Thiers accused M. Guizot of having been duped and deceived. M. Guizot, on the contrary, declared that M. Thiers had been deaf to his warnings. One of Lord Palmerston's letters touches on this point, and says :

"It is an important fact, and one which I know from a person who has seen Guizot's dispatches, that from the 17th of March down to the 9th of this month* Guizot continually warned Thiers not to be deceived about the conduct of the English government; and told him that, if France did not come in to our views, we should infallibly go on with the four Powers, and without France; and Guizot moreover said that the event was imminent, and that a convention between the four, and without France, might be signed any day of any week. Thiers therefore cannot say that he was taken by surprise."

The fact is that M. Guizot foresaw and warned M. Thiers that he could not go on long in his endeavors to effect a compromise between Abdul-Medjid and Mehemet Ali behind the back of the other Powers without being discovered; but it was equally certain that in regard to the treaty itself he was as ignorant of it during the negotiations as M. Thiers himself. These differences, exaggerated by the partisans of either rival, each one being loud in defending his chief, were further enlarged by the different views which the two statesmen formed as to the policy which France had to pursue under existing circumstances.

M. Guizot said that the whole question at issue had depended on the strength of Mehemet Ali. The French

* July 29. I have not quoted it, since quoting too many letters arrests narrative; and it contained nothing beyond this extract not said elsewhere.

government had considered he was strong enough to resist the forces that had been directed against him. If they, the French government, had been right, the allies would have had to give way, and France, without any effort, would have been triumphant. As it was, the French government was wrong. Mehemet Ali had been ignominiously worsted; the French government therefore had to give way, and submit to the consequences of its erroneous opinion. To enter into a war to support Mehemet Ali's pretensions—pretensions which had no other basis but his supposed strength—after his weakness had been proved, would be an inconsistency in logic and a blunder in policy.

So argued M. Guizot. M. Thiers, on the contrary, maintained that France had been insulted; that a great European question had been settled without her, and in spite of her; that the position of Mehemet Ali was now a secondary affair; that French honor was a primary one, and that France when prepared should demand, and if necessary insist in arms, on some satisfaction.

It is clear that under such circumstances no intrigue was necessary to bring forward M. Guizot as the successor of M. Thiers; he became so naturally when the king determined in favor of peace instead of war.

Lord Palmerston himself did not pass through this crisis without considerable difficulty. There are a number of men always for living an easy life.

To foresee and guard against future evils—to face boldly confronting difficulties—to maintain the prestige of a great state against the encroachments of a rival one—are all troubles, bothers which a gentleman who is lazy and short-sighted, or timid, tries to avoid. The whole of this clique—which calls itself safe and prudent,—enlisting under it men who had taken a fancy for Mehemet Ali, or who had literary or other intimate connections in France, was

opposed to Lord Palmerston, whom they called adventurous, dangerous, and, above all things, *troublesome*.

It was under these circumstances that the following letters were written to Lord Melbourne, ten days before the famous treaty of July 15:

To the Right Hon. Viscount Melbourne.

“CARLTON TERRACE, July 5, 1840.

“MY DEAR MELBOURNE,—

“The difference of opinion which seems to exist between myself and some members of the Cabinet upon the Turkish question, and the extreme importance which I attach to that question, have led me, upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which I owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of other members of the Cabinet on these matters, by placing, as I now do, my office at your disposal.

“I have, indeed, for some time past found myself in a difficult situation in regard to this affair.

“The collective note of July last, the decision of the Cabinet held at Windsor in October, the course and tenor of my written communications with foreign governments for several months past, sent round in circulation to the Cabinet; our verbal communications with the envoys and ministers of those governments in this country, and with Brunnow in particular; the two drafts of convention, which, if I mistake not, I read some time ago to the Cabinet, the one drawn up by myself, the other by Brunnow and Neumann, were all founded upon one view of the question, namely, the expediency of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire; and I have considered myself as negotiating with the knowledge and sanction of the Cabinet in furtherance of that view. On the other

hand, other members of the Cabinet have, in their conversations with those very foreign ministers with whom I was thus negotiating, held language and opinions founded upon a different view of the matter; and I have been told from various quarters, that persons not belonging to the government, but known to be in habits of intimacy with members of the government, have studiously, both at home and abroad, inculcated the belief that my views were not those of the majority of my colleagues, and that consequently I was not in this matter to be considered as the organ of the sentiments of the British government.

“The particular and immediate object which I have been endeavoring for some months past to accomplish, in conjunction with the representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, has been to persuade the French government to come in to some plan of arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which the other four Powers could consider compatible with the integrity of the Turkish empire, and with the political independence of the Porte. In this I have ultimately failed. Perhaps the object was in any case unattainable in the present stage of the affair; but the circumstances to which I have adverted were certainly not calculated to diminish my difficulties.

“The question which the British government now has to decide is, whether the four Powers, having failed in persuading France to join them, will or will not proceed to accomplish their purpose without the assistance of France; but with the certainty, both from positive and repeated declarations of the French government and from conclusive political considerations, that they will meet with no assistance from France in the execution of their measures.

“My opinion upon this question is distinct and unqualified. I think that the object to be attained is of the utmost

importance for the interests of England, for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the maintenance of peace in Europe. I find the three Powers entirely prepared to concur in the views which I entertain on this matter, if those views should be the views of the British government. I can feel no doubt that the four Powers, acting in union with and in support of the Sultan, are perfectly able to carry those views into effect; and I think that the commercial and political interests of Great Britain, the honor and dignity of the country, good faith toward the Sultan, and sound views of European policy, all require that we should adopt such a course.

“ I think, on the other hand, that if we draw back, and shrink from a co-operation with Austria, Russia, and Prussia in this matter, because France stands aloof and will not join, we shall place this country in the degraded position of being held in leading-strings by France, and shall virtually acknowledge that, even when supported by the other three Powers of the Continent, we dare embark in no system of policy in opposition to the will of France, and consider her positive concurrence as a necessary condition for our action. Now this appears to me to be a principle of policy which is not suitable to the power and station of England, and which must frequently, as I think it would in the present instance, lead England to make herself subservient to the views of France for the accomplishment of purposes injurious to British interests.

“ The immediate result of our declining to go on with the three Powers because France does not join us will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to unite herself with the other Powers for a settlement of the affairs of Turkey, and she will again resume her separate and insulated position with respect to those affairs; and you will have the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi renewed under some still more

objectionable form. We shall thus lose the advantages on this point which it has required long-continued and complicated efforts on our part to gain, and England will, by her own voluntary and deliberate act, re-establish that separate protectorship of Russia over Turkey, the existence of which has long been the object of well-founded jealousy and apprehension to the other Powers of Europe.

“The ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical division of the Turkish empire into two separate and independent states, whereof one will be the dependency of France, and the other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political influence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be sacrificed; and this dismemberment will inevitably give rise to local struggles and conflicts, which will involve the Powers of Europe in most serious disputes.

“I have given to these matters for some years past my best and unremitting attention. I do not know that I ever had a stronger conviction upon any matter of equal importance; and I am very sure that, if my judgment is wrong on this matter, it can be of little value upon any other.

“Twice my opinion on these affairs has been overruled by the Cabinet, and twice the policy which I recommended has been set aside. First in 1833, when the Sultan sent to ask our aid before Mehemet Ali had made any material progress in Syria, and when Russia expressed her wish that we should assist the Sultan—saying, however, that if we did not, she would. Secondly in 1835, when France was ready to have united with us in a treaty with the Sultan for the maintenance of the integrity of his empire. Subsequent events in each instance showed that I had not overrated the imminence of the danger which I wanted to avert, nor the magnitude of the embarrassments which I wished to prevent.

"We are now arrived at a third crisis, when the resolution of the British Cabinet will exercise a deciding influence upon future events; but this time the danger is more apparent and undisguised, and the remedy is more complete and within our reach.

"The matter to be dealt with belongs to my own department, and I should be held in a peculiar degree personally responsible for the consequences of any course which I might undertake to conduct. I am sure, therefore, that you cannot wonder that I should decline to be the instrument for carrying out a policy which I disapprove, and that I should consequently take the step which I have stated in the beginning of this letter.

"My dear Melbourne,

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Viscount Melbourne.

"CARLTON TERRACE, July 6, 1840.

"MY DEAR MELBOURNE,—

"It was not till after much consideration that I wrote you my letter of yesterday, but it seemed to me that I had no other course to pursue. My own belief is, that the majority of the Cabinet would concur in the course of policy which I recommend; but from some expressions which were dropped in our discussion of Saturday, I am led to infer that there might be on the part of some of the minority objections to that course, of so strong a nature as to create embarrassment to you, if those objections should be brought into direct collision with the opinion of the majority of the Cabinet; and I therefore thought it right to relieve you from such difficulty by taking the step which I took yesterday. On the other hand, if the decision of the Cabinet were adverse to the course which I pro-

pose, that step would necessarily become unavoidable; and it seemed to me, therefore, that I had but three courses: first, to say nothing to you, and to wait the result of Wednesday's Cabinet, and then to act accordingly; secondly, to tell you beforehand what I should think myself obliged to do in a given contingency; thirdly, to place the matter at once entirely in your hands, as far as I am concerned. It struck me that either of the two first courses might be liable to misconstruction, and that the last was the simplest and the straightest. I am, however, quite willing to let the matter rest as it does till after Wednesday, now that I have fully explained myself to you.

"I do not see, however, that my retirement need in any degree break up the government; but even if it were demonstrated that it would do so, I cannot think that any man can be expected to work out in his own department a course of policy which he thinks injurious to the interests of his country, let what may be the consequences of his declining to do so.

"The accounts we have received within the last two days from Egypt and Syria show that, so far from Mehemet Ali having the means of raising Turkey against the Sultan, Syria has risen against *him*, and Egypt is not unlikely to follow the example; and it seems pretty clear that, if at this time his communications by sea between Egypt and Syria had been cut off, his internal difficulties would already have been such as probably to have made him much more reasonable than he has hitherto been.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

The result of this letter had been the treaty of July 15. The result of that treaty had been the defeat of Mehemet Ali, the overthrow of a warlike ministry in France, and

the installation of a peaceful one; but the affairs of the East were not yet settled, and the peaceful ministry said, "We are peaceful, therefore let us have the air of doing what the warlike ministry could not do."

It will be seen what Lord Palmerston says on this subject.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, Nov. 26, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"I have received your letter of the 23d. There are several objections to authorizing M. Guizot to say that the intervention of France has induced the allies to grant Egypt to Mehemet Ali. First of all, to do so would imply on our part an engagement toward France which we never have taken, and which we have pointedly, by my dispatch of the 2d of November, as well as by other dispatches, explained that we have not taken. We have *informed* France that we have advised the Sultan to leave Mehemet Ali in Egypt, if Mehemet shall submit within a certain period of time; but we have also explained that if Mehemet shall not so submit, he must take the consequences, and abide the chances which await him. We have never told France that Mehemet would at all events be left in Egypt; and therefore we could not acquiesce in a declaration by which the French Ministers would be able to say that the interference of France has retained Mehemet in Egypt.

"Besides, we cannot acknowledge any protectorship of Mehemet Ali in France. Mehemet is the subject of the Sultan, and nothing more, and never can or will be anything more; and neither France nor any other foreign Power has any right whatever to erect itself into the protector of that subject against his legitimate sovereign, unless France intends to make war upon the Sultan.

"I am very sorry to find that M. Guizot is still hanker-

ing after Mehemet Ali, and clinging to the broken-down policy of Thiers.

"Pray communicate the substance of this letter to M. Guizot.

"Yours sincerely,
"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, Nov. 27, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"This is indeed glorious news from Syria; and our fleet has maintained its old reputation. This exploit* must settle the Eastern question, and will, moreover, when coupled with our previous successes in Syria, place England on a footing with respect to other Powers which will be greatly conducive to the permanent maintenance of peace.

"This result will also render Guizot's task more easy; for nobody can think in France of going to war now to revive a dead man.

"I expect indeed every day to hear that Mehemet has made his submission to the Sultan. The fall of Acre, and the fall of Thiers, and the good advice which he must have received from Guizot, will surely bring him to his senses.

"Yours sincerely,
"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, Nov. 30, 1840.

"MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

"In your letter of the 20th you say that what the French wish is 'that the final settlement of the Eastern

* Capture of Acre.

question shall not appear to have been concluded without their concurrence.' But this is exactly what I now wish should appear. If France had joined us in July and had been party to the coercive measures we undertook, we should have been delighted to have had her assistance, and she would then have come in as an ally and protector of the Sultan. But France having then stood aloof, and having since that time avowedly taken part with the Pasha, morally although not physically, if she were now to come in and to be a party to the final settlement, it would not be as a friend of the Sultan, but as the protector of Mehemet Ali; and of course we could not permit her to meddle with the affair in that capacity and with such a view.

"As to the stale pretense of wounded *amour-propre* and mortified vanity, the recent debates prove that she acted from much deeper and more rational motives than vanity and *amour-propre*, and that she had laid down to herself during the last fifty years a systematic plan of aggrandizement in the Levant, to the intended detriment of England.* It is the being baffled in this scheme when close upon its accomplishment that excited the fury which has lately burst forth; and the fury was the more intense and ungovernable, because they who felt it could not in decency avow its real cause, and were obliged to charge it upon

* There is some exaggeration in all this. The government of M. Thiers had got into inextricable difficulties; it wished to get out of them with a certain degree of success and dignity, and had found this impossible; and then, to defend and elevate its policy, talked of great national designs which it had not *at the moment* seriously contemplated, though no doubt they were booked in the French archives for some future essay, should events ever seem favorable to their realization.

feelings of which any man out of his teens must necessarily be ashamed.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.”

The letter of the 8th December, which I now give, shows Lord Palmerston at the culminating point of his desires.

To the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Paris.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Dec. 8, 1840.

“MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—

“This day has brought us a flight of good news: Mehemet’s submission, Dost Mahomed’s defeat, and the occupation of Chusan. The first settles the Turco-Egyptian question. The great point now will be to decide on what yet remains to be arranged in such a way that Mehemet shall be really and *bona fide* a subject of the Sultan, and not a protected dependant and tool of France.

“Yours sincerely,
“PALMERSTON.

“Parliament meets the 26th of January.”

This is the time at which I must interrupt my narrative of Turkish and Egyptian affairs, to speak briefly of what had been passing relative to the affairs that Lord Palmerston has just alluded to, in Afghanistan and China; for though they did not belong practically to the Foreign Office, they were within the range of its administration.

Our relations with Eastern nations were until lately managed by companies. This arrangement was disadvantageous by confining commercial relations, advantageous by regulating political ones. The company was represented by a small body having the enjoyment of privileges

on the acceptance of obligations, which a company could easily compel its own limited number of servants to observe.

When the Chinese trade became open to all comers, all sorts of irregularities commenced, the most notable of which was the smuggling of opium contrary to Chinese law. An officer, called a superintendent, who had been sent out to regulate our commercial intercourse, ought to have had the power to do so; but he was impotent; and the question constantly arose as to whether he should attempt to protect the illicit practices of his countrymen, or allow them to be put down and punished. The declaration that we were not to protect British subjects in violating the Chinese laws came out from the Home government, but it came too late.

The Superintendent, Captain Elliott, had already applied to the Governor-General of India for some ships of war, and had already commenced war, these ships having arrived. It was judged difficult under such circumstances to stop this war, without producing impressions that would have led to future wars. Guided by political expediency, but acting with very doubtful morality, we allowed the continuance of hostilities. Junks were burnt, Chusan, as Lord Palmerston in his recent letter notices, was taken; and eventually (a year after Lord Palmerston was out of office) a treaty was concluded, by which the Chinese agreed to pay us a large indemnity, to open to us four of their chief ports, and to cede the island of Hong-Kong.*

* On Aug. 10, 1842, in a speech in the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston observed that exception had been taken to his China policy; but on that head he said he would appeal to the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords, merely observing that if a satisfactory arrangement of commerce with a nation of two hundred millions of people was the consequence, a greater benefit to British manufactures could hardly be conceived.

The war in Afghanistan was a more serious adventure ; and I find it difficult to sketch its outline more briefly and eloquently than it is sketched in the passage which, with slight alterations, I copy from a little work that I have already alluded to, and of which I am happy to have this opportunity of noticing its merits :*

“ At this time the northwestern frontier of our possessions in India was a great sandy desert extending from the jungles of the hill states of Gurwal to the sea. Beyond this lay the Punjaub, ruled by Runjeet Singh, the old lion of Lahore. Beyond this again, farther to the west, lay a country one of the most interesting in all Asia. From time immemorial it has served as the great highway—alike for trader and conqueror—from Western to Eastern Asia. This country—Cabul, or Afghanistan—lying directly between Persia and the Punjaub, has been traversed by all the great conquerors who penetrated to India from the Mediterranean, the Black, and the Caspian Seas.

“ An old Indian proverb runs, that he alone can be emperor of Hindostan who is first lord of Cabul. Alexander of Macedon had to fight his way through it, capturing Herat as he went, ere he met and defeated Porus, discoursed with the sacred Gymnosophistæ, and founded a city in honor of his steed Bucephalus on the shores of the Hydaspes. Timour-Bec Mahmoud, the founder of the Mohammedan dynasty in India, Nadir, and Baber, all conducted their mighty hordes to India by the same route. It was, and is, the key to India from the northwest.

“ Although it was by means of English money and the assistance of British officers that the young Shah had been established on the throne of Persia, he prized the Russian

* “ Life of Lord Palmerston, with an Account of his Death.”
Price One Shilling.

alliance more highly than the British. At least, so far back as 1835, Mr. Ellis, our envoy at Teheran, said this was the case; and, what was worse, that Persia, at the instigation of Russia, meditated a hostile movement against Herat, one of the three independent principalities into which the country of the Afghans was divided. This excited great alarm in England, and the more so as the Ministers of the Shah made no secret of their intention to proceed, after the capture of Herat, to the conquest of the other provinces of the Afghans—in other words, almost as far eastward as the frontier of our Eastern empire. Meanwhile it was notorious that Russian agents were busily at work all through the affected districts; and the Russian ambassador to the court of the Shah, Count Simonvich, had absolutely offered—such were our advices—to take command of the young prince's army in the expedition against Herat."

Now the ruler of Herat, thus menaced, was Kamran, the only descendant of the great Timour Shah, who was then in possession of actual power. His relatives and chiefs, Zeman Shah and Soojah Shah, had been successively dispossessed of the throne of Afghanistan, and a rival dynasty, that of the Barokzye, ruled, under Dost Mahomed, in their place at Cabul; Dost Mahomed was naturally anxious to overthrow Kamran at Herat, as he had overthrown Soojah Shah at Cabul. Thus there appeared the probability of Persia and Dost Mahomed, under the influence, as it was said and thought by our agents, of Russia, uniting in a coalition that had at once to be encountered.

To force the Shah of Persia to raise the siege of Herat—which we did partly by menace, partly by the expedition from India of a small force to Karrak, an island in the Persian Gulf—was the first measure which the government of India deemed it necessary to adopt; the second was to

substitute for Dost Mahomed, in Afghanistan, who was an open or disguised enemy, a prince who, owing his throne to our assistance, might be considered our friend. Soojah, whom Dost Mahomed had deposed, was the rival whose cause we resolved to espouse.

"In October, 1838, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, who was, rightly or wrongly, considered as an especial nominee of Lord Palmerston, although Lord Palmerston was certainly not the Minister of the Crown responsible for his appointment, declared war, and decreed the invasion of Afghanistan. Runjeet Singh was to act in combination with us. In November he and Lord Auckland met at Ferozepore, the most advanced of our strongholds in the northwest.

"This meeting of the two great chiefs, with their magnificent armies and retinues, was a splendid and imposing sight. Thence the march commenced. The Bombay contingent had to force its way through Scinde, which territory, and its rulers, the Ameers, were also involved in this complicated conflict. At Shikarpur, a place within the boundaries of Scinde, but near the Afghan frontier, they were met by the main army from Bengal. Sir John Keane was appointed to the command of the united host, which now proceeded forward under the greatest physical difficulties; now wading through artificially flooded rivers for whole days, then hewing a path through tangled jungles, and all the while having predatory and murderous Beloochees hovering on its flanks. Candahar was entered, Ghuznee stormed in the most magnificent manner, and at last the city of Cabul was in the hands of the British. McNaghten was appointed Political Resident. And there also the joyous and too confiding Sir Alexander Burnes took up his residence, too unsuspecting of the melancholy fate that was so soon to overtake him. All seemed to go

well. Everybody at home was satisfied. The general unpopularity of the Melbourne government was to some extent redeemed by the *éclat* of the campaign; and the whole country gladly approved when the Crown showered honors upon the organizers and leaders of the expedition, when Auckland received two steps in the peerage, when Sir John Keane was made a baron, and Pottinger and McNaghten baronets.”*

Lord Palmerston's success at the time was, indeed, complete. For as to the disasters that three years afterward followed, owing to the incapacity and want of foresight of those who had the management of affairs within the conquered territory, he was no more responsible than an admiral who commanded a fleet in a certain expedition would be, if a ship belonging to that expedition were suddenly upset in a squall three years after the squadron which he had led into battle had returned victorious.

He was right therefore in considering the defeat of the Egyptian forces in Syria, the taking of Chusan, and the overthrow of Dost Mahomed, the happy combination of a series of triumphs which it only wanted the formal submission of Mehemet Ali,† which may be dated 14th January, 1841, to be complete.

* This is quoted from the same little work just cited before.

† On Jan. 14, 1841, Mehemet Ali restored the Turkish fleet to the Sultan; this transaction completing his submission to the Sublime Porte, and the Firman of the Porte, which states the conditions under which he was to hold the hereditary government of Egypt, was dated Feb. 13, 1841. The treaty signed in London on July 13, 1841, by the five great Powers, was the culminating triumph of Lord Palmerston's policy respecting the affairs of Turkey, for by it Turkey was formally put under the general protectorate of Europe, and was relieved from the degrading position it had been reduced to by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi—of being a virtual vassal of Russia.

This indeed seems to have been the epoch in which the good genius of Lord Palmerston was especially triumphant, for he had then been married about a year—December 11, 1839—to a lady whose benign influence was already felt, and who surrounded his political existence with a social charm which gave to his hospitality an attraction which at once enthralled his friends and softened his opponents.

Political power, however, he was not much longer to possess. Among the Whig ministers he and Lord John Russell were the only ones who had shown vigor, and therefore, though criticised by drawing-room politicians, they were the only ones popular with the public. But the ministry as a ministry was weak, and its approaching fall became more and more apparent. Defeated on several occasions, and finally June 4, on a vote of confidence, Lord Melbourne dissolved Parliament; and on its meeting again had to yield to a majority of seventy-two in the Lords and ninety-one in the Commons, August 28. Lord Palmerston had foreseen this result; and I was the medium of a final explanation between himself and M. Guizot, which I shall here notice.

If Lord Palmerston took more interest in one subject than another, that subject was the slave-trade. One of his last speeches in Parliament in this year (1841), delivered May 18, in the debate on the sugar duties, contained this eloquent passage :

“As long as England remains pre-eminent on the ocean of human affairs, there are none, be they ever so unfortunate, none, be their condition ever so desperate or forlorn, who do not turn with a look of hope to the light that beams from here. They may be beyond the reach of our power, still our moral sympathy and our influence can support them under their reverses, and hold out to them,

in the midst of their difficulties, the hope of better days. But if, by the assaults of her enemies or the errors of her sons, England should fall, or her star lose its lustre, with her would fall the hopes of the Africans, whether on their own continent or on the vast regions of America; and they would, for a time at least, be buried in despair. (Loud cheers.) I know no nation that is now ready to supply our place."

Well, he had long been laboring at a slave treaty between the five Powers, and he wrote me the following letter in reference to it, when his speedy departure from office was certain: —

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., British Minister, Paris.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 10, 1841.

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"Try to persuade Guizot to send Bourqueney an order to sign the slave-trade convention between the five Powers. It is very shabby of Guizot to endeavor to shirk this, in order to sign with Aberdeen a treaty which I have been hammering at these four years.

"As France concurred with England in proposing the treaty to the other three Powers, she cannot back out by pretending that she has not made her own mind up about a thing which she herself proposed.

"Yours sincerely, .

"PALMERSTON."

I give my answer and Lord Palmerston's reply, and a short extract from a subsequent letter, all bearing upon this subject.

To the Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.

“(Private.)

“August 13, 1841.

“MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—

“I thought it best to go to M. Guizot, and to speak to him frankly on the subject of the slavery convention.

“He told me it would expose him to some little unpopularity, and that there would be some difficulties to vanquish at the Marine; that these would require some time, unless he gave himself extraordinary trouble. ‘And now as to giving myself such trouble,’ he said, ‘I will speak to you frankly and confidentially, or, rather, I will read to you a private letter which I wrote about three weeks ago to Bourqueney.’ With this he turned to his drawer and pulled out the letter, the contents of which (placed in a short compass) were as follows. I give them unreservedly.

“‘I like Lord Palmerston very much, I like himself personally, I think him very able, I like doing business with him; he may not be perfect, but no one is.

“‘I think, however, he has not behaved kindly or considerately to me. I bear no malice for this, but I feel it; I should like him to know that I feel it. The three things especially of which I complain are—

“‘Firstly, his note of the 2d November.

“‘Secondly, his stating in the House of Commons that he was attempting *singly* to bring about an arrangement between Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, when I thought, from his previous conversation with you (Bourqueney), that I might consider the two governments of France and England were acting together to effect this object.

“‘Thirdly, his speech at Tiverton. Now I will not say that in all or any of these matters he acted as he did with the intention to injure or embarrass me. But he acted without any care for doing so, and did in fact embar-

rass me very much. I should not certainly do anything on this account prejudicial to the public service or even disagreeable to him. But I would not put myself out of the way—such having been his disregard of me and my position—to meet his wishes. The convention in question, taking its natural course, passing through the Marine Department, being debated in Council, etc., cannot be ready to sign before six or seven weeks.’ (He was speaking of the time at which he was then writing.) ‘Were I to take upon myself unnecessary responsibility, and give myself peculiar trouble, I might get it done no doubt sooner. But I don’t think myself called upon to take upon myself unnecessary responsibility or give myself peculiar trouble to oblige Lord Palmerston, because he has never seemed to think it necessary to do anything particular to oblige me.’

“The letter then went on to define the language and the tone which Bourqueney ought to take as to manner, etc., and the like.

“As all this was read to me in a manner friendly to myself, and respectful to you, and that I thought you might be anxious to have the point carried, I listened quietly, with a view to ascertain how it could be so.

“And now *my belief* is this, that if you, my dear Lord Palmerston, will write to me a civil private letter—a personally civil letter—about M. Guizot and his three grievances, which I may show him, I shall be able to get the powers for Bourqueney *immediately*. But if not, all my official endeavors (I have, as you will have seen, already written an official dispatch) will be civilly but slowly dealt with, and the powers in question will not arrive to Bourqueney so early as you wish to have them.

“The fact is that M. Guizot thinks you have treated him as nobody, while he thinks that he is somebody, and a

great somebody. For nothing else do I believe him hostile to you, and, indeed, I know that he speaks in the highest terms of your abilities.

"The opportunity strikes me, then, as not a bad one for setting all things right with him, if you should think it worth while to do so; and I should be glad of it, insomuch as that I believe M. Guizot is the best minister out of the ministerial lot in France. But at the same time, though I myself think it may be advisable to take his communication as an opening to a more friendly intercourse, I cannot presume to determine that your lordship may not see objections thereto, more especially as I am not acquainted with all the circumstances to which M. Guizot alluded. At all events, you will, I know, my dear Lord Palmerston, feel certain that I have acted in this little affair in the manner which I thought the best and most consonant with your wishes; and that I shall say or do privately or publicly what you instruct me.

"HENRY LYTTON BULWER."

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

"CARLTON TERRACE, August 17, 1841.

"MY DEAR BULWER,—

"I am very sorry to find from your letter of last week that you observed in your conversation with M. Guizot, that there is an impression on his mind that, upon certain occasions which you mention, I appear not to have felt sufficient consideration for his ministerial position; and you would much oblige me, if you should have an opportunity of doing so, by endeavoring to assure him that nothing has been further from my intention than so to act. I have a great regard and esteem for M. Guizot; I admire his talents, and I respect his character; and I have found him one of the most agreeable men I have had to deal with

in public affairs, because he takes large and philosophical views of things, discusses questions with clearness, and sifts them to the bottom, and seems always anxious to arrive at the truth. It is very unlikely that I should have intentionally done anything that could be personally disagreeable to him.

“ You say he mentioned three circumstances, with regard to which he seemed to think I had taken a course unnecessarily embarrassing to him; and I will try to explain to you my course upon each occasion. First, he adverted to my note of the 2d November last, in reply to M. Thiers’ note of the 8th of the preceding October. I certainly wish that I had been able to answer M. Thiers’ note sooner, so that the reply could have been given to him, instead of to his successor. But I could not. I was overwhelmed with business of every sort and kind, and had no command of my time. I did not think, however, that the fact of M. Thiers having gone out of office was a reason for withholding my reply. The note of October contained important doctrines of public law, which it was impossible for the British government to acquiesce in; and silence would have been construed as acquiescence. I considered it to be my indispensable duty as minister of the Crown to place my answer upon record; and I will fairly own that, though I felt that Thiers might complain of my delay, and might have said that, by postponing my answer till he was out of office, I prevented him from making a reply, it did not occur to me at the time that M. Guizot would feel at all embarrassed by receiving my answer to his predecessor.

“ When M. Guizot, as ambassador here, read me Thiers’ note of October 8, he said, if I mistake not, that he was not going to discuss with me the argument or the doctrines contained in it, and that he was not responsible for them. In fact, I clearly perceived that M. Guizot saw through

the numerous fallacies and false doctrines which that note contained. It appeared to me, therefore, that, as M. Guizot could not intend to adopt the paradoxes of his predecessor, it would rather assist than embarrass him in establishing his own position to have those paradoxes refuted; and that it was better that this should be done by me, than that the ungracious task of refuting his predecessor should by my neglect devolve upon him.

“Secondly, M. Guizot mentioned my reply to a question in the House of Commons about the war between Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. I understood the question which was put to me to be whether any agreement had been made between England and France to interpose by force to put an end to that war; and I said that no formal agreement of any kind had been made between the two governments, and certainly none of that kind, but that a formal application had been made some time before by the government of Montevideo for our mediation, and that we had instructed Mr. Mandeville to offer it to the other party, the Buenos Ayres government. I ought perhaps also to have mentioned the conversation which I had had with Baron Bourqueney, and in which he proposed on the part of his government, that our representatives at Buenos Ayres should communicate and assist each other in this matter; but in the hurry of reply it did not occur to me that that conversation came within the scope of the question.

“With regard to what I said at Tiverton about the proceedings of the French troops in Africa, I may have judged wrong, but I chose that opportunity on purpose, thinking that it was the least objectionable way of endeavoring to promote the interests of humanity, and, if possible, to put a check to proceedings which have long excited the regret of all those who attended to them; and it certainly

did not occur to me to consider whether what I said might or might not be agreeable. That everything which I said of those proceedings is true is proved by the French newspapers, and even by the general orders of French generals. I felt that the English government could not with propriety say anything on the subject to the government of France. For a like reason I could not in my place in Parliament advert to it; but I thought that when I was standing as an individual on the hustings before my constituents I might use the liberty of speech belonging to the occasion, in order to draw public attention to proceedings which I think it would be for the honor of France to put an end to; and if the public discussion which my speech produced shall have the effect of putting an end to a thousandth part of the human misery which I dwelt upon, I am sure M. Guizot will forgive me for saying that I should not think that result too dearly purchased by giving offense to the oldest and dearest friend I may have in the world. But I am quite sure that M. Guizot regrets these proceedings as much as I can do; though I well know that from the mechanism of government a minister cannot always control departments over which he does not himself preside.

“We are now about to retire, and in ten days’ time our successors will be in office. I sincerely hope that the French government may find them as anxious as we have been to maintain the closest possible union between France and England. More anxious, whatever may have been said or thought to the contrary, I am quite sure they cannot be.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To H. L. Bulwer, Esq., Paris.

"August 27, 1841.

"I have given up all thoughts of the slave-trade treaty, but the papers already laid and to be laid before Parliament will sufficiently show that the fault of the delay lies with France, and not with me."

I close the second volume of my work at this epoch of Lord Palmerston's public life, for his success up to this period was, in fact, the pedestal of his after-fortunes, as well as the foundation of that reputation which he still enjoys among foreign nations.

He had, in fact, been successful in two most difficult crises, acting with France in one, against France in the other; but in neither case abandoning a principle, nor being false to an ally. In those eleven years which intervened between 1830 and 1842 he had kept up England as the Great State, morally and materially, of Europe. He had always expressed her ideas; he had always maintained her interests. His language was clear and bold; and when he menaced action, or thought action necessary, he had ever been ready by his deeds to make good his language; yet in no instance had his free speech and ready courage led to those wars which timid politicians fear, and bring about frequently by their apprehensions.

He had, in fact, been eminently a peace minister, and chiefly so because he had not been saying that he would have peace at any price.

Nor is this all. There had been occasions where he did to a certain degree use threats, not shrinking from blows. There had been others where he merely gave counsel or

stated opinions. Was that counsel wise? Were those opinions without effect?

He condemned the arbitrary laws intended to oppress the German people. Where are those laws? He forewarned the King of the French when he "was getting," as he said, "into a false position." What became of the throne of the King of the French? He condemned the Austrian rule in Italy. What has become of that rule? He condemned the temporal policy of the Pope. What has that temporal policy ended by?

It will be observed that I do not speak here of arbitrary acts in Spain or the French acquisition of Savoy, because we have not yet arrived at the remonstrances against both. But who shall tell me that our opinion has no moral force, when history stands there to teach the world that our opinion has been prophetic of its events?

As to the letters which I have quoted—I hope not too abundantly—that which must most strike those who read them is their constant perspicuity in style and correctness in sentiment. Lord Palmerston could express distinctly what he meant, because he knew distinctly what he wanted.

I do not say he was always exactly right either in the views he took or in his mode of stating them: at times his eagerness after what he thought right hurried him into adopting an extreme opinion or using an exaggerated expression concerning it.

A severe critic might say, more gravity, more measure, more consideration, both in words and actions, might on occasions have been desirable; his personal likings and dislikings were, moreover, often formed on too slight grounds; and you may find in his writings instances, as in the case of Marshal Sebastiani, where he passes, on better acquaintance, from unqualified blame to almost un-

qualified praise. But this proves that his prejudices ceased when experience taught him they were prejudices. There was, besides, a manliness, a sincerity, a high breeding, if I may use the expression, about his thoughts, which kept them, under all circumstances, at a healthy elevation. You can fancy, as you read him, that he had just come home from his ride to Wormwood Scrubs before breakfast, and had infused the fresh morning air into his letters and dispatches.

I have but one more remark to make. The reader will perceive, in the particular portion of his life that in this second volume of his *Biography* I have been describing, not unfrequent complaints as to our relations with France, and as to French policy in general. I ought to prevent this fact leading to exaggerated conclusions. You do not quarrel with nor complain much of those from whom you greatly differ. But if you are near agreeing with parties, with whom you never entirely agree, you are certain to be querulous, and may at times, being very angry, be a little unjust.

One knows the natural disposition of the Frenchman is always to *take the best side of the pavement*, and, consequently, if an Englishman walks with him he cannot walk quite comfortably. Our intimate arm-in-arm alliance with France, possessing other advantages, had that inconvenience. Lord Palmerston, also, might not always sufficiently allow for the possibility of two persons looking at the same thing from two different points of view. Neither perhaps did he always take into sufficient consideration the great difficulties under which the King of the French and his various Cabinets labored in a country where no government is fixed above an inch deep in the soil, and where, consequently, every government must be alarmed

at the threatening of any gust of wind, since a very slight one could blow it over.

It was a little difficult, too—foreigners said—for him to imagine that a statesman differed honestly from views he himself honestly entertained. He could not entirely conceive that Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France might have Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and French ways of considering things, which to them seemed natural and sensible, but which to him seemed unnatural and foolish.

It is doubtful, however, whether this, which somewhat disturbed the perfect sobriety of his judgment, did not give energy to his policy, and place him more in sympathy with his country, which recognized at once he was emphatically English. It is again to be observed that the defects I have noticed (for I wish to be a biographer, and not a eulogist) were only visible in small matters and comparatively unimportant details; his policy as a whole, his conduct as a whole, admitted, throughout the transactions I have been narrating, of so little censure, that England was never so looked up to by Europe at large, as a powerful and enlightened state, as during the time he managed her affairs with Europe; nor if we have no longer that high position which we enjoyed when he directed our affairs, is this an argument against the policy which gave us that position. There is hardly at this moment a thing he then did, or a thing he then said, that we could wish as Englishmen undone or unsaid. It is likewise well to remark that though he was, at the period where this volume ends, approaching toward threescore, he had not completed half of what may be called his great political career, whilst each day improved, up to the very last, his good qualities and diminished his defects.

To give a fuller estimate of his faults and merits, there-

fore, would at this time be premature; the more especially as I cannot refrain from observing that my opinion of him has constantly risen in proportion as I have known him better; and that I never appreciated him half so highly as I have done since the perusal of his correspondence has enabled me to know him thoroughly.

APPENDIX.

I.

PROTOCOL OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON THE 19th OF FEBRUARY, 1831.

PRESENT :—The Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia having assembled, directed their serious attention to the different interpretations given to the Protocol of the Conference of London, of December 20, 1830; and to the principal Acts that have followed it. The deliberations of the Plenipotentiaries led them to admit unanimously, that they owe it to the position of the five Courts, as well as to the cause of general peace, which is their own cause, and to that of European civilization, to repeat here the grand principle of public law, of which the Acts of the Conference of London have only presented a salutary and constant application.

According to this principle of a superior order, treaties do not lose their force, whatever changes may take place in the internal organization of nations. To judge of the application which the five Courts have made of this same principle, and to appreciate the determinations which they have formed with regard to Belgium, it suffices to go back to the year 1814.

At that period the Belgian provinces were occupied by the military forces of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia; and the rights which these Powers exercised over them were completed by the renunciation on the part of France of the possession of those provinces. But the renunciation of France was not made in favor of the occupying Powers. It proceeded from a

principle of a more elevated order. The Powers, and France herself, equally disinterested then, as at present, in their views with regard to Belgium, kept the disposal, but not the sovereignty of that country, with the sole intention of making the Belgian provinces contribute to the establishment of a just balance of power in Europe, and to the maintenance of a general peace. It was this intention that guided their ulterior stipulations, and united Belgium to Holland; it was this that led the Powers to secure from that moment to the Belgians the twofold blessings of free institutions, and of a commerce fertile in wealth, and favoring the development of their industry.

The union of Belgium with Holland was broken. Official communications ere long convinced the five Courts that the means primarily destined to maintain it could neither restore it for the present, nor preserve it subsequently; and that henceforth, instead of amalgamating the affections and happiness of two nations, it would only bring into contact passions and hatred, and from their collision nothing could proceed but war, with all its disasters. It did not belong to the Powers to judge of the causes which severed the ties which they had formed. But when they beheld those ties broken, it belonged to them again to accomplish the object which they proposed to themselves in forming them. It belonged to them to secure, by means of new combinations, that tranquillity of Europe, of which the union of Belgium with Holland had constituted one of the bases. To this duty the Powers were imperiously called. They had the right, and events rendered it their duty, to prevent the Belgian provinces, become independent, from disturbing the general security and the balance of power in Europe.

Such a duty rendered all foreign concurrence useless. In order to act together, the Powers had only to consult their treaties, and to calculate the extent of the dangers to which their inaction or their want of concord might give rise. The steps taken by the five Courts with a view to bring about a cessation of the struggle between Belgium and Holland, and their firm resolution to put an end to every measure which, on one side or the other, might have worn a hostile character, were the first consequences of the identity of their opinions upon the force

and upon the principles of the solemn transactions which bind them together.

The effusion of blood was stopped. Holland, Belgium, and even the neighboring states, are equally indebted to them for this benefit.

The second application of the same principles took place in the Protocol of the 20th of December, 1830.

To an exposition of the motives which determined the five Courts, this Act connected a reservation of the duties which Belgium would still have to perform towards Europe, upon seeing her wishes for separation and independence accomplished.

Each nation has its particular rights; but Europe has also her rights; it is social order that has given them to her.

Belgium, upon becoming independent, found the treaties which governed Europe already made, and in force. She was bound then to respect them, and was not at liberty to infringe them. By respecting them, she conformed to the interest and repose of the great community of European states; by infringing them, she would have brought on confusion and war. The Powers alone could prevent this evil, and as they could do so, it was their duty; it was their duty to give ascendancy to the salutary maxim, that the events which gave birth to a new state in Europe give it no more right to alter the general system into which it enters, than the changes that may have arisen in the condition of an ancient state authorize it to believe itself absolved from its anterior engagements. A maxim of all civilized nations—a maxim which is connected with the very principle by which states survive their governments; and by which the imprescriptible obligations of treaties survive those who contract them; a maxim, in short, which could never be overlooked without causing civilization to retrograde, of which morality and public faith are happily the first fruits and the chief guarantees.

The Protocol of December 20 fully expressed these truths. It declared "that the Conference would proceed to discuss and concert such new arrangements as might be most proper for combining the future independence of Belgium with the stipulations of treaties, with the interests and security of other Powers, and with the preservation of the balance of Europe." Thus did

the Powers point out the objects they wished to attain. They proceeded towards their execution, strong in the purity of their intentions and in their impartiality. While, on the one hand, by their Protocol of January 18, they repelled pretensions which never could be admissible, on the other hand, they weighed with the most scrupulous care all the opinions that had been put forth by both parties, and all the claims that each had set up. From this discussion, founded upon the various communications made by the Plenipotentiaries of the King of the Netherlands, and by the Commissioners from Belgium, resulted the definitive Protocol of January 20, 1831.

It was to have been foreseen that the first ardor of a nascent independence would tend to overstep the just bounds of treaties, and of the obligations resulting from them. The five Courts, however, could not admit a right on the part of Belgium to make conquests from Holland or from other states. But, compelled to settle questions of territory essentially connected with their own conventions and their own interests, the five Powers did not insist, with regard to Belgium, upon any principles which they did not follow as rigorous laws for their own conduct. They most assuredly did not pass the limits of justice and equity, nor the rules of sound policy, when, by adopting impartially the limits which separated Belgium from Holland before the union, they only refused to the Belgians the power of invasion. This power they refused, because they considered it as subversive of peace and of social order.

The Powers had also to deliberate upon other questions which were connected with their treaties, and which consequently could not be subjected to new decisions without their direct concurrence.

According to the Protocol of December 20, the instructions and full powers necessary for the Belgian Commissioners that were to be sent to London, ought to have embraced all the objects of the negotiation. Nevertheless, these Commissioners arrived without sufficient powers, and, on many important points, without information ; and circumstances admitted of no delay.

The Powers, notwithstanding, by the Protocol of January 27, confined themselves, on the one hand, to enumerating the charges

attached either to the Belgian or to the Dutch territory, and, on the other, limited themselves to proposing arrangements founded upon a reciprocity of concessions, upon the means of preserving to the Belgians those markets which had most contributed to their wealth, and upon the notoriety of the public budgets of the kingdom of the Netherlands.

In these arrangements the mediation of the five Powers must necessarily be required, since without it the interested parties could not come to an understanding, nor could the stipulations in which those Powers took an immediate part in 1814 and 1815 be modified.

The adhesion of the King of the Netherlands to the Protocols of January 20 and 27, 1831, has justified the care of the Conference of London. The new mode of existence of Belgium, and its neutrality, thus received a sanction which could not be dispensed with. It remained only for the Conference to come to resolutions on the protest made by Belgium against the first of these Protocols; the more important as it is fundamental.

This protest claims a right of *post limine*, which belongs only to independent states, and which cannot, consequently, belong to Belgium, since she has never been reckoned among those states. This protest mentions also cessions made to a third Power, and not to Belgium, which never had been in possession of them, and therefore cannot insist upon them.

The nullity of such pretensions is evident. Far from making any attack upon the ancient provinces of Belgium, the Powers have only declared and maintained the integrity of neighboring states. Instead, indeed, of contracting the limits of these provinces, they have comprised in them the principality of Liege, which had at no former period formed part of them.

Moreover, all that Belgium could require she has obtained—separation from Holland—independence—external safety—guarantees of her territory, and neutrality—the free navigation of the rivers that serve as the channel of her commerce—and peaceable enjoyment of her national liberties.

Such are the arrangements to which the protest in question opposes the design, publicly avowed, to respect neither the possessions nor the rights of adjoining states.

The Plenipotentiaries of the five Courts, considering that such views are views of conquest, incompatible with existing treaties, with the peace of Europe, and consequently with the independence and neutrality of Belgium, declare :

1. That it remains understood, as it has been from the beginning, that the arrangements resolved on by the Protocol of January 20, 1831, are fundamental and irrevocable.

2. That the independence of Belgium shall only be recognized by the five Powers, upon the conditions and within the limits which result from the said arrangements of January 20, 1831.

3. That the principle of the neutrality and the inviolability of the Belgian territory within the above-mentioned limits, remains in full force, and obligatory upon the five Powers.

4. That the five Powers, faithful to their engagements, claim the full right of declaring that the Sovereign of Belgium should, by his personal situation, conform to the principles of the existence of Belgium, insure the safety of other states, accept without restriction, as his Majesty the King of the Netherlands did with regard to the Protocol of July 21, 1814, all the fundamental arrangements contained in the Protocol of January 20, 1831, and be in a situation to secure to the Belgians the peaceable enjoyment hereof.

5. That these first conditions being fulfilled, the five Powers will continue to employ their care and their good offices to procure the reciprocal adoption and execution of the other arrangements rendered necessary by the separation of Belgium from Holland.

6. That the five Powers admit the right in virtue of which other states may take such measures as they may judge necessary to enforce respect to or to re-establish their legitimate authority in all the territories, belonging to them, to which the protest mentioned above sets up pretensions, and which are situated out of the Belgian territory declared neutral.

7. That his Majesty the King of the Netherlands having acceded without restriction, by the Protocol of February 18, 1831, to the arrangements relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland, every enterprise of the Belgian authorities upon the territory which the Protocol of January 20 has declared Dutch,

will be regarded as a renewal of the struggle to which the five Powers have resolved to put an end.

ESTERHAZY. WESSENBERG.

TALLEYRAND.

PALMERSTON.

BÜLOW.

LIEVEN. MATUSZEWIC.

II.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND THE NETHERLANDS, ON THE OTHER. SIGNED AT LONDON, APRIL 19, 1839.

IN the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, his Majesty the King of the French, his Majesty the King of Prussia, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, having taken into consideration their Treaty concluded with his Majesty the King of the Belgians, on the 15th of November, 1831; and his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, being disposed to conclude a definitive arrangement on the basis of the twenty-four Articles agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the 14th of October, 1831; their said Majesties have named for their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable, Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of her Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and

Bohemia, the *Sieur Frederic Christian Louis, Count de Senfft-Pilsach*, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold, and of that of St. Joseph of Tuscany, etc., etc.;

His Majesty the King of the French, the *Sieur Horace Francis Bastien*, Count Sebastiani-Porta, Grand Cross of his Royal Order of the Legion of Honor, etc., etc.;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the *Sieur Henry William, Baron de Bülow*, Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the Second Class, etc., etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the *Sieur Charles Andrew*, Count Pozzo di Borgo, a General of Infantry in his Armies, his Aide-de-Camp General, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to her Britannic Majesty, Knight of the Orders of Russia, and of the Military Order of St. George of the Fourth Class, etc., etc.;

And his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, the *Sieur Solomon Dedel*, Commander of the Order of the Netherland Lion, Commander of the Order of the Polar Star of Sweden, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to her Britannic Majesty;

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ART. I.—His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, engages to cause to be immediately converted into a Treaty with his Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Articles annexed to the present Act, and agreed upon by common consent, under the auspices of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.

ART. II.—Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, his Majesty the King of the French, his Majesty the King of Prussia, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare, that the Articles mentioned in the preceding Article are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.

ART. III.—The union which has existed between Holland and Belgium, in virtue of the Treaty of Vienna of the 31st of May, 1815, is acknowledged by his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, to be dissolved.

ART. IV.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of six weeks, or sooner, if possible. The exchange of these ratifications shall take place at the same time as that of the ratifications of the Treaty between Holland and Belgium.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have affixed thereto the seal of their Arms.

Done at London, the nineteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine.

PALMERSTON.

DEDEL.

SENFFT.

H. SEBASTIANI.

BÜLOW.

POZZO DI BORGO.

ANNEX TO THE TREATY SIGNED AT LONDON, ON THE 19TH OF APRIL, 1839, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND THE NETHERLANDS, ON THE OTHER PART.

ART. I.—The Belgian territory shall be composed of the provinces of South Brabant, Liege, Namur, Hainault, West Flanders, East Flanders, Antwerp, and Limburg, such as they formed part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands constituted in 1815, with the exception of those districts of the province of Limburg which are designated in Art. IV

The Belgian territory shall, moreover, comprise that part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg which is specified in Art. II.

ART. II.—In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg the limits of

the Belgian territory shall be such as will be hereinafter described, viz.—

Commencing from the frontier of France between Rodange, which shall remain to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and Athus, which shall belong to Belgium, there shall be drawn, according to the annexed map, a line which, leaving to Belgium the road from Arlon to Longwy, the town of Arlon with its district, and the road from Arlon to Bastogne, shall pass between Mesancy, which shall be on the Belgian territory, and Clemancy, which shall remain to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, terminating at Steinfort, which place shall also remain to the Grand Duchy. From Steinfort this line shall be continued in the direction of Eischen, Hecbus, Guirsch, Ober-Pallen, Grendé, Nothomb, Parette, and Perlé, as far as Martelange; Hecbus, Guirsch, Grendé, Nothomb, and Parette being to belong to Belgium, and Eischen, Ober-Pallen, Perlé, and Martelange to the Grand Duchy. From Martelange the said line shall follow the course of the Sure, the water-way (*thalweg*) of which river shall serve as the limit between the two states, as far as opposite to Tintange, from whence it shall be continued, as directly as possible, toward the present frontier of the arrondissement of Diekirch, and shall pass between Surret, Harlange, and Tarchamps, which places shall be left to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and Honville, Livarchamps, and Loutremange, which places shall form part of the Belgian territory. Then having, in the vicinity of Doncols and Soulez, which shall remain to the Grand Duchy, reached the present boundary of the arrondissement of Diekirch, the line in question shall follow the said boundary to the frontier of the Prussian territory. All the territories, towns, fortresses, and places situated to the west of this line, shall belong to Belgium; and all the territories, towns, fortresses, and places situated to the east of the said line, shall continue to belong to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

It is understood, that in marking out this line, and in conforming as closely as possible to the description of it given above, as well as to the delineation of it on the map, which, for the sake of greater clearness, is annexed to the present Article, the Commissioners of demarcation, mentioned in Article V., shall pay due

attention to the localities, as well as to the mutual necessity for accommodation which may result therefrom.

ART. III.—In return for the cessions made in the preceding Article, there shall be assigned to his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, a territorial indemnity in the province of Limburg.

ART. IV.—In execution of that part of Article I. which relates to the province of Limburg, and in consequence of the cessions which his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, makes in Article II., his said Majesty shall possess, either to be held by him in his character of Grand Duke of Luxembourg, or for the purpose of being united to Holland, those territories, the limits of which are hereinafter described.

1. *On the right bank of the Meuse:* to the old Dutch enclaves upon the said bank in the province of Limburg, shall be united those districts of the said province upon the same bank, which did not belong to the States-General in 1790; in such wise that the whole of that part of the present province of Limburg, situated upon the right bank of the Meuse, and comprised between that river on the west, the frontier of the Prussian territory on the east, the present frontier of the province of Liege on the south, and Dutch Guelderland on the north, shall henceforth belong to his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, either to be held by him in his character of Grand Duke of Luxembourg, or in order to be united to Holland.

2. *On the left bank of the Meuse:* commencing from the southernmost point of the Dutch province of North Brabant, there shall be drawn, according to the annexed map, a line, which shall terminate on the Meuse above Wessem, between that place and Stevenswaardt, at the point where the frontiers of the present arrondissements of Ruremonde and Maestricht meet, on the left bank of the Meuse; in such manner that Bergerot, Stamproy, Neer-Itteren, Ittervoordt, and Thorn, with their districts, as well as all the other places situated to the north of this line, shall form part of the Dutch territory.

The old Dutch enclaves in the province of Limburg, upon the left bank of the Meuse, shall belong to Belgium, with the exception of the town of Maestricht, which, together with a radius of

territory, extending twelve hundred toises from the outer glacis of the fortress, on the said bank of this river, shall continue to be possessed in full sovereignty and property by his Majesty the King of the Netherlands.

ART. V.—His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, shall come to an agreement with the Germanic Confederation, and with the Agnates of the House of Nassau, as to the application of the stipulations contained in Articles III. and IV., as well as upon all the arrangements which the said Articles may render necessary, either with the above-mentioned Agnates of the House of Nassau or with the Germanic Confederation.

ART. VI.—In consideration of the territorial arrangements above stated, each of the two parties renounces reciprocally, and forever, all pretension to the territories, towns, fortresses, and places situated within the limits of the possessions of the other party, such as those limits are described in Articles I., II., and IV.

The said limits shall be marked out in conformity with those Articles, by Belgian and Dutch commissioners of demarcation, who shall meet as soon as possible in the town of Maastricht.

ART. VII.—Belgium, within the limits specified in Arts. I., II., and IV., shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states.

ART. VIII.—The drainage of the waters of the two Flanders shall be regulated between Holland and Belgium according to the stipulations on this subject, contained in Article VI. of the definitive Treaty concluded between his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and the States-General on the 8th of November, 1785; and in conformity with the said Article, commissioners, to be named on either side, shall make arrangements for the application of the provisions contained in it.

ART. IX.—§ 1. The provisions of Articles CVIII. to CXVII. inclusive, of the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, relative to the free navigation of navigable rivers, shall be applied to those navigable rivers which separate the Belgian and the Dutch territories, or which traverse them both.

§ 2. So far as regards specially the navigation of the Scheldt, and of its mouths, it is agreed, that the pilotage and the buoying of its channel, as well as the conservation of the channels of the Scheldt below Antwerp, shall be subject to a joint superintendence; and that this joint superintendence shall be exercised by commissioners to be appointed for this purpose by the two parties. Moderate pilotage dues shall be fixed by mutual agreement, and those dues shall be the same for the vessels of all nations.

In the mean time, and until these duties shall be fixed, no higher pilotage dues shall be levied than those which have been established by the tariff of 1829, for the mouths of the Meuse from the high sea to Helvoet, and from Helvoet to Rotterdam, in proportion to the distances. It shall be at the choice of every vessel proceeding from the high sea to Belgium, or from Belgium to the high sea, to take what pilot she pleases; and upon the same principle, it shall be free for the two countries to establish along the whole course of the Scheldt, and at its mouth, such pilotage establishments as shall be deemed necessary for furnishing pilots. Everything relating to these establishments shall be determined by the regulation to be concluded in conformity with § 6 hereinafter following. These establishments shall be placed under the joint superintendence mentioned in the beginning of the present paragraph. The two governments engage to preserve the navigable channels of the Scheldt, and of its mouths, and to place and maintain therein the necessary beacons and buoys, each for its own part of the river.

§ 3. There shall be levied by the government of the Netherlands, upon the navigation of the Scheldt and of its mouths, a single duty of florins 1.50 per ton; that is to say, florins 1.12 on vessels which, coming from the high sea, shall ascend the Western Scheldt in order to proceed to Belgium by the Scheldt, or by the Canal of Terneuze; and of florin 0.38 per ton on vessels which, coming from Belgium by the Scheldt or by the Canal of Terneuze, shall descend the Western Scheldt in order to proceed to the high sea. And in order that the said vessels may not be subject to any visit, nor to any delay or hindrance whatever, within the Dutch waters, either in ascending the Scheldt from the high sea, or in descending the Scheldt in order to reach the high sea, it is agreed that

the collection of the duty above mentioned shall take place by Dutch agents at Antwerp and at Terneuze. In the same manner, vessels arriving from the high sea in order to proceed to Antwerp by the Western Scheldt, and coming from places suspected in regard to health, shall be at liberty to continue their course without hindrance or delay, accompanied by one health guard, and thus to proceed to the place of their destination. Vessels proceeding from Antwerp to Terneuze, and *vice versa*, or carrying on in the river itself coasting trade or fishery (in such manner as the exercise of the latter shall be regulated in pursuance of § 6 hereinafter), shall not be subjected to any duty.

§ 4. The branch of the Scheldt called the Eastern Scheldt not being in its present state available for the navigation from the high sea to Antwerp and Terneuze, and *vice versa*, but being used for the navigation between Antwerp and the Rhine, this eastern branch shall not be burdened, in any part of its course, with higher duties or tolls than those which are levied, according to the tariffs of Mayence of the 31st of March, 1831, upon the navigation from Gorcum to the high sea, in proportion to the distances.

§ 5. It is also agreed that the navigation of the intermediate channels between the Scheldt and the Rhine, in order to proceed from Antwerp to the Rhine, and *vice versa*, shall continue reciprocally free, and that it shall be subject only to moderate tolls, which shall be the same for the commerce of the two countries.

§ 6. Commissioners on both sides shall meet at Antwerp in the space of one month, as well to determine the definitive and permanent amount of these tolls, as to agree upon a general regulation for the execution of the provisions of the present Article, and to include therein a provision for the exercise of the right of fishing and of trading in fish, throughout the whole extent of the Scheldt, on a footing of perfect reciprocity and equality in favor of the subjects of the two countries.

§ 7. In the mean time, and until the said regulations shall be prepared, the navigation of the Meuse and of its branches shall remain free to the commerce of the two countries, which shall adopt provisionally, in this respect, the tariffs of the Convention signed at Mayence on the 31st of March, 1831, for the

free navigation of the Rhine, as well as the other provisions of that Convention, so far as they may be applicable to the said river.

§ 8. If natural events or works of art should hereafter render impracticable the lines of navigation mentioned in the present Article, the government of the Netherlands shall assign to Belgian navigation other lines equally safe, and equally good and commodious, instead of the said lines of navigation become impracticable.

ART. X.—The use of the canals which traverse both countries shall continue to be free and common to the inhabitants of both. It is understood that they shall enjoy the use of the same reciprocally, and on equal conditions; and that on either side moderate duties only shall be levied upon the navigation of the said canals.

ART. XI.—The commercial communications through the town of Maestricht, and through Sittardt, shall remain entirely free, and shall not be impeded under any pretext whatsoever.

The use of the roads which, passing through these towns, lead to the frontiers of Germany, shall be subject only to the payment of moderate turnpike tolls, for the repair of the said roads, so that the transit commerce may not experience any obstacle thereby, and that by means of the tolls above mentioned, these roads may be kept in good repair, and fit to afford facilities to that commerce.

ART. XII.—In the event of a new road having been constructed, or a new canal cut, in Belgium, terminating at the Meuse, opposite the Dutch canton of Sittardt, in that case Belgium shall be entitled to demand of Holland, who, on the other hand, shall not in such case refuse her consent, that the said road, or the said canal, shall be continued, according to the same plan, and entirely at the cost and charge of Belgium, through the canton of Sittardt, to the frontiers of Germany. This road or canal, which shall be used only as a commercial communication, shall be constructed, at the option of Holland, either by engineers and workmen whom Belgium shall obtain permission to employ for that purpose in the canton of Sittardt, or by engineers and workmen to be furnished by Holland, and who shall execute the works agreed upon at the expense of Belgium; the whole without any

charge whatsoever to Holland, and without prejudice to her exclusive rights of sovereignty over the territory which may be traversed by the road or canal in question.

The two parties shall fix, by mutual agreement, the amount and the mode of collection of the duties and tolls which should be levied upon the said road or canal.

ART. XIII.—§ 1. From and after the 1st of January, 1839, Belgium, with reference to the division of the public debt of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, shall remain charged with the sum of five millions of Netherland florins of annual interest, the capital of which shall be transferred from the debit of the Great Book of Amsterdam, or from the debit of the General Treasury of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to the debit of the Great Book of Belgium.

§ 2. The capitals transferred, and the annuities inscribed upon the debit of the Great Book of Belgium, in consequence of the preceding paragraph, to the amount of the total sum of 5,000,000 Netherland florins of annual interest, shall be considered as forming part of the Belgian National Debt; and Belgium engages not to admit, either at present or in future, any distinction between this portion of her public debt arising from her union with Holland, and any other Belgian national debt already created, or which may be created hereafter.

§ 3. The payment of the above-mentioned sum of 5,000,000 Netherland florins of annual interest, shall take place regularly every six months, either at Brussels or at Antwerp, in ready money, without deduction of any kind whatsoever, either at present or in future.

§ 4. In consideration of the creation of the said sum of 5,000,000 florins of annual interest, Belgium shall be released from all obligation toward Holland, on account of the division of the public debt of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

§ 5. Commissioners, to be named on both sides, shall meet within the space of fifteen days in the town of Utrecht, in order to proceed to the transfer of the capitals and annual interest which, upon the division of the public debt of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, are to pass to the charge of Belgium, up to the amount of 5,000,000 florins of annual interest.

They shall also proceed to deliver up the archives, maps, plans, and other documents whatsoever which belong to Belgium or which relate to her administration.

ART. XIV.—The port of Antwerp, in conformity with the stipulations of the XVth Article of the Treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814, shall continue to be solely a port of commerce.

ART. XV.—Works of public or private utility, such as canals, roads, or others of a similar nature, constructed wholly or in part at the expense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, shall belong, together with the advantages and charges thereunto attached, to the country in which they are situated.

It is understood that the capitals borrowed for the construction of these works, and specifically charged thereupon, shall be comprised in the aforesaid charges, in so far as they may not yet have been repaid, and without giving rise to any claim on account of repayments already made.

ART. XVI.—The sequestrations which may have been imposed in Belgium, during the troubles, for political causes, on any property or hereditary estates whatsoever, shall be taken off without delay, and the enjoyment of the property and estates above mentioned shall be immediately restored to the lawful owners thereof.

ART. XVII.—In the two countries of which the separation takes place in consequence of the present Articles, inhabitants and proprietors, if they wish to transfer their residence from one country to the other, shall, during two years, be at liberty to dispose of their property, movable or immovable, of whatever nature the same may be, to sell it, and to carry away the produce of the sale, either in money or in any other shape, without hindrance, and without the payment of any duties other than those which are now in force in the two countries upon changes and transfers.

It is understood that the collection of the *droit d'aubaine et de détraction* upon the persons and property of Dutch in Belgium, and of Belgians in Holland, is abandoned both now and for the future.

ART. XVIII.—The character of a subject of the two govern-

ments, with regard to property, shall be acknowledged and maintained.

ART. XIX.—The stipulations of Articles from XI. to XXI., inclusive, of the Treaty concluded between Austria and Russia, on the 3d of May, 1815, which forms an integral part of the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, stipulations relative to persons who possess property in both countries, to the election of residence which they are required to make, to the rights which they shall exercise as subjects of either state, and to the relations of neighborhood in properties cut by the frontiers, shall be applied to such proprietors, as well as to such properties, in Holland, in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, or in Belgium, as shall be found to come within the cases provided for by the aforesaid stipulations of the Acts of the Congress of Vienna. It is understood that mineral productions are comprised among the productions of the soil mentioned in Art. XX. of the Treaty of the 3d of May, 1815, above referred to. The *droits d'aubaine et de détraction* being henceforth abolished as between Holland, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and Belgium, it is understood that such of the above-mentioned stipulations as may relate to those duties, shall be considered null and void in the three countries.

ART. XX.—No person in the territories which change domination shall be molested or disturbed in any manner whatever, on account of any part which he may have taken, directly or indirectly, in political events.

ART. XXI.—The pensions and allowances of expectants, of persons unemployed or retired, shall in future be paid, on either side, to all those individuals entitled thereto, both civil and military, conformably to the laws in force previous to the 1st November, 1830.

It is agreed that the above-mentioned pensions and allowances to persons born in the territories which now constitute Belgium, shall remain at the charge of the Belgian treasury; and the pensions and allowances of persons born in the territories which now constitute the Kingdom of the Netherlands, shall be at the charge of the Netherlands treasury.

ART. XXII.—All claims of Belgian subjects upon any private

establishments, such as the widows' fund, and the fund known under the denomination of the *fonds des leges*, and of the chest of civil and military retired allowances, shall be examined by the Mixed Commission mentioned in Article XIII., and shall be determined according to the tenor of the regulations by which these funds or chests are governed.

The securities furnished, as well as the payments made, by Belgian accountants, the judicial deposits and consignments, shall equally be restored to the parties entitled thereto, on the presentation of their proofs.

If, under the head of what are called *the French liquidations*, any Belgian subjects should still be able to bring forward claims to be inscribed, such claims shall also be examined and settled by the said Commission.

ART. XXIII.—All judgments given in civil and commercial matters, all acts of the civil power, and all acts executed before a notary or other public officer under the Belgian administration, in those parts of Limburg and of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, of which his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, is to be replaced in possession, shall be maintained in force and validity.

ART. XXIV.—Immediately after the exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty to be concluded between the two parties, the necessary orders shall be transmitted to the commanders of the respective troops, for the evacuation of the territories, towns, fortresses, and places which change domination. The civil authorities thereof shall also, at the same time, receive the necessary orders for delivering over the said territories, towns, fortresses, and places, to the commissioners who shall be appointed by both parties for this purpose.

This evacuation and delivery shall be effected so as to be completed in the space of fifteen days, or sooner if possible.

PALMERSTON. DEDEL.

SENFFT.

H. SEBASTIANI.

BÜLOW.

POZZO DI BORGO.

III.

TREATY BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY, THE QUEEN REGENT OF SPAIN, THE KING OF THE FRENCH, AND THE DUKE OF BRAGANZA, REGENT OF PORTUGAL. SIGNED AT LONDON, APRIL 22, 1834.

HER MAJESTY the Queen Regent of Spain, during the minority of her daughter, Donna Isabella the Second, Queen of Spain, and his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of the kingdom of Portugal and of the Algarves in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second, being impressed with a deep conviction that the interests of the two Crowns, and the security of their respective dominions, require the immediate and vigorous exertion of their joint efforts to put an end to hostilities, which, though directed in the first instance against the throne of her Most Faithful Majesty, now afford shelter and support to disaffected and rebellious subjects of the Crown of Spain; and their Majesties being desirous, at the same time, to provide the necessary means for restoring to the subjects of each the blessings of internal peace, and to confirm, by mutual good offices, the friendship which they are desirous of establishing and cementing between their respective states, they have come to the determination of uniting their forces, in order to compel the Infant Don Carlos of Spain, and the Infant Don Miguel of Portugal, to withdraw from the Portuguese dominions.

In consequence of this agreement, their Majesties the Regents have addressed themselves to their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of the French; and their said Majesties, considering the interest they must always take in the security of the Spanish monarchy, and being further animated by the most anxious desire to assist in the establishment of peace in the Peninsula, as well as in every other part of Europe; and his Britannic Majesty considering, moreover, the special obligations arising out of his ancient alliance with Portugal, their Majesties have consented to become parties to the proposed engagement.

Their Majesties have therefore named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say :—

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of his Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and his Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs :

Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain during the minority of her daughter Donna Isabella the Second, Queen of Spain, Don Manuel Pando, Fernandez de Pinedo, Alava, y Dabila, Marquis of Miraflores, etc., etc., her Catholic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Britannic Majesty :

His Majesty the King of the French, the Sieur Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince-Duke de Talleyrand, Peer of France, his said Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Britannic Majesty, etc., etc. :

And his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of the Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second, the Sieur Christopher Peter de Moraes Sarmiento, etc., etc., her Most Faithful Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Britannic Majesty :

Who have agreed upon the following articles :—

ART. I.—His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of the Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second, engages to use all the means in his power to compel the Infant Don Carlos to withdraw from the Portuguese dominions.

ART. II.—Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain during the minority of her daughter Donna Isabella the Second, Queen of Spain, being hereby requested and invited thereto by his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second ; and having moreover received just and grave cause of complaint against the Infant Don Miguel, by the countenance and support given by him to the Pretender to the Spanish Crown, engages to cause such a body

of Spanish troops as may hereafter be agreed upon between the two parties, to enter the Portuguese territory, in order to co-operate with the troops of her Most Faithful Majesty, for the purpose of compelling the Infants Don Carlos of Spain, and Don Miguel of Portugal, to withdraw from the Portuguese dominions. And her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain further engages that these troops shall be maintained at the expense of Spain, and without any charge to Portugal; the said Spanish troops being nevertheless received and treated, in all other respects, in the same manner as the troops of her Most Faithful Majesty; and her Majesty the Queen Regent engages that her troops shall withdraw from the Portuguese territory as soon as the above-mentioned object of the expulsion of the Infants shall have been accomplished, and when the presence of those troops in Portugal shall no longer be required by his Imperial Majesty the Duke Regent in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second.

ART. III.—His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland engages to co-operate, by the employment of a naval force, in aid of the operations to be undertaken, in conformity with the engagement of this Treaty, by the troops of Spain and Portugal.

ART. IV.—If the co-operation of France should be deemed necessary by the high contracting parties, for the complete attainment of the object of this Treaty, his Majesty the King of the French engages to do, in this respect, whatever might be settled by common consent between himself and his three august Allies.

ART. V.—It is agreed between the high contracting parties, that in pursuance of the stipulations contained in the foregoing Articles a declaration shall be immediately issued, announcing to the Portuguese nation the principles and object of the engagements of this Treaty. And his Imperial Majesty the Duke Regent, in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second, animated by a sincere desire to obliterate all remembrance of the past, and to unite around the Throne of her Most Faithful Majesty the whole of that nation over which the will of Divine Providence has called her to reign, declares his intention to proclaim, at the same time, a complete and general amnesty in favor of all such of the subjects of her

Most Faithful Majesty as shall, within a time to be specified, return to their allegiance; and his Imperial Majesty the Duke Regent, in the name of the Queen Donna Maria the Second, also declares his intention to secure to the Infant Don Miguel, on his retiring from the Spanish and Portuguese dominions, a provision suitable to his birth and rank.

ART. VI.—Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain during the minority of her daughter Donna Isabella the Second, Queen of Spain, hereby declares her intention to secure to the Infant Don Carlos, on his retiring from the Spanish and Portuguese dominions, a provision suitable to his birth and rank.

ART. VII.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in one month from this date, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the twenty-second day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four.

PALMERSTON.

MIRAFLORES.

TALLEYRAND.

C. P. DE MORAES SARMENTO.

IV.

LETTER TO THE KING.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 5, 1832.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honor of acknowledging your Majesty's memorandum of the 3d instant, upon the subject of the draft of a dispatch to Lord Erskine, and of submitting to your Majesty those considerations which he wishes to be permitted to lay before your Majesty on this matter.

Viscount Palmerston begs, however, in the first place, to say that he entirely acquiesces in your Majesty's opinion, that the communication, whatever it may be, which the British government may make upon the present state of affairs in Germany should not be addressed exclusively or principally to the Court of Bavaria; and although Viscount Palmerston had prepared a communication to that Court, in the shape of a reply to an inquiry of Lord Erskine's, because that appeared to him to be the least formal way of expressing the sentiments of the British government, yet it was undoubtedly his intention also to prepare for your Majesty's consideration communications to the same effect to your Majesty's ambassador at Vienna, and to your Majesty's ministers at the other Courts of Germany; and if your Majesty should not disapprove of such a course being pursued, it will be the duty of Viscount Palmerston to prepare for your Majesty's consideration drafts of such communications, which should be sent off at the same time as the dispatch to Lord Erskine.

Viscount Palmerston begs to make his grateful acknowledgments to your Majesty for the manner in which your Majesty has been graciously pleased to advert to the embarrassments which your Majesty's government may experience by the expression on the part of your Majesty of opinions deeply rooted, founded upon principle, and therefore not readily to be abandoned; but Viscount Palmerston humbly trusts that, whatever may be the impression at first sight produced upon your Majesty's mind by the practical manner in which he proposes to apply the principles on which your Majesty's servants are desirous of acting, these principles will be found to be essentially such as your Majesty, as sovereign of the British Empire, cannot fail to approve; because your Majesty's servants humbly conceive them to be those on which the constitution of this country is founded, and to which these realms have been indebted for those paternal and beneficent reigns under which the British nation has so eminently prospered during nearly a century and a half.

Viscount Palmerston is aware that, in all times, those who have entertained liberal opinions in matters of government, and who have thought that free institutions are conducive to good order in society, and to the welfare of nations, and that they are

not merely compatible with monarchical governments, but afford to thrones, in times of difficulty and danger, a stability which in more absolute governments is wanting—Viscount Palmerston is aware that such persons have in all times been represented by the advocates of opposite doctrines as men dangerous to the tranquillity of states, and enemies to established order. But to your Majesty it cannot be necessary to point out the wide distinction between such principles as those above mentioned and that reckless spirit of innovation which aims at the subversion of order, and deems revolution to be the natural condition of society. To confound the liberal and constitutional party with the republican faction would be as erroneous and unjust as it would be to suppose that every champion of monarchy was a friend to despotism, and that those who uphold the rights and prerogatives of the crown are desirous of surrounding the throne with arbitrary and irresponsible power.

Neither are your Majesty's servants actuated by any meddling wish needlessly to interfere with the institutions of other states, and forcibly or prematurely to extend to other countries arrangements which, however intrinsically invaluable, those countries may not be desirous of adopting, or prepared to receive.

But while, on the one hand, your Majesty's servants would always be ready to discountenance any attempts to subvert existing institutions by popular violence; so, on the other, history and recent events teach them to look with alarm at any endeavor, by the exertion of overruling power, forcibly to deprive nations of rights and privileges which have been solemnly conferred upon them. Violent changes so brought about are revolutions also, and their tendency is to excite resistance, which may overshoot its mark, and lead to the same consequences which spring from popular violence. But if an overstrained exercise of domestic authority, such as the ordinances of Charles the Tenth with respect to the liberty of the Press and the constitution of the Chambers, may produce resistance, how much more likely are such measures to excite a general ferment when they emanate from an external authority and are to be supported by a foreign force! Is it not probable that, in such a case, the question of resistance or submission will be decided by a calculation of the chances of

success ? and in a moment of general excitement that calculation will be made by men on whose judgment and discretion the peace of nations ought never to depend.

It is then upon conservative principles, in the strictest sense of the expression, that Viscount Palmerston is alarmed at the possible consequences which may ensue from the recent proceedings of the Frankfort Diet. He fears that those proceedings may be followed up by violent infringements of the existing constitutions of Germany. He believes the German nations who live under those constitutions to be firmly attached to them, and not likely to surrender them without a struggle ; and in the present agitated state of Europe, and in the temper of men's minds, from Italy to Belgium, and from the western provinces of France to the Lithuanian governments of Russia, he thinks that nothing could be more dangerous to established institutions than a war of political opinions commenced upon the Rhine, by the aggression of power against legal rights.

Therefore it is that Viscount Palmerston humbly thinks that, while it is yet time, and before the crisis has happened, the friendly counsels of the British government, conveyed to the Powers of Germany, may essentially contribute to preserve the general peace.

If the warnings of an ally not directly concerned in these transactions should induce those governments, whose passions must necessarily be more or less mixed up with their decisions, to take a calmer view of affairs, and to limit their proceedings within the strict necessity of self-defense, an important benefit will have been conferred upon Europe, and the interests of England will also have been served. If, on the contrary, the opinions of the British government should be disregarded, and the evils which are apprehended should ensue, your Majesty's servants, when called upon hereafter to account for the advice which in this crisis they have tendered to your Majesty, would be enabled to show by the record that they had not neglected those steps which their duty required them to take, and Great Britain would be absolved from all obligation to engage in war for the support of Powers who had brought their difficulties on themselves by neglecting the advice of a disinterested ally.

V.

EXTRACT FROM DISPATCH FROM COLONEL PATRICK CAMPBELL, BRITISH CONSUL-GENERAL IN EGYPT, TO LORD PALMERSTON, DATED ALEXANDRIA, MAY 25, 1838.

THE intended realization by Mehemet Ali of his long-meditated plan to declare his independence, has at length been unequivocally communicated by him, both to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France, and myself.

* * * * *

Mehemet Ali said that he had requested me to call on him in order to communicate to me his fixed resolve, and from which nothing should divert him, to declare his independence of the Porte. That he was between two swords, his family and the Great Powers; that the interests of his children and family imperiously called upon him to fix their future state; that it was with tears in his eyes, and an oppressed heart (*les larmes aux yeux, et le cœur serré*), that he had taken his present resolution, from which he would not swerve; but that the interests of his family demanded it; and that he was now an old man of seventy years of age, and, as he might soon be carried off by death, he could not any longer delay the settlement of the question; and he then requested me to inform my government, as early as possible, of his communication to me, and of his fixed determination; and that he would wait a reasonable time for a reply, in the full persuasion and hope that the British government would take such measures as would permit an amicable and satisfactory arrangement of this affair, so as to preserve peace, at the same time that his (Mehemet Ali's) independence should be established and recognized.

VI.

CONVENTION CONCLUE ENTRE LES COURS DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE, D'AUTRICHE, DE PRUSSE, ET DE RUSSIE, D'UNE PART, ET LA SUBLIME PORTE OTTOMANE, DE L'AUTRE, POUR LA PACIFICATION DU LEVANT; SIGNÉE À LONDRES, LE 15 JUILLET, 1840.

Au Nom de Dieu Très Miséricordieux.

SA Hautesse le Sultan ayant eu recours à Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, pour réclamer leur appui et leur assistance au milieu des difficultés dans lesquelles il se trouve placé par suite de la conduite hostile de Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte,—difficultés qui menacent de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et à l'indépendance du Trône du Sultan; Leurs dites Majestés mûes par le sentiment d'amitié sincère qui subsiste entr'Elles et le Sultan; animées du désir de veiller au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la Paix de l'Europe; fidèles à l'engagement qu'Elles ont contracté par la Note Collective remise à la Porte par Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839; et désirant de plus prévenir l'effusion de sang qu'occasionnerait la continuation des hostilités qui ont récemment éclaté en Syrie entre les Autorités du Pacha d'Egypte et les sujets de Sa Hautesse;

Leurs dites Majestés et Sa Hautesse le Sultan ont résolu, dans le but susdit, de conclure entr'Elles une Convention; et ont nommé à cet effet pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Très-Honorable Henri Jean, Vicomte Palmerston, Baron Temple, Pair d'Irlande, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en Son Conseil Privé, Chevalier Grand' Croix du Très-Honorable Ordre du Bain, Membre du Parlement, et Son Principal Secrétaire d'Etat ayant le Département des Affaires Etrangères;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Neumann, Commandeur de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré de la Croix pour le Mérite Civil, Commandeur des Ordres de la Tour et de l'Épée du Portugal, de la Croix du Sud du Brésil, Chevalier Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe de Russie, Son Conseiller Aulique, et Plenipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Henri Guillaume, Baron de Bulow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge de première classe de Prusse, Grand' Croix des Ordres de Léopold d'Autriche et des Guelphes de Hanovre, Chevalier Grand' Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe, et de St. Wladimir de quatrième classe, de Russie, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Faucon de Saxe-Weimar, Son Chambellan, Conseiller intime actuel, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Brunnow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Ste. Anne de première classe, de St. Stanislas de première classe, de St. Wladimir de troisième, Commandeur de l'Ordre de St. Etienne de Hongrie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge, et de St. Jean de Jérusalem, son Conseiller Privé, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique ;

Et Sa Majesté le Très Majestueux, Très Puissant et Très Magnifique Sultan, Abdoul Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, Chékib Effendi, décoré du Nichan Ifthar de première classe, Beylikdgi du Divan Impérial, Conseiller honoraire du Département des Affaires Etrangères, son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près sa Majesté Britannique :

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivans :

ART. I.—Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'étant entendu avec Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, sur les conditions de l'arrangement qu'il est de l'intention de Sa Hautesse d'accorder à Méhémét Ali—conditions lesquelles se trouvent

spécifiées dans l'Acte Séparé ci-annexé,—Leurs Majestés s'engagent à agir dans un parfait accord, et d'unir leurs efforts pour déterminer Méhémet Ali à se conformer à cet arrangement; chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes se réservant de co-opérer à ce but selon les moyens d'action dont chacune d'elles peut disposer.

ART. II.—Si le Pacha d'Egypte refusait d'adhérer au susdit arrangement qui lui sera communiqué par le Sultan avec le concours de leurs dites Majestés, celles-ci s'engagent à prendre, à la réquisition du Sultan, des mesures concertées et arrêtées entr'Elles, afin de mettre cet arrangement à exécution. Dans l'intervalle, le Sultan ayant invité Ses Alliés à se joindre à lui pour l'aider à interrompre la communication par mer entre l'Egypte et la Syrie, et à empêcher l'expédition de troupes, chevaux, armes, munitions et approvisionnemens de guerre de tout genre d'une de ces provinces à l'autre; Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engagent à donner immédiatement à cet effet les ordres nécessaires aux commandans de leurs forces navales dans la Méditerranée; Leurs dites Majestés promettent en outre, que les commandans de leurs Escadres, selon les moyens dont ils disposent, donneront au nom de l'Alliance tout l'appui et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir à ceux des sujets du Sultan qui manifesteront leur fidélité et obéissance à leur Souverain.

ART. III.—Si Méhémet Ali, après s'être refusé de se soumettre aux conditions de l'arrangement mentionné ci-dessus, dirigeait ses forces de terre ou de mer vers Constantinople, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur la réquisition expresse qui en serait faite par le Sultan à Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, sont convenues, le cas échéant, de se rendre à l'invitation de ce Souverain, et de pourvoir à la défense de son trône, au moyen d'une co-opération concertée en commun, dans le but de mettre les deux détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, ainsi que la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, à l'abri de toute agression.

Il est en outre convenu, que les forces qui, en vertu d'une pareille entente, recevront la destination indiquée ci-dessus, y resteront employées aussi long tems que leur présence sera re-

quise par le Sultan, et lorsque Sa Hautesse jugera que leur présence aura cessé d'être nécessaire, les dites forces se retireront simultanément, et rentreront respectivement dans la Mer Noire et le Méditerranée.

ART. IV.—Il est toutefois expressément entendu, que la coopération mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, et destinée à placer temporairement les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore et la Capitale Ottomane sous le sauvegarde des Hautes Parties Contractantes, contre toute agression de Méhémet Ali, ne sera considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptée à la demande expresse du Sultan, et uniquement pour sa défense dans le cas seul indiqué ci-dessus. Mais il est convenu que cette mesure ne dérogera en rien à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été de tout tems défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances Etrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Et le Sultan, d'une part, déclare par le présent Acte, qu'à l'exception de l'éventualité ci-dessus mentionnée, il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir ce principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de Son Empire, et tant que le Porte se trouve en paix de n'admettre aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles; d'autre part, Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

ART. V.—La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de deux mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

PALMERSTON.

CHEKIB.

NEUMANN.

BÜLOW.

BRUNNOW.

ACTE SÉPARÉ ANNEXÉ À LA CONVENTION CON-
CLUE À LONDRES, LE 15 JUILLET, 1840, ENTRE LES
COURS DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE, D'AUTRICHE,
DE PRUSSE, ET DE RUSSIE, D'UNE PART, ET LA
SUBLIME PORTE OTTOMANE, DE L'AUTRE.

SA Hautesse le Sultan a l'intention d'accorder et de faire
notifié à Méhémet Ali les conditions de l'arrangement ci-
dessous :

§ 1. Sa Hautesse promet d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui
et pour ses descendans en ligne directe, l'administration du Pa-
chalic de l'Egypte ; et Sa Hautesse promet en outre d'accorder à
Méhémet Ali, sa vie durant, avec le titre de Pacha d'Acre, et
avec le commandement de la Forteresse de St. Jean d'Acre, l'ad-
ministration de la partie méridionale de la Syrie, dont les limites
seront déterminées par la ligne de démarcation suivante :

Cette ligne, partant du Cap Ras-el-Nakhora sur les côtes de la
Méditerranée, s'étendra de là directement jusqu'à l'embouchure
de la rivière Seisaban, extrémité septentrionale du Lac Tibérias ;
longera la côte occidentale du dit Lac ; suivra la rive droite du
fleuve Jourdain, et la côte occidentale de la Mer Morte ; se pro-
longera de là en droiture jusqu'à la Mer Rouge, en aboutissant à
la pointe septentrionale du Golfe d'Akaba ; et suivra de là la côte
occidentale du Golfe d'Akaba et la côte orientale du Golfe de
Suez jusqu'à Suez.

Toutefois, le Sultan, en fesant ces offres, y attache la condition
que Méhémet Ali les accepte dans l'espace de dix jours après que
la communication lui en aura été faite à Alexandrie par un Agent
de Sa Hautesse ; et qu'en même tems Méhémet dépose entre les
mains de cet Agent les instructions nécessaires aux Commandans
de ses forces de terre et de mer, de se retirer immédiatement de
l'Arabie et de toutes les Villes Saintes qui s'y trouvent situées ;
de l'Île de Candie ; du district d'Adana ; et de toutes les autres
parties de l'Empire Ottoman qui ne sont pas comprises dans les
limites de l'Egypte et dans celles du Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a
été désigné ci-dessus.

§ 2. Si dans le délai de dix jours fixé ci-dessus, Méhémet Ali

n'acceptait point le susdit arrangement, le Sultan retirera alors l'offre de l'administration viagère du Pachalic d'Acre ; mais Sa Hautesse consentira encore à accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendans en ligne directe, l'administration du Pachalic d'Egypte, pourvu que cette offre soit acceptée dans l'espace de dix jours suivans, c'est-à-dire, dans un délai de vingt jours, à compter du jour où la communication lui aura été faite, et pourvu qu'il dépose également entre les mains de l'Agent du Sultan les instructions nécessaires pour ses Commandans de terre et de mer de se retirer immédiatement en dedans des limites, et dans les ports, du Pachalic de l'Egypte.

§ 3. Le tribut annuel à payer au Sultan par Méhémet Ali, sera proportionnée au plus au moins de territoire dont ce dernier obtiendra l'administration, selon qu'il accepte la première ou la seconde alternative.

§ 4. Il est expressément entendu de plus, que dans la première comme dans la seconde alternative, Méhémet Ali (avant l'expiration du terme fixé de dix ou de vingt jours) sera tenu de remettre la flotte Turque, avec tous ses équipages et armemens, entre les mains du Préposé Turc qui sera chargé de la recevoir. Les Commandans des Escadres Alliées assisteront à cette remise.

Il est entendu que dans aucun cas Méhémet Ali ne pourra porter en compte, ni déduire du tribut à payer au Sultan, les dépenses qu'il a faites pour l'entretien de la flotte Ottomane pendant tout le tems qu'elle sera restée dans les ports d'Egypte.

§ 5. Tous les Traités, et toutes les lois de l'Empire Ottoman s'appliqueront à l'Egypte et au Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus, comme à tout autre partie de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais le Sultan consent, qu'à condition du paiement régulier du tribut susmentionnée, Méhémet Ali et ses descendans perçoivent au nom du Sultan, et comme délégué de Sa Hautesse, dans les provinces dont l'administration leur sera confiée, les taxes et impôts légalement établis. Il est entendu en outre, que moyennant la perception des taxes et impôts susdits, Méhémet Ali et ses descendans pourvoieront à toutes les dépenses de l'administration civile et militaire des dites Provinces.

§ 6. Les forces de terre et de mer que pourra entretenir le Pacha d'Egypte et d'Acre, faisant partie des forces de l'Empire Ottoman,

seront toujours considérées comme entretenues pour le service de l'Etat.

§ 7. Si à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours après la communication qui lui aura été faite (ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, § 2), Méhémet Ali n'adhère point à l'arrangement proposé, et n'accepte pas l'hérédité du Pachalic de l'Egypte, le Sultan se considérera comme libre de retirer cette offre, et de suivre, en conséquence, telle marche ultérieure que ses propres intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés pourront lui suggérer.

§ 8 Le présent Acte Séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré mot à mot dans la Convention de ce jour. Il sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres en même tems que celles de la dite Convention.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
BÜLOW.
BRUNNOW.

CHEKIB.

VII.

DISPATCH OF MR. BULWER TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

PARIS, September 18, 1840.

MY LORD,—

Being aware that M. Thiers had just received dispatches from the Levant, I called on him yesterday morning, in order to be able to communicate to your lordship their contents; and in answer to my inquiry as to news, M. Thiers showed me passages from the communications he had received from M. Cochelet, the purport of which was:

First: That the Viceroy of Egypt had accepted the hereditary

government of Egypt, and informed the consuls of the four Powers, that as to the expectations he entertained with respect to the other possessions which he held, he had referred to the magnanimity of the Sultan.

“Secondly: That his demands on the Porte, in explanation of this phrase, were the government of Syria, Adana, and Candia (giving up the holy cities) for himself during his own life, or for Ibrahim during Ibrahim’s life.

Thirdly: That the French agents, MM. Cochelet and Walewski, had obtained from him, in addition to these terms, the further immediate concessions to the Porte of Adana and Candia; and that consequently his (the Viceroy’s) demands were now confined to the hereditary government of Egypt for himself and family, together with the government of the Pashalics of Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo, for himself during his own life, or for his son Ibrahim, during that son’s life.

M. Cochelet continued to say, that the utmost limit of Mehemet’s concessions was now arrived at; and that he considered that the French government, having obtained such concessions from his friendship, was bound to stand by him, if those concessions were not accepted.

After showing me this dispatch, M. Thiers had a long conversation with me upon the subject of which it treated. It is difficult to report a conversation of this kind, without, on the one hand, giving it a tone of menace, which in no wise belonged to it, or without, on the other hand, weakening the impression which I saw it was M. Thiers’ intention to convey to my mind, and which, therefore, it is my duty to convey to your lordship. I trust, therefore, it will suffice to say, that I felt clearly convinced that M. Thiers wished me to understand, that he was anxious that peace should be maintained; that with this view he had done all in his power to persuade Mehemet Ali to be reasonable in his conditions; that he thought the present conditions reasonable; and that if they were accepted, there was an end of the impending struggle. But if they were refused, and the execution of the treaty rigorously insisted on, he, for his own part, without giving any pledge to the Pasha, still felt in a certain degree pledged toward him; and that he was convinced, putting himself out of

the question, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to form any government which would remain a perfectly passive and disinterested spectator of the measures to be pursued. Consequently, that without any decided act of immediate hostility, or any positive declaration of war, such a state of things would ensue as must, ere long, disturb the peace of the world.

A great part of this was especially said to me as an intimate acquaintance, and the terms in which I report it are, after all, rather ambiguous; but the subject of the conversation was so serious, and might, if expressed officially, or said more clearly, have such serious consequences, that I was not anxious, in the present stage of the business, to press for language more explicit, being satisfied with communicating to your lordship that it was evidently the President of the Council's wish to impress on my belief, in a manner that would not be offensive, his conviction that things were now arrived at a crisis, in which they would either terminate, at once, peaceably, or assume a new and more dangerous character, which, through more or less transitions, must lead eventually to war.

I have, etc.,

HENRY L. BULWER.

VIII.

FIRMAN OF INVESTITURE SENT TO MEHEMET ALI, FEB. 13, 1841.

C'EST avec une vive satisfaction que j'ai été informé de la soumission dont tu viens de faire preuve, ainsi que des sentimens de loyauté, dévouement et de fidélité que tu manifestes, tant envers ma personne Impériale, que pour les intérêts de mon Empire. Ces sentimens, joints au zèle et à la sagesse dont tu es doué, ainsi qu'aux connaissances et à l'expérience que tu as acquises par rapport aux affaires de l'Egypte dans le cours de ton administration, me sont garants que tu sauras mériter les marques

de faveur et de confiance que je veux te donner, c'est-à-dire que tu en reconnaitras tout le prix, et que tu t'appliqueras à transmettre ces sentimens à ta postérité. Dans cette conviction, je t'ai réintégré dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte, compris dans telles et telles limites, et y ai ajouté le privilège de l'hérédité sous les conditions suivantes :

Lorsque par la suite le gouvernement de l'Egypte deviendra vacant, il sera conféré à celui parmi tes enfans mâles qui sera préféré et choisi par moi, et le même principe sera suivi à l'égard de leurs enfans mâles. En cas d'extinction de ta descendance masculine, ma Sublime Porte conférera le dit gouvernement à quelqu'un autre, et les mâles issus de la ligne féminine n'y auront aucune espèce de droit.

Celui parmi tes enfans qui dorénavant sera monté au gouvernement de l'Egypte, devra se rendre en personne à Constantinople pour en recevoir l'investiture.

Les gouverneurs d'Egypte, bien que jouissant du privilège de l'hérédité, seront assimilés aux autres Vizirs sous le rapport du grade et de la préséance, laquelle se réglera d'après l'ancienneté ; par conséquent, le cérémonial, les dénominations et les titres dont on se sert à l'égard des autres Vizirs de ma Sublime Porte, seront également applicables aux gouverneurs de l'Egypte.

Les dispositions salutaires de mon Hatti-Chérif de Gulhané, toutes les lois établies ou à être établies par ma Sublime Porte, ainsi que tous les Traités conclus ou à conclure entr'elle et les Cours amies, seront de même exécutés en entier en Egypte.

Tous les impôts et revenus de l'Egypte seront perçus en mon nom ; mais comme les habitans de l'Egypte sont aussi des sujets de ma Sublime Porte, et que par conséquent il faut les garantir à jamais de toute espèce de cruauté et de vexation, les dîmes, droits et autres impôts qui seront prélevés dans le dit gouvernement, devront l'être conformément aux principes en vigueur dans les autres provinces de mon Empire.

Quelque soit la somme à laquelle s'élèveront annuellement les droits de douanes, dîmes et autres impôts et revenus quelconques du gouvernement de l'Egypte, un quart de ce revenu brut, c'est-à-dire, avant d'en faire aucune déduction de frais, sera pris et payé à ma Sublime Porte ; les autres trois quarts seront laissés

aux gouverneurs de l'Égypte pour les frais de perception, pour les dépenses administratives et militaires, ainsi que pour leur propre usage, comme aussi en paiement de vivres que l'Égypte, d'après l'usage, fournit tous les ans, en nature, aux deux Villes Saintes. La qualité et le mode de l'acquittement du tribut qui revient à ma Sublime Porte sera valable, tels qu'ils sont déterminés ici, pendant cinq ans, à partir de la présente année, 1257 (1841). Ensuite ces points doivent être réglés d'une manière convenable, conformément à l'état futur de l'Égypte et aux exigences du moment. Ma Sublime Porte ayant l'obligation de connaître exactement les revenus annuels de l'Égypte, ainsi que le mode dont on y prélèvera les dîmes et autres impôts, et cette connaissance ne pouvant être obtenue qu'au moyen d'un contrôle établi dans la dite province, on prendra à ce sujet les mesures que je ferai connaître par une ordonnance Impériale.

Ma Sublime Porte ayant résolu d'améliorer la monnaie de l'Empire qui sert de régulateur pour les transactions du peuple, et ce point devant être réglé d'une manière qui rendra désormais impossible toute altération de taux et d'aloi, les monnaies d'or et d'argent qui se frappent en Égypte en mon nom et avec ma permission Impériale, devront, sous le rapport de taux et d'aloi, et de la forme, être pareilles à celles de Constantinople.

Dix-huit mille hommes de troupes étant suffisant, en tems de paix, pour la sécurité intérieure de l'Égypte, il ne sera pas permis de dépasser ce nombre. Toutefois, comme les forces de terre et de mer de l'Égypte sont entretenues pour le service de ma Sublime Porte, celle-ci pourra en tems de guerre augmenter le dit nombre de telle manière qu'elle le jugera à propos.

Comme il a été établi que les soldats qui seront dans les autres parties de l'Empire, doivent, après cinq années de service, être remplacés par de nouvelles recrues, cette même pratique devra ainsi être suivie en Égypte. Par conséquent on prendra parmi les troupes Égyptiennes actuelles les soldats provenant du dernier recrutement; et sauf à fixer plus tard la durée de leur service, d'après la date de leur enrôlement, on en formera 20,000 hommes, dont 18,000 seront employés, ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, pour le service intérieur de l'Égypte, et 20,000 pour le service d'ici. Et puisqu'un cinquième de ces 20,000 hommes devra

être renouvelé tous les ans, on levera annuellement sur la population effective de l'Égypte 4000 recrues, en procédant avec la plus grande humanité, et en tirant impartialement au sort ceux qui remplissent les conditions voulues par la loi. De ces 4000 hommes, 3600 seront retenus là, et 400 seront envoyés ici. Mais tant les uns que les autres seront renvoyés dans leurs foyers après cinq années de service, et ceux dont le terme sera achevé, ne pourront plus être enrôlés.

Quoique les troupes qui serviront en Égypte pourront, à cause du climat, être vêtus d'une étoffe différente, cependant la coupe et la forme de leurs habits, ainsi que leurs Nichans et drapeaux, ne se distingueront en rien de ceux en usage dans les autres troupes de ma Sublime Porte.

Les pavillons des bâtimens Égyptiens, comme aussi les uniformes et Nichans des officiers et des soldats de marine, seront pareils à ceux d'ici.

Les officiers de terre et de mer, jusqu'au grade de Kol Aghassi (Major) inclusivement, seront nommés au choix des gouverneurs de l'Égypte ; les grades supérieurs ne pourront être conférés que par moi, sur la proposition des dits gouverneurs.

Il ne sera pas permis aux gouverneurs d'Égypte de construire désormais des vaisseaux de guerre sans la permission expresse de ma Sublime Porte.

Comme le privilège de l'hérédité dépend de chacun des présentes conditions, le non-accomplissement d'une d'entre elles entraînerait la révocation et l'annulation immédiate du dit privilège.

Telle étant ma volonté Impériale, toi et tes enfans et descendans vous devrez apprécier avec reconnaissance cette insigne faveur Impériale, et exécuter scrupuleusement les présentes conditions.

Vous aurez à veiller constamment au bien-être et à la sûreté des habitans de l'Égypte, à les préserver de tout acte d'injustice et de vexation, et à vous abstenir de tout procédé contraire au contenu du présent firman.

C'est dans ce but que cet ordre Impérial, etc.

IMPERIAL FIRMAN ADDRESSED TO MEHEMET ALI,
CONFERRING UPON HIM THE GOVERNMENT OF
NUBIA, DARFOUR, KORDUFAN, AND SENAAR, AND
ENJOINING HIM TO ABOLISH THE NEGRO-HUNTS,
ETC.

A MON Vizir Méhémet Ali Pacha, Gouverneur d'Egypte, à qui je confie à présent l'administration des provinces de Nubie, Darfour, Cordufan, et Senaar.

O toi, mon susdit Vizir ! comme ainsi qu'il a été dit dans une autre ordonnance Impériale j'ai jugé à propos de te réintégrer dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte, comprise dans ses limites connues, et d'y ajouter l'hérédité sous certaines conditions, j'ai pris aussi la gracieuse résolution de t'accorder, sans l'hérédité, le gouvernement de Nubie, Darfour, Cordufan, et Senaar, avec toutes leurs dépendances, c'est-à-dire, avec toutes leurs annexes situées en dehors de l'Egypte, et j'ai rendu à ce sujet une ordonnance Impériale.

Tu t'appliqueras donc par suite de ton habileté et de ta sagesse à administrer et à faire prospérer ces pays conformément à mes intentions pleines de justice, et assurer le repos et le bien-être de leurs habitants. Tu soumettras, aussi, à ma Sublime Porte une liste exacte des revenus annuels des dites provinces.

Les incursions que les troupes ont coutume de faire de tems en tems dans les villages des pays ci-dessus nommés, et par suite desquels les individus jeunes et vigoureux des deux sexes sont fait captifs et restent entre les mains des soldats en payement de leur solde, entraînent, nécessairement, la ruine et le dépeuplement de ces contrées, et sont contraires à notre sainte loi et aux maximes de la justice.

Comme donc cet usage, ainsi que celui de réduire quelques-uns des dits captifs à la condition d'eunuques, est sous tous les rapports opposé à ma volonté Impériale, et qu'en général de pareils actes de cruauté répugnent aux principes de justice et d'humanité que j'ai hautement proclamés dès mon avènement au trône :

Tu aviseras avec la plus grande sollicitude aux moyens de les défendre sévèrement, et de les abolir d'une manière définitive.

Tous les officiers, soldats et autres employés qui se trouvent en Egypte, à l'exception de certains individus qui s'y sont rendus avec ma flotte, ayant été gracieusement pardonnés par moi, tu auras à leur annoncer à tous cette heureuse nouvelle.

D'après ce qui est dit dans l'autre ordonnance Impériale mentionnée ci-dessus, les officiers employés auprès de toi, et qu'il s'agira de nommer à un grade supérieur à celui de Kol Aghassi (Major), ne pourront être nommés qu'après qu'il en aura été référé à ma Sublime Porte.

Toutefois ceux qui se trouvent actuellement au service, seront confirmés dans leur grade, et tu auras à soumettre à ma Sublime Porte une liste de ces officiers, pour que l'on puisse publier et expédier leur firman de confirmation.

Ma volonté Impériale étant que tous ces divers points soient exécutés, tu devras t'empresser de t'y conformer exactement, et c'est à cette fin que, etc., etc.

THE GRAND VIZIER TO MEHEMET ALI, ON HIS NOMINATION TO THE HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT.

L'EMPRESSEMENT de votre Excellence à remplir les devoirs de l'obéissance, en prouvant, par des faits promptement exécutés, la sincérité de la soumission que vous aviez offerte, a été fort agréable à Sa Hautesse, qui a daigné en conséquence vous réintégrer dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte et vous en accorder l'hérédité.

J'envoie à votre Excellence par Saïd Muhib Effendi un firman revêtu d'un Aatti-Chérif, et contenant certaines conditions attachées à l'hérédité, ainsi que le Nichan, que Sa Hautesse a bien voulu vous conférer, comme étant celui qui est affecté au rang de Vizir. Sa Hautesse est convaincu, qu'agissant avec cette prudence et cette haute sagesse qui vous distinguent, vous ne

vous écarterez jamais de la voie de la droiture, de l'obéissance et de dévouement à votre Souverain.

Sa Hautesse a toute confiance en votre Excellence, et si l'on a établi des conditions dans le firman susdit, ce n'est pas qu'on ait le moindre soupçon sur votre compte. Mais indépendamment de la nécessité absolue que des conditions essentielles soient rattachées à une aussi grande concession que celle du privilège de l'hérédité, Sa Hautesse a voulu et a jugé à propos d'insérer ces conditions dans le firman, parcequ'elle les considère non seulement comme un moyen de prévenir toute espèce de différends qui, vu les difficultés de prévoir l'avenir et à cause de vicissitude humaine, pourraient surgir par la suite, mais aussi comme une mesure de précaution tendant à assurer pour toujours le repos et la tranquillité des habitans de l'Egypte.

Désormais la Sublime Porte aura tout aussi peu lieu de concevoir des soupçons que votre Excellence en aura de parler de sa sûreté personnelle et de l'avenir de famille.

Enfin, il n'y a plus entre nous aucun motif de contestation, c'est-à-dire les démêlés qui ont subsistés depuis, ont cessé, grâce à Dieu ; et il n'y a pas de doute que votre Excellence ne remplisse avec empressement le devoir de témoigner sa reconnaissance pour les bienfaits et les faveurs dont elle a été ainsi l'objet de la part de Sa Hautesse.

Dorénavant nous serons, s'il plaît à Dieu, unis de cœur et d'âme, et n'ayant entre nous aucun sujet de division, nous emploierons, sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, nos communs efforts à servir notre religion, notre gouvernement notre patrie et notre nation : ce qui me cause la plus grande satisfaction à moi, votre sincère ami, ainsi qu'à tous les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, etc., etc.

IX.

DRAFT OF CONVENTION BETWEEN AUSTRIA,
FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, PRUSSIA, RUSSIA,
AND TURKEY. SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13,
1841.

LEURS Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, persuadées que leur union et leur accord offrent à l'Europe le gage le plus certain de la conservation de la paix générale, objet constant de leur sollicitude; et leurs dites Majestés voulant attester cet accord en donnant à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits Souverains, ainsi que de leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire, leurs dites Majestés ont résolu de se rendre à l'invitation de Sa Hautesse le Sultan, afin de constater en commun, par un Acte formel, leur détermination unanime de se conformer à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, d'après laquelle le passage des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doit toujours être fermé aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix.

Leurs dites Majestés d'une part, et Sa Hautesse le Sultan de l'autre, ayant résolu de conclure entr'elles une Convention à ce sujet, ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires; savoir:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, etc., etc.;

Sa Majesté le Roi des Français, etc., etc.;

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, etc., etc.;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, etc., etc.;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, etc., etc.;

Et Sa Majesté le très-Majestueux, très-Puissant et très-Magnifique Sultan Abdul Medjid, Empereur de sOttomans, etc., etc.

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs Pleins Pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivans:

ART. I.—Sa Hautesse le Sultan, d'une part, déclare qu'il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, et en vertu duquel il a été de tout tems défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore ; et que, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les dits détroits.

Et leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, de l'autre part, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

ART. II.—Il est entendu, qu'en constatant l'inviolabilité de l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, le Sultan se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels seront employés comme il est d'usage au service des légations des Puissances amies.

ART. III.—Sa Hautesse le Sultan se réserve de porter la présente Convention à la connaissance de toutes les Puissances avec lesquelles la Sublime Porte se trouve en relation d'amitié, en les invitant à y accéder.

ART. IV.—La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres à l'expiration de mois, au plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres le treize Juillet de l'an de grâce mil huit cent quarante et un.

(Paraphé)

E.

N.

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END OF VOL. II.

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